Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has struggled to find its place in the European political, economic, and security space. But to what extent does Ukraine’s fate matter to Europe and the world? And what role should states to Ukraine’s west, in Europe and North America, play in answering those questions? Russia’s ongoing aggression—escalated first in 2014 and then with its full-scale invasion in 2022—have foregrounded these questions in Brussels, Kyiv, Washington, and beyond. Now, nearly five years into this phase of Russia’s war, these issues remain unresolved and highly contested.
Ukraine’s current challenges are a product of the last time those questions came to the fore: the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. To the millions who had taken to the streets demanding Ukraine’s independence, this was cause for celebration. But to others, including top Western policymakers, Ukrainian independence was fraught. “The breakup of the Soviet Union cannot be in our interest,” German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd at the beginning of that fateful year.1 Kohl went further in a later conversation with US President George H. W. Bush: “The Balkanization of the Soviet Union would lead to a catastrophe.”2 A collapsing Soviet Union and the newly independent post-Soviet states that resulted introduced a host of new challenges for Western policymakers.
Independent Ukraine’s early diplomacy has been understood in two main ways, both centering the United States. The first focuses primarily on Ukraine’s nuclear inheritance from the Soviet Union and the US-led push for denuclearization. Works by Mariana Budjeryn, Stephan Kieninger, and Polina Sinovets show the central role of nuclear weapons in Ukraine’s early years.3 The second highlights a relative lack of US interest in Ukraine, as Washington prioritized Russia. Eugene Fishel demonstrates this, echoing broader arguments advanced by Mary Sarotte and Kristina Spohr about the lack of imagination in the immediate post–Cold War years among US policymakers, who often imposed old mental maps onto a new era.4
Building on that literature and drawing on newly declassified archival materials in Europe and North America, this article reconstructs Western diplomacy toward Ukraine during the 1990s. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Kyiv’s priority was to forge a new, European identity.5 Rather than be seen as part of the moribund Former Soviet Union (FSU in the Western bureaucratic language of the day), Ukraine hoped to join the upwardly mobile CEE (Central and Eastern Europe). To a visiting European Community (EC) delegation in late 1992, Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk insisted that “Ukraine saw itself as belonging to Central Europe.”6 And Central Europe certainly saw Ukraine’s problems as their own. Czechoslovak diplomats warned that the rise of a heavily armed, resource-rich, and ambitious Ukraine could reshape the region.7 Polish policymakers saw the risk of an unsteady Ukraine on their borders as a reason to boost defense spending, not to reap a post–Cold War peace dividend.8
“The problem of its nuclear potential hung, ever-present, over Ukraine’s foreign policy like a heavy cloud that blocked light and prevented growth.”
Ukrainian policymakers tried to persuade their Western interlocutors that the most acute security threats were economic, not nuclear, and to give the former set of issues as much attention as the latter. Ambivalence, however, defined Western policy. Ukraine’s economy had enormous potential but was in dire need of reform. Ukraine was also a new nuclear power, with around one-sixth of the old Soviet arsenal on its territory—albeit not entirely under its control—threatening the global non-proliferation regime. In theory, these two factors—economic security and nuclear security—could be balanced. Instead, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko bemoaned: “All Ukrainian diplomats in one way or another had to become disarmament experts whether they liked it or not. The problem of its nuclear potential hung, ever-present, over Ukraine’s foreign policy like a heavy cloud that blocked light and prevented growth.”9
This nuclear emphasis reflected decades of US policy. Throughout the Cold War, as Francis Gavin shows, non- and counter-proliferation concerns shaped grand strategy in Washington.10 The Cold War’s end did not shift US focus away from the very real dangers of nuclear proliferation; Bush and his successor, Bill Clinton, both deemed preventing the spread of nuclear weapons a vital national interest, and identified the breakup of the Soviet Union as a particular danger—especially if reform were to falter.11 Ukraine crystallized these fears of out-of-control proliferation, inadequate safeguards, destabilizing security dilemmas, and “loose nukes” in the hands of dangerous actors into a single, tangible case.12 Denuclearization was thus the default US and Western position and priority vis-à-vis Ukraine; no meaningful alternatives entered the US policy debate, even as Kyiv desperately lobbied for an approach that took economic, as well as nuclear, security seriously. Ukraine’s nuclear weapons were a Cold War coda: one of many policy problems created during the Cold War that came to define the post–Cold War period.13
That problem was not a focus of US policy alone. European perspectives, often overlooked in the literature, contain important insights about the diplomacy of the 1990s. This article focuses on four actors in addition to the United States: Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. British, French, and German diplomats regularly met their US counterparts on the eve of sessions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Group on Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union to coordinate policy. Canadian diplomats, many of Ukrainian extraction themselves, were widely seen to be mentoring Kyiv.14 Using international sources to examine these developments illuminates the degree to which US policy preferences prevailed in the West’s approach to Ukraine during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Major allies subordinated their own thinking to that of the United States, and the preponderance of US power was such that Ukraine’s denuclearization became a “loyalty test.”15 This deference, though not entirely surprising, mattered: It eliminated alternative policy pathways. That left Ukraine, in Zlenko’s words, “a relatively tiny and not-very-new boat surrounded by at least three aircraft carriers”—the United States, Western Europe, and Russia.16
Revisiting this decade of diplomacy shows how the decision to allow nuclear security to crowd out economic security actually undermined the West’s own stated aims and Ukraine’s post–Cold War development.17 Bush, for instance, emphasized the inextricability of prosperity and security.18 Clinton, too, pledged US backing for reforms to make old foes into future partners.19 Yet, in practice, the dangers of Ukraine’s nuclear inheritance predominated, often encouraging the West and Russia to use economic coercion to achieve their shared goal of a non-nuclear Ukraine. Over the course of the 1990s, as Ukraine’s economic situation worsened and Washington and Kyiv continued to talk past one another, Ukraine was increasingly unable to resist this pressure. This is not to suggest that, had aid not been conditioned on non-proliferation compliance, Ukraine would have become wealthy—the West’s appetite for aid had its limits. But, in retrospect, the choice to prioritize Ukraine’s denuclearization over its development and stability foreclosed policy options that might have reduced Kyiv’s vulnerability to coercion and enhanced European security over the long run.
Four principal lessons from the history of the 1990s stand out that bear directly on challenges being confronted in Western capitals today vis-à-vis Ukraine and the Central and Eastern Europe region. First, economic and comprehensive security cannot just be sequenced behind whatever narrow issue dominates the agenda. During the 1990s, the West demanded denuclearization before aid, which resulted in a Ukraine vulnerable to Russian coercion that Kyiv could not and the West would not counteract. Second, security arrangements calibrated for Moscow’s comfort rather than Ukraine’s needs neither deterred the former nor reassured the latter. Ukrainian negotiators repeatedly asked their Western counterparts for security guarantees before they surrendered their nuclear leverage; they never offered more than nonbinding assurances for fear of alienating the Kremlin. Third, when smaller allies simply defer—and larger allies treat policy debates as loyalty tests—alternatives disappear. British, Canadian, French, and German diplomats saw that Russian contentment was being bought at its neighbors’ expense, often more clearly than did their US counterparts, but subordinated those analyses to Washington’s Moscow-centric line. That narrowed the range of possibilities available to all in the long run, the United States included. Fourth and finally, the frequent assumption that the Cold War’s end had birthed a new Russia, rendering revanchism obsolete, proved just as costly as the older, surviving habit of seeing Central and Eastern Europe through the prism of Moscow. Continuity in policymakers’ mental maps and novelty in their threat assessments combined, in this case, at Ukraine’s expense. Then, as now, so-called frontline states read the Kremlin more accurately than those in further-away capitals eager to declare the dawn of a new era in international politics and avoid tough choices.
Anxious Inheritors: August 1991–May 1992
When George H. W. Bush visited Ukraine in August 1991—the occasion of his infamous “Chicken Kiev” speech warning against “suicidal nationalism” on the eve of Ukrainian independence—Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, stressed Ukraine’s hope for a positive, cooperative relationship with Washington as well as the severity of the country’s economic crisis.20 Already, Ukrainians were debating what they would do with the Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory after independence. Some insisted that Ukraine should hold onto them as leverage for economic aid and Western attention. Others advocated denuclearization, anticipating Western rewards.21 Zlenko hoped for a speedy exchange of the weapons for Western aid—a direct link between nuclear and economic security.22
At the heart of the nuclear issue were Ukraine’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These included 46 Ukrainian-made and -designed solid-fuel SS-24 Scalpels with 274 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads deployed in silos in the south of the country, and 140 older liquid-fueled SS-19 Stilettos with 780 MIRV warheads in silos dotting the west and south. All of these missiles targeted the United States. Ukraine also inherited 274 warheads for air-launched weapons and 44 Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear strategic bombers to deliver them. At the tactical level, Ukraine inherited a stockpile of 2,883 warheads, which ran the gamut from SS-21 Scarab short-range ballistic missiles to nuclear mines and gravity bombs. All told, this comprised around 15 percent of the Soviet arsenal—more megatonnage than France, the People’s Republic of China, and the United Kingdom combined at the time.23
Ukraine could not launch these weapons independently, though it could block Russian orders to do so.24 Western analysts doubted that Ukraine would try to gain that capability—let alone do so—but Russian officials nevertheless spread “scare-stories” about Kyiv’s nuclear intentions.25 The Kremlin’s chief nuclear negotiator, Yuri Dubinin, admitted the stories were exaggerated, but they served to keep Western policy aligned with Russian interests.26 As one British report circulated at NATO stressed, Kyiv’s bid for recognition as an independent country gave the West leverage.27
Kravchuk, now president after Ukraine’s August 24, 1991, declaration of independence, admitted on a visit to Washington the following month that the Ukrainian economy was unraveling, with a 10 percent drop in output in mere months. Yet Ukrainians expected to see benefits from independence, not hardship. Bush remained skeptical of Ukraine going it alone, insisting that there must be an economic union of former Soviet states centered on Moscow. Kravchuk rejected any such union as preserving Kremlin dominance—exactly what Ukraine had declared independence from.28 Though Bush responded positively to Kravchuk’s affirmation of Ukraine’s non-nuclear intentions, his preferred solution was to have Russia play the role of “vacuum cleaner for the Soviet nuclear arsenal.”29
A successful December 1991 independence referendum—which earned 90 percent support overall and not less than 50 percent in any district of Ukraine—amplified US concerns. Beyond that, two schools of thought on the Ukrainian nuclear issue existed within the Bush administration. On the one hand, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft was nonplussed: Fewer nuclear weapons in Moscow’s hands meant fewer aimed at the United States, and a nuclear-armed Ukraine could counterbalance Russia. On the other hand, Secretary of State James Baker believed that US interests were best served by maintaining the order in Europe, which would be best accomplished by not allowing new nuclear powers to emerge.30 Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, there had been only one nuclear power in the region, and Baker wanted no more. Furthermore, tensions between the former Soviet states emerged almost immediately; Baker did not relish “uneasy nuclear standoffs” between them.31 Scowcroft, by contrast, “was pretty relaxed about the whole thing.”32 Baker won the policy debate more because Scowcroft was not actively opposed than because the Secretary of State garnered much support.33
“Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, there had been only one nuclear power in the region, and Baker wanted no more.”
The Ukrainians knew that nuclear weapons would color their independence and made early, explicit commitments to denuclearization in its legislature, the Verkhovna Rada, as well as to foreign interlocutors. In private, Ukrainian policymakers stressed the importance of security guarantees, ideally from NATO, as part of that process.34
Ensuring that the Ukrainians kept their denuclearization promise mattered all the more in light of Russian policy around the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). START, signed by Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991, had committed the superpowers to the largest-ever cuts in nuclear arsenals: 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery platforms. Now the Soviet Union was no more, and the treaty was in trouble—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine had all inherited nuclear weapons. Russia would only implement START if the three signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states.35 While START defined Washington’s ends, its means, at least initially, came from the efforts of senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, who sought to address the dangers of nuclear command-and-control and storage in a disintegrating Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 committed $400 million to decommissioning and securing weapons of mass destruction.36
US allies embraced this logic. Canada’s Department of External Affairs, for example, acknowledged that, even though Ottawa had moved faster to recognize Ukraine’s independence than any other NATO member, Canadian policymakers “must defer to the [United States] on the overriding issue of securing and disposing of Soviet nuclear weapons.”37 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney reassured US policymakers that progress on denuclearization would be his government’s chief requirement to establish formal diplomatic relations.38 He offered identical reassurances to Moscow.39 True to his word, Mulroney’s congratulatory post-referendum letter to Kravchuk stressed that diplomatic relations depended on denuclearization, Canada’s top priority.40
Kyiv got the message: Denuclearization was a prerequisite for entry into Western institutions—which was Ukraine’s overarching priority.41 Time and again, Ukrainian officials underscored their commitment to denuclearization. They were not, however, prepared to do so no matter the terms. They insisted, above all, that the warheads should be dismantled, not simply transferred to Russia as Bush hoped they would be.42 Their French and German interlocutors agreed, echoing Scowcroft’s aversion to strengthening the Kremlin’s hand.43 So, too, did Ukraine’s neighbors in Central Europe. Polish diplomats, for example, warned their French counterparts that “a very dangerous country still existed, even if the [Soviet Union] no longer did.”44
Zlenko told Friedrich Bohl, head of the German Chancellery, that “Russia has hopes of building a new empire” using institutions like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) —an intergovernmental organization established by most of the successor states to the Soviet Union—to do so in stealth. Without tangible support to Ukraine from the West, Zlenko warned, those pushing for confederation—and, with it, Russian domination—would win. That would be in nobody’s interest: Ukraine wanted to look westward for a secure future.45 In Ukraine’s view, a newly unified Germany would be a natural partner to make that possible. Kravchuk, for instance, called on the Germans to act as a “bridge” between East and West.46 “If you know the history of Ukraine,” Kravchuk observed to Kohl, “you can understand its interest in close relations with Western Europe, and the way to Europe leads through Germany.”47 Zlenko, in conversation with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, emphasized the importance of “Western Europeans accept[ing] the new [post-]Soviet states with open arms.”48
Over the course of 1992, Ukraine’s first year of independence, its interactions with the West settled into a pattern: Western leaders underscored the importance of denuclearization. Ukrainian leaders countered, pointing to the immense costs of doing so, which they argued necessitated further economic assistance, and highlighted the potential ensuing risks to their security. Western leaders replied that aid depended on progress toward denuclearization.49 There were exceptions: German advisors, for instance, were dispatched to Kyiv to facilitate Ukraine’s economic integration with Europe, drawing on lessons learned from having integrated East Germany.50
Even so, Kohl had doubts. He and Bush both feared that their capacity to aid the newly independent states—whose leaders, Kohl complained, “have no idea how to get their economies going”—was already running out. International financial institutions would have to be brought in. Complicating matters, relations between Russia and Ukraine were already poor, thanks in large part to Russian territorial claims on Ukraine.51 According to German policymakers, revanchist and progressive Russians alike saw Ukrainian independence as unacceptable and Ukrainians as the “little brother.” But in Bonn, like many Western capitals, Ukraine was lesser-than: “Despite all our well-founded interests in Ukraine,” one briefing for Kohl stipulated, “our interest in trouble-free relations with Russia predominates.” The chancellor scrawled an approving “Ja” in the margin.52
When Kohl and Kravchuk met in April 1992, the Ukrainian president bemoaned the West’s inability to comprehend how widespread and vast the economic reforms required truly were. As a result, Kravchuk insisted, Western policymakers clung to unrealistic expectations about the pace of change. But Kohl worried that the risks came from making the reform process too long—it might be abandoned as the pain set in. Kravchuk insisted that “Ukrainians understand there was no turning back—this would be catastrophic.”53
“Times were tough, but Ukraine’s economic trajectory was salvageable with wise policy and external support.”
To make the necessary economic changes, however, Ukraine needed Western support. As one Kravchuk adviser, Volodymyr Horbulin, put it: “We understood full well that [economic] growth was possible only through . . . the gates of the world market. Therefore, we were drawn to where there was already success, where there were technologies and a developed market. That is, to the West.”54 Early on, observers such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) saw potential in Ukraine’s agricultural, industrial, and raw-material assets. Times were tough, but Ukraine’s economic trajectory was salvageable with wise policy and external support.55
Ukrainian policymakers therefore touted progress on nuclear issues to secure Western support. On the telephone with Bush in April 1992, for instance, Kravchuk announced that he had abandoned earlier preconditions regarding the transfer of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia.56 Previously, at a December 1991 CIS summit in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, he and Russian President Boris Yeltsin had agreed that tactical nuclear warheads would be sent to Russia to be decommissioned. After it became clear that Russia was stockpiling rather than dismantling the weapons, Kravchuk halted the transfers in March 1992. To resume them, he demanded reassurances that the weapons would, in fact, be decommissioned; he also insisted on financial compensation for the value of the fissile materials Russia would obtain in so doing.57 Though Russia eventually agreed to dismantle the warheads, Kravchuk resumed transfers without any commitment of compensation. He recognized that Ukraine needed an agreement on the tactical nuclear weapons sooner rather than later, as warheads did not have an indefinite shelf-life. Neither did Western patience.58
Relations between Kyiv and Moscow continued to deteriorate. Against the backdrop of a growing perceived Russian threat, by mid-1992 Kravchuk saw security guarantees from “leading states (above all, the United States)” as a vital piece of Ukraine’s denuclearization puzzle.59 Ukrainian diplomats underscored the dangers of Russian predation—for example, Levko Lukyanenko, the ambassador in Ottawa, warned of a Russian fifth column within Ukraine.60 But the Canadian embassy in Moscow took a different view of Lukyanenko’s warnings about Russian intentions, dismissing them as “a bit dramatic. . . . This seems to be a Slavic affliction. . . . [The] Russians also suffer from it.”61
Western observers recognized that, as relations deteriorated, the nuclear issue had become a competition between Kyiv and Moscow, rife with mutual recrimination.62 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and CIS Commander-in-Chief Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov complained to a French visitor that Ukraine was cynically “playing the nuclear card to establish their international status.”63 Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, Valentyn Lipatov, complained to a visiting Canadian delegation that some in Moscow saw Ukraine as a “suburb of Russia.” He stressed that while the two states had always been connected, Ukraine wanted equality, not subordination.64
Other elements of Russian policy fed Ukrainian anxieties. To Bush, Kravchuk complained that Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoy was stoking Crimean separatism, including making unauthorized trips to Ukraine.65 Rutskoy, Kravchuk warned, reportedly had a map in his Kremlin office that depicted Alaska as part of Russia. “Now you’re getting my attention!” Bush replied. Even so, the president had a fundamentally different view of Russia: He feared that additional pressure on an increasingly embattled Yeltsin would cause him to lash out. Deepening ties with the West would provide Ukraine’s best security guarantee, Bush insisted, but anything more formal could provoke Moscow.66 Viewed from Kyiv, US and Russian policy seemed aligned; “the interests of the two most powerful states in the world,” Zlenko concluded, “were combined into one fist directed against Ukraine.”67
Many Western analysts agreed with Bush’s Moscow-centric approach to denuclearization. Joint US-Russian pressure, for instance, explained Kravchuk’s commitment on a May 1992 visit to Washington to transfer the remaining strategic weapons to Russia within seven years. In exchange, Bush pledged Nunn-Lugar funding.68 Yet Ukrainians saw the package as incomplete. After committing to complete denuclearization by 1999, Ukrainian policymakers vowed to “‘fight to the last’ for compensation and security guarantees.”69 Kravchuk told the ambassadors of NATO members in Kyiv that Ukraine deserved formal security guarantees in exchange for disarmament.70 Lukyanenko made the same declaration in Ottawa, but with an important caveat: Kyiv recognized that it would likely have to wait for such guarantees until after the nuclear weapons were withdrawn.71
Ukraine formalized its commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory at the Lisbon Conference on Assistance to the Newly Independent States later in May 1992, where it signed START and the NPT, alongside Belarus and Kazakhstan. The Lisbon conference was an important boost for the Ukrainians: It multilateralized START, and recognized Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as legitimate, independent actors in the drama of post-Soviet denuclearization, on equal footing with the United States and Russia.72 But nuclear issues only appeared on the agenda in Lisbon at the behest of the United States—an initiative not coordinated with other parties and “designed to highlight American ‘leadership’” on the question. The fact that the United States set a critical piece of the agenda at a large, multilateral gathering organized by the EC reinforced the message that Washington was calling the shots.73
False Starts: June 1992–January 1993
Six months after independence, French diplomats in Kyiv observed that Ukraine had maintained its social and ethnic stability at the cost of badly needed reform. Ukrainian leaders viewed the shock-therapy market reforms in Yeltsin’s Russia as a cautionary tale, not a model. Meanwhile, Kravchuk worked to underline Ukraine’s European character with an early state visit to France, seeking the security guarantees Kyiv needed in order to put its promised denuclearization into action.74 In his assessment, relations with Russia were improving, but still poor, and the Kremlin’s project of creating a CIS-based economic union centered on Moscow boded ill.75 Yeltsin’s intentions remained unclear, Kravchuk warned Horst Köhler, the top civil servant at the German Ministry of Finance. Western deference to Russia would only reinforce imperial instincts: “If the West accepted Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union, then the Russian government would pursue the same policies as Stalin.”76
Ukrainian leaders worried that Western policy was doing just that. Russia had inherited the Soviet Union’s seat on the UN Security Council and its legitimate right to nuclear weapons under the NPT. All formerly Soviet benefits seemed to accrue to Russia alone; liabilities, however, were distributed. But Ukraine’s rightful share of the Soviet Union’s debts was cold comfort to a country in economic free fall.77
Only Russia, for example, was invited to the Munich Summit of the Group of Seven (G7) in July 1992 to discuss aid to the former Soviet states.78 There, Yeltsin met with the assembled leaders for an afternoon, insisting (like his Ukrainian counterparts) that implementing reforms would take time and that violence, or even revolution, could ensue if the process were mismanaged.79 Yeltsin left Munich with a $24 billion assistance pledge; Ukraine requested less than a third of that and received nothing.80 The consensus in Kyiv was that this Russia-centric pattern of Western behavior would only get worse post-denuclearization.81
Some Western leaders appreciated the problem. Kohl, for instance, tried to reassure the Ukrainians that the West—and Germany in particular—felt a “responsibility” to them. Ukraine should be a force for stability in Europe, Kohl stressed to Kravchuk, insisting that because of his own experiences with German unification, he understood the challenges Ukraine faced. He admitted, however, that he still struggled to make other Western leaders understand the enormity of Ukraine’s task.82 Other diplomatic exchanges drove this point home for Ukrainian leaders. When Kravchuk met Bush in June 1992, as the first US Peace Corps volunteers arrived in Ukraine—a welcome manifestation of deepening ties—the Ukrainian president laid out an ambitious agenda for investment and trade with the United States and other Western countries. Bush, however, immediately pivoted to nuclear matters, urging Ukraine to fulfill its Lisbon promises.83 When Bush wrote to Kravchuk in December of that year, to mark the first anniversary of Ukrainian independence, he “welcomed Ukraine into the Western community of nations” but made it clear that full membership came with a prerequisite: denuclearization.84
Across Western capitals, the shortcomings of this narrow policy focus on denuclearization above all, even at the expense of Ukraine’s broader security and stability, seemed clear. “The West has mistaken the collapse of communism for the rise of democracy,” Allan Kagedan of the Canadian Department of National Defense concluded. Life in Ukraine more closely resembled anarchy—“a legal and spiritual no-man’s land”—than stable, institutionalized democracy. Some believed that Ukraine’s slower pace of reform would lay a more stable foundation than Russian shock-therapy, but this was a minority view; most simply concluded that something was better than nothing.85 Without additional Western support, however, IMF and World Bank officials were free to impose solutions that seemed to French diplomats totally ignorant of local realities, exacerbating fears that Ukraine had been relegated to second-class status.86 When Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov visited London, he warned his British counterpart, Malcolm Rifkind, “that in the West’s overriding determination to establish a strong relationship with Russia lay a danger of recreating the old [Cold War] order.”87
In Kyiv, the Rada remained seized with the issue of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. Yuriy Kostenko, leader of the parliamentary working group on Ukraine’s national-security concept, spoke for those who feared that Kravchuk was being too accommodating. Ukraine must be acknowledged as the owner of weapons on its territory—if Kyiv inherited a share of the Soviet Union’s debts, then it must also inherit its assets. This side of the argument contended that Ukraine should have the right to use the fissile material in the warheads for power generation, or to sell it for profit. Western aid and security guarantees were a prerequisite to offset the enormous cost of denuclearization, and to supplant the security benefits Ukraine had derived from nuclear weapons.88
“In Kyiv, the Rada remained seized with the issue of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal.”
Foreign Minister Tarasyuk made clear to a visiting group of EC member-state diplomats that, although Kravchuk had made promises—which, the deputy foreign minister stressed, were not legal obligations—and his commitment to denuclearization was unchanged, the Rada would be an obstacle. Ukrainian legislators feared being abandoned after denuclearization. Tarasyuk therefore urged the West to provide international security guarantees to neutralize the argument that nuclear weapons would keep Ukraine safe from Russia, as well as encouraging aid that would provide badly needed economic security.89 One British diplomat conceded that was “fair enough.”90 But going forward, Foreign Secretary Hurd instructed, British diplomats should “revert to the Americans” on the question of security commitments.91
“In Beethoven’s opera Fidelio the prisoners emerge blinking into the sunlight,” the British ambassador to Ukraine, Simon Hemans, wrote in his annual review for 1992. “Ukraine’s first year of independence has been a similar experience on a larger scale.” Ukraine remained cohesive, but its economic situation was dire. Incomes hovered around a $6-per-month average against a backdrop of hyperinflation and widespread shortages.92 Firms once deeply integrated into a Soviet Union–wide economy now struggled to find markets for their goods, and massive factories sat idle.93 Ukraine’s greatest needs had substantial price tags, including loans and credits to keep the health-care system functioning and the agricultural sector productive.94
On the international front, Hemans observed, “it was impossible until at least September to talk to any senior Ukrainian [policymaker] without receiving a monologue on the Russian threat.”95 One of the ambassador’s Whitehall colleagues elaborated, “I wonder if they are doomed to Franco-German type conflicts before they will be ready for Franco-German type reconciliation.”96 At NATO, US Permanent Representative Reginald Bartholomew expressed the Bush administration’s frustration with what Washington saw as procrastination on nuclear issues.97 EC diplomats in Kyiv continued to stress the stakes: A successful independent Ukraine would be a force for stability in Europe, whereas the country’s collapse would create a dangerous vacuum. What to do to prevent that, however, remained far less clear.98
By the end of 1992, Kravchuk had settled on a guiding policy principle: “Ukraine should not spend money on a dangerous toy, but, on the contrary, should receive it.” Compensation for its nuclear inheritance would make a difference to the government’s ability to carry out necessary reforms. So, too, would the international goodwill Kravchuk anticipated that Ukraine would garner by surrendering its nuclear weapons.99 As Poland’s intelligence service put it, “pragmatism” had replaced “naive romanticism.”100
But pragmatism meant that Ukraine would need to, as Kravchuk put it, “make the Kremlin nervous and the White House worried” by giving freer rein to those who wanted to hang on to the country’s nuclear inheritance. Exploiting uncertainty about Ukrainian intentions would generate critical leverage to secure concessions from these more powerful actors.101 Kravchuk may have believed that Ukraine’s European future would require bold new policy moves, but to the West, this new phase of Ukrainian policy harkened back to the days of the Soviet Union.102
The West could be pragmatic, too. Ukraine’s dire economic situation offered it leverage. So acute was Kyiv’s need for assistance that the State Department’s top arms-control official, James Timbie, thought that Ukrainian policymakers would eventually settle for “a modest . . . political document,” not “substantive security guarantees.”103 Timbie’s colleague Jon Purnell, director of the State Department’s Office of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, agreed: “The real danger to Ukraine lay neither in Russia nor in nuclear weapons, but in its inability to reform.”104 The Bush administration called on its allies to ramp up the denuclearization pressure.105
From Bad to Worse: January 1993–May 1993
Bill Clinton’s victory in the 1992 US presidential election marked the beginning of a shift in US and Western policy. The new president intended his January 1993 telephone call to Kravchuk to redress the Ukrainian leader’s belief “that the Bush administration paid too much attention to Russia, and too little to Ukraine,” a ubiquitous resentment in Kyiv. National Security Advisor Tony Lake advised Clinton to pledge an interest in broadening the relationship, but to still emphasize the centrality of denuclearization.106 The nuclear issue was the first one Clinton raised; Kravchuk was noncommittal, and the conversation ended with that.107
Clinton and Lake’s efforts nevertheless bore fruit. Kravchuk came away from the call sensing that a page had turned. The Bush administration had been overly solicitous of Russia, Kyiv felt, to the point that it saw Ukraine as less than fully sovereign. Even if only to keep the Ukrainian diaspora voting Democrat, Clinton seemed to favor a more balanced approach.108 However, having spent 1992 just “making the Americans realize that Ukraine was not going to capitulate,” Zlenko feared, time was running out.109
In January 1993, the Ukrainians and the Russians met at Irpin, just outside Kyiv, for nuclear talks. The summit brought Russian diplomats face-to-face with the legacy of nearby Chornobylʹ crystal-clear lakes now unsafe to swim in or drink from. The talks soon stalled as the Russians refused to recognize Ukrainian ownership of the nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s now-sovereign territory, and therefore to compensate Ukraine for these weapons’ transfer to Russian custody. Another round of talks near Moscow achieved little more, though the two sides did agree on some principles for the joint safeguarding and upkeep of the weapons during negotiations.110 This lack of progress worried US observers like Nunn, who had secured the funding for denuclearization in Congress but now feared that the process might collapse.111
British diplomats concluded that the policies of the Bush administration had led the Ukrainians to doubt the West’s commitment to their very sovereignty.112 Ukraine’s ambassador in London, Serhiy Komisarenko, for instance, bemoaned that the West privileged Russia and seemed unable—or unwilling—to see Ukraine as anything other than a case study in denuclearization.113 Ukrainian officials lobbied the British and French for security guarantees in order to put pressure on Washington and Moscow to follow suit; such guarantees, they insisted, would facilitate Ukraine’s ratification of START and the NPT, still pending in the Rada after Lisbon.114 And the Ukrainians lobbied for more aid, also to facilitate denuclearization.115
Russian diplomats, however, seized on the ambiguities in Ukrainian policy. Kyiv, they charged, was being rewarded for equivocation on the nuclear issue with a high-profile visit to the United Kingdom in February 1993. These “rewards” only served to undermine pro-Western politicians in Russia like Yeltsin; Russian diplomats argued that Kravchuk should be reprimanded, not feted, in London.116
British diplomats advised Prime Minister John Major to pressure Kravchuk to make good on his denuclearization promises, while also moving to diversify the UK-Ukraine relationship. British policymakers assumed that the Ukrainian president would blame the lack of progress since signing the Lisbon Accords on a dysfunctional Rada. Whitehall, however, believed that Kravchuk and the Rada had actually agreed to condition ratification of START and the NPT on suitable security assurances and badly needed financial assistance.117 Both wanted “to sell the surrender of [Ukraine’s] putative nuclear status and its share of Soviet nuclear assets for the highest available price.”118 Both needed to understand that closer relations and greater support would not be forthcoming as long as the country’s nuclear status remained in doubt.119
In keeping with the pattern of Ukrainian-Western exchanges, Major raised nuclear issues first. Kravchuk reaffirmed Ukraine’s denuclearization plans, but stressed his anxiety over what that would mean for Russian behavior absent other measures to address Ukraine’s security concerns. Ukraine was trapped: It desperately needed aid in order to implement market reforms, but potential benefactors would not send aid until market reforms had been implemented.120 Worse, any aid would end if Kyiv did not cooperate to Western satisfaction on the nuclear issue.121 To Foreign Secretary Hurd, Kravchuk went even further, warning that failure to support Ukraine might lead to chaos like that on display in Yugoslavia, then being torn apart by genocidal civil conflict.122
“Ukraine was trapped: It desperately needed aid in order to implement market reforms, but potential benefactors would not send aid until market reforms had been implemented.”
Kravchuk’s British interlocutors understood Ukraine’s abysmal economic situation and saw that “Russia is not yet reconciled to the divorce which Ukraine is anxious to finalize.”123 At NATO, the US delegation stressed how important a stable and independent Ukraine, with friendly relations with Moscow but not in its thrall, was to US and Western interests. Achieving that goal would require paying closer attention to Kyiv—what one US paper circulated at NATO described as “stroking the Ukrainian man-child state.”124
Kyiv could be forgiven for seeing Western policy differently. Of the $200 million in aid credits Clinton had extended, the Department of Agriculture would not allow Ukraine to spend more than $70 million to purchase US wheat and corn to make up for poor harvests and failing distribution networks.125 A German review of overall aid to Ukraine deemed it insufficient, especially when compared to the aid flowing to Russia.126 But denuclearization-specific assistance remained Bonn’s priority, to speed Ukraine toward START and NPT ratification. Until then, economic cooperation would be confined to “symbolic significance.”127
Even Kravchuk’s domestic political opponents thought the president was not getting a fair shake.128 From Kyiv, Hemans warned that “isolation and Western recriminations” would not help achieve the British and Western objectives of speedy Ukrainian START ratification and accession to the NPT. But breaking with that approach would make it difficult to remain aligned with key British allies, above all the United States.129 Back in London, Hurd was fed up with Ukraine’s “treating grave international issues like a bazaar.” He now suspected Kravchuk of wanting full control over the nuclear weapons and wondered if the Russians could thwart him.130
Ukrainian diplomatic tactics were not having their intended effect, but the perceived threat that had inspired them remained. Russia’s ambassador in Kyiv, Leonid Smolyakov, declared that Russo-Ukrainian reunification was a year away. Kozyrev dismissed Ukraine as a “mythical state.”131 Such outbursts gave Ukrainian policymakers valuable evidence that their security concerns were real, not imagined.132 The neighboring Poles agreed: Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka was exploring what could be done to seal Poland’s eastern border for fear of an imminent crisis.133
Course Correction: May 1993–July 1993
By mid-1993, US policy toward Ukraine had accomplished little. Despite signing the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Kyiv had made no progress on denuclearization; START and the NPT remained unratified. Clinton’s frequent reminders of Ukraine’s nuclear obligations had little visible effect.
The Clinton administration established a National Security Council (NSC) working group to rethink policy toward Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet republics, including Russia, under Strobe Talbott, then ambassador-at-large and special advisor to the secretary of state on the newly independent states.134 Washington had made the nuclear issue the heart of Ukraine policy, Lake explained, but Ukraine’s leaders felt ignored. Abstract promises of future cooperation early on had had little effect. The administration concluded that it would take concrete action in the security and economic spheres, as the United States had already taken with Russia, to make Washington’s commitment credible. This new policy was to be inaugurated with a visit to Kyiv by Talbott and Toby Gati, NSC senior director for Russia, Ukraine, and the Eurasian states; they would start in the Ukrainian capital rather than stopping on the return leg of a trip to Moscow, as had been the wont of visitors from Washington.135
Rose Gottemoeller of the NSC’s Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia affairs directorate got straight to the point: Nuclear weapons had obscured—and undermined—the full range of US interests in Ukraine. Many in Kyiv believed that surrendering the weapons would eliminate any leverage in relations with the West or Russia, and viewed Ukraine as “a bridge between Russia and Europe” that should be treated as a strategic actor in its own right by the United States, not approached merely through a Russia-centric lens. The old sequencing of denuclearization then aid had not worked, and real inducements were required.136
The Clinton administration shared this new approach with its allies. Lake acknowledged to his British counterpart, Roderic Lyne, that Washington had paid insufficient attention to—and been insufficiently understanding of—Ukraine because the nuclear issue had overshadowed other topics.137 The White House wanted to move beyond that focus, Talbott explained on a trip to London, so long as the nuclear issue were satisfactorily resolved. Though it was critical of the Bush administration for its narrow focus on nuclear issues, the Clinton administration still made expanding the relationship, and any increase in economic assistance, contingent on progress toward denuclearization. For example, Talbott, like the Bush administration, opposed the Ukrainian idea of a multilateral treaty to provide Kyiv with security guarantees, preferring nonbinding assurances from the major powers over anything that actually committed the United States to respond if Ukraine’s sovereignty were threatened, including by an attack from Russia—a political nonstarter in the post–Cold War.138 Whitehall concluded that US policy had changed in style, but not substance; “real US assistance still depended on Ukraine fulfilling its START and NPT commitments.” The new approach bore striking similarity to the old.139
In Kyiv, Talbott and Gati received assurances that Ukraine would go to great lengths to ratify START and the NPT. They also heard entreaties for Washington to “make up for lost time” in bilateral relations and prove it saw more than just nuclear danger in Ukraine, a perception that had made Washington’s insistence on denuclearization unpopular. US-Russian relations should be positive, Kravchuk stressed to the visiting US policymakers, “but don’t put all your eggs in one basket and don’t give the Russians a blank check.” Ukrainian interlocutors emphasized that Russia needed assistance, but so did the rest of the region, and that ceding a “special role” to the Kremlin would not serve US interests.140
Soon after, Kohl arrived in Kyiv, bearing aid and accompanied by German business leaders keen to invest.141 Bonn believed that Ukraine had been neglected diplomatically and viewed too narrowly through the nuclear lens. If Kravchuk could right the ship (with Western help), “undreamt-of [economic] prospects would result.”142 Security-wise, a joint German-Canadian analysis argued that a stable, independent Ukraine would be the best hedge against Russian attempts to “resurrect the Soviet Union.”143 Yet, Kohl addressed none of these issues with Kravchuk; instead, he focused on the resettlement of the so-called Volga Germans who had come to southern Ukraine in the early nineteenth century and been deported to Siberia by Soviet authorities in the 1940s.144
The Clinton administration, fearing that Ukraine’s economic situation was so precarious that progress might easily be undone, tried to maintain the momentum created by the Talbott-Gati visit.145 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin visited Kyiv in June 1993 to talk up the new phase in relations and emphasize how much further Washington was prepared to go—once Ukraine ratified START and the NPT.146 A few days later, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed to EC foreign ministers that Western support for Ukraine should be more forthcoming, at least rhetorically.147 As he put it to Hurd, Washington was now “showing the carrot without abandoning the sticks.”148
Moscow did not welcome this new tack. Russian diplomats redoubled their efforts to stoke fears of Ukraine’s imminent nuclear breakout, and encouraged the British not to join in the US expansion of contacts.149 But London agreed with the US assessment that a purely punitive approach perceived to be aligned with Russia, Ukraine’s foremost security preoccupation, would not bear fruit on denuclearization.150 Ukrainian leaders simply could not understand, according to Hemans, why “having won the Cold War we [in the West] are prepared to sit by and let our gains be slowly but surely reversed.”151
It Takes Three: July 1993–March 1994
At a meeting on the margins of the G7’s Tokyo Summit in July 1993, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that their separate denuclearization talks with Ukraine were going nowhere. Yeltsin proposed a trilateral format, which Clinton accepted.152 Earlier that year, Secretary of State Christopher had advised Clinton that the key to swaying Ukraine would be a Lisbon-style multilateral framework that included the United States, not a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Kyiv.153
The trilateral road was a rocky one. Kyiv still felt excluded. Ukrainian diplomats, for example, chafed at being left out of the Tokyo summit, having been told that the club could do nothing for Ukraine until Ukraine put its house in order.154 Worse still, the G7 did provide substantial aid to Russia, whose economy was equally shambolic and equally plagued by corruption.155 In fact, Yeltsin and the G7 were actively discussing a G8 with Russian membership.156 “Suspicions and unreasonableness” dominated in Moscow and Kyiv alike, Hurd bemoaned in London.157
In August 1993, Talbott convened Tarasyuk and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov in London for talks on denuclearization. Disagreements emerged both between the delegations and within Ukraine’s. Talbott pushed for early decommissioning with compensation, a combination of both sides’ priorities; Mamedov insisted that all warheads be transferred first, with compensation coming later. Some Ukrainian policymakers accepted the Russian plan, and Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Anatoliy Lopata even initialed a draft agreement. Zlenko, however, rejected it in favor of the US variant. Talbott refused to mediate, saying that Yeltsin and Kravchuk would have to find a resolution.158 If the two could not, Kravchuk would pay the price, in the form of a denied request to visit Washington.159 In his diary, Talbott complained that the Ukrainians were intransigent and unrealistic: “They want to be members of NATO and can’t be.”160
In September 1993, Kravchuk and Yeltsin met at the Massandra Palace, near Yalta on Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, and made the breakthrough that had eluded their representatives in London—or so it seemed. Ukraine agreed to sell its share of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to Russia in exchange for an energy debt write-off, and to transfer all nuclear weapons to Russia within two years of the Rada ratifying START.161 The deal, however, drew domestic backlash in Ukraine. Critics accused Kravchuk of conceding too much.162 Kravchuk countered that any Russian concession was a relative win for Ukraine.163 In the West, the deal was greeted with relief. Ultimately, however, it collapsed, amid accusations by both parties that the other had tried to sneak advantageous clauses into the final document without the other side’s knowing.164
“They want to be members of NATO and can’t be.”
After the breakdown of the Massandra agreement, Ukrainian policymakers concluded that progress would require an overall improvement in relations with Russia. That was clearly a long way off.165 On a June 1993 visit to Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, for example, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin declared in front of his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kuchma, that “he believed Russia’s western border should be with Romania and Ukraine’s eastern border at Vladivostok”—in other words, that the two should be one state—and that “while he knew eastern Ukrain[ians] had voted for an independent Ukraine [in 1991], he was confident none of them would do so now.”166 Chairman of the Rada Foreign Affairs Committee, Dmytro Pavlychko, warned that Russia’s goal was “droit de seigneur” over Ukraine. His proposed solution: Ukraine should join NATO and be allowed “even if only one, a nuclear weapon capable of striking Russia.”167
Unsurprisingly, Western policymakers had other ideas. Alongside Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to provide security assurances—which they differentiated from guarantees—to Ukraine. They wanted to make sure that “the Ukrainians do not pocket this and, like Oliver [Twist], ask for more.” At the top of Kyiv’s list of further requests, British diplomats suspected, would be economic aid.168 That had been Kravchuk’s message to Clinton in a July 1993 letter.169 While Clinton applauded the improvement of relations in his reply, he insisted that denuclearization was the United States’ top priority, and that other issues like investment hinged on it.170 In a later letter, Clinton was even clearer: It was important to “reach an understanding on the nettlesome problem of the missiles,” so that they could “concentrate on the new business of our broader relationship, not the old business of the nuclear question.”171
Ukrainian leaders continued to see the weapons as a source of leverage for Kyiv. In October 1993 at the UN General Assembly, for example, Zlenko made the connection between nuclear and economic security explicit: He argued that the $2.8 billion estimated cost to dismantle the remaining weapons was currently prohibitive, but could be offset by returning to Ukraine components obtained from the warheads for use as nuclear-reactor fuel.172 Later that month, Kravchuk insisted to Christopher that Ukraine could not surrender its warheads to Russia without compensation. Given Russian territorial claims against Ukraine, he said, only “legal guarantees from the great powers,” Russia and the United States (ideally also with both the UN and NATO involved), would be sufficient. Existing plans for tripartite assurances fell short of Kyiv’s security needs. In the eyes of Ukrainian policymakers, such guarantees should come before Ukraine ratified START and the NPT, not after it had already done so.173
Six months after the Clinton administration had declared its new approach, Kyiv was hard-pressed to identify much that had actually changed. Russia remained the centerpiece of the administration’s policy. The White House would not allow anything to impede Russia’s reforms, which Talbott and Christopher both understood to be Clinton’s top priority.174 As the Ukrainians watched neighboring states move toward NATO membership, their fears of being left out of the emerging European security order intensified. “The pull of Russia seems even stronger,” warned Hemans from the British embassy in Kyiv, “while the West seems to offer little but goodwill.”175 In Kyiv, earlier visions of no-strings-attached Western aid gave way to a pessimistic consensus that no Western money was coming, conditional or otherwise.176 In Whitehall, Ukraine’s pessimism made sense—it was unlikely that the West would “offer Ukraine the sort of special attention that Russia has had.”177 Russia received nearly five times more US aid than Ukraine in 1993 alone. In cumulative terms, as table 1 illustrates, Ukraine saw 33 cents per Ukrainian for every 1 dollar of aid Russia received per Russian. By the end of the decade, this ratio would reach a mere 66 cents.
Table 1. Cumulative aid to Ukraine and Russia per capita during the 1990s
Fiscal year | Ukraine | Russia | Ukraine-to-Russia ratio of cumulative aid per capita |
||||
US aid | IMF lending | Population | US aid | IMF lending | Population |
||
1991 | $309,740 | $0 | 52,170,961 | $993,692 | $0 | 148,394,216 | 89% |
1992 | $512,938 | $0 | 52,323,671 | $11,734,918 | $1,404,131,154 | 148,538,197 | 0% |
1993 | $138,188,835 | $348,396,100 | 52,350,126 | $642,621,178 | $2,098,771,686 | 148,458,777 | 33% |
1994 | $379,708,831 | $1,114,263,067 | 52,075,998 | $1,677,253,103 | $0 | 148,407,912 | 97% |
1995 | $260,784,149 | $1,508,424,895 | 51,665,539 | $542,776,286 | $6,519,025,466 | 148,375,787 | 84% |
1996 | $172,620,377 | $875,534,489 | 51,226,109 | $362,081,040 | $19,335,798,51 | 148,160,129 | 43% |
1997 | $104,707,894 | $556,836,928 | 50,786,885 | $323,126,356 | $0 | 147,915,361 | 48% |
1998 | $277,842,822 | $2,588,480,199 | 50,379,731 | $392,101,486 | $8,089,000,623 | 147,670,784 | 59% |
1999 | $287,773,454 | $640,796,168 | 49,976,446 | $1,601,800,119 | $0 | 147,214,776 | 63% |
2000 | $199,461,467 | $254,938,811 | 49,556,660 | $708,564,906 | $0 | 146,596,869 | 66% |
Source: IMF, “Russian Federation: History of Lending Commitments,” https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?date1key=2000-12-31&memberkey1=819; IMF, “Special Drawing Rights Valuation,” https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx; IMF, “Ukraine: History of Lending Commitments,” https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?date1key=2000-12-31&memberkey1=993; US Agency for International Development, “Overseas Loans and Grants,” https://foreignassistance.andrewheiss.com/greenbook.html; World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0037712/world-development-indicators.
The Kremlin kept up its pressure campaign, telling a US delegation that a third of Ukrainian weapons were in “pre-accident” condition. When questioned, Russian diplomats offered to allow representatives of the environmentalist (and ardently anti-nuclear) group Greenpeace to inspect the warheads.178 Ukrainian officials, too, returned to familiar themes. Reacting to the success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (which was neither liberal nor democratic) in recent legislative elections, for example, Kravchuk’s foreign policy advisor Anton Buteyko drew “a direct parallel with [Adolf] Hitler’s rise to power” in 1930s Germany.179
In December 1993, Talbott and Vice President Al Gore traveled to Moscow for a meeting with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. The two sides agreed that the United States would provide Ukraine with security assurances—again, rather than legally binding guarantees—and assistance to defray the costs of sending its weapons to Russia to be dismantled, while Russia would compensate Ukraine for the value of the uranium contained therein and offer its own security assurances.180 Clinton described the breakthrough to Kravchuk as “the beginning of a new era in US-Ukrainian relations,” and declared that the time had now come to begin exploring a wider range of engagement.181 Kravchuk, too, welcomed this news. Most importantly, Washington had persuaded the Russians to compensate Ukraine.182 “Nobody in any position of influence in the [Ukrainian military] has ever considered nuclear weapons as anything other than a military liability,” the British defense attaché in Kyiv summed up. “Their only value lies in their ability to attract much needed cash.”183
Clinton enlisted Kohl to persuade the Ukrainians that this was the best deal they would get.184 When the German chancellor visited Washington in January 1994, however, he encouraged Clinton to sweeten the deal further, by paying more attention to Kyiv. Clinton agreed that Ukraine was key to the development of Central and Eastern Europe.185 Ambassadors of NATO member-states in Kyiv reached the same conclusion: Support for Ukraine, including sending staff to assist Ukraine in its talks with the IMF, needed to be a priority.186 This news came as a relief to Ukrainian policymakers, who had felt themselves trapped in a “vicious circle” and believed they were now nearing a breakthrough.187
Behind closed doors, however, Western policymakers were losing patience with Ukraine. Kyiv found itself “in an extremely difficult situation,” Bonn conceded, but one “into which [it] has largely maneuvered itself due to its own ineptitude.”188 French officials questioned Ukraine’s commitment to reform and its future viability, and believed that tighter conditionality was necessary going forward.189 In London, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Douglas Hogg went so far as to commiserate with Russian Ambassador Boris Pankin over being “bullied by Ukraine.”190
The final terms of a nuclear agreement would be agreed during Clinton’s brief visit to Kyiv—where he ventured no further than a conference room at Boryspil Airport—en route to Moscow in January 1994.191 When Clinton, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin gathered in the Russian capital shortly thereafter, Yeltsin signed off on security assurances for Ukraine, including forswearing economic coercion, in exchange for Ukraine’s denuclearization.192 Kravchuk saw this elevation to a “full and equal partner” of the United States and Russia as a major victory.193
Afterwards, Clinton wrote to Kravchuk applauding Ukraine’s progress and promising $350 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance. Now, Clinton declared, “our work to develop our economic relations has taken on the same urgency with which we have addressed the nuclear issues.” The United States would double its direct economic assistance and back Ukraine’s entreaties to the IMF for further support.194 Kravchuk would also get his long-awaited visit to Washington. The Clinton administration framed the visit as a fresh start in bilateral relations, with an emphasis on economic and security ties and a new opportunity for US partnership with “potentially one of Europe’s great powers.”195 During Kravchuk’s visit, Clinton pledged another $700 million to support Ukraine’s reforms and disarmament. The Ukrainian president had big plans for the future:
As I understand it, here is the old Europe, with its strong democracies and healthy economies. All of this should be moved further east, step by step. If we do not accomplish that, then the world will again be divided into two parts, the old Soviet system and Europe. If Ukraine serves as the means to move these democratic and economic principles to the east, then Russia will join in the process. . . . I see Ukraine’s role as exceptional.196
To Budapest: April 1994–December 1994
In the spring of 1994, Ukrainians went to the polls to elect a new president. Former Prime Minister Kuchma trounced Kravchuk in an election campaign centered on Russo-Ukrainian relations.197 Kuchma recognized that Ukraine’s economy was still so intertwined with Russia’s that only improving bilateral relations could improve its economic circumstances. Voters agreed.198 Ukrainian public opinion still feared the West’s “jump[ing] Ukraine to embrace Russia.”199 From the British embassy in Kyiv, Hemans shared that pessimistic sentiment.200
France welcomed Kuchma’s victory as reinforcing the Ukrainian political center at the expense of both the ultranationalist right and the communist left.201 To London, Kuchma seemed poised to make vital progress on the economy and relations with Russia, and hopefully would be less suspicious of the West.202 Policymakers worried that if Ukraine’s independence eroded, demands from Central Europe for strengthened security commitments and faster integration into the newly constituted European Union (EU)—“not in [the] EU’s interests”—would only intensify.203 Even Ukraine’s own intelligence community welcomed the change, favoring relations with Russia characterized by pragmatism, and cognizant of the reality that Russia was Ukraine’s most important energy supplier and market for goods.204
Kuchma’s July 1994 inaugural address offered a bleak assessment of Ukraine’s economy: “The country is in danger of death.” He prescribed Russo-Ukrainian cooperation.205 He also remonstrated with the diplomatic corps in Kyiv for having underestimated Ukraine’s potential: “Ukraine does not intend to be a vast ‘terra incognita’ in the center of Europe, nor to be a bargaining chip. . . . Ukraine must be not a buffer state but a trustworthy bridge” between Europe and Russia.206
Western pressure was still on. In February 1994, William Perry replaced Aspin as secretary of defense. His top priority was “reducing the transcendental danger of loose nukes” and he believed that Ukraine’s was the most dangerous legacy stockpile. The Pentagon, and Perry in particular, played a key role in the Clinton administration’s denuclearization-centric efforts in Ukraine.207 Further afield, Kuchma’s visit to Canada early in his term for meetings with Prime Minister Jean Chrétien gave the Canadians an opportunity to get to know him. Ottawa applauded Kuchma’s swift moves to stabilize the economic situation and his more constructive approach to Russia, but Chrétien’s talking points still stressed NPT ratification as key to unlocking opportunities in the West.208 Additionally, Major assured Yeltsin in September 1994 that Britain would “continue to add [its] weight to pressure on the Ukraine to accede to the [NPT].”209 If Ukraine wanted to draw closer to the West and its institutions, like the EU and all the economic opportunity it represented, the Ukrainians were reminded, they would have to play ball on denuclearization.210
In October 1994, a month before Kuchma visited Washington, Clinton called to reassure him that $130 million of the promised $350 million in Nunn-Lugar funding would arrive by the end of the year. And with NPT ratification before the Rada, the United States would do everything it could to help. Kuchma insisted he needed aid more than words.211 The EU was delaying a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement until Kyiv signed the NPT.212 To Kohl, Kuchma framed Western support not as charity, but as investment—a stable Ukraine would ensure European stability.213 Ukraine’s Central European neighbors certainly felt that way. As one Hungarian diplomat told his British interlocutor, Budapest had joined with Poland and Slovakia to form “an informal group of ‘Friends of Ukraine’” out of fear of Ukraine’s isolation and vulnerability to Russian pressure. The West’s “preoccupation with Russia” was not helping matters.214
Having ratified START a year earlier, in November 1994 the Rada ratified the NPT. That paved the way for the final agreement to be signed on the margins of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting in Budapest, Hungary—where Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged to not use force or coercion against Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and to otherwise respect their territorial integrity, in exchange for the latter three renouncing nuclear arms.215 That agreement was not finalized until 4:00 am on December 5, the day it was signed, as the parties haggled over the wording of the security assurances. In the end, as US policymakers had intended from the outset, they were minimally binding.216
The so-called Budapest Memorandum nevertheless represented a key victory for Ukrainian diplomacy. Kyiv’s earlier insistence on security assurances in exchange for denuclearization had met with little more than what Zlenko dismissed as “ironic smiles.” Now Kyiv had secured such an agreement, even if not as rigid as hoped. Critically, Ukraine also received a commitment to return the fissile material in its nuclear warheads back from Russia at a lower level of enrichment suitable for fueling the country’s nuclear power stations.217 Clinton had also achieved a major foreign-policy objective in solving the Ukrainian nuclear dilemma, but the summit in Budapest was not a good one from the vantage point of the United States—success on the nuclear front was overshadowed by Yeltsin’s public denunciations of US-backed NATO expansion. As a result, Clinton “was really pissed off” with the Russian leader.218
“The so-called Budapest Memorandum nevertheless represented a key victory for Ukrainian diplomacy.”
Western diplomats grew increasingly understanding when it came to Ukrainian fears of Russia.219 Russian foreign policy seemed, to British observers, designed to situate it “at the center of a constellation of broadly pliant states,” and to preserve the old Soviet border as the new Russia’s “outer line of defense and control.”220 William Hopkinson, assistant under-secretary for policy at the British Ministry of Defense, worried that Western pursuit of a “contented, unstressed” Russia in the short term, even if that came at its neighbors’ expense, was undermining Western long-term interests. Moscow’s definition of good relations with its neighbors clearly differed from what those neighbors had in mind.221 French diplomats decried Moscow’s “neo-imperialist” behavior in the former Soviet space.222 Paris wanted an independent and strong Ukraine as “a bridge between the Russian sphere and Central Europe.”223 Poland’s diplomats put it even more bluntly: Between Western recalcitrance, economic disaster, and Russian predation, Ukraine had “a cross too heavy to bear.”224
New Opportunities and New Realities: January 1995–July 2000
Signing the Budapest Memorandum was supposed to have lifted “the political and diplomatic blockade of Ukraine,” but not all of Kyiv’s aspirations were realized.225 Speaking to a group of Canadians, Ukrainian diplomats dubbed Britain and France “hostile” for dragging their feet on EU financial assistance. Perhaps, one Canadian diplomat suggested, the British and French experience of losing their colonies made them unduly sympathetic to the Russian perspective vis-à-vis independent Ukraine.226
In a memorandum preparing Clinton for meetings in Kyiv in May 1995, Lake declared that “the Ukrainians responded to your policy on denuclearization, and we put the nuclear weapons issue behind us.” But he warned Clinton that Ukraine remained anxious about becoming a buffer state, left out of the emerging Central European security order and vulnerable to Russian predation, due to increasing talk of NATO’s eastward expansion—which would not extend as far east as Ukraine.227 Kuchma needed the political boost from Clinton’s visit to show that he had traded Ukraine’s nuclear weapons for influence with and support from the West.228 Though the meetings took place as a stopover on Clinton’s return to the United States from a summit with Yeltsin (coinciding with Russia’s Victory Day celebrations), the Ukrainians were nevertheless effusive. “We have the impression that it is the United States, not Europe, that is Ukraine’s neighbor,” declared Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk. Clinton congratulated himself and his administration for appreciating Ukraine’s importance more quickly than the Europeans had, but also conceded that he had had a large Ukrainian-American community at home holding his feet to the fire.229
Despite outward appearances, Kuchma was not entirely happy. After several years of G7 summits welcoming Yeltsin, the Ukrainians hoped to be invited to Halifax in 1995, where Ukraine was on the agenda.230 The Canadian hosts declined, though they did invite Kuchma to submit a video-recorded message.231 Moreover, Kyiv asked for some $4 billion in support from G7 members, but only received $1.5 billion.232 Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, Yuriy Shcherbak, stressed that Ukraine also wanted closer ties with NATO, but NATO members seemed opposed lest the development of those ties antagonize Russia.233 This chafed: “Kuchma said he could understand Russia not regarding Ukraine as independent,” reported British diplomats, “but not West European countries.”234 Chief of the General Staff Lopata warned a visiting German general officer, Klaus Reinhardt, that if Ukraine was left out of the process of NATO expansion, it would surely come “under Russian hegemony.”235
When British Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth Clarke visited Kyiv shortly after Clinton’s visit, the Ukrainian president gave him an earful, reeling off a list of conditions that Ukraine had met in exchange for support: denuclearization, NPT accession, and an agreement with the IMF.236 Now an $85 million EU loan, as well as discussion of a further $177 million for balance-of-payments assistance, was being withheld until Kyiv pledged to fully decommission the Chornobylʹ nuclear power station—another burdensome inheritance from the Soviet Union.237 “What,” Kuchma wondered sardonically, “would be the next condition imposed by the West?”238
Kuchma also pressed for stronger security pledges, beyond what Ukraine had received in Budapest, and started to do so even before he left the Hungarian capital.239 To Major, Kuchma emphasized the importance of binding security arrangements to guard against Russian “blackmail,” stressing that the Kremlin had shut off the flow of essential gas to Ukraine as a form of coercion.240 And to Michael Portillo, the new defense secretary, he emphasized the need for economic assistance, too, “so that [Ukraine’s] population did not see greener pastures in Russia.”241 But no more reassurances were forthcoming.
Kuchma expressed his mounting concern about Russo-Ukrainian relations to Clinton in February 1996, insisting that while the Russians professed friendship and goodwill toward Ukraine, especially to Western audiences, Moscow was actually “doing everything possible to suppress us and drive us to our knees.”242 French diplomats thought they had a solution: “Russia seems mired in its decolonization problems: could France, with its wealth of experience [in that regard], help Russia find solutions . . . [and] help set the rules for the ‘decolonization’ of the Soviet empire?”243
Hennadiy Udovenko, who had replaced Zlenko as Ukraine’s foreign minister in the summer of 1994, wrote to Christopher that while Ukraine was grateful for US support, Kyiv was still anxiously awaiting the promised expansion of relations. In particular, Ukraine wanted to join the “pan-European security structure” to its west: NATO.244 Ukraine’s place in Europe remained a dominant theme. A visit to Kyiv in June 1996 by Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s foreign minister, reflected this ambivalence in Western assessments of Ukraine. Though Canadian diplomats credited Kuchma with saving Ukraine from collapse, he was not being rewarded and supported; rather, he faced new demands to go further and faster before aid would be forthcoming.245
When Kohl visited Kyiv in September 1996, he assured Kuchma that he wanted Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO and the EU to develop further, and that the expansion of both would not leave Kyiv “in a gray area of security policy.” Kuchma complained of continued Russian economic pressure, such as the Kremlin’s introduction of a 20 percent tariff on Ukrainian imports.246 Kohl had to pull off a delicate—but familiar—balancing act: He concluded that Yeltsin’s fall from power in Russia would likely be catastrophic, and punishing Russian misbehavior toward Ukraine would erode his position, and with it European stability—but Ukraine was nevertheless vital to European stability and needed help standing up to Moscow.247 How to reconcile the two remained unclear.
In the fall of 1996, Udovenko elaborated on the Ukrainian desire for closer relations with the West in the face of a domineering Russia, telling Talbott that “NATO and Russia are competitors; NATO and Ukraine are not.” Talbott replied that Washington did not see Ukraine as falling in a Russian sphere of influence and opposed such a concept.248 In a series of conversations with Gore, Kuchma reinforced the point: “I am alone in dealing with Russia and need your help and support.” Gore applauded Ukraine’s desire to draw closer to the West, but he could not commit any more US support and warned that reports from early US investors were not encouraging.249 By the next year, Kuchma and his diplomats were making the same complaint about the Clinton administration as Kravchuk had about Bush: The United States was focusing on Russia at Ukraine’s expense.250
Meeting with Rifkind, now the UK foreign secretary, in February 1997, Kuchma boasted of Ukraine’s plummeting inflation rates (from 900 percent in 1993 to 40 percent in 1996) and insisted that corruption in Ukraine “paled into insignificance when compared with what was happening in Russia.”251 For all Ukraine’s progress, however, relations with NATO—particularly regarding the NATO-Ukraine Charter for which Kyiv was pushing, to mirror one being negotiated with Russia—remained challenging.252 When he met NATO Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke in the spring of 1997, Tarasyuk pressed for security assurances from the alliance to be included in the charter.253 Western policy, however, was designed to keep Ukraine on the outside. London, for instance, envisioned the charter as a means of delaying Kyiv’s aspiration for even closer relations with NATO or, worse, full membership.254 In the United States, Washington was happy for an expanded NATO-Ukraine relationship, “but not as full as that on offer for Russia.”255
Ukraine’s economic woes remained central to its security challenges. In July 1997, Kuchma complained to Kohl that Ukraine was meeting IMF budget-deficit and inflation targets, but still not receiving assistance. Kohl, who professed himself a “Ukraine fan,” offered to intervene on Kyiv’s behalf.256 Tarasyuk, who had succeeded Udovenko as foreign minister in April 1998, summed the issue up succinctly in a meeting with Talbott: “Solving Ukraine’s economic problems is a security issue.”257
“Ukraine’s economic woes remained central to its security challenges.”
Still, in the last years of the Clinton administration, as Washington and Kyiv alike came to see Russia’s foreign-policy intentions—particularly vis-à-vis Ukraine—in a darker light, Talbott emphasized that “it was important for Ukraine to remain committed to finding Ukrainian solutions.”258 Kuchma shared his concerns with Madeleine Albright, the new secretary of state, in the spring of 2000. After leadership change in Russia, Kuchma warned that “[Vladimir] Putin’s Russia would be very different from Yeltsin’s. . . . Putin would try to rebuild ‘Greater Russia.’”259
Conclusion
Events since 2000 have proven Kuchma right, as Ukraine’s present challenges and above all Russia’s war illustrate. Choices during the 1990s—putting denuclearization first, at all costs; privileging Russian status anxieties over Ukrainian security, broadly understood; and deference to those two US policy priorities by Washington’s allies, even when they questioned their wisdom—contributed to what came in the new millennium. But it is an oversimplification to say that had Kyiv not surrendered its nuclear weapons in 1994, Russia would not have invaded in 2014 nor widened its war against Ukraine in 2022. Ukraine did not have a real nuclear deterrent at its disposal—at most, it had the makings of one, and only if it were willing to bear enormous financial and political costs that it had consistently decided to avoid, rather than bear, throughout the early years of the post–Cold War period.260 What Ukraine did have was, as Kravchuk put it in his memoirs, “a massive headache.”261 Clinton’s later regrets, including his suggestion that Ukraine could have been spared Russia’s invasions but for Western—above all, US—denuclearization pressure, are easy to understand, but wide of the mark.262
Reconstructing the history of Western diplomacy around Ukraine’s denuclearization does suggest that, had aid been more forthcoming as Ukrainian policymakers requested, a more economically secure Ukraine might have been less vulnerable to subsequent Russian aggression. Nuclear issues, however, were not the only impediments to Western aid: Concerns about rule of law and corruption, which also limited Ukraine’s economic trajectory, limited Western support—to a far greater extent than they limited Western aid to Russia itself, though they were equally applicable.
Western policy toward Ukraine fixated on nuclear non-proliferation at the cost of a clear-eyed understanding of Ukraine as a crisis-stricken post-Soviet state in need of foreign aid and economic support. After independence, Ukrainians found that few knew much about their country. “We faced a situation,” one Kravchuk adviser, Valentyn Chemerys, recalled, “where we came into the world and, strangely enough, no one there knew us.”263 Instead, what came to define Ukraine was its nuclear inheritance—which, particularly after Chornobylʹ, the West perceived as a dangerous aberration to be rectified. As Zlenko put it, “the phrase ‘nuclear weapons’ appeared in [Western] minds after the word ‘Ukraine’ with the same immutability as Pavlov’s dog salivated after turning on the lightbulb.”264
Over the course of the 1990s, Central Europe’s security landscape transformed. States that were once adversaries became partners, even allies, and the region pivoted from looking east to looking westward. Ukrainian diplomacy during this decade tried to carve out a role for Kyiv to participate in—and benefit from—this massive reorientation. Ukrainian diplomats tried to practice “the art of the possible” and learned that less was possible—or rather, permitted by their British, Canadian, French, German, and US counterparts—than they had hoped.265 The decline of Ukraine’s economy over the course of the decade also meant that Kyiv’s room for maneuver contracted year-on-year in the face of Western pressure. Ukraine’s nuclear inheritance from the Soviet Union proved a hindrance—while Ukrainians called for aid to bolster their economic security, Western policymakers prioritized nuclear security. Though Kyiv was able to use its ICBMs as leverage, doing so also slowed and reduced badly needed assistance and, ultimately, excluded Ukraine from many of the potential benefits of the post–Cold War era that the rest of Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed.
Simon Miles is the Kevin D. Gorter Associate Professor of Public Policy and director of the Master of National Security Policy program at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy. He is the author of Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War, published by Cornell University Press in 2020, and of articles in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Diplomatic History, International Security, the Journal of Cold War Studies, and Slavic Review.
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA, email: simon.miles@duke.edu
Acknowledgments: For their valuable comments on earlier drafts and helpful discussions, the author thanks Matéj Bílý, Mariana Budjeryn, Susan Colbourn, Marilena Gala, Wanda Jarząbek, Jeff Jones, Stephan Kieninger, Leopoldo Nuti (who inspired the title), Mark Thomas-Patterson, Giordana Pulcini, Donald Raleigh, Timothy Sayle, Joseph Torigian, Vladislav Zubok, and the anonymous reviewers. The author also thanks the organizers of and participants in seminars and panels at the Università degli Studi Roma Tre; the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies; Univerzita Karlova; and the Ústav pro Soudobé Dějiny Akademie Věd České Republiky. Researching and writing this article was funded by the Czech Science Foundation through grant no. 24-10150S to the Czech Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Contemporary History.