The (Elusive) Search for Strategic Stability

Emerging technologies developed since the end of the Cold War—and their proliferation to new actors—call into question the prospects for strategic stability in the twenty-first century. Strategic stability exists when rivals are mutually deterred and lack any rational incentive to escalate to nuclear use during conflict. Yet, as this issue’s Roundtable examines, emerging technologies—with their new knowledge and tools with the potential for enhancing military capabilities—are impacting stability in such ways that the assumptions of rationality and deterrence no longer hold. First, these emerging technologies may be able to achieve effects once reserved to nuclear weapons, creating incentives for preemption. Second, these technologies are proliferating horizontally across more states, complicating mutual deterrence. Third, such technologies affect the psychology of decision-makers during crises, undermining rationality. Just as these phenomena may undermine stability, however, adversaries may yet be able to use the very same technologies to restore the strategic balance, although how is not yet fully apparent.

Mara Karlin and Mathew Burrows review “The Insiders’ Game,” a book exploring how democratic elites—including legislators, military leaders, and civilian officials—constrain presidential decision-making in war.

The global nuclear order is undergoing rapid and complex transformations, driven by the expansion of arsenals, evolving doctrines, and the interplay of domestic and international politics. This roundtable brings together seven incisive essays that explore the shifting dynamics of nuclear security across six key regions—Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, China, and the Korean Peninsula. From the cascading effects of U.S.-China competition to the domestic political drivers of nuclear policy in both democratic and authoritarian states, the contributors analyze how these forces are reshaping deterrence, alliances, and proliferation risks.