

Appendices for “A Plum for a Peach? Issue Linkage, Taiwan, and China’s Policy Toward North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program” by Shuxian Luo

Appendix 1. 2002–08 Level of China’s Cooperation on North Korea

Level	Cooperation			
	<i>Declaratory position</i>	<i>International sanctions</i>	<i>China–North Korea high-level contact</i>	<i>Role in multilateral efforts</i>
High	• “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea flagrantly conducted a nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of the international community.” (China’s statement on North Korea’s nuclear test, October 10, 2006)	Cut off all financial transactions with North Korea (October 2006)	• Hui Liangyu’s visit to North Korea (July 2006)*	• Host of the Six-Party Talks • “Relatively assertive leadership role”
Medium	• “China advocates for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. . . . At the same time, North Korea’s legitimate security concerns should also be addressed.” (Premier Wen Jiabao, meeting with President George W. Bush, December 10, 2003) • “[China] supports denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula . . . and advocates that North Korea’s legitimate concerns should be taken seriously and addressed.” (Hu Jintao, meeting with Kim Jong Il, April 22, 2004)	• Voted for UNSC Resolution 1695 but only after negotiating away the inclusion of Chapter 7 of UN Charter (July 15, 2006) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 1718 but only after negotiating away any threat of military action against the North and ensured that inspections of DPRK cargo were not mandatory (October 14, 2006)	• Wu Bangguo’s visit to North Korea (October 2003)** • Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea (June 2008)**	
Low			• Kim Jong Il’s visit to China (April 2004) • Hu Jintao’s visit to North Korea (October 2005)*** • Kim Jong Il’s visit to China (January 2006)	

Appendix 2. 2002–08 Level of US Assurance on Taiwan

Level	Assurance		
	<i>Declaratory position</i>	<i>Arms sale</i> (million USD, date of notification to Congress)	<i>US-Taiwan government contact</i>
High	• “The comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we <i>oppose</i>.” (President George W. Bush, joint press conference with Premier Wen Jiabao, December 9, 2003) • “We are serious about our defense responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act, and we intend to fulfill these to the extent necessary. . . . [Taiwan authorities] misunderstood [that the U.S. would unconditionally support Taiwan’s actions].” (James Kelly, assistant secretary of state, congressional hearing, April 21, 2004) • “Independence movements or those who speak out for independence movements in Taiwan will find no support from the United States.” (Colin Powell, secretary of state, interview with Phoenix TV, October 25, 2004) • “We have the requirement with the Taiwan Relations Act to keep sufficient force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack. We are not required to defend [Taiwan].” (Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state, interview with PBS, December 10, 2004) • “The United States opposes any initiative that appears designed to change Taiwan's status unilaterally. This would include a referendum on whether to apply to the United Nations under the name Taiwan.” (state department daily press briefing, June 19, 2007)	• Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems/Low Volume Terminals (775, September 24, 2003) • Ultra-High Frequency long-range early-warning radars (1776, March 30, 2004) • Missiles and Pilot Training Program (280, October 25, 2005) • AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Attack Helicopters; UGM-84L Sub-Launched HARPOON Block II Missiles; UTM-84L HARPOON Block II Exercise missiles; upgrade of four E-2T Aircraft to the HAWKEYE 2000 configuration; PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles; spare parts in support of F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, Indigenous Defense Fighter IDF Aircraft, communication equipment, radar, and other related elements of logistics support; JAVELIN guided-missile rounds and JAVELIN command launch units (6463, October 3, 2008)	• Chen Shui-bian’s transits in New York City and Anchorage (October 31–November 2, November 4, 2003) • Chen’s transits in Seattle and Honolulu (August 29–30, September 5–6, 2004) • Chen’s transit in Guam (January 31, 2005) • Chen’s transit in Miami (September 21–22, 2005) • Chen cancelled transit in Anchorage; rerouted through Abu Dhabi and Amsterdam (May 6, 2006) • Chen’s transit in Guam (September 6, 2006) • Chen’s transit in San Francisco, refueling stop in Los Angeles (January 8–9, January 12, 2007) • Chen’s refueling transit stop in Alaska (August 21, 2007) • Chen’s refueling transit in Alaska (January 14, 2008) • Ma Ying-jeou’s stopover in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and refueling transit in Austin (August 15, August 17–18, 2008)
Medium		• Air Traffic Control Radar (108, June 4, 2002) • Rebuilt Standard Assault Amphibious Personnel Vehicles; maintenance of Repairable Material; AIM-9M-1/2 Missiles; AGM-114M3 HELLFIRE II Air-to-Surface Anti-Armor Missiles (520, September 4, 2002) • TOW-2B Missiles (18, October 11, 2002) • KIDD Class Guided Missile Destroyers (875, November 21, 2002) • AMRAAM and Maverick Missiles (421, February 28, 2007) • AGM-84L HARPOON Block II Missiles (125, August 8, 2007) • SM-2 Block IIIA STANDARD Missiles; Excess P-3C Aircraft (2232, September 12, 2007) • PATRIOT Configuration 2 Ground Systems Upgrade (939, November 9, 2007)	
Low			

Appendix 3. 2009-17 Level of China’s Cooperation on North Korea

Level	Cooperation			
	<i>Declaratory position</i>	<i>International sanctions</i>	<i>China–North Korea high-level exchanges</i>	<i>Role in multilateral efforts</i>
High	• “The DPRK conducted another nuclear test. . . . The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to this act. . . . China strongly urges the DPRK to . . . stop relevant moves that may further worsen the situation.” (China’s statement on North Korea’s nuclear test, May 25, 2009) • “The DPRK conducted another nuclear test. . . . the Chinese government is firmly opposed to this act. . . . We strongly urge the DPRK to . . . refrain from any move that may further worsen the situation.” (China’s statement on North Korea’s nuclear test, February 12, 2013) • "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted once again a nuclear test. . . . The Chinese government is firmly opposed to that . . . We strongly urge the DPRK side to . . . stop taking actions that worsen the situation.” (China’s statement on North Korea’s nuclear test, January 6, 2016) • "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted once again a nuclear test. . . . The Chinese government is firmly opposed to that. . . . We strongly urge the DPRK side to . . . stop taking actions that worsen the situation.” (China’s statement on North Korea’s nuclear test, September 9, 2016) • "The Chinese government expresses firm opposition to and strong condemnation of the test. . . . China urges the DPRK to cease incorrect actions that worsen tensions and run against its own interests, and return to dialogue to resolve problems. China will work with the international community to comprehensively and completely implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions." (China’s statement on North Korea’s nuclear test, September 3, 2017)	• Voted for UNSC Resolution 2087 (January 2, 2013) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2094 (March 7, 2013) • Closed North Korean Foreign Trade Bank’s account at Bank of China (May 2013) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2270 (March 2, 2016) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2321 (November 30, 2016) • Accepted an annual cap on North Korean coal imports (pursuant to Res. 2321) and significantly declined imports followed (2017) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2356 (June 2, 2017) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2371 (August 5, 2017) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2375 (September 11, 2017) • Ordered closure of JVs with North Korea (September 2017) • Suspended tourism to North Korea (November 2017) • Voted for UNSC Resolution 2397 (December 22, 2017)	• Li Jianguo to North Korea (November 2012)* • Li Yuanchao’s visit to North Korea(July 2013)*	• “Worked fairly hard” to help cement the Leap Day Agreement • Open, active support for UN resolutions
Medium	• “[T]he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had violated Security Council resolutions, impaired the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and affected international peace and stability. . . . At the same time . . . the sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate security concerns and development interests of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be respected.” (China’s representative to UN Zhang Yesui, remarks at the voting of Resolution 1874, June 12, 2009) • “We need to insist on resolving the issue through dialogue and heed on all parties’ legitimate security concerns.” (Premier Wen Jiabao, remarks at the China–Japan–South Korea summit, May 13, 2012)	• Voted for UNSC Resolution 1874 CN voted but only after again weakening its articles on cargo inspections (June 12, 2009)	• Li Keqiang’s visit to North Korea (October 2011)** • Liu Yunshan’s visit to North Korea (October 2015)**	
Low			• Kim Jong Il’s visit to China (May 2010) • Kim Jong Il’s visit to China (August 2010) • Kim Jong Il’s visit to China (May 2011)	

Appendix 4. 2009–17 Level of US Assurance on Taiwan

Level	Assurance		
	<i>Declaratory position</i>	<i>Arms sale</i> (million USD, date of notification to Congress)	<i>US-Taiwan government contact</i>
High	• “The United States stated that it follows its one China policy and abides by the principles of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués. The United States welcomes the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations.” (US-China joint statement, November 17, 2009) • “President Trump . . . agreed to honor our ‘one China’ policy.” (readout of President Trump’s call with President Xi Jinping of China, February 9, 2017) • (In declining Tsai Ing-wen’s proposal for a second call), “I really feel that [Xi Jinping] is doing everything in his power to help us with a big situation [on North Korea]. . . . So I wouldn’t want to be causing difficulty right now for him. . . . I would certainly want to speak to him first.” (President Trump, interview with Reuters, April 27, 2017)	• UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters; Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-1); OSPREY Class Mine Hunting Ships; ATM-84L and RTM-84L HARPOON Block II Telemetry Missiles; PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Firing Units, Training Unit, and Missiles (6392, January 29, 2010) • F-16 pilot training program; retrofitting of F-16A/B Aircraft; spare parts in support of F-16A/B, F-5E/F, C-130H, and Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) Aircraft (5852, September 21, 2011) • Javelin Missiles; Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger Missiles and related equipment and support; Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates; MIDS/LVT-1 and JTIDS Follow-on Support; Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System (TATDLS) and Link-11 Integration; Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs); TOW 2B Aero RF Missiles, support and training; MK 15 Phalanx Block 1B Baseline 2 Close-in Weapons System (CIWS); Guns, Upgrade Kits, Ammunition, and Support (1718, December 16, 2015) • SM-2 Block IIIA All-Up Rounds with other associated equipment and technical support; MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo Conversion Kits, with spare parts and other support and assistance; MK 48 Mod 6AT Heavyweight Torpedoes, with other support, spare parts, training, and engineering and technical assistance; hardware, software, and other upgrades to the AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare Systems in support of Taiwan’s KEELUNG Class (formerly KIDD Class) destroyers; AGM-154C JSOW Air-to-Ground Missiles with spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, training and training equipment, and other related elements of logistical and program support; AGM-88B HARMs and Training HARMs, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, and other related elements of logistical and program support; SRP Operations and Maintenance follow-on sustainment, engineering services and technical updates (1363, June 29, 2017).	• Ma’s transit in Los Angeles and Seattle (May 26–27, June 2–4, 2009) • Ma’s transit in San Francisco and Honolulu (June 29–30, July 4–5, 2009) • Ma’s transit in San Francisco and Los Angeles (January 26–27, January 28–29, 2010) • Ma’s refueling stopover in Guam (March 22, March 26, 2010) • Ma’s transit in New York and Los Angeles (August 11–13, August 19–20, 2013) • Ma’s transit in Los Angeles (January 27–28, 2014) • Ma’s transit in San Francisco and refueling stopover in Honolulu (June 29, July 3–4, 2014) • Ma’s transit in Boston and Los Angeles (July 11–12, July 16, 2015) • Ma’s transit in Houston and Los Angeles (March 13–14, March 17–18, 2016) • Tsai Ing-wen’s transit in Miami and Los Angeles (June 25–26, June 30–July 1, 2016) • Tsai’s transit in Houston and San Francisco (January 7–8, January 13–14, 2017) • Tsai’s transit in Honolulu and Guam (October 27–29, November 3–4, 2017)
Medium			
Low	• “I fully understand the ‘One China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘One China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” (President-elect Trump, interview with Fox, December 11, 2016)	Trump-Tsai phone call (December 2, 2016)	

Appendix 5. 2018–24 Level of China’s Cooperation on North Korea

Level	Cooperation			
	<i>Declaratory position</i>	<i>International sanctions</i>	<i>China–North Korea high-level exchanges</i>	<i>Role in multilateral efforts</i>
High			• Li Hongzhong’s visit to North Korea (July 2023)* • Liu Guozhong’s visit to North Korea (September 2023)*	
Medium	• “The parties' legitimate security concerns, including those of the DPRK, can be addressed in exchange for and in tandem with progress towards denuclearization. This is China's long-standing position.” (Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the press, March 9, 2018) • “North Korea and the US should move toward the same goal and address each other’s legitimate concerns.” (President Xi Jinping, meeting with Trump in Buenos Aires, December 3, 2018) • “While insisting on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, relevant parties should heed on and respond to North Korea’s legitimate concerns.” (Xi Jinping, meeting with Moon Jae-in, June 18, 2019) • "China reaffirmed its position on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at a trilateral summit with Japan and South Korea." (Trilateral joint statement, May 27, 2024)	• Abstained on UN panel monitoring North Korea sanctions (March 29, 2024)	• Li Zhanshu’s visit to North Korea (September 2018)** • Zhao Leji’s visit to North Korea (April 2024)**	Non-obstruction participate
Low	• “We have seen some positive steps taken by the DPRK in the last few years toward de-escalation and denuclearization. Regrettably, these steps have not been reciprocated in a substantive way by the US side. This is the main reason for the ongoing stalemate in DPRK-US dialogue.” (State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets the press, May 25, 2020) • “The core of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is the issues between the US and the DPRK. The US side should take seriously the legitimate concerns of the DPRK and take substantive actions.” (State Councilor Wang Yi, phone call with Anthony Blinken, February 22, 2022)	• Vetoed US-drafted UNSC resolution for strengthening sanctions on North Korea (May 26, 2022)	• Kim Jong Un’s visit to China (March 2018) • Kim Jong Un’s visit to China (May 2018) • Kim Jong Un’s visit to China (June 19–20, 2018) • Kim Jong Un’s visit to China (January 2019) • Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea (June 2019)***	Resist

Appendix 6. 2018–24 Level of US Assurance on Taiwan

Level	Assurance		
	<i>Declaratory position</i>	<i>Arms sale</i> (million USD, date of notification to Congress)	<i>US-Taiwan government contact</i>
High		- Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II (330, September 24, 2018) 40 155mm M109A6 Paladin Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems (750, August 4, 2021)	
Medium	“We do not support independence.” (President Joe Biden, January 13, 2024)	18 MK-48 Mod6 Advanced Technology (AT) Heavy Weight Torpedoes (HWT) (180, May 2020) - Repair & Recertification of PAC-3 Missiles (620, July 9, 2020) - AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles; MS-110 Recce Pod System; M142 HIMARS Missile Launchers, support, and equipment; Mobile Coastal Defense Systems with RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Missiles (4181, October 21, 2020) 4 Weapons-Ready MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft (600, November 3, 2020) - Field Information Communications System (FICS) (280, December 7, 2020) - Participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years (100, February 7, 2022) - Patriot Contractor Technical Assistance (95, April 5, 2022) - Ship Spare Parts and Ship System Spare Parts (120, June 8, 2022) - Contractor Technical Assistance Support (108, July 15, 2022) - Follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) and related equipment and support; 60 AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II Missiles, 4 ATM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II Exercise Missiles, and related equipment and support; 100 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Missiles, 4 AIM-9X Block II Tactical Guidance Units, and related equipment and support (1106, September 2, 2022) - Aircraft standard spare parts and related equipment; aircraft non-standard spare parts and related equipment (428, December 6, 2022) - Volcano anti-tank munition-laying systems (180, December 28, 2022) 100 AGM-88B HARM, 200 AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM, training missiles, guidance sections, launchers, and related equipment and support (619, March 1, 2023) - Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) Foreign Military Sales Order II (FMSO II); 30-mm Ammunition and related equipment (440, June 29, 2023) - F-16 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) (500, August 23, 2023) - C4 Life Cycle Support (300, December 15, 2023) - Advanced Tactical Data Link System Upgrade Planning (75, February 21, 2024) - F-16 Non-Standard Spare and Repair Parts; F-16 Standard Spare and Repair Parts (300, June 5, 2024)	- Tsai’s transit in Los Angeles and Houston (August 12 –13, August 18–19, 2018) - Tsai’s transit in Honolulu (March 26–27, 2019)

		• Switchblade 300 Anti-Personnel and Anti-Armor Loitering Missile System; ALTIUS 600M-V Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (360, June 18, 2024) • Return, Repair, and Reshipment of Spare Parts (228, September 16, 2024) • 3 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) Medium-range Air Defense Solutions and related equipment; AN/TPS-77 and AN/TPS-78 Radar Turnkey Systems and related equipment (1988, October 25, 2024) • Spare Parts and Support for F-16 Aircraft and Active Electronically Scanned Array Radars and related equipment; improved mobile subscriber equipment follow-on support and related equipment (385, November 29, 2024) • MK 75–76-mm Gun Mounts; Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Modernization (295, December 20, 2024)	
Low	• “Taiwan is a partner in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.” (Randall Schriver, the United States assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs, remarks at a seminar on Taiwan, July 18, 2018) • “The United States is pursuing a strong partnership with Taiwan and will faithfully implement the Taiwan Relations Act, as part of a broader commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific.” (DOD Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 1, 2019) • “We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with Taiwan.” (President Joe Biden, interview with ABC, August 19, 2021) • “Yes. . . . We have a commitment to [defending Taiwan].” (President Joe Biden, CNN town hall, October 21, 2021) • “Yes. That’s the commitment [defending Taiwan is it comes under a PRC attack] we made.” (President Joe Biden, remarks at joint press conference with Japanese PM Kishida Fumio, May 23, 2022) • “Yes [that US forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion].” (President Joe Biden, interview with CBS, September 19, 2022)	• CONUS-Based F-16 Training (500, April 15, 2019) • Stinger Missiles and related equipment and support; M1A2T Abrams Tanks and related equipment and support (2224, July 8, 2019) • F-16C/D Block 70 Aircraft and related equipment and support (8000, August 20, 2019)	• Trump’s signing of the Taiwan Travel Act (March 16, 2018) • DAS Alex Wong visit Taiwan (March 20, 2018) • Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Marie Royce attended AIT new building opening ceremony (June 12, 2018) • Tsai’s transit in New York and Denver, holding unprecedented media reception during Denver stopover (July 11–13, July 19–21, 2019) • DASD Heino Klinck visited Taiwan (mid-November 2019) • HHS Alex Azar visited Taiwan (August 10, 2020) • Under Secretary of State Keith Krach visit to Taiwan (September 17–19, 2020) • Pompeo lifted all restrictions on US-Taiwan official contacts (January 9, 2021) • Speaker Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan (August 2–3, 2022) • DASD Michael Chase visit to Taiwan (mid-February 2023) • Tsai’s transit in New York and Los Angeles, meeting with Speaker Kevin McCarthy during Los Angeles stopover (March 29–31, April 4–6, 2023)

* Chinese senior-level visits are defined as visits by CCP Politburo members *minus* all Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members.

** Chinese leadership-level visits are defined as visits by PBSC members *minus* the general secretary.

*** Chinese top leader visits are defined as visits by the general secretary of the CCP.