Nuclear Strategy
Ensuring US Military Readiness in the Indo-Pacific
Eyck Freymann and Harry Halem argue that the United States can sustain conventional deterrence against China into the 2030s through targeted investments in logistics and the industrial base. They join our editors to discuss why a holistic view of the military…
Conventional Options Theory in the New Nuclear Era
Tyler Bowen from the US Naval War College joins us to discuss the logic of conventional coercion in nuclear crises. As the US faces nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia and China, understanding how to "thread the needle" between defense and escalation is…
The Arsenal of Democracy: Keeping China Deterred in an Age of Hard Choices
The margin of deterrence against China is rapidly shrinking, driven not by a failure of US technological innovation, but by the American and allied defense industrial base’s inability to field and sustain cutting-edge capabilities at scale, at speed, and…
Threading the Needle: The Logic of Conventional Coercion in Nuclear Crises
Can conventional military success lead to coercive success in a nuclear crisis? Some scholars argue that achieving limited conventional success can be used to coerce nuclear adversaries. Others argue that conventional capabilities coerce by manipulating…
Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons: A Commonsense Approach to Understanding Costs and Benefits
Artificial intelligence (AI), particularly machine learning (ML), has transformed computing, offering potential benefits in the nuclear enterprise, which encompasses weapons, delivery systems, platforms, and command and control infrastructure. While AI can…
Negotiating Primacy: Strategic Stability, Superpower Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War
The United States successfully used the concept of strategic stability to tip the nuclear balance against the Soviet Union during the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) of the 1980s and early 1990s. Both superpowers sought to employ strategic stability to…
Escalation Management in Ukraine: “Learning by Doing” in Response to the “Threat that Leaves Something to Chance”
The article analyses a process of escalation management over time between nuclear states under conditions of radical uncertainty. After Russia invaded Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin manipulated uncertainty to manage escalation and to deter NATO support of…
Just Like Yesterday? New Critiques of the Nuclear Revolution
Four recent books offer compelling political and strategic explanations for why states pursue expansive nuclear and foreign policies. They provide new insights on an enduring question: What are the implications of nuclear weapons for international competition…
The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of Second-Strike Vulnerability and Options to Address It
Emerging and disruptive technologies spell an uncertain future for second-strike retaliatory forces. New sensors and big data analysis may render mobile missiles and submarines vulnerable to detection. I call this development the “standstill conundrum”:…
Nuclear Operations and Counter-Homeland Conventional Warfare: Navigating Between Nuclear Restraint and Escalation Risk
Bruce Sugden explores the dynamics that could lead the nuclear great powers to conduct counter-homeland conventional strikes, risking nuclear escalation. He explores how competitors view one another's conventional-nuclear firebreaks and their nuclear…
Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age
Increasingly capable and intrusive digital information technologies, advanced dual-use military capabilities, and diffused global power structures will reshape future crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed adversaries and challenge traditional ways of…
Contrasting Views on How to Code a Nuclear Crisis
In this issue’s correspondence section, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long offer up an alternative way to code nuclear crises in response to Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald's article in the February 2019 issue of TNSR. Bell and Macdonald, in turn,…