Book Review Roundtable: Lost Opportunities in Vietnam

Book Review Roundtable: Lost Opportunities in Vietnam

1. Max Boot’s Revisionist Look at Vietnam By Mark Atwood Lawrence Could the United States have won in Vietnam if only Americans had made different decisions about how to fight the war there? For the most part, academic historians have said no. The South…

Book Review Roundtable: The Future of Extended Deterrence

Book Review Roundtable: The Future of Extended Deterrence

Our reviewers respond to Terence Roehrig's new book, "Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella," and ask some tough questions about the purpose and future of extended deterrence.

Book Review Roundtable: Is War with China Coming? Contrasting Visions

Book Review Roundtable: Is War with China Coming? Contrasting Visions

As China increasingly threatens to supplant America's place on the international stage, four scholars review Graham Allison's "Destined for War" and Thomas Wright's "All Measures Short of War."

Too Much History: American Policy and East Asia in the Shadow of the Past

Too Much History: American Policy and East Asia in the Shadow of the Past

East Asian countries have a tendency to recall their historical grievances with rival nations, thus increasing the risk of eventual conflict. American policy toward East Asia, on the other hand, tends to have too short of a memory.

Why Did America Cross the Pacific? Reconstructing the U.S. Decision to Take the Philippines, 1898-99

Why Did America Cross the Pacific? Reconstructing the U.S. Decision to Take the Philippines, 1898-99

A closer examination of what led President William McKinley to take the Philippines reveals a series of deliberate and thoughtful choices that have often been overlooked or ignored.

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1. Max Boot’s Revisionist Look at Vietnam

By Mark Atwood Lawrence Could the United States have won in Vietnam if only Americans had made different decisions about how to fight the war there? For the most part, academic historians have said no. The South Vietnamese state was so flawed and the reservoir of Soviet and Chinese support for the communist war effort so vast, runs the argument, that Washington had no meaningful chance of victory, no matter how adroitly it used its vast power.[1] However, a small handful of historians has long begged to differ. These “revisionists” argue that the United States could have achieved its goal — a secure, anti-communist South Vietnam capable of enduring into the indefinite future — if only it had chosen its methods more wisely. To be sure, proponents of this outlook vary widely in their assessments of precisely what went wrong and what could have been done better. Some focus on military decisions, others on the political or diplomatic realms. But the basic point is the same: American leaders stole defeat from the jaws of victory through bad choices. The “lost-victory” argument first took root in the wartime years, when Lyndon Johnson’s critics excoriated him for failing to wage the war with sufficient boldness. It gained new traction in the 1970s, when Henry Kissinger and his supporters assailed Congress for reneging on U.S. obligations to defend South Vietnam following the 1973 ceasefire, sabotaging a peace deal that would otherwise have established a secure nation.[2] Such views gained additional legitimacy a few years later when revisionism jumped from the realm of naked partisanship into the world of history writing. In America in Vietnam, the first comprehensive revisionist account of the war, political scientist Guenter Lewy contended that the war was winnable if the United States had only prioritized counterinsurgency operations. Lewy also blamed antiwar activists for creating the myth that the United States was inevitably doomed by the complexities of Vietnamese politics.[3] Retired Army Col. Harry G. Summers Jr. followed in 1982 with On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, which took revisionism in a different direction by criticizing civilian leaders for doing too little to mobilize the American public and the U.S. military for failing to use its overwhelming conventional superiority to block the infiltration of supplies and troops from North to South Vietnam.[4] But the real heyday of Vietnam revisionism has been the last couple of decades, when a new group of authors has drawn on mountains of newly available source material to make the case in unprecedented detail. First came Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, which argues that U.S. forces fought effectively in the years after the Tet Offensive and commanded the battlefield to an extent unrecognized by the politicians who pulled the plug on the American military effort.[5] A few years later, Mark Moyar published Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, which delves into the years before the arrival of U.S. combat forces. During that time, argues Moyar, American advisers working alongside South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem made steady progress toward bolstering a viable state. But craven political leaders, abetted by self-serving journalists, torpedoed the whole enterprise by conspiring in Diem’s overthrow, an event that exacerbated South Vietnam’s problems and opened the way to disaster.[6] Now comes Max Boot’s The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, an engaging book that, like Moyar’s study, focuses on lost opportunities in the years before the major escalation of U.S. forces. But Boot makes the case in a fresh and distinctive way — through a biography of Edward G. Lansdale, one of the most fascinating and complex figures in the pantheon of American Cold Warriors. Boot makes no effort to disguise his admiration for Lansdale. The Air-Force-officer-turned-CIA-operative possessed, in Boot’s view, a unique blend of creativity, cultural sensitivity, charisma, and doggedness that made him an exceptionally effective practitioner — indeed, a “maestro” — of counter-insurgency warfare and nation-building in far-off lands. The book focuses first on Lansdale’s work in the Philippines, where he played a key role in defeating the communist Huk insurgency and in rallying Filipinos behind the pro-Western liberal Ramon Magsaysay in the 1953 presidential election. Boot then shifts to Vietnam, where Lansdale attempted to work similar magic in the mid-1950s. This mission started off well enough: Lansdale helped Diem survive innumerable threats to his rule and then lay the foundations of a secure Vietnamese state by winning over his population and suppressing communist opponents. But all this promise evaporated when U.S. leaders abandoned Diem and scrapped Lansdale’s counterinsurgency methods in favor of a conventional war that, in Boot’s view, had no chance of succeeding. Boot writes,
The course that the United States was now embarked on was not just a mistake; it was a catastrophe that would profoundly alter American foreign policy for decades to come, and it might conceivably have been avoided if only Washington policymakers had listened to the advice of a renowned counterinsurgency strategist who had been present at the creation of the state of South Vietnam.
Nor does Boot hold anything back in offering Lansdale up as a model for the 21st century. Over the years, other revisionists — mostly, like Boot, hawkish foreign policy pundits with positions at think tanks rather than academic institutions — have aimed to influence ongoing policy debates by encouraging confidence about the efficacy of U.S. power when properly applied. But Boot, who has championed counterinsurgency tactics in earlier books, takes this presentist agenda to a whole new level.[7] In Lansdale’s story, Boot contends, lie valuable lessons about how to fight insurgencies and how to shape the behavior of unreliable allies. “His practices could be emulated by contemporary advisers in countries ranging from Mali to Mexico,” the book insists. In the reviews that follow, four eminent scholars sink their teeth into Boot’s core claims about Lansdale’s accomplishments and his relevance for our own times. Each raises serious questions about Boot’s analysis, as one might expect at a time when, despite the resurgence of revisionism in some quarters, most academic specialists remain skeptical at best. But these reviews offer far more than mere reassertion of long-standing conventional wisdom. Each delves into a different aspect of the book and raises important questions relevant not just to Boot’s study but to the larger proposition that the United States possesses the power and know-how to shape foreign societies through Lansdalean arts of persuasion. The first review comes from Gregory A. Daddis of Chapman University and author, most recently, of Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (2017), which rebuts revisionist claims about the war in the early 1970s. Daddis criticizes Boot on various fronts but attaches particular importance to Boot’s thin attention to Vietnamese perspectives. The book, complains Daddis, takes an “American-centric” approach that unpersuasively casts Lansdale in the role of “enlightened imperialist” while depicting Diem as a passive and needy recipient of American advice. Daddis also contends that Boot fails to reckon with new evidence of Hanoi’s determination starting in the early 1960s to mount a major war in the South, making Lansdale’s insistence on counterinsurgency methods hopelessly ill-suited to the basic military situation. The second reviewer is Walter C. Ladwig III of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and author of The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (2017). While most reviewers of Boot’s book have understandably focused on the sections dealing with Vietnam, Ladwig offers fresh analysis by focusing on the parts concerning Lansdale’s time in the Philippines. Central to Boot’s argument is Lansdale’s alleged ability to promote constructive change in the Philippines through personal charm and gentle persuasion — a combination of traits that Boot suggests could also have worked in Vietnam if given a chance. Ladwig questions this whole chain of thinking by suggesting that, in fact, the United States got its way in the Philippines as much through coercion as through Lansdale’s friendly partnership with Magsaysay. Heather M. Stur of the University of Southern Mississippi and author of Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era (2011) provides the third review. Stur zeroes in on Boot’s extensive analysis of Landsale’s relationships with the two women in his life, his wife Helen and his mistress (and eventually second wife), a Filipina known as Pat Kelly. Boot attaches huge importance to this triangle, partly because he is the first author to use Lansdale’s extensive correspondence with both women but also because Lansdale’s conflicted affections map so neatly onto his role as intermediary between America and Asia. But Stur takes Boot to task for failing to give the women authentic agency and especially for buying into orientalist clichés about the mysterious sexual allure of Asia. Like Daddis, Stur wonders whether Lansdale was, on the whole, more an old-fashioned imperialist than the tolerant, enlightened man whom Boot describes. Finally, Jon Askonas, a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, echoes Daddis by criticizing Boot for ignoring the perspectives of the Vietnamese and other peoples on the receiving end of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency projects. But he also goes in a different direction by questioning whether Lansdale was, at the end of the day, more a shrewd student of social dynamics or a delusional oddball whose skills have been wildly exaggerated by Boot and other admirers. Fortunately, Askonas concludes, Boot’s biography is so expansive and detailed that attentive readers can reach behind Boot’s enthusiastic spin on his subject and find evidence of the less attractive possibility. Mark Atwood Lawrence is Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin and Director of Graduate Studies at the Clements Center for National Security. He is author or editor of several books about the Vietnam War, including The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. He is now working on a book about U.S. policymaking toward the developing world in the Vietnam era.

2. Vietnam and the White Man’s Burden

By Gregory A. Daddis “He was there creating Vietnam in 1954.” So proclaimed journalist Max Boot during an interview moderated by a fawning Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus at the New York Historical Society in January 2018. The topic of the evening’s discussion was Boot’s latest book, The Road Not Taken, a biographical tome on former U.S. Air Force officer and CIA operative Edward Lansdale.[8] Petraeus found Boot’s biography on Lansdale “wonderful” because it “offers lessons for the present day.” “You should know,” responded Boot. “You literally wrote the manual on counterinsurgency.” The former four-star general’s adulation should not come as a surprise. Much of the 2007 surge in Iraq, overseen by Petraeus himself, was predicated on assumptions similar to those that Lansdale held about local peoples immersed in a civil war. Internal political dissension wracked both the Iraqis and South Vietnamese. Both societies were engaged in internecine war. Both apparently required outside guidance from enlightened Americans to put their countries on a path toward democracy. One might even ask if Petraeus, reading The Road Not Taken, saw himself as part of a counterinsurgency lineage that ran from T.E. Lawrence through Lansdale to the general himself. Given Boot and Petraeus’s obvious desire to fashion Edward Lansdale into a usable figure for today’s conflicts, it seems worthwhile to question a major argument in The Road Not Taken. How responsible was Lansdale for the creation of South Vietnam? For Boot, the answer is clear. Lansdale was already his “country’s most successful political warrior” of the entire Cold War era.[9] He “masterminded the election of Ramon Magsaysay” in the Philippines, according to Boot in his New York interview. The American was a decisive factor in prevailing over the 1955 sect crisis that threatened South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem’s political future. Lansdale traveled extensively, taught “psywar” techniques to Vietnamese soldiers, wrote a counterinsurgency strategy, and “took on the herculean challenge of trying to consolidate Diem’s power.”[10] Moreover, Boot argues, Lansdale was “right to doubt Diem’s political acumen.”[11] Thus, throughout The Road Not Taken, Lansdale is portrayed as an enlightened imperialist who uses his charm and empathy to befriend local leaders and then gently guide them, as would a tolerant parent, through the tribulations of political adolescence. This American-centric view of the Cold War surely is not without precedent. Many U.S. policymakers came out of World War II with a deep-seated faith in their ability to transform societies abroad and inoculate them from the contamination of communist influence. Modernization theorist Walt Rostow argued in The Stages of Economic Growth, that “traditional” societies too could mature into modern nations if only they followed the developmental model of the United States.[12] It is no surprise that the American experience served as the model for such philosophers. Yet what if we take Boot’s claims about Lansdale and shift the lens of analysis to the Vietnamese themselves? How did local leaders view this supposedly modern-day Lawrence of Arabia? Perhaps unsurprisingly, these local leaders did not revere Lansdale in the same way Boot does. The endnotes of The Road Not Taken contain few, if any, materials from Vietnamese sources. Readers rarely hear local voices in this story except for those filtered through Americans. Like Lansdale, Boot has no fluency in the Vietnamese language (nor did Lansdale even speak French which makes one question how much insight he truly could have gained during his two-year stint in Vietnam from 1954 to 1956). A new generation of scholars on Vietnam, however, are far better equipped than Boot to judge Lansdale’s accomplishments, and they are less reverential of the American. Edward Miller, for instance, finds Diem and his inner circle crafting their own strategy for political consolidation in South Vietnam. To Miller, Diem was careful to accept any U.S. advice and support “only on his own terms, in ways that furthered his designs.”[13] Boot certainly acknowledges that Lansdale’s advice was “eclipsed by the influence of Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and his sister-in-law.”[14] But here the storyline remains firmly embedded in an American-centric worldview because Lansdale functions as a convenient North Star. “If only” Diem had been wiser, more compliant, less obdurate. If only he had listened to the wise American, things might have turned out differently. This counterfactual approach reaches its crescendo as the Lyndon B. Johnson administration decided to Americanize the war in mid-1965. If only Lansdale had been able to prevail over the bureaucracy and convince Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to embrace a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy — so admired by Petraeus — then the American war might have evolved along a different path. Yet, as Boot tells us, “McNamara had little time for Lansdale.”[15] By considering the Vietnamese perspective, such “if only” arguments ultimately fall flat. While Boot correctly argues that Diem’s coup and assassination in November 1963 proved a major turning point in U.S. decision-making on Vietnam, he errs in assuming that Lansdale’s advice continued to make sense in 1964 and 1965. In short, Boot views the war in Vietnam as static. It was not. After Diem’s overthrow, the Hanoi Politburo, now under the influence of General Secretary Le Duan, decided upon a strategy aiming for a “decisive military victory.” Scholarship based on Vietnamese rather than only American sources offers important perspective. Lien-Hang Nguyen’s excellent work on Hanoi’s wartime decision-making clearly demonstrates that Le Duan had committed in late 1964, if not earlier, to achieving a military victory in South Vietnam. In early 1965, for instance, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) doubled its ranks for what Politburo leaders feared was an upcoming battle with American troops.[16] Lansdale may not have wanted to fight a conventional war, but Le Duan certainly did. One wonders how Lansdale’s prescriptions on counterinsurgency were at all relevant to the threat of North Vietnamese regiments infiltrating down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam. Boot never says, instead placing blame on McNamara and the U.S. military commander in Vietnam, William C. Westmoreland, for committing to an ill-advised strategy of attrition. The “if only” counterfactuals stack higher and higher. Returning to Boot’s endnotes, such flawed argumentation begins to makes sense. Boot has marshaled no primary sources from the military command — no command policies, no private messages from Westmoreland to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no after-action reports from U.S. combat units in the field. Instead, old clichés are recycled in mechanical fashion. Thus, in Boot’s storyline, Westmoreland had turned the entire South Vietnamese countryside into one ruinous “free fire zone” where “victory was a high body-count.”[17] In reality, U.S. military strategy proved far more comprehensive than Boot allows. Even before the introduction of American combat troops, Westmoreland was laying out a concept of operations that noted the dual threat to the South Vietnamese countryside — from “large well-organized and -equipped forces including those that may come from outside their country” and from “the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer.”[18] Moreover, allied pacification plans from 1964 onward consistently stressed the importance of securing the population and the importance of the political contest for the people’s loyalty.[19] To Petraeus, though, Boot offered a different, more spiteful account: Westmoreland thought “Lansdale was an idiot.” Yet, quite simply, there is not a shred of evidence in the historical record to support this bogus assertion. This is not meant to defend Westmoreland. Clearly, U.S. military strategy in Vietnam failed to achieve its aim of promoting a stable, independent, non-communist South Vietnam. Rather, a deeper analysis of the American war in Vietnam illustrates far more nuance than depicted in The Road Not Taken. But for his “if only” history to persuade, Boot requires convenient bogeymen. If only the U.S. governmental bureaucracy had listened to Lansdale. If only McNamara and Westmoreland were as discerning as Lansdale. If only the South Vietnamese had been more compliant apprentices. This last point seems most central — and most pernicious — in Boot’s admiration of Edward Lansdale. At its core, The Road Not Taken is a story of an enlightened imperialist. A white Westerner swoops in with only his wit and personal magnetism to captivate the local leaders and offer them a path toward modernity. That the traditional society never realizes its full potential has less to do with the imperialist himself than with those too feeble of mind to accept his advice and munificence. Like ancient lore passed down in an oral tradition from generation to generation, this revisionist recasting of history as a white man’s burden surely holds allure for those like Boot who aspire to a new global American empire.[20] Such narratives reinforce the nationalistic sense of self in the minds of many Americans like him. They bolster claims to American exceptionalism. But these fanciful tales also nudge the reader away from deeper questions that surely would be more profitable when studying the American experience during the Cold War era. Was it wise for the United States to intervene in a civil war over Vietnamese identity? Could a white foreigner with no language skills truly understand the local political community, which he aspired to mentor? Why, throughout the war in Southeast Asia, did far too many Americans see themselves as superior to the Vietnamese, both north and south? And how did this experience illustrate the limits of American power abroad? To engage in such a retrospective, to tackle these deeper questions, undoubtedly is an uncomfortable exercise. But history should be more than a “dose of patriotic therapy.”[21] Counterfactual storytelling based on “if only” narratives may satisfy emotionally, but they hardly impart a history that embraces complexity. Max Boot wants his reader to believe that if only Edward Lansdale had prevailed, history might have unfolded in dramatically different ways. Yet widening the historical scope to include more than just American voices, to evaluate why historical actors made the decisions they did rather than what they should have done, reveals a different, perhaps less satisfying, conclusion. Lansdale’s was a road not taken because it was a road not feasible. Gregory A. Daddis is an associate professor of history and director of Chapman University’s MA Program in War and Society. His most recent book is Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2017).

3. Friendly Persuasion is Not Enough: The Limits of the Lansdale Approach

By Walter C. Ladwig III Providing aid and advice to local governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than directly intervening with American forces, has recently been identified as a more cost-effective way to counter irregular threats to U.S. interests.[22] The challenge that such undertakings have repeatedly faced in the past is that partner governments often have their own interests and priorities which can diverge significantly from those of Washington.[23] Consequently, a host of observers have pointed out that while the United States has provided its partners with extensive assistance to combat insurgents and terrorist groups, an inability to convince them to adopt its counterinsurgency prescriptions or address what Washington sees as the political and economic “root causes” of a conflict has repeatedly emerged as a major impediment to success.[24] In the absence of sufficient influence to convince a local government to address these shortcomings, critics suggest that significant American aid and support can actually reduce its incentives to address domestic discontent or govern inclusively, which can render a supported regime less stable than it would have been without U.S. assistance.[25] Based on his study of the life and career of Edward Lansdale, Max Boot has suggested that future advisors can find a template for influencing local governments in Lansdale’s “art of friendly persuasion.”[26] One of the Cold War’s most colorful characters, Lansdale’s career spanned Madison Avenue, the U.S. Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Lansdale rose to prominence as the advisor, confidant, and friend of Philippine Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay during the Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946 to 1954). Under Lansdale’s mentorship, Magsaysay professionalized and depoliticized the Philippine armed forces, which enhanced their effectiveness in the field, while also working to ensure that free and fair elections in the country were not thwarted by vested political interests.[27] In 1949 the Hukbalahap guerrillas possessed some 12,000 men under arms and more than 100,000 active sympathizers.[28] By 1954, however, facing defeat on the battlefield and seeing an opportunity to achieve social change via the ballot box, the Huks were willing to give up their armed struggle. The tools Lansdale employed to influence and mentor Magsaysay were patience, understanding, and above all friendly persuasion to build trust with his counterpart. The CIA operative would later seek to employ the same means to shape the behavior of another U.S. partner in Southeast Asia, the leader of the fledgling Republic of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem.[29] In calling attention to the importance of advisory efforts, Boot does a real service. Unfortunately, a narrow focus on Lansdale himself and an over-reliance on the man’s own account of events in the Philippines leads to mistaken conclusions about cause and effect. A broader reading of U.S. involvement in the Huk Rebellion raises questions about the degree to which American influence stemmed from friendly persuasion and the utility of that technique to, in Boot’s words, “influence allies to take difficult but necessary steps such as fighting corruption without risking a blowup or backlash.”[30] Pressure Not Persuasion in the Huk Rebellion There is no question that Lansdale and Magsaysay formed a highly effective partnership that helped transform the Philippine government’s counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, at the end of the day, as secretary of national defense, Magsaysay was but one part of the administration. As my own study of U.S. patron-client relations in counterinsurgency demonstrates, their relationship was embedded in a far more coercive American influence strategy that pressured, rather than persuaded, the Philippine government to reform.[31] Despite the communist links of the Hukbalahap insurgents who were attempting to overthrow the government of President Elpidio Quirino, the American view was that the roots of the insurgency were socio-economic rather than strictly political. Guerrilla fighters primarily took up arms in response to abuses by the security forces, electoral fraud, and a lack of access to sufficient agricultural land.[32] Consequently, in countering the insurgency, as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed, “military measures … can only be a temporary expedient. Remedial political and economic measures must be adopted by the Philippine Government in order to eliminate the basic causes of discontent among the Philippine people.”[33] Unfortunately, Quirino was disinclined to undertake these redistributive reforms because the base of his ruling Liberal Party benefitted from the existing political and economic status quo. The Philippine government did eventually take steps to address some of the rural discontent driving support for the insurgency. They introduced a minimum wage for agricultural workers and significantly revised the government’s tax policy that enhanced revenue in an equitable fashion to pay for the war and enhanced social spending. These reforms, which had been opposed by the Philippine government, did not come about via friendly persuasion, but by attaching tough conditions to American aid. In the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, American assistance was “firmly conditioned on satisfactory performance by the Philippine Government,” rendering it “as a lever to obtain such performance.”[34] This lever worked. As a contemporaneous scholar of Philippine politics, David Wurfel, wrote,
Few would have dared predict six months earlier that the Philippine Congress could pass in short order two laws, such as the minimum wage and the increased corporate income tax . . . In sum, the leverage of proffered foreign aid had produced the legislative authorization for social change probably not possible otherwise.[35]
A similar approach was taken in the military realm. At the start of the conflict, counterinsurgency operations were the responsibility of the Philippine Constabulary, a national paramilitary police force whose corrupt and abusive ways created more insurgents than they captured.[36] Under the authority of the secretary of the interior, the constabulary often functioned as hired thugs for the country’s large landlords who employed them to terrorize agricultural workers. Recognizing the role of the constabulary in stimulating support for the insurgency, the commander of the U.S. Joint Military Assistance Group urged Quirino to depoliticize the force by putting them under the control of the Department of National Defense and assigning the Philippine army primary responsibility for combatting the insurgents. The Philippine president resisted because such reforms would constrain the Liberal Party’s ability to use the constabulary to suppress their political opponents — which is precisely what the American advisors intended. The United States eventually succeeded in forcing the Philippine government to restructure its armed forces, subordinate the constabulary to the less politicized Department of National Defense, and give the army the lead in counterinsurgency operations, but once again it was tough conditions on U.S. military aid — even in the face of a growing insurgent threat — not friendly persuasion that achieved the result. Magsaysay’s own rise to power from congressman to secretary of national defense was due, in part, to American coercion. This is not to say that Magsaysay was an American creation by any means—he possessed his own political base and the patronage of leading Filipino politicians—but his candidacy received a boost from U.S. pressure. The details remain somewhat murky since the American officials involved actively attempted to downplay their role to avoid undercutting Magsaysay’s credibility.[37] Douglas MacDonald recounts a claim that “President Truman sent a telegram directly to Quirino telling him to appoint Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense or risk losing U.S. military aid.”[38] Boot’s version of events echoes Cecil Currey in crediting Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant with delivering the same message, while the State Department’s Director of the Office of Philippine Affairs, John Melby maintains that he was the one to instruct Quirino that future U.S. military aid was linked to Magsaysay’s appointment.[39] When the Philippine president shrugged and replied, “You know, you’re asking me to commit political suicide,” Melby allegedly responded, “Yes, I know that, but unless you do it there’s no more American military aid forthcoming.”[40] In the face of this threat, Quirino acquiesced. Common to all of these accounts is an American threat to cut off military aid to a partner government that was on the back foot in its battle against an insurgency. This was persuasion, but it certainly wasn’t friendly. Once in office, the effect of Magsaysay’s military reforms was bolstered by American pressure being wielded on his behalf. Magsaysay managed to engender dramatic improvements in the army’s rank-and-file as well as the junior officer corps. However, the effectiveness of the military was hampered by the fact that it was still led by the architects of the Philippine government’s initial abusive and ineffective response to the Huk insurgency, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mariano Castañeda, and the constabulary commander, Brigadier Alberto Ramos. Castañeda was a corrupt yet affable figure who refused to cooperate with Magsaysay’s reform efforts and was not seen by senior Philippine leaders to be sufficiently competent for command of the military.[41] Ramos was even worse: A known Japanese collaborator, the U.S. embassy in Manila judged that “beyond protecting perpetrators of abuses,” the brigadier had “done nothing but draw his breath and his salary.”[42] Although replacing the duo might have enhanced military effectiveness, the two men had played a key role in delivering the fraudulent 1949 election to the Liberal Party. Moreover, after several recent coup attempts in the region, Quirino was particularly fearful about the loyalty of his armed forces and favored reliability over capability. Magsaysay’s predecessor as Secretary of National Defense had resigned when Quirino refused to fire Castañeda and Ramos for mismanaging the anti-Huk campaign. Magsaysay ended up issuing a similar ultimatum to Quirino, however, this time around the threat was bolstered by the American decision to condition $10 million in military aid on the immediate retirement of the pair.[43] Under duress, Quirino complied. As Magsaysay turned his attention to ensuring free and fair elections in the country, he alienated his former patrons in the ruling Liberal Party who stood to lose from legitimate polls. These senior politicians worked to constrain his authority, undo his reforms, and remove him from office. However, it was implicit and explicit threats to cut American military aid, not friendly persuasion, that shielded Magsaysay and his reform efforts from domestic political enemies.[44] Whether in the economic, the military, or the political realm, pressure not persuasion was the main source of American influence over the Philippine government. Such was the judgement of the American ambassador in Manila, Myron Cowen, who advised Washington that although the United States successfully shaped the Philippine government’s policies in a number of areas, we “must recognize that without exception, [these reforms] were made possible only by continuously applied pressure.”[45] When the Americans did not deploy pressure via conditions on aid to support Magsaysay, he was far less effective. Having won the presidency in a landslide in the 1953 election at the head of a broad coalition, it was expected that Magsaysay would continue his reforming ways from the highest office in the land.[46] With the Huk rebellion defeated, however, the United States was far less concerned about redistributive reforms in the Philippines and no longer intervened on the new President’s behalf. Consequently, Magsaysay’s various attempts at socio-economic reforms foundered at the hands of vested interests. By this time, however, Lansdale was no longer involved in events on a day-to-day basis, having been dispatched to South Vietnam by CIA director Allen Dulles. The lesson Lansdale drew from his narrow perspective in the Philippines was that a combination of patience, shared hardship, and an exhibition of sincere empathy could foster the personal chemistry necessary to influence an embattled American partner. He presumed that the trust and confidence inspired by a sympathetic advisor could lead a previously reactionary or repressive government to willingly rein in abuses by the security forces, combat corruption, implement civic-action programs (health, education, public welfare, etc.), and undertake other reforms that would rally the population to the government’s side. Consequently, Lansdale would prove to be just the first of many American officials in Saigon who would search in vain for a “Vietnamese Magsaysay” to save the country.[47] Modern Magsaysays? The purpose of recounting these events is not to quibble over the historiography of U.S.-Philippine relations, but to ask: What this can tell us that is relevant for today? Friendly persuasion was an effective influence tool in Lansdale’s relationship with Magsaysay in no small part because the latter’s interests and aims were already closely aligned with those of the U.S. Magsaysay had fought with an American affiliated guerrilla unit during World War II, he shared many of his American partners’ assessments of the problems facing the Philippines, and as a congressman, he cooperated closely with the U.S. military assistance group.[48] In short, as Douglas MacDonald writes, “…Magsaysay was an American liberal reformer’s dream come true. A dynamic, charismatic, honest and compassionate leader dedicated to democratic values is a rare commodity in any country, not just in the Third World.”[49] In contrast, more coercive strategies were necessary to influence Quirino because his interests and those of the U.S. diverged in key respects. The Philippine and American governments agreed that preventing the Huks from seizing power was important, but the way they wanted to go about it was quite different. For Quirino, maintaining his office was a competing priority and both rival political elites and the nation’s armed forces were potential threats to his power. Consequently, the types of reforms and policy changes the United States was pushing in the Philippines — redistributive economic reforms, ending patronage politics in the military, and holding clean elections — were resisted because, irrespective of their utility as counterinsurgency measures, they directly challenged the interests of his key supporters and therefore his hold on power. If you are lucky enough to have an authentic domestic reformer with no internal opposition as your partner, friendly persuasion may be an effective influence tool. It is unlikely to be sufficient, however, to convince a less enlightened leader to risk reforms that they believe could lead to their overthrow or worse. This raises a key question: In the future is the United States more likely to work with regimes whose interests are closely aligned or those who diverge significantly? To put it differently, are Magsaysays more common or Quirinos? Sadly, recent academic research on the subject suggests that the latter is far more common.[50] Advising a government in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism suffers from a phenomenon that economists call adverse selection.[51] This is a situation where, due to the specifics of a transaction, the only actors who wish to participate are “bad” ones. Adverse selection often occurs in insurance markets, like automobile insurance, where the people who most want collision insurance are those who drive a lot or otherwise self-assess that they are more likely to have accidents. If there wasn’t a law requiring people to have insurance, the people seeking coverage would not be a representative sample of all drivers, but only the riskiest ones. There is a parallel phenomenon with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.[52] Since effective, legitimate governments rarely lose control of substantial portions of their country to terrorists or insurgents, the only regimes needing external assistance to combat domestic political opponents are almost by definition flawed in some key respects—be they weak, incompetent, fraudulent, abusive, or all of the above. In turn, the same governmental shortcomings that facilitate the emergence of an insurgency also undercut the effectiveness of the counterinsurgent response.[53] Even if they have the capacity to do so, local governments are rarely eager to address such problems as their core supporters frequently benefit from the country’s political and economic status quo. It is perhaps unsurprising that after a year serving as the senior U.S. advisor to the South Vietnamese I Corps, Col. Bryce Denno cogently observed in his 1963 end-of-tour report that:
It would be a miraculous coincidence if a host nation in a war of counterinsurgency were to share identical objectives with the U.S. or arrive at identical solutions to problems that arise. Hence, it behooves the U.S. to seek ways in which it can influence the host nation to act in a manner compatible with U.S. interests in a war which we are financing to a large extent and otherwise supporting.[54]
Consequently, Denno advised his superiors:
The development of techniques and means to increase U.S. leverage in Vietnam is the single most important problem facing us there and it will be a fundamental problem in any future counterinsurgency effort in which we become involved.[55]
No matter how much aid you give a country or how many advisers you send, if you cannot prevent the local government from employing these resources to pursue its own agenda, or from prioritizing political reliability in the armed forces over military effectiveness, the assistance effort will come to naught. One does not have to revisit the unhappy American experience in Vietnam to understand the limits of friendly persuasion in such circumstances, but merely look at the recent U.S. experience in Iraq.[56] The Bush administration expected that their partner, Iraqi Prime Minister Nori al-Maliki, would embrace its strategy of overcoming the insurgency by bringing Kurds and Sunnis into the political process alongside the Shia majority. Instead, Maliki prioritized bolstering his position among radical Shia political groups, turned a blind eye to violence against Sunnis, and favored sectarian loyalists rather than professional officers in the Iraqi Security Forces.[57] The Bush administration never tried to compel Maliki to change his ways, even though his actions were undermining American efforts in Iraq.[58] Instead, the Iraqi leader was provided with unconditioned aid and support to persuade him to make better choices. President Bush personally sought to mentor Maliki and in his own words provided him with unstinting “advice and understanding” in the belief that “Once I had earned his trust I would be in a better position to help him make the tough decisions.”[59] Bush specifically notes that he “was careful not to bully him or appear heavy-handed.”[60] This approach failed to restrain Maliki’s sectarian agenda, which prevented the military gains from the 2007 surge from being translated into positive political outcomes and arguably laid the foundation for the rise of the Islamic State.[61] Toward the Future With large-scale U.S. military interventions seemingly at an end, it appears that advisory missions will be a key component of U.S. efforts in the so-called War on Terror. In a coda to his phenomenally researched and detailed account of Edward Lansdale’s career, (“Lansdalism in the Twenty-First Century”), Boot suggests that the quixotic CIA officer can provide a useful role model for future American advisors, both civilian and military.[62] Lansdale’s advocacy of patience, understanding, cultural awareness and local solutions for local problems are all to be commended. It is similarly difficult to disagree with Lansdale’s focus on the political dimensions of civil war, or as Boot writes, the belief “that there was more to defeating insurgencies than killing insurgents.” Unfortunately, Lansdale’s partnership with Ramon Magsaysay does not provide a template for addressing what Boot describes as “the key American shortcoming” in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam: “the inability to constructively guide the leaders of allied states in the direction desired by Washington.”[63] The emergence of a popular, capable, indigenous reformer in Magsaysay was a unique circumstance that is unlikely to be replicated in other settings. Moreover, whether Lansdale realized it or not, American influence over the Philippine government was primarily the result of pressure and tough conditions on aid, which strengthened Magsaysay’s hand vis-à-vis reactionaries opposed to his reforms. Lansdale’s life story makes an entertaining read and his model of friendly persuasion is a wonderful ideal, but the strategy is unlikely to be sufficient in practice. Walter C. Ladwig III is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the author of The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017) from which materials in this essay are drawn.

4. The Woman Question in Max Boot’s Tale of Edward Lansdale

By Heather Marie Stur During a party at Edward Lansdale’s Saigon villa in 1956, Lansdale performed a traditional Philippine dance called tinikling, and it was not awkward. A photograph of the moment shows Lansdale in a white tunic and cropped pants, smiling joyfully as he taught the dance to a friend. He was not an embarrassed white man clumsily attempting a native dance in a cringeworthy demonstration of good will. It was Lansdale at his most comfortable: as the life of a multicultural party where a Philippine dance broke the ice between his American and Vietnamese friends. The snapshot depicted Lansdalian diplomacy in action, in which cultural exchange on the ground with ordinary people was an essential tactic in nation-building strategy. Max Boot’s engaging biography is one of only a few works that examines Lansdale, whose belief in cultural sensitivity and commitment to individual liberty continues to inform American counterinsurgency theory. In the early 1950s, Lansdale’s successful training of Ramon Magsaysay to assume the presidency of an independent Philippines and neutralize the Hukbalahap rebellion became the model U.S. policymakers would attempt to replicate in South Vietnam. While working in Vietnam, Lansdale got closer than any other American to Ngo Dinh Diem, the man meant to be a Vietnamese Magsaysay. Things didn’t work out in Vietnam quite the way they did in the Philippines, though. Diem alienated the Buddhist opposition and was never popular with the masses. After Diem was assassinated, Washington replaced Lansdale and his CIA team with combat troops. Yet Lansdale’s influence remained in the “hearts and minds” approach to pacification that Gen. Creighton Abrams advocated. Lansdale himself spent the better part of two decades in Southeast Asia, save a brief detour to the Caribbean to try and topple Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba. From the Office of Strategic Services to the CIA, from the Philippines to Vietnam, from the United States to Asia, Lansdale traversed the transpacific world in a life’s work that bridged Tales from the South Pacific and The Ugly American. In his career, Lansdale embodied the “ugly American” — a misunderstood moniker that refers not to an American tourist behaving badly but to a diplomat willing to roll up his sleeves and get down at the village level for a drink, a meal, a walk, and a conversation to learn about local customs, values, and needs. It is one of two sides of Lansdale that Boot’s portrait reveals. In that form, Lansdale was a maverick who possessed an innate curiosity about humanity in all its diversity.[64] Boot makes a compelling claim that racism did not appear to have tainted Lansdale’s view of Asia at a time when U.S. policymakers referred to Filipinos and Vietnamese as “little brown brothers.” It was a key example of the chasm between Lansdale and the risk-averse policy establishment, a rift made all the wider by Lansdale’s unwillingness to accept received wisdom about nation-building. The tragedy that emerges from Boot’s telling of the Vietnam War story resulted from Washington’s impatience with what Lansdale understood to be the slow processes of cultivating political stability, fostering economic development, and establishing a national identity. As unconventional as Lansdale was in his career, he was an everyman in his personal life, and this is where Boot’s book contributes something new. Other scholars, notably Edward Miller, Mark Moyar, and Lewis Sorley, have written about the possibilities for Vietnam had Americans made different choices regarding Diem and the war.[65] While Boot’s focus on Lansdale is unique, the broader theme of “what might have been” is established in the historiography. What we know much less about is the impact of U.S. foreign relations on the lives and marriages of deployed personnel, their families, and local populations from the 1940s onward as part of U.S. military and diplomatic expansion. (In the afterword, Boot speculates that Lansdale might have had a Vietnamese mistress, in addition to his long-time Filipina paramour.) In Boot’s narrative, Lansdale’s love life was not the sideshow but the main event. It shaped him, his work, and, by extension, U.S. intervention in Asia. From the collections of personal letters Boot accessed, he pieces together a picture of an international post-World War II generation in which foreign relations shaped and were influenced by the women in the lives of American men overseas. Helen Lansdale represents the diplomatic and military wives whose husbands were stationed at U.S. embassies and military bases all over the world. Pat Kelly, a Manila newspaper staffer who volunteered to be Lansdale’s guide through rural Luzon, symbolizes the local women who caught the attention of American men abroad. Kelly, whose given name was Patrocinio Yapcinco, was from Tarlac Province, a Huk stronghold in central Luzon. Her husband, James Kelly, an Irish-Filipino orphan, died of tuberculosis in 1944, and Pat got a job to support herself and her baby daughter, Patricia. Pat eventually went to work for the United States, and she was assigned to work as Lansdale’s guide and interpreter. Sometimes the intersections of the personal and the political determined the course of international relations. Had Pat and Ed not met, Ramon Magsaysay might not have ascended to the presidency of the Philippines, providing the United States with its model for South Vietnam and sealing the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale might not have requested to return to the Philippines. Perhaps without realizing it, Boot validates the “cultural turn” in diplomatic and military history. Gender and sex influence the behavior of diplomats, military officers, and intelligence agents in ways that end up charting or shifting the courses of foreign relations and war. Boot is very clear about the importance of Lansdale’s wives (he married Kelly after Helen died in the 1970s), noting their roles in “some of his most consequential decisions, such as his return to the Philippines for a second, history-altering tour in 1950.”[66] He claims to be the first writer to have read Lansdale’s letters from both wives, which “provide the most intimate and complete account that will ever be available of Lansdale’s thinking — and they reveal the hitherto unrevealed importance of his love affair with Pat to the narrative of his life.”[67] Boot’s portrayal of the women in Lansdale’s life is provocative because, according to a recent piece he wrote for Foreign Policy, 2017 was the year Boot “got woke” to his white male privilege.[68] Unfortunately, neither Boot’s new consciousness nor the weight he places on Lansdale’s relationships with his wives inspired him to flesh out the Lansdale love triangle. His depiction of Helen Lansdale is one-dimensional, and his discussions of Pat Kelly are, at times, tied to old tropes about the exotic Orient and its alluring women. In Boot’s version of Lansdale’s romantic drama, Pat Kelly was beguiling while Helen Lansdale was prematurely gray. Pat teased and flirted while Helen was quiet. Pat was exciting while Helen was boring. It is as though Boot is trying to excuse Lansdale’s dalliances by making Helen the problem, implying that someone so dull couldn’t possibly satisfy an adventurous man of the world like Lansdale, and, let’s face it, men must be satisfied. That is their privilege. All of this may have been true, but Boot’s flat sketch of Helen leaves out the broader contexts that help explain her behaviors and motives. She was a complex human being just as her husband was. Social and cultural expectations likely limited her options and influenced her personal decisions as much as Lansdale did. Mr. and Mrs. Lansdale weren’t making love on a beach in California because he was overseas, and she was back home playing both mother and father to two sons. Boot remarks that Helen Lansdale refused to ask for a divorce when she learned of her husband’s affair, but a truly “woke” character study of the first Mrs. Lansdale would include a discussion of the limited financial and legal options she would have faced as a divorcee, not to mention the emotional and psychological effects on her and her sons. There was more at stake than Lansdale’s belief in his ability to win hearts and minds in Asia, his desire for adventure, or his longing for Pat Kelly. Lansdale himself understood this, which is why he didn’t simply quit his American family when Helen wouldn’t seek a divorce. Meanwhile, Kelly is important to the story not because she was a bewitching Filipina, but because she helped Lansdale break into rural Philippine society where he learned the most about the Huk insurgency. Kelly was a high school classmate of Luis Taruc, the Huks’ military leader, in Tarlac City in central Luzon, and she was able to get Lansdale remarkably close to the rebels. To his credit, Boot writes Kelly with much more empathy and depth than what he offers Helen. He acknowledges Kelly’s strategic importance, asserting that “it was her role as an invaluable intermediary and interpreter, not only of language but also of customs and mindsets, that would account for so much of his success with the Filipino people.”[69] Kelly played a vital role in one of America’s most successful nation-building efforts and had a long history of working for the United States, including years with the U.S. War Damage Commission and the U.S. Information Agency at the U.S. embassy in Manila. As Boot explains, Kelly was fairly unconventional in Philippine society as a working woman who became the head of her family after her husband and her father both died in the 1940s. Boot brings Kelly to life and illustrates her importance to the mission primarily through Lansdale’s letters and the author’s interviews with those who knew Kelly. From a methodology perspective, Boot’s book is a good example of how personal papers and oral histories can offer important details on military missions, policymaking, and other “official” business. Despite Kelly’s important role in U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the Philippines, it would not be surprising if her voice is absent from the archival record. Her race and her gender would have ensured that her American male colleagues would not have written her recommendations into an official report, and if they did, they likely would not have credited her. It is not clear whether Boot looked for Kelly in the records of the War Damage Commission or the U.S. Information Agency where she had worked, but were Kelly still alive, it would be fascinating to talk with her and learn her opinions of U.S.-Philippine relations, her country’s history and future, and her married lover. That Boot made the effort to craft a fairly vibrant portrait of Pat Kelly leaves readers wondering why he did not do Helen the same courtesy even though Lansdale’s relationship with her is also important to his life story. Having spent most of her adult life as a housewife, Helen likely would not appear in archival documents, but published sources on American women in the Cold War era would have provided some context for understanding the women of Helen’s generation. This type of background information might have helped Boot speculate about why Helen behaved and responded to her husband in the ways that she did. While Boot develops Kelly as an agent of her own history, he comes close to orientalism when describing the “mysterious East” as he sets the scene for the moment Lansdale and Kelly met. He writes, “As long as Western men have been journeying to the Orient (a term that once encompassed all of Asia and North Africa), they have, inevitably, fallen in love with the women they found there.”[70] Does Boot believe that, or is he referring to what men of a different era thought? He continues by describing the “Age of Discovery” as “an age of sexual discovery, with all kinds of tropes and innuendos that are now considered racist.”[71] But it’s not just that standards for polite conversation have changed. Europeans’ “erotic fascination” with the Far East was part of a broader imperial culture that used race, gender, and sexuality to justify Europe’s subjugation of its African and Asian colonies and establish power dynamics between Europeans and people of color. Boot does not discuss this context except to mention Edward Said’s orientalism, the theory that 19th-century Europeans crafted an exotic, romanticized image of the Middle East that rationalized Europe’s exploitation of colonized subjects. Boot concedes that “[t]here is an element of truth in the charge” but then counters with: “… the exploitation was not entirely one-sided—many poor Asian women saw relationships with Westerners as an opportunity for economic betterment”.[72] Poor Asian women exploited Western men? In colonialism? An author who claims to understand his white male privilege and “the reality of discrimination, harassment, even violence that people of color and women continue to experience” wrote this?[73] By accusing impoverished Asian women of manipulating Western men for a chance at a more financially secure future, Boot demonstrates a surprising obliviousness to the power dynamics that would have prevented such reverse exploitation. Boot lets quotes such as the Times’ Richard Bernstein’s comment about “an Eastern erotic culture that had always been more frank and less morally fastidious about sexual needs than the Western Christian erotic culture” hang without analysis.[74] Failing to delve into meaning and context, Boot misses an opportunity to challenge an outdated Western image of Asia by describing the prudish nature of Diem-era Vietnamese society. It’s important context for the time period in which Lansdale was stationed in Vietnam. Concerned citizens worried about the corrupting effects of American men and Western culture on Vietnamese women and traditional values. As J. William Fulbright noted, the Americans, not the Vietnamese, were responsible for turning Saigon into a brothel.[75] Boot’s link between Sir Richard Burton’s orientalism and Lansdale’s Southeast Asia is Puccini’s Madame Butterfly. The 1904 opera tells a tragic love story of an American naval officer and a Japanese teenaged girl who bears his son and then commits suicide when her lover returns to Japan with his American wife. Speculating that “[n]o doubt there were many such heartbreaks — and even some suicides — that resulted from liaisons between Western men and Asian women,” Boot then brings readers to the love story of Edward Lansdale and Pat Kelly.[76] Boot’s description of Helen Lansdale as “an old-fashioned, self-conscious ‘lady’ who had gone to a finishing school and behaved according to the prim standards of the early twentieth-century provincial American upper class” sets her up as the inhibited wife who drove her husband into the arms of a “livelier” Asian woman.[77] What does it all mean for our understanding of Lansdale and U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia? Was Lansdale a Western explorer who “inevitably” fell in love with an Asian woman? Does Boot believe Lansdale was the Cold War-era descendant of a 400-year-old lineage of white men drawn to the “alluring Orient?” If so, can we extrapolate that the orientalist framework that Europeans used to justify imperialism also informed U.S. intervention in Asia in the twentieth century?[78] Does Boot believe that the United States acts in the world just like its imperial European forefathers? Where does Pat Kelly fit into this framework? Does Boot see her independence and political acumen as an anomaly, or as a real-life example that complicates the romanticized image of Asian women? Absent a discussion of the colonial context in which Europeans developed the idea of the exotic Orient and the ways in which similar racial constructs have shaped U.S. foreign relations, it is unclear why Boot introduced Lansdale’s relationship with Kelly in this framework. Lansdale is actually an interesting character through which to explore these issues. Boot describes his long fascination with Asia, from his wearing of a sarong while in college to his interest in Filipino folk music, none of which indicates racism or anything else insidious. Lansdale’s willingness to meet Filipinos and Vietnamese on their terms and to go into villages to assess the attitudes of local people suggests a genuine desire to assist in these nations’ political development. Based on the evidence Boot offers, Lansdale did not appear to see himself as a man on a civilizing mission to uplift the darker races. Boot could have used Lansdale and Kelly to challenge the mysterious Asia construct rather than presenting it as the natural explanation for their relationship. Lansdale, the ugly American, believed that native people had important things to tell him about their country’s future. Kelly was an employee of the U.S. government, not a dragon lady or a sexually exotic object. In his letters, Lansdale wrote that he was drawn to Kelly’s mind as much as her body, and if that was true, then he deserves more credit than Boot gives him when he places him in the same category as earlier European colonizers. Boot’s tendency to provide lengthy quotes — usually from love letters between Lansdale and Kelly — without analysis or broader context is a flaw that runs throughout the book. Perhaps Boot believes discussions of the cultural constructs that influenced Lansdale’s relationships with his women belong in dense academic tomes and might bore a popular audience. But analysis need not be laden with tedious jargon, and the American public gets the complicated issues regarding gender, sex, women, and the patriarchy. The #metoo movement has proven that. Analysis can also prevent readers from mistaking the writer for being uninformed or, worse, an apologist for the orientalism of Victorian imperialists. This should be especially important to an author who has announced that his consciousness is raised, and that he now understands that the oppressive forces of racism and sexism are real. Sometime in the mid-1950s, Helen Lansdale stood beside her husband as he received a medal from Vice President Richard Nixon. While Edward Lansdale lived an adventure-filled career in the Pacific world, taking a mistress as he attempted to save the free world, his wife remained stateside doing the heavy and largely unnoticed work of maintaining a façade of normalcy even as it threatened to collapse. In her role on the home front, Mrs. Lansdale was not unlike all the other military and diplomatic wives who spent the Cold War years as single parents, filling their days with children’s activities, trips to the grocery store, and luncheons, but wondering in the lonely hours where their husbands were, who they were with, and why ordinary family life wasn’t enough for them. We know the story of Edward Lansdale the CIA agent, and what might have been in Vietnam, but Max Boot lets us in on a more universal tale. Edward and Helen Lansdale got married. They tried to play husband and wife and parents like they thought they were supposed to. The exigencies of U.S. national security gave Mr. Lansdale an honorable escape from the monotony of family life, while respectability required Mrs. Lansdale to quietly stand by her man. According to the conventions of the time, it would not have been appropriate for her to travel through a Southeast Asian jungle by jeep. But Americans did not hold Filipinas to the same standards. It was perfectly fine for them to drive into a war zone if they were from the same town as the leader of the local insurgency and spoke both English and Tagalog. And so Pat Kelly became part of Ed Lansdale’s fantasy, but even if his first wife had agreed to a divorce, it would have been difficult for Lansdale to make her part of his life back home. Boot points out that when Pat and Ed first met in the late 1940s, the United States was not kind to Asians, as anti-Asian immigration laws and Japanese internment illustrated. Americans likely would not have seen Pat Kelly, employee of the U.S. War Damage Commission and crucial operative in the counterinsurgency mission in the Philippines. They would have only seen her race. Heather Marie Stur, Ph.D., is an associate professor of history at the University of Southern Mississippi and a fellow in USM’s Dale Center for the Study of War & Society. 

5. Everything but Politics: America’s Counterinsurgency Blindspot

By Jon Askonas Max Boot has left no stone unturned in his extensive biography of Edward Lansdale, debonair ad man-turned-counterinsurgent. Boot’s tome contains, among other things, informed speculation on Lansdale’s sex life, psychoanalysis of Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsburg’s piano-playing, asides on Graham Greene’s novels, and short biographies of almost every character in the extensive cast of would-be American counterinsurgents, Filipino and Vietnamese politicos, and various world historical figures. This makes what was left out of The Road Not Taken all the more revealing. Boot’s mission is to make the case for “Lansdalism,” a variant of counter-insurgency characterized by winning “hearts and minds” through civic action (honest elections, government reforms, political persuasion) to legitimize governments and put pressure on insurgents.[79] According to Boot, Lansdale’s approach would have been far less costly than the massive armed military intervention in Vietnam, and might have actually worked. Boot believes Lansdalism provides a template and inspiration for future U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. But to support this argument, Boot selectively emphasizes details from Lansdale’s life that result in an oversimplified telling of the story: In Vietnam, Lansdale is foiled by bureaucratic insouciance, corrupt Vietnamese leaders, stubborn American politicians, and soldiers dedicated to “conventional warfare.” Boot’s oversimplification highlights this otherwise excellent biography’s most notable flaw. In making his case, Boot fails to contend with the ultimate sources of both Lansdale’s successes in the Philippines and his failures in Vietnam — the political desires of insurgents and of the people in the nations where Lansdale worked. Never is the possibility considered that people simply might not be buying what Lansdale — and Boot — are selling. Because Boot is a powerful storyteller, this failure isn’t immediately obvious. In both the Philippines and Vietnam, we are introduced to the players on both sides of the conflicts, and their relationships with each other are given dramatic life. But Boot’s political analysis never gets past this superficial layer. Why, exactly, are the Huks of the Philippines up in arms? Boot gives us little insight, except for a few slogans and a single oblique reference to a land-owning elite.[80] We learn nothing of the centuries of exploitation under the Spanish, nor that the postwar regime Constabulary destroyed more peasant villages than the Japanese did in their attempt to suppress the government.[81] Besides an innate charisma and popular touch, we never learn why Filipino politician Ramon Magsaysay might have had broad political appeal. This is not to suggest that the programs Lansdale embarked upon with Magsaysay (reforming the Army, improving elections, and resettling former insurgents with land, among others) were not valuable. However, throughout the book, one gets the sense that native populations, whether in the Philippines and Vietnam or in Iraq and Afghanistan, are primarily acted upon. If the wise Lansdalian counterinsurgent follows the right recipe, the native population cannot help but come around to the American position. There is no sense that they could legitimately choose otherwise. This political blindspot is particularly egregious in Boot’s treatment of Vietnam. He had time enough in his book for a short examination of Allen Dulles’ womanizing and spent pages on Hubert Humphrey’s relationship with LBJ. But he left no room for an analysis of Vietnam’s colonial history, nor for a discussion of why the South Vietnamese regime could be so easily associated with the imperialists, what the average rural resident might want, or why Ho Chi Minh remained such a popular figure. Not a jot is spent exploring the relative effectiveness of Southern and Northern propaganda or comparing relations between rural and urban residents or the rich and the poor. Choices that were in fact highly political and intentional are subsumed under the categories of excess violence due to notions of “conventional war,” “corruption” among military and civilian officials, and interpersonal feuds among both American and South Vietnamese leaders. Boot (following the work of Mark Moyar) identifies the 1963 overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem as a critical inflection point in the course of the war,[82] but says little about the political tensions his regime was causing, focusing instead on the dissatisfaction of the generals and the impatience of the American diplomatic and press corps.[83] He adopts Lansdale’s conviction that in Vietnam, “what was missing was a high-level American official who could influence allies to take difficult but necessary steps such as fighting corruption without risking a blowup or backlash.”[84] Boot thinks the same is true for both Iraq and Afghanistan. But client leaders are usually acutely aware of their interests, needs, and political pressures. They do not need a “stiff talking to” from some Yankee, but rather a reconfiguration of the incentives they face, which may be quite deep-seated.[85] Lansdale’s laser-sharp focus on the importance of building South Vietnamese state legitimacy was unique and laudable, but American leaders from JFK to Richard Nixon understood more or less the same thing. The problem for all of these American decision-makers (including Lansdale) was figuring out how to support the South Vietnamese without corrupting or distorting the regime, all the while attempting to keep both the Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese infiltrators at bay. Boot’s tendency to oversimplify is present throughout the book, especially regarding the complicated story of the American war effort in Vietnam. Boot tells us that Lansdale was avant garde in reading Mao in the 1950s. He wasn’t. Due to America’s involvements in Asia, military leaders were already reading and discussing the writings of Mao and Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap.[86] Boot argues that the conventionally minded soldiers (symbolized by Robert McNamara and Gen. William Westmoreland) ignored the human and political element. Yet the bibliography indicates Boot never consulted the actual records of MACV (the American military command in Vietnam) or its predecessor, which tell a much different story. Boot relies on Lewis Sorley’s narrative of the war (blaming Westmoreland for America’s heavy-handed strategy and praising Gen. Creighton Abrams for his belated attempt to turn things around), and ignores Gregory Daddis’ authoritative and detailed historical work rebutting most of Sorley’s claims.[87] If these flaws don’t ultimately undermine the book, it’s in part because Boot is a faithful interpreter of Lansdale himself. It would be hard to claim that Boot is projecting his ideas about counterinsurgency onto Lansdale. If anything, Boot is usually (though not always) circumspect about Lansdale’s zanier ideas, self-serving misconceptions, and occasional fables. In Boot’s book, one can find evidence to support both Lansdale the genius and Lansdale the crank. Though he wants us to see Lansdale through the eyes of his admirers, as an honest, savvy, warm counterinsurgency guru, Boot is honest in admitting that criticisms about Lansdale have merit as well. Thus, Boot conveys Daniel Ellsburg’s loving assessment of Lansdale as a “very shrewd, smart guy”, but also tells us that most of Lansdale’s bureaucratic rivals viewed him as “nutty, lightweight, stupid.”[88] The book contains ample evidence supporting both the case for Lansdale’s shrewdness and for his nuttiness. Lansdale’s naïveté about the political roots of insurgencies is emblematic of his place riding the line between idealism and delusion. To his dying day, he affirmed the universal appeal of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.[89] If only, he thought, Vietnam’s leaders were good enough, honest enough, and liberty-loving enough, Vietnam’s people would be sure to follow. It’s hard to reconcile Lansdale’s enthusiastic tinkering in other peoples’ governments with those ideals. Boot concludes the book by arguing that, in lieu of extensive intervention or aid, America could parachute “skilled political operatives” like Lansdale into dusty countries the world over to “subtly influence the course of an important, if obscure, conflict.” One cannot help but admire Boot’s wistful romance and self-delusion, reminiscent of Lansdalian plots to destabilize Castro with fireworks or win the Vietnam War with an accommodating soothsayer. Without a generous dose of realism and humility about the ultimate political forces driving an insurgency, Lansdalism risks turning into a kind of fantasy about plucky Americans manipulating local leaders with a wink and winsome smile (all for their own good, of course). Rather than his approach to counterinsurgency, Lansdale’s true enduring legacy may be his guileless optimism wedded to an unfalsifiable belief in the universal appeal of American political ideals. It is to Boot’s great credit that he has included enough unvarnished historical material that different interpretations of Lansdale’s life are available within the book itself. Outside of the sections on U.S. military operations in Vietnam, the biography gives a credibly balanced and detailed overview of the man’s complex life and times — not an easy feat. Boot is right that we have a lot to learn from Lansdale. Guided as he was by intuition, there is no doubt that Lansdale in practice was superior to Lansdale in theory. And no one can argue that in America’s counterinsurgencies we have spent too much time listening to “the natives,” lavished too many resources attempting to force actual reform, or hewed too closely to our traditional democratic and constitutional principles. It’s similarly hard to argue with Lansdale’s and Boot’s belief that the civic action approach to counterinsurgency is far less costly than any of the strategies the United States employed in Vietnam and Iraq. Despite the book’s shortcomings, in giving this extraordinary and inspirational American figure his due, Boot has done us all a service. Jon Askonas is a predoctoral fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin and a DPhil Candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford. His research focuses on the relationship between organizational adaptation and post-war “forgetting,” using case studies from U.S. Army efforts in Vietnam and Iraq.   Flickr: Rocklin Lyons [post_title] => Book Review Roundtable: Lost Opportunities in Vietnam [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => book-review-roundtable-lost-opportunities-in-vietnam [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-04-11 17:56:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-04-11 21:56:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?post_type=roundtable&p=544 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => roundtable [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => [pubinfo] => [issue] => [quotes] => [style] => roundtable [type] => Book [style_label] => Roundtable [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 164 [1] => 161 [2] => 162 [3] => 163 [4] => 165 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] For an overview of such arguments, see Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2009). [2] An old but fascinating account of these charges is Jeffrey P. Kimball, “The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War,” Armed Forces and Society 14, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 433-458. [3] Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). [4] Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1982). [5] Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1999). [6] Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). [7] Especially Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002). [8] Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright, 2018). Max Boot, interview by David H. Petraeus, New York Historical Society, New York, Jan. 9, 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?438632-1/max-boot-discusses-the-road-taken. [9] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 311. [10] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 234. [11] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 209. [12] W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960). [13] Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 86. Similarly, Jessica M. Chapman argues that a closer reading of Vietnamese sources “suggests that politico-religious leaders acted more rationally than Lansdale presumed.” In Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, The United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 77. [14] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 281. [15] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 367. [16] Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 76. [17] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 475. [18] COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, “Concept of Operations—Force Requirements and Deployments, SVN,” June 13, 1965, in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam [Senator Gravel ed., 5 vols.] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-1972), IV: 606. [19] The best one-volume account of allied pacification plans remains Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). [20] Max Boot, “The Case for American Empire,” The Weekly Standard, Oct. 15, 2001, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-american-empire/article/1626. [21] Edward T. Linenthal, “Anatomy of a Controversy,” in History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, eds. Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 62. [22] Spc. Noelle Wiehe, “1st SFAB combat advisor teams train for upcoming Afghanistan deployment,” U.S. Army, Jan. 16, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/199082/1st_sfab_combat_advisor_teams_train_for_upcoming_afghanistan_deployment. [23] Stephen Biddle et al., “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 89-142; Walter C. Ladwig, III, “Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1979-92,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 99-146. [24] Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Benjamin Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991). [25] William E. Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). [26] Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2018); Max Boot, “Win The War on Terror with Lansdale’s Cold- War Era ‘Friendly Persuasion,’” USA Today, Jan. 9, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/01/09/avoid-vietnam-fiascos-win-terror-war-learn-lansdale-friendly-persuasion-max-boot-column/1013646001/. [27] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 122-124, 138. [28] Charles T.R. Bohannan, “Antiguerrila Operations,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 341, no. 1 (May 1962), 21. [29] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 211. [30] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 602. [31] Walter C. Ladwig, III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). [32] Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 164. [33] “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), Sept. 6, 1950,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Doc. 837, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d837. [34] Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 107. [35] David Wurfel, “Foreign Aid and Social Reform in Political Development: A Philippine Case Study,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 2 (June 1959): 466. [36] Walter C. Ladwig III, “When Police are the Problem: The Philippine Constabulary and the Hukbalahap Rebellion,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, ed. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 24-25. [37] Myron M. Cowen, Letter to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, Feb. 18, 1952, Box 6, Myron M. Cowen Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/MagPressure.pdf [38] Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 326. [39] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 113; Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 84. [40] Oral History Interview with John F. Melby, Truman Library & Museum, Nov. 21, 1986, 239, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/melby3.htm - 239. [41] The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI, Part 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d3. [42] Chargé in the Philippines to the Secretary of State. [43] Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos, 152. [44] Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 133. [45] Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos, 155. [46] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 162-163. [47] For mention of the repeated attempts to replicate the Philippines template in Vietnam, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), 126; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 240; Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 98. [48] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 110-112. [49] Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos, 183. [50] Biddle et al., “Small Footprint, Small Payoff,” 98-101; Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 22-51. [51] Carmen M. Alston, “Adverse Selection,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/adverse-selection. [52] Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 28. [53] Daniel L. Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 79-115. [54] Bryce Denno, “Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: Vietnam War, 1962–1972,” July 19, 1963, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/DennoAA.pdf. [55] Denno, “Debriefing Reports.” [56]  For studies of U.S.-Vietnamese relations, particularly in the context of security force assistance, see Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983); Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 67-107. [57] Bernard Trainor and Michael Gordon, The End Game: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama (London: Atlantic Books, 2015), 290-292. [58] Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Patraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 36. [59] George W. Bush, Decision Points, (New York: Random House, 2010), 362. [60] Bush, Decision Points. [61] Peter Beinart, “The Surge Fallacy,” The Atlantic, Sept. 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-surge-fallacy/399344/. [62] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 599. [63] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 602. [64] Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2018), 15. [65] Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). [66] Boot, The Road Not Taken, XVLII. [67] Boot, The Road Not Taken. [68] Max Boot, “2017 Was the Year I Learned About My White Privilege,” Foreign Policy, Dec. 27, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/27/2017-was-the-year-i-learned-about-my-white-privilege/. [69] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 73. [70] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 67. [71] Boot, The Road Not Taken. [72] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 68. [73] Boot, “White Privilege.” [74] Boot, “White Privilege,” 67. [75] Heather Stur, Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 58. [76] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 69. [77] Boot, The Road Not Taken. [78] Key works that explore orientalism in a U.S. context include: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2008); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). [79]  Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright, 2018), 601-602. [80] Boot, Road Not Taken, 76. [81] Andrew Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 58. [82] Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xiv-xv. [83] Boot, Road Not Taken, 405. [84] Boot, Road Not Taken, 602. [85] Walter Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017). [86] Jon Askonas, “A Vicious Entanglement, Part IV: If Only the North Vietnamese Had Read Galula,” Oct. 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/a-vicious-entanglement-part-iv-if-only-the-north-vietnamese-had-read-galula/. [87] Daddis has written a trilogy of books dismantling the notion that a simple focus on “the conventional war” or on the use of force is to blame for America’s loss in Vietnam: No Sure Victory (2011), Westmoreland’s War (2015), and Withdrawal (2017), all Oxford University Press. [88] Boot, Road Not Taken, 470. [89] Boot, Road Not Taken, 529. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => Contents [contents] => 1. Introduction, by Mark Atwood Lawrence 2. Vietnam and the White Man's Burden, by Gregory A. Daddis 3. Friendly Persuasion Is not Enough: The Limits of the Lansdale Approach, by Walter C. Ladwig III 4. The Woman Question in Max Boot's Tale of Edward Lansdale, by Heather Marie Stur 5. Everything but Politics: America's Counterinsurgency Blindspot, by Jon Askonas ) ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 503 [post_author] => 146 [post_date] => 2018-02-28 12:36:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-02-28 17:36:48 [post_content] =>

1. Introduction: Debating the Role of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia

By Matthew Fuhrmann Extended nuclear deterrence remains central to world politics in light of growing concerns about Chinese, North Korean, and Russian ambitions. Terence Roehrig’s new book, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella contributes to the scholarship on this important issue.[1] The book provides a helpful overview for anyone seeking to understand the dilemmas that the United States faces when attempting to protect allies with nuclear threats, especially when it comes to Japan and South Korea. Roehrig’s central argument is that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is not especially useful for deterring attacks because nuclear threats lack credibility. Nevertheless, the American nuclear umbrella remains significant in East Asia because it reassures allies and promotes nonproliferation. The contributors to this roundtable recognize the value in Roehrig’s book but also highlight some of its limitations. Their reviews raise important questions that carry implications for both alliance politics and nuclear proliferation. The degree to which readers agree with Roehrig’s arguments may depend on their general attitudes about the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Some scholars and policymakers believe that the world would be safer if countries placed a smaller emphasis on nuclear weapons. Many individuals in this camp embrace the “global zero” movement — an international campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons — and the 2017 treaty that bans nuclear weapons.[2] Another school of thought suggests that nuclear weapons should not be eliminated because they produce desirable political effects, at least for the countries that possess them. In this view, having a reliable nuclear arsenal allows the United States to deter attacks with greater ease, while without it, major war would be more likely. This roundtable captures unique views about the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons. Two commentators, Crystal Pryor and Eric Gomez, argue that Roehrig may place too much emphasis on nuclear forces. Pryor questions whether the benefits of the U.S. nuclear umbrella outweigh the costs. She accepts Roehrig’s argument that U.S. nuclear threats lack credibility in the context of extended deterrence. Yet Pryor challenges the notion that U.S. nuclear forces reassure officials in Seoul or Tokyo. She points to many other factors that keep both of these countries nonnuclear, including international norms, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and American coercive pressure. Moreover, the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is dangerous, Pryor argues, because it raises the risk of catastrophe due to miscalculation. She therefore concludes that the United States should consider eliminating the nuclear dimension from its alliances with Japan and South Korea. Both the United States and its allies might be better off if they downplayed the role of nuclear weapons in their alliance relationships. Gomez reaches a similar conclusion, albeit for slightly different reasons. He argues that conventional capabilities, especially precision strike weapons and ballistic missile defense systems, can take the place of U.S. nuclear forces. As U.S. allies develop these capabilities, the need for the U.S. nuclear arsenal may diminish. To substantiate this argument, Gomez considers three conflict scenarios where the U.S. defense commitment might come into play: Chinese occupation of islands in the East China Sea, a North Korean invasion of South Korea, and Pyongyang’s first use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is most relevant for the third scenario, according to Gomez, yet it may not even be effective in deterring a North Korean nuclear attack. He concludes that nuclear weapons “should not be an albatross around the neck of America’s security policy in East Asia.” The other reviewers (Christopher Twomey and Andrew O’Neil) are more sanguine about the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in East Asia. They suggest, contrary to the other commentators, that Roehrig understates the potential significance of the American nuclear umbrella in extended deterrence. Twomey suggests that U.S. nuclear weapons could be relevant for counterforce missions against North Korea, given the difficulties in locating and destroying Pyongyang’s missiles and other relevant military technology. He also cites evidence suggesting that Japanese and South Korean officials believe that U.S. nuclear forces enhance extended deterrence — not just symbolic reassurance — even though those weapons may be used under extreme circumstances only. Twomey also posits that nuclear weapons are more likely to enter the fray in a dispute over Taiwan than in Japan or South Korea, a topic Roehrig does not extensively analyze in his book. O’Neil likewise maintains that nuclear weapons are more relevant to the landscape in East Asia than Roehrig’s book leads us to believe. Roehrig’s argument that extended deterrent nuclear threats lack credibility rests, in part, on the existence of a nuclear taboo — the strong opprobrium of nuclear first use.[3] O’Neil is less convinced that normative aversion to using nuclear weapons renders them ineffective for extended deterrence in East Asia. He substantiates this argument by highlighting the apparent weakening of the nuclear taboo during the Trump administration. Recent experimental evidence supports this view, showing that the American public is less averse to nuclear first use than previous research would lead us to believe.[4] O’Neil also worries more than Roehrig about the possibility of independent nuclear arsenals in East Asia. Despite the presence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, he argues, Japan and South Korea may seek their own nuclear weapons as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities increase in the years and decades ahead. Whether or not one agrees with Roehrig’s argument, his book is an important part of the debate about the future of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the contributions in this roundtable point out the need for more extensive research and thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.   Matthew Fuhrmann, PhD, is Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. He is also an affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Carnegie Corporation of New York Andrew Carnegie Fellow (2016-18).

2. Nuclear Umbrella or Nuclear Albatross?

By Eric Gomez Despite stringent international sanctions, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have developed at breakneck speed and show no sign of slowing down. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” approach to the problem has little to show besides growing fear of a U.S. preemptive strike and a war of words between two colorful leaders. Yet North Korea’s ability to hold the United States homeland at risk with a nuclear weapon raises important questions about the future of extended deterrence commitments and especially the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea and Japan.[5] China’s growing military power also presents a serious, albeit less urgent, challenge to extended deterrence. Improvements in weapons technology, extensive organizational reforms, and assertive moves in disputed areas like the South China Sea stoke regional fears that China’s rise may not be peaceful. As Beijing narrows the local balance of power gap with the United States, security commitments made by Washington decades ago could become harder to maintain.[6] A relatively calm U.S.-China relationship suggests a very low probability of a serious crisis for the foreseeable future, but U.S. policymakers must keep this long-term challenge in the back of their mind as they contend with the immediate crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Both the North Korea and China challenges make Terence Roehrig’s book, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, a valuable tool for American analysts grappling with questions of extended deterrence in an increasingly volatile Northeast Asia. The book opens with an excellent summary of deterrence theory before laying out the history of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea. Roehrig uses this accessible blend of theory and history to explore the future of both extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. Although Roehrig treads somewhat cautiously in his analysis, and has left some important strategy and policy debates under-discussed, his is an otherwise exceptional book that offers a great starting point for future research. Roehrig makes two important arguments about the nuclear umbrella and the role it plays in extended deterrence. First, he argues that “The nuclear umbrella [over Japan and South Korea] likely does little to deter anything other than nuclear war, because threats to use nuclear weapons…are simply not very credible.”[7] During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the best way for the United States and its allies to offset the large militaries of North Korea and China. Today, however, modern conventional weapons provide the United States and its allies with other means for countering quantitatively superior adversaries without the same need for nuclear weapons. As Roehrig writes, “The United States has numerous, potent conventional options that would have similar strategic effects [as nuclear weapons] on an adversary and would be highly credible.”[8] Roehrig does acknowledge that the destructive power of nuclear weapons coupled with ambiguity over the conditions that would lead to their use may be valuable for deterrence, but the book’s core take-away is that the nuclear umbrella is real but is not, in the end, credible for its primary purported aim of deterrence. Second, Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is vital for alliance reassurance and for maintaining a generally strong relationship with Japan and South Korea. He writes, “Despite the significant credibility problems of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence…the nuclear umbrella is an important political signal that reflects and helps buttress the overall health of the alliances.”[9] According to Roehrig, closing the U.S. nuclear umbrella would likely have greater costs than benefits. Tokyo and Seoul are highly sensitive to U.S. actions that weaken the nuclear umbrella. For example, Roehrig argues that Japanese analysts and officials were very concerned by the Obama administration’s decision to retire the Tomahawk Land-Attack Nuclear Cruise Missile (TLAM/N) in the early 2010s.[10] He also notes that South Korea embarked on a covert nuclear weapons program in the 1970s after regional events — the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and rapprochement with China — called into question the reliability of the nuclear umbrella.[11] Closing the nuclear umbrella at a time of intense uncertainty would likely exacerbate regional tension despite the fact that the U.S. pledge to use nuclear weapons is so difficult to make credible. As Roehrig states, “To remove the umbrella based on the lack of credibility may be a serious negative political signal and a modification of the status quo that would be very disturbing to allies.”[12] Thus the United States finds itself in a strategic catch-22. It is practically impossible for Washington to make the nuclear umbrella credible as a deterrent due to the military and reputational problems attendant with nuclear use, so allies can never be completely reassured. However, if Roehrig’s assessment is correct, the costs of abandoning this dubious position would likely outweigh the benefits. While Roehrig does a commendable job explaining the current state of extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella, his analysis does not dive deeply enough into what the future may hold. On the whole, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella is a valuable resource for understanding how these three countries arrived at the current moment. Yet Roehrig misses an opportunity to discuss in detail some important issues related to extended deterrence that could have major policy implications in the years to come. For starters, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not the only component of America’s extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea. Yet Roehrig only briefly touches upon this fact in the book.[13] A strong Japan and South Korea armed with conventional precision strike and ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities could reduce the relative importance of the nuclear umbrella in extended deterrence. While the U.S. nuclear umbrella may still be valuable for deterring the use of a nuclear weapon, it is substitutable. Eventually, stronger U.S. allies could enable Washington to adopt a more restrained force structure and strategy in East Asia. Japan and South Korea are making significant investments in conventional strike and BMD that bolster their contribution to extended deterrence, with each country emphasizing different capabilities based on their particular threat perceptions. Tokyo’s close cooperation with Washington on BMD was prompted by North Korean satellite launches and ballistic missile tests that flew over Japanese territory. This emphasis on BMD fits into Japan’s defensively-oriented military posture and the importance Tokyo places on close cooperation with the United States as part of its overall defense strategy. The Japanese military is also improving its conventional strike capabilities, though these developments are in a much earlier stage compared to BMD cooperation with the United States.[14] Moreover, while North Korea provides the immediate impetus for Japan’s pursuit of conventional strike capabilities, the long-term threat they are intended to counter is China.[15] Tokyo does not want a defense posture independent of the United States and places great emphasis on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but even historically pacifist Japan realizes it must play a greater role in providing for its own defense as regional threats grow more serious.[16] By contrast, South Korea’s approach to conventional strike and BMD is driven entirely by North Korea. Recent developments in its defense posture stress independence from, rather than integration with, the United States. After North Korean military forces sank a South Korean warship and shelled an offshore island in 2010 “[South Korean] leaders…concluded that to deter North Korea from further provocations, it needed to have its own capability to strike targets throughout [North Korea].”[17] South Korea now possesses an impressive array of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles and has developed two operational concepts that call for early strikes against North Korean leadership targets, missile sites, and the city of Pyongyang in the event of a conflict.[18] South Korea can, in theory, use these conventional strike forces unilaterally. Roehrig notes this, stating that “…South Korea is not reliant solely on U.S. conventional strike or the nuclear umbrella to preempt or retaliate.”[19] However, South Korea’s conventional strike capability depends on U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for targeting. Until Seoul develops more sophisticated ISR, its strike capability will not be fully independent from the United States. South Korea’s search for military options independent from the United States extends to BMD. Seoul is anxious to develop indigenous BMD systems, and has repeatedly rejected invitations to integrate its capabilities with American and Japanese systems. This does not mean that South Korea will go it alone completely on BMD; Seoul has participated in training simulations with the United States and Japan and hosts a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery near the city of Seongju. But South Korea’s longstanding antipathy toward Japan makes it wary of becoming enmeshed in a regional BMD architecture that links its fate to its former colonial overseer. Three Overlooked Scenarios While Roehrig’s book is a good foundational text on modern extended deterrence in Asia, it fell short in addressing the three most likely conflict scenarios that could invoke U.S. extended deterrence commitments: China establishing military control over disputed islands in the East China Sea; a North Korean invasion of South Korea; and the first use of a nuclear weapon by North Korea. In each scenario, the political and psychological rationales that Roehrig establishes for maintaining the nuclear umbrella persist, but he does not address the declining relative importance of U.S. nuclear weapons as South Korea and Japan develop their ability to implement deterrence by denial using conventional capabilities and BMD. Only in the third scenario does the U.S. nuclear umbrella offer unique deterrence value, and even there it generates risks of its own. East China Sea One of Japan’s most pressing short-term security challenges is maintaining its control over islands in the East China Sea that China also claims. While the possibility of China initiating a large-scale conflict against Japan over the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands is unlikely, lower-level friction is entirely plausible. As Roehrig states, “Conflict in gray zones…is of greater concern, along with the possibility that a small-scale or accidental clash could escalate.”[20] Beyond traditional war, Japanese strategists have been preoccupied deterring lower-level aggression in general, and they specifically seek to deter a fait accompli in which China seizes disputed territory and threatens escalation should Japan try to restore the status quo ante. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is ill-suited for deterring such gray-zone scenarios in the East China Sea. It strains credulity to think U.S. leaders could convince Beijing that it will use nuclear weapons to prevent or reverse the seizure of uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea. According to Daryl Press’s book on credibility, “Leaders assess the credibility of threats by comparing the expected costs of carrying out those threats against the interests at stake.”[21] Press’s views on credibility have been overturned in recent years by new research, but none of the new literature disputes his emphasis on the balance of interests for making credible threats.[22] The U.S. nuclear umbrella plays no plausible role in a gray-zone scenario involving Chinese aggression in the East China Sea because the U.S. stake in uninhabited rocks is too negligible to risk Chinese nuclear retaliation. As Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel’s work on China’s nuclear strategy argues, “[Chinese analysts] implicitly assume that the stakes would be too low for the United States…and that Washington would either restrain or abandon its allies if defending them gave rise to a situation in which the United States would need to threaten to use nuclear weapons.”[23] While the U.S. nuclear umbrella offers little protection in an East China Sea scenario, improved conventional strike capabilities would allow Japan to implement a deterrence-by-denial approach much more credibly. As Roehrig explains in his chapter on deterrence theory, “Deterrence by denial seeks to defeat an attack or…to make an aggression so costly that it would not be worth attacking in the first place.”[24] Intelligence gathering assets, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles stationed on nearby Japanese islands, and maritime patrol ships and aircraft would make it very difficult for China to covertly seize territory and would provide highly credible non-nuclear options for defending Japanese territorial claims. Beijing does possess a quantitative advantage in ships and aircraft, but Tokyo does not need parity with China to effectively impose high military costs that could deter Chinese overreach. A North Korean Invasion The U.S. nuclear umbrella is also unnecessary to deter a North Korean invasion of South Korea due to Seoul’s increasingly powerful conventional forces. South Korea’s geography creates predictable invasion routes that are heavily fortified by American and Korean troops who have had years to train for stopping such an invasion. Moreover, South Korea’s offensive conventional strike capability allows it to hold North Korean leadership targets at risk with weapons that would almost certainly be used in the event of an invasion. Roehrig states, “It is not clear that [North Korea] is any more deterred by the threat of nuclear weapons than it is by the likelihood of an overwhelming conventional response that would have the same strategic effect.”[25] Roehrig points out that the U.S. nuclear umbrella “adds another layer of punishment” for North Korea should it invade, but Washington would probably hesitate to make good on its nuclear threats. Putting aside the reputational and normative costs of violating the nuclear taboo, there are strong operational downsides to using nuclear weapons in an invasion scenario that Roehrig does not emphasize enough. A U.S. nuclear attack meant to blunt an invasion would necessarily entail strikes against North Korean troops near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) because this is where the majority of troops are permanently deployed. Fallout from these strikes would be a major hazard to both civilians close to the DMZ (Seoul is only 35 miles away) and defending allied troops. The contamination caused by nuclear strikes against North Korean targets in the country’s interior would kill civilians, complicate a conventional counter-attack into the North, and make post-conflict stabilization more dangerous.[26] While it is impossible to prove a negative in this case — that is, that the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not deter a North Korean invasion — the conventional superiority of U.S. and South Korean forces represents a more credible and effective deterrent than that umbrella. North Korean Nuclear First-Use Of the three scenarios examined here, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is probably most valuable for deterring North Korea from resorting to nuclear first-use, but even under this scenario the umbrella is hardly an unmitigated good. The logic of the nuclear umbrella for deterring a nuclear strike by North Korea rests on punishment. If Kim Jong Un uses a nuclear weapon first, he would be inviting U.S. nuclear retaliation in kind, as well as, in all likelihood, the end of his regime. Yet consider for a moment the technical characteristics of North Korea’s nuclear forces and its unfavorable military balance vis-à-vis the United States. In this context of nuclear and conventional inferiority, its nuclear weapons should be most valuable for heading off a U.S. preemptive strike against its nuclear forces and political leadership.[27] The U.S. nuclear umbrella may be a credible deterrent, but it may also indirectly fuel a North Korean escalatory first-strike strategy if conflict breaks out. In other words, it is just as likely that North Korean nuclear first-use prevents U.S. nuclear retaliation by raising the stakes of an ongoing conflict. The United States may be able to soothe Pyongyang’s itchy trigger finger by adopting a “no first-use” pledge, but, as Roehrig shows, ambiguity over nuclear first-use is a defining feature of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.[28] It is also unclear whether North Korea would believe such a U.S. pledge. Preventing a Nuclear Liability The U.S. nuclear umbrella should not be an albatross around the neck of America’s security policy in East Asia. As Tokyo and Seoul improve their conventional military capabilities, the relative importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for deterring many types of regional conflicts should decrease. Stronger Japanese and South Korean conventional forces could more credibly deter a variety of likely conflict scenarios than nuclear weapons, and the United States should encourage allies to take up more of the burden for regional security. If the United States is able to place greater responsibility for deterring conflicts on the conventional prowess of its allies, it could then afford to scale back its own force posture in East Asia and pursue a more restrained regional strategy.[29] Roehrig offers persuasive insights into why scrapping the nuclear umbrella is inadvisable, but neither should U.S. strategy hinge on a tool that cannot credibly address the region’s most important challenges.   Eric Gomez is a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute.

3. The Nuclear Umbrella is Necessary, But Is It Adequate?

By Andrew O’Neil These days it is hard to believe, but less than ten years ago, a number of observers were predicting the gradual demise of extended nuclear deterrence. The heady rhetoric surrounding President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech,[30] calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons, encouraged a climate in which advocates of disarmament optimistically foreshadowed the declining currency of nuclear weapons. Implicit in this vision was a conviction that America’s closest allies had a responsibility to disavow the nuclear umbrella in order to strengthen global momentum for disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review[31] and preceding Congressional Strategic Posture Commission[32] provided a key reality check on this assumption. Both reviews revealed an intense anxiety on the part of policymakers in Japan and, to a lesser extent, South Korea over whether the Obama administration would move to enshrine a sole-purpose commitment — that the United States would only use nuclear weapons in response to others’ nuclear use — in U.S. nuclear doctrine.[33] This anxiety stemmed from two specific concerns. The first was operational in nature. Defining the circumstances in which the United States would not use nuclear weapons was seen as detracting from the strategic ambiguity underpinning extended deterrence, a vagueness that U.S. allies preferred. For Japanese strategists in particular, keeping Chinese and North Korean planners guessing over the “firebreak” between conventional and nuclear responses to provocations was one of the key ways extended deterrence worked. Removing this through a sole-purpose declaration was therefore seen as operationally sub-optimal. The second was related to existential worries over the long-term credibility/reliability of the American nuclear umbrella and the broader alliance security commitment of the United States. While proponents of a sole-purpose declaration argued that it would send a critical signal about the decreasing value of nuclear weapons in international relations, and would serve to further deflate proliferation pressures, most U.S. allies were ambivalent. For Japan and South Korea, the nuclear dimension of security reassurances from Washington was (and still is) seen as a sign of the greater depth of U.S. commitment to their security. Put another way, the U.S. willingness to consider using nuclear weapons in defense of its allies — and in the process exposing the American homeland to retaliation — deepens the credibility of U.S. security guarantees in the eyes of those allies. Japanese officials made it clear to U.S. policymakers that a sole-purpose policy would be received negatively in Tokyo. Even Australia, which for some time has declared that only a nuclear attack on Australia would activate the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conveyed its unease to Washington over the prospect of a no-first-use commitment, noting that, as a valued ally, it expected to be “consulted closely on the specific details” before any decisions were made.[34] America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea are not the only ones the United States has in Asia. However, they remain the most important alliances for two key reasons. The first is that the depth of the political ties and operational commitments underpinning both alliances is arguably only surpassed by the institutional depth of NATO. The second reason is that both of these U.S. allies confront immediate, and potentially intractable, threats to their security from the world’s newest nuclear power that also happens to be the world’s most aggressive and unpredictable state — North Korea. In his outstanding new book, Terence Roehrig explores the underlying dynamics of the nuclear dimension of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliances.[35] Given how central the nuclear umbrella is to America’s alliances in Asia and Europe, it is striking how few high-quality, contemporary accounts of this kind have been published. Along with Brad Roberts’ 2016 book[36], Roehrig’s new work, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War, represents the most significant contribution to the literature on extended nuclear deterrence in recent years. Using a wide variety of sources, and drawing on his high-level knowledge of the topic, Roehrig provides a comprehensive account of the Cold War experience, the contemporary threats “that drive the nuclear umbrella,” Japanese and South Korean perceptions of extended nuclear deterrence, and U.S. capabilities, doctrine, and force planning. In light of the Trump administration’s haphazard approach to alliance management, the mixed signals Trump himself has been sending regarding the “value” the United States gains from its allies, and the administration’s apparently more permissive attitude toward the possibility of nuclear proliferation on the part of Japan and South Korea,[37] the publication of Roehrig’s book is exquisitely timed. Yet, the book’s contemporary relevance does not detract from the depth of historical awareness that informs its analysis. Roehrig rightly acknowledges that the origins and early days of the nuclear umbrella in Northeast Asia continue to shape the dynamics of extended nuclear deterrence relationships with Japan and South Korea today. Because of its ability to reach back into history, contextualize the present, and envision a series of future scenarios, this is a book that will make a significant and lasting contribution to our understanding of the nuclear umbrella. Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella is underpinned by three interlocking arguments. The first is that, while the nuclear umbrella is real in the sense that the United States maintains the systems and strike capabilities to use nuclear weapons in defense of its allies, it is highly unlikely that any American president would authorize the execution of such a mission. The second argument is that the nuclear taboo is still pervasive in U.S. thinking despite America maintaining the world’s biggest nuclear arsenal, and notwithstanding some of the Trump administration’s muscular rhetoric in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy. The third argument is that, paradoxically, although the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella is low, its existence helps demonstrate U.S. commitment to its Asian allies, including persuading allies to forgo the option of obtaining a nuclear arsenal themselves. It’s Unlikely any U.S. President Would Authorize a Nuclear Strike in Defense of Japan or South Korea Roehrig finds implausible any scenario in which a U.S. president launches a nuclear strike in response to an armed attack by North Korea or China. This is not due to a lack of commitment to defend South Korea or Japan. On the contrary. According to Roehrig, the extraordinary conventional strike power of U.S. forces will more than adequately do the job of inflicting unacceptable damage on any state that attacks an American ally, irrespective of whether this attack involves the use of nuclear weapons: “Given the power and precision of U.S. conventional weapons, their use can have strategic effects similar to nuclear weapons, and threats to use them are far more credible.”[38] This argument has understandable appeal for many strategists. Indeed, it pivots off Thomas Schelling’s timeless distinction “between national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ [being] the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be made credible.”[39] At the same time, Roehrig’s argument goes to the heart of a concern on the part of many policymakers in allied capitals that the United States may fail to live up to its rhetorical assurances in the moment of truth. They worry that everything would not be on the table in the event of war, which would fundamentally contradict and undermine long-standing U.S. assurances to close allies, in Europe as well as Asia. These assurances, while at times ambiguous, have nevertheless been predicated on an assumption that a nuclear attack on an ally would almost certainly trigger a nuclear response. Such an assumption is built into NATO’s military doctrine and has been a key feature of alliance discussions in Northeast Asia over several decades. In the entirely plausible event that North Korea initiates the use of nuclear weapons against the South, there would be significant pressure for a matching response, irrespective of whether conventional forces could deliver equivalent devastation. As perverse as it may sound, a U.S. president would face compelling incentives to respond in-kind to a nuclear attack on Japan or South Korea in order to uphold the credibility of America’s alliance commitments worldwide, especially those in Europe. Any decision by a U.S. president not to respond in-kind to a North Korean nuclear attack would probably spell the end of the nuclear umbrella in Europe and raise serious questions about the very future of the NATO alliance. A legitimate question would be whether the United States intended to take the same approach in the event Russia launched a nuclear attack on a NATO ally. Senior U.S. officials undoubtedly appreciate the wider implications and costs of non-use in such circumstances, and this would certainly influence the equation of any decision-making process following a North Korean nuclear strike on Japan or South Korea. The Nuclear Taboo Remains Pervasive in U.S. Thinking The tradition of nuclear non-use is said to be a strong thread running through American strategic policy. As the only state to have fired nuclear warheads at another nation, the United States faces perhaps unique normative constraints in using nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that,
U.S. [nuclear] use, especially first use, but also in retaliation, would lower the firewall and make it more difficult to begin rebuilding nuclear norms so that others did not resort to nuclear weapons too quickly in the future against either the United States or another country…Washington would be setting a precedent for the utility and acceptability of using nuclear weapons.[40]
In the context of its alliances with Japan and South Korea, from Roehrig’s perspective, this logic remains just as compelling. There can be little doubt that the tradition of U.S. nuclear non-use is rooted in a normative aversion to repeating Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, it is important not to exaggerate the influence the nuclear taboo will have over U.S. decisions going forward. Since the Eisenhower administration, U.S. nuclear doctrine has swung between high-barrier and low-barrier approaches to nuclear use. We now appear to be entering a period when those barriers are being lowered even further. Coming on the heels of President Trump’s thinly-veiled nuclear threats against North Korea throughout 2017, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review endorses an unprecedentedly permissive approach to nuclear employment. This includes reference to nuclear use in response to “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” that encompass attacks on U.S. and allied infrastructure in addition to civilian populations and command and control assets.[41] Said to reflect President Trump’s personal views on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in the broader menu of U.S. military options, the 2018 review indicates a significant watering down of the nuclear taboo. Under an administration that has demonstrated a blatant disregard for global norms and an absence of integrated strategic thinking when it comes to America’s role in the world, Roehrig is perhaps overly optimistic regarding what he portrays as a fixed normative aversion to nuclear use in U.S. policy. Despite the Lack of Extended Nuclear Deterrence Credibility, It Still Reassures Allies Strategic policy is full of paradoxes, and even contradictions. So Roehrig’s argument that Japan and South Korea remain reassured by a nuclear umbrella that lacks credibility should not be dismissed. He maintains that “despite questions of credibility, an uncertain umbrella retains value as a deterrent.”[42] Because adversaries like North Korea can never be sure that the United States will not use nuclear weapons, it retains a useful effect as a deterrent. With respect to the more difficult proposition of reassuring allies of the credibility of the nuclear umbrella, Roehrig maintains that it is important to contextualize this in terms of the levels of confidence in the broader U.S. security commitment: “So long as both allies retain confidence in the overall U.S. defense commitment and the costs of going nuclear are sufficiently high, Japan and South Korea will continue their nonnuclear status.”[43] Again, Roehrig may be taking his optimism too far here. As he acknowledges, domestic calls for an indigenous South Korean nuclear force have become more bullish as Pyongyang has doubled down on its nuclear program. In Japan, pressures to proliferate have historically been more of a slow burn. Yet, those pressures should not be underestimated in light of North Korea’s propensity to leverage its nuclear force for coercive purposes and China’s expanding strategic footprint.[44] Japanese policymakers watch U.S. nuclear behavior with rapt attention and remain highly sensitive to any indication Washington may be watering down its extended deterrence commitments. In Seoul, anxiety over U.S. abandonment persists in parallel with concerns about potential decoupling (due to the Trump administration’s tendency to fixate on the North Korean threat to the U.S. mainland).[45] As North Korea’s capacity to strike targets in Northeast Asia with nuclear weapons becomes increasingly likely, an uncertain nuclear umbrella may no longer be adequate to contain those domestic pressures in Tokyo and Seoul to obtain their own nuclear arsenal. In other words, assumptions about “the nuclear umbrella being ‘good enough’ when it is part of a strong, credible alliance may not stand the test of time.”[46]   Andrew O’Neil is Professor of Political Science and Dean in the Business School at Griffith University. Before joining academia in 2000, he worked as a strategic analyst with Australia’s Department of Defence.

4. Is it Time to Rethink the "Nuclear" in "Nuclear Umbrella"?

By Crystal Pryor The concept of extended deterrence — the threat of retaliation to dissuade adversaries from attacking allies — has been central the United States’ relationships with many of its treaty allies since the Cold War. While the concept itself is fairly straightforward, whether and how extended deterrence works is more complicated. The success of extended deterrence has always depended on credibility, which itself is based on two factors — capability and resolve. The United States has long had the capability to use nuclear weapons in defense of its allies, but whether it has the resolve to do so, particularly against another nuclear-armed adversary, is another question entirely. Scholars have yet to reach a consensus on how a state can best convince both friends and adversaries that it possesses that resolve.[47] The threat environment in contemporary Northeast Asia has reignited a discussion about the relevance and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. China’s growing military capabilities pose one kind of challenge. But it’s the possibility that North Korea might be able to reach the United States with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that has led to doubts about U.S. credibility in Japan and South Korea. During the Cold War, a common question was whether the United States would trade Paris or Berlin for New York or Washington. Today, it is whether the United States will trade Seattle or Los Angeles for Seoul or Tokyo. In the so-called second nuclear age,[48] policymakers are again raising fears of the United States “decoupling” from its alliances. Decoupling represents the breakdown of extended deterrence, in which the United States backs away from its commitment to its allies’ security (or allies break away from the United States). President Donald Trump’s “America first” rhetoric and policies have accentuated these concerns. In such a context, it is worth noting that Terence Roehrig’s latest book, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War, is the only comprehensive text exclusively focused on Japan and South Korea’s relationship to the U.S. nuclear deterrent.[49] As the policy world agonizes over the future of a nuclear Asia, Roehrig’s book is a welcome addition as a scholarly reference on this topic. The primary dilemma he addresses is the continued centrality of the nuclear umbrella for the United States and its allies despite the very low probability of it ever being employed. Roehrig puts forward several interconnected arguments: First, the umbrella is an important signal to allies and adversaries, and a key part of the region’s security architecture. Second, withdrawing the nuclear umbrella would disrupt security relations with U.S. allies. Third, the existence of the nuclear umbrella, even with a miniscule likelihood of use, deters would-be attackers. And fourth, the nuclear umbrella limits the spread of nuclear weapons. Some of these arguments have greater merit than others, but on the whole they tend to justify, rather than scrutinize, the received wisdom on nuclear deterrence. Differential Threat Perceptions Among Allies The book’s greatest strength is as a useful reference for understanding the role of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Japan and South Korea. In comparing the two countries, Roehrig explains the differential threat perceptions of North Korea and China in Japan and South Korea, respectively. While Japan and South Korea both view North Korea as a threat, it is a more palpable challenge to South Korea given their shared border. As for China, Japan — unlike South Korea — views it to be a regional rival. As Roehrig notes, China is South Korea’s largest trading partner by far and also holds at least some of the cards with respect to North Korea. He offers an illustrative example of the Japan and South Korea’s divergence on China in his discussion on ballistic missile defense (BMD). Japan has funneled billions of dollars to jointly develop BMD with the United States. Meanwhile, China is concerned that U.S. deployment of BMD in the region is undercutting its strategic deterrent, and that North Korea simply serves as a convenient excuse.[50] In deference to China’s warnings, and despite the threats it faces from North Korean missiles, South Korea has been a reluctant participant in U.S. BMD efforts, instead developing its own capability called Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). Japan and South Korea also differ in their stance on possessing nuclear weapons. In light of the growing threats from North Korea, many South Koreans have called for re-deployment of U.S. tactical weapons or even development of South Korea’s own nuclear arsenal.[51] Japanese people, in contrast, have retained what might be described as a “nuclear allergy,” due to their experience during World War II.[52] While the average Japanese citizen is opposed to the introduction or development of nuclear weapons, Roehrig details the secret agreements made between the Japanese government and the U.S. government on nuclear weapons, as well as the Japanese elite’s desire to maintain breakout capability through a civil nuclear program. According to Roehrig’s sources, Japan maintains its civil nuclear capability — even after the 2011 Fukushima disaster — at least in part for the latent ability to produce a nuclear weapon. Why Not Use the Nuclear Umbrella? Despite the existence of the nuclear umbrella, the United States is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in defense of its Asian allies. Roehrig highlights several reasons why the United States would hesitate to use nuclear weapons in a conflict with North Korea, even in response to a nuclear attack. Militarily, the residual effects of nuclear strikes against North Korea would complicate South Korea-U.S. military actions, follow-on operations, and occupation. Regionally, dangerous residual effects would spill across borders into South Korea, China, and Russia. Due to its mountainous geography, an effective attack against North Korea would require the use of many nuclear weapons in a confined space. The fallout from these detonations would affect civilians in North and South Korea and likely civilians in neighboring countries as well. Roehrig also discusses the “nuclear weapons taboo,” the international norm against the use of nuclear weapons.[53] He argues the United States would face high reputational costs for using nuclear weapons, even if it were responding to North Korean first use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Strategically, using nuclear weapons sets a dangerous precedent, especially in first use, but also in retaliation. Finally, using nuclear weapons would complicate nonproliferation efforts because it would not only make future use more acceptable, but other countries might also seek to develop nuclear weapons as a result. Smaller countries like North Korea already see nuclear weapons as a great equalizer. The United States’ use of nuclear weapons in war would legitimate them and make them appear even more valuable. Roehrig says the United States can avoid all of these pitfalls and drawbacks by instead using its precise and lethal conventional weapons, which it currently maintains in the region and beyond. After developing the various arguments for not using nuclear weapons against North Korea, the most pressing security threat in Asia, Roehrig emphasizes that it is even more difficult to envision a scenario involving the use of nuclear weapons against China. Therefore, the nuclear umbrella, rather than intended for use in war, “is part of a broad effort to deter the use of nuclear weapons, provide reassurance to Japan and South Korea of the U.S. defense commitment, contribute to overall credibility of the alliance, and convince Tokyo and Seoul that they do not need their own nuclear weapons.”[54] What Good Are Unusable Weapons? Roehrig claims the nuclear umbrella reassures Japan and South Korea and symbolically enhances those alliances, but is it really what keeps Tokyo and Seoul from developing their own nuclear weapons? What about the cost of development and maintenance of nuclear weapons, or international opprobrium for violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?  The decision to pursue nuclear weapons would also mean renouncing a security guarantee of protection with unparalleled U.S. conventional capabilities. Roehrig largely avoids discussing these potential explanations for why Japan and South Korea have not gone nuclear. Relatedly, the proffered U.S. nuclear umbrella was not likely the main driver for Australia (which is not discussed in the book) to forego nuclear weapons capability.[55] Furthermore, as the book acknowledges, the main challenge in the region today lies not in outright war but rather in the so-called gray zone — encompassing China’s actions in the South and East China Seas and North Korean cyberattacks — activities that can escalate to war if managed poorly. Roehrig writes that, “In the end, the nuclear umbrella likely does little to deter anything other than nuclear war…”[56] Therefore, vaunting the nuclear umbrella in the face of gray-zone contingencies does not deter them, but instead heightens the risk of miscalculation on both sides. For example, a cyberattack against critical infrastructure in the region could quickly escalate to full-blown conflict. The nuclear umbrella would not stop this escalation, and if nuclear weapons were ultimately used in retaliation, the effects to the region would be devastating. President Trump is currently engaged in a (rhetorical) campaign of “fire and fury” — not steady assurance to either allies or adversaries — that itself may spiral into serious consequences. Also troubling is the potential for an “emotional” response to an attack against the United States or its allies that leads the U.S. president to use nuclear weapons.[57] Doubling down on the nuclear umbrella in response to North Korea’s (or China’s) provocative actions, as Roehrig suggests, sends the wrong signal, and in fact risks leading to an unintended nuclear war over a small-scale incident. Roehrig, therefore, fails to convince skeptics that the United States’ Asian allies are safer under the nuclear umbrella than without it. Relying on Nukes to Prevent the Spread of Nukes? Roehrig believes the promise of the nuclear umbrella keeps nuclear proliferation at bay, yet acknowledges a real tension between the umbrella and stated nonproliferation goals. He addresses this issue in the context of President Barack Obama’s 2009 speech in Prague calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons,[58] along with shifts in U.S. nuclear force posture. There is also discord between the nuclear umbrella and Japan’s so-called nuclear allergy, as well as its professed commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan is the only country to have had a nuclear weapon used against it in war. As such, its support of any movement to abolish nuclear weapons globally is essential. Yet Japan’s emphasis on the nuclear umbrella undermines its ability to unequivocally advocate for nuclear abolition. If Japan did not seek cover under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it could be a stronger voice against nuclear weapons. The problem with emphasizing extended nuclear deterrence is that it makes nuclear weapons seem more important than they are. Roehrig asserts that U.S. nuclear promises have many benefits, including preventing Japan and South Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons of their own, but he does not actually demonstrate as much. The more the United States, Japan, and South Korea emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons for deterrence, the more that weaker or threatened countries such as North Korea will want them. The U.S. nuclear umbrella inevitably generates pressures to develop weapons elsewhere. After all, the umbrella preceded North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Finally, if the nuclear umbrella were retracted today but the alliances remained solid, it is unlikely that Japan and South Korea would invest in building nuclear weapons anew — particularly if doing so directly threatened their alliance with the United States. In exchange for closing the nuclear umbrella, the United States can invest in various diplomatic initiatives and conventional military mechanisms to reassure its allies. Time for a Nuclear Pivot The time has come to move away from Cold War thinking. Models of deterrence that were relevant then should not be applied wholesale to the modern nuclear age. First, there is a dramatic difference between the former Soviet Union and North Korea or China today. The nuclear umbrella does not have the same relevance now as it did during the Cold War, when it was intended to protect U.S. allies against an overwhelming Soviet nuclear attack. In any future contingency in Asia, the United States is much more likely to draw on BMD and conventional weapons than nuclear weapons. Second, the commitment to maintaining the nuclear umbrella has negative implications for arms control, such as in Russia, because it creates incentives for the United States to resist a further draw-down of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Third, with the passage of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, states under the nuclear umbrella find themselves in a quandary.[59] Japan, for one, advocates a world without nuclear weapons, but also demands protection based on them. The Japanese people will eventually hold its policy elite to account for this hypocrisy. Disarmament advocates can build on Roehrig’s assessment of the dubious credibility of nuclear deterrence in Asia to reach the conclusion that the United States should retract the nuclear umbrella, rather than maintain it as he prescribes. If the world would be a safer place with fewer nuclear weapons, the United States can get the ball rolling by eliminating an already empty promise to use nuclear weapons in Asia. Japan and South Korea can assist global processes of nuclear disarmament by shifting their attention to the more realistic elements of their alliances with the United States, like BMD and conventional deterrence, and by continuing to publicly foreswear the development of nuclear weapons.   Crystal Pryor is program director and research fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. Before joining Pacific Forum CSIS, she held a postdoctoral fellowship in the U.S.-Japan relations program at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Dr. Pryor is currently focusing on nonproliferation in Asia while developing a research agenda on cybersecurity policy. Dr. Pryor received her Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington, master’s degrees in political science from the University of Washington and the University of Tokyo, and B.A. in international relations with honors from Brown University.

5. Stable Umbrellas: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?

By Christopher P. Twomey Strategic rivalry in Northeast Asia is likely to be a major source of security tension in the 21st century. Beyond the major implications stemming from North Korea’s increasingly robust arsenal, long simmering security tensions among China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are deepening the nuclear element in their competition. Terence Roehrig’s new book is a useful resource for understanding precisely what the book’s title describes: Japan, South Korea, and the United States’ Nuclear Umbrella.[60] While cognizant of the challenges posed by strategic dynamics in Asia and noting tremendous impediments to nuclear retaliation in the face of an attack on U.S. allies, Roehrig is nevertheless optimistic about the positions of United States, South Korea, and Japan. Throughout the book, he evaluates a range of arguments advocating major shifts in U.S. and allied strategic postures, including the development of new, smaller nuclear weapons; the forward deployment of nuclear weapons ashore; and the indigenous development of such weapons in Tokyo or Seoul. In the end, Roehrig finds these arguments overstated and unnecessary. He concludes that under current U.S. posture, “…the nuclear umbrella remains an important political signal that is an integral part of regional security architecture.”[61] This insight about the viability of the current nuclear umbrella to regional stability is important, but hardly the book’s only contribution. Roehrig also provides a nice conceptual overview of extended deterrence and the challenges it raises, drawing constructively on recent work on reputations, credibility, and resolve — all without becoming excessively theoretic. But where the book proves most valuable is in providing a comprehensive compilation of policy statements and diplomatic engagement as expressions of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Japan and, especially, South Korea.[62] The evolution of these policies is subtle and nuanced, and Roehrig’s meticulous analysis captures this well. While the book emphasizes declaratory policy, signaling, and diplomatic engagement, it contains solid discussions of related capabilities for all players. It also lays out the challenges posed by China’s military rise and evolving North Korean conventional and strategic capabilities.[63] Roehrig’s broadly positive message is reassuring. Still, if one explores the topic of nuclear weapons and extended deterrence in Asia beyond Japan and the Korean Peninsula, there is stronger grounds for pessimism about the region than his analysis concludes. So while this book is commendable in many respects, issues that it addresses only in passing — and sometimes not at all — are important in their own right and complicate the somewhat rosy picture that Roehrig conveys. But this is not to suggest Roehrig oversimplifies his analysis. The book superbly illustrates the importance of moving beyond analyzing countries in pairs (or “dyads”) when the reality of regional relations is much more intertwined. Without trivializing the differences between Japanese and South Korean circumstances, Roehrig notes “the nuclear umbrella for each U.S. ally is, in many respects, an interconnected commitment.”[64] He has done an excellent job examining one set of regional interactions in the nuclear (and missile defense) realms. But in so doing he has focused on the issues where there is more room for optimistic appraisal. The context of strategic rivalries outside Japan and South Korea, and extended deterrence in relation to new military technologies (like precision-guided munitions, low-yield nuclear weapons, space-based systems, and cyber weapons), introduces additional dangers unaccounted for in Roehrig’s analysis. Competitive relationships — not just cooperative ones — involve interconnected commitments, and Asia is rife with such complex interactions. U.S. behavior towards North Korea, for example, affects Chinese perceptions of crisis stability in its relationship with the United States. Japanese missile defense systems developed to face North Korea also complicate China’s strategic calculus.  And Pakistani nuclear modernization drives a response in India which has implications for China.[65] In other words, broadening the geographic and technical scope of analysis creates more grounds for pessimism. A Conventional Fight May Not Be Enough Central to Roehrig’s optimistic conclusion are his assumptions about the limited marginal contribution that new types of nuclear weapons, or changes in the current deployment pattern of nuclear weapons, make compared to advanced conventional capabilities. But that conclusion must be based partly on an evaluation of the conventional military balance. While Roehrig briefly notes challenges posed by China’s military modernization, much more could be said. For instance, U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea find themselves vulnerable to some coercive leverage since they fall within the range of China anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) weapons.[66] As China’s military modernization increases their vulnerability, it is likely that Chinese interests will evolve in a way that will clash with Japanese (and to a lesser extent, South Korean) interests.[67] While Asia hands commonly think of the Japan-controlled Senkaku islands as the most likely object of conflict between China and Japan, there are other potential battlegrounds that may be more problematic. One need not believe that Chinese geopolitical ambitions are insatiable[68] to recognize that China and Japan will differ on preferred outcomes regarding Taiwan, a unified Korea, the status of the South China Sea and its surrounding states, and other issues. As the shifting conventional balance facilitates expanding China’s interests in these areas, new areas for nuclear posturing and rivalry may develop. Beyond the implications of a deteriorating conventional military balance, other grounds for pessimism about Asia’s strategic future stem from the role of nuclear weapons during a hypothetical war in North Korea. Roehrig is certainly correct to assert that nuclear weapons, whether held by Washington, Seoul, or even Tokyo, would do little to address low-level provocations or gray-zone conflicts.[69] And while some loose talk in 2010 did connect those provocations to failures of strategic deterrence,[70] serious analysis would look elsewhere to explain those cases, such as North Korea’s willingness to take big risks. But deploying new types of U.S. nuclear weapons in unconventional ways might help address entirely different strategic goals, like preventing decoupling and advancing the counter-force mission. With the North Korean development of mobile missiles, at least those with regional range, the counter-force fight becomes dramatically more difficult. Were an intense conflict to break out on the Korean peninsula and include any significant North Korean use of WMD against either civilians or combatants, U.S. leaders (and their South Korean counterparts) would come under tremendous pressure to prevent further use. Given imperfect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, knowing exactly where North Korean mobile missile launchers are will prove difficult at best. Relying on the precision of advanced conventional munitions in a degraded electromagnetic environment also has risks. Korea’s mountainous terrain further complicates such targeting. North Korea defense planners already make use of deeply buried bunkers for command and control of nuclear weapons, as well as for warhead storage. It also uses caves for “scoot and shoot” artillery tubes; some variation of this could similarly protect mobile nuclear launchers. While the use of U.S. nuclear weapons is far from a silver bullet against any of these tactics, small-sized nuclear weapons can have area effects that overcome imperfect ISR, modestly moved weapons, and penetration disadvantages against bunkered systems. Forward deployment of nuclear weapons, while perhaps raising some “use or lose” concerns that Roehrig correctly notes,[71] would also decrease the response time for their use in ways that can ameliorate some of the above North Korean advantages. One area for future research based on Roehrig’s work would be detailed net assessments of what an extensive conventional military conflict might look like and how nuclear weapons (particularly, lower yield ones) could contribute to it. Such a study should, in addition, build on the points that Roehrig develops regarding the added dangers of introducing weapons into such conflicts by, for example, exacerbating the problems of nonproliferation, expanding war to include other regional players, and maintaining proportionality for the sake of keeping conflict limited. Taiwan and the Nuclear Umbrella Roehrig’s work could also be expanded to take into account the position of Taiwan. All studies are, by necessity, limited in scope. However, follow-on work relating to Taiwan is needed for several reasons. Certainly, the Cold War-era parallel between Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea warrants some discussion: All three were treaty allies in the 1950s-70s; all hosted U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War; and like South Korea, Taiwan had to be dissuaded from pursuing its own nuclear weapons. Today, like both Seoul and Tokyo, Taipei, finds itself on the weak side of a deteriorating conventional military balance vis-à-vis China. Although the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan today is vastly different than it was during the Cold War — not to mention from the commitments given to Japan and South Korea — the United States does nevertheless have “certain obligations” under the Taiwan Relations Act, obligations that are gaining particular emphasis today from the Trump administration. Roehrig makes a number of good points regarding the low stakes in conflicts over gray-zone crises, arguing that in the absence of an intense conventional fight, nuclear diplomacy should not be expected to play much of a role in such low-level regional conflicts.[72] But in any Taiwan conflict scenario, it gets much easier to imagine an intense conventional conflict that includes nuclear posturing in some way. Indeed, Taiwan’s political status is arguably the only plausible issue that would force conflict between the United States and China and involve nuclear posturing, or at least, it is the most plausible out of many implausible conflict-triggering issues. By extension, Taiwan is relevant to Roehrig’s study because a war there could very well drag Japan (and South Korea) in, despite their strong desires to stay out. Similarly, developing the capabilities necessary to intervene in any Taiwan conflict may drive the United States to think about its strategic posture in the region in the future. In that case, the capabilities the United States has in Asia for such a contingency would necessarily play some role in defining the context of Sino-American rivalry. Seoul and Tokyo have to assess alliance commitments in relation to that broader rivalry. As much as South Korea and Japan may want to avoid involvement in a Sino-U.S. conflict over Taiwan, their strategic position is affected by any U.S. engagement over Taiwan, and in the final disposition of such a conflict if it occurred. The Credibility Problem Finally, Roehrig’s differentiation between the credibility of the United States actually using nuclear weapons and the utility of the political symbolism of those weapons is a difficult contrast to draw. I have written myself of the ways that military organizational cultures can shape interpretation of the balance of power, so I am broadly sympathetic to this sort of argument.[73] Still, in this case (indeed, in any case) the source of that symbolism needs to be laid out explicitly: What does the nuclear umbrella commitment suggest or imply to whom, and why? Is this simply a matter of educating U.S. allies about the limited utility of nuclear weapons in these contexts (and as noted above, additional work is necessary on this score before one can conclusively assert such a claim)? Roehrig approvingly shares Dennis Healy’s famous quote that “5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter… but 95 percent credibility to reassure [allies],”[74] which is intuitively appealing but not well validated through rigorous empirical study. Ally reassurance is a task that falls primarily to diplomats, even when military capabilities are involved. Deterrence of adversaries — and sending the corresponding signals — tends to rely more directly on military capabilities per se. Furthermore, at least some Japanese and South Korean officials expect that there are circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be used.[75] Those circumstances are no doubt exceedingly narrow. But it is the existence of such scenarios that makes extended nuclear deterrence credible, not purely their symbolism. This review has highlighted areas where additional work can build on the robust foundation Roehrig lays down in his carefully structured and clearly argued book. Roehrig’s study highlights the complexity of interactions in this issue area and the widening scope of the challenges it poses.  If policymakers err in managing these relationships — both in deterrence and assurance — the scale of the ensuing catastrophe will be appalling.   Christopher P. Twomey, PhD, is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). The views expressed in this review are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent any U.S. official policy or assessment. Image: Wikimedia Commons [post_title] => Book Review Roundtable: The Future of Extended Deterrence [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => book-review-roundtable-future-extended-deterrence [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-02-28 12:41:29 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-02-28 17:41:29 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?post_type=roundtable&p=503 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => roundtable [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => Our reviewers respond to Terence Roehrig's new book, "Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella," and ask some tough questions about the purpose and future of extended deterrence. [pubinfo] => [issue] => [quotes] => [style] => roundtable [type] => Book [style_label] => Roundtable [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 146 [1] => 147 [2] => 148 [3] => 149 [4] => 150 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). [2] For an overview of this debate, see George Perkovich and James M. Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). [3] Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). [4] Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think About Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” International Security 42, no. 1 (2017), 41-79. [5] Benjamin Haas, “South Korean Media Call for Country to Build its Own Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, Sept. 4, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/south-korean-media-calls-country-build-own-nuclear-weapons; Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Decoupling is Back in Asia: A 1960s Playbook Won’t Solve These Problems,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 7, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/decoupling-is-back-in-asia-a-1960s-playbook-wont-solve-these-problems/. [6] Eric Gomez, “A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 800, Sept. 28, 2016. [7] Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 187. [8] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 156. [9] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella. [10] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 110–111. [11] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 126, 148. [12] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 36. [13] On Japanese efforts, see Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 116–120. On South Korean efforts, see Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 140–145. [14] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan’s Defense Ministry Confirms Plans to Buy Long-Range Stand-off Missiles,” The Diplomat, Dec. 11, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/japans-defense-ministry-confirms-plans-to-buy-long-range-stand-off-missiles/. [15] Leo Lewis and Kana Inagaki, “Japan Plans Missile to Test Chinese Strategy in East China Sea,” Financial Times, Aug. 17, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/760e5c60-6445-11e6-a08a-c7ac04ef00aa; Clint Richards, “Japan’s New Remote Island Defense Plan,” The Diplomat, Aug. 13, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/japans-new-remote-island-defense-plan/. [16] Jennifer Lind, “Japan’s Security Evolution,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 788, Feb. 25, 2016. [17] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, 142. [18]Franz-Stefan Gady, “South Korea to Build New Ballistic Missile Targeting North Korea,” The Diplomat, Oct. 23, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/south-korea-to-build-new-ballistic-missile-targeting-north-korea/; Jun Ji-hye, “3 Military Systems to Counter N. Korea: Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR,” The Korea Times, Nov. 1, 2016, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/11/205_217259.html; Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, 141-143. [19] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 143. [20] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 64. [21] Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 25. [22] Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (March 2015): 473-495. [23] Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 35. [24] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 15. [25] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 185. [26] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 188-190. For a more sympathetic assessment of the effects of nuclear strikes against North Korea see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 9-49, especially 27-32. [27] Vipin Narang, “Why Kim Jong Un Wouldn’t Be Irrational to Use a Nuclear Bomb First,” The Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-kim-jong-un-wouldnt-be-irrational-to-use-a-nuclear-bomb-first/2017/09/08/a9d36ca4-934f-11e7-aace-04b862b2b3f3_story.html?utm_term=.350206fa7a12. [28] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 183. [29] Ted Galen Carpenter and Eric Gomez, “East Asia and a Strategy of Restraint,” War on the Rocks, Aug.10, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/east-asia-and-a-strategy-of-restraint/; Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). [30] Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered. [31] U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf. [32] William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009). [33] See Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the Twenty-First Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 66, 90-91. [34] Department of Defence, “Australian Position on the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review,” (Attachment A), Aug. 6, 2009, 4. [35] Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). [36] Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016). [37] Van Jackson, “Let’s Make a (Nuclear) Deal: Bargaining, Credibility, and the Third Offset Strategy,” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 1 (2017): 35–40. [38] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 181. [39] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 36. [40] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 171. [41] U.S. Department of Defense,  Nuclear Posture Review, Jan. 2010, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. [42] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 197. [43] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 197–98. [44] David W. Kearn, “China’s Expansion in the South China Sea: A Return to Great Power Politics,” HuffPost, June 12, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-w-kearn/chinas-expansion-in-the-s_b_7562344.html. [45] For a good analysis of this phenomenon, see Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Decoupling is Back in Asia: A 1960s Playbook Won’t Solve These Problems,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 7, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/decoupling-is-back-in-asia-a-1960s-playbook-wont-solve-these-problems/. [46] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 197. [47] For arguments that question the significance of reputation or credibility, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2005); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). For a more recent rejoinder suggesting that reputation, and more specifically, resolve matters in international affairs, see Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 473-95. For the role of reputation in U.S.-North Korea relations, see Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). [48] See, for example, James R. Holmes, “The Second Nuclear Age,” The Diplomat, Oct. 16, 2012, thediplomat.com/2012/10/welcome-to-the-second-nuclear-age/; and Gaurav Kampani and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Asia in the ‘Second Nuclear Age,’ Atlantic Council, 2017, www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Asia_in_the_Second_Nuclear_Age_web_1115.pdf. [49] Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). [50] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 118. [51] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “A History of US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 6 (2017): 349–357, doi:10.1080/00963402.2017.1388656. [52] See Maria Rost Rublee, “The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy,” Strategic Insights 8, no. 2 (April 2009): 4, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/institutional/newsletters/strategic%20insight/2009/rubleeApr09.pdf. [53] Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (Jan. 1999): 433–468, doi:10.1162/002081899550959. [54] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 175. [55] See Christine M. Leah and Crispin Rovere, “Issue Brief #1 — Chasing Mirages: Australia and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella in the Asia-Pacific,” Wilson Center, Mar. 11, 2013, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/issue-brief-1-chasing-mirages-australia-and-the-us-nuclear-umbrella-the-asia-pacific. [56] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella,187. [57] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 179. [58] Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered. [59] “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/. [60] Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). [61] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 9-10. [62] There is probably more to say about South Korea in the strategic realm, given Japan’s nuclear allergy and the more proximate threat faced by Seoul. Still, interesting work in English suggests some reason for further concerns in the Japanese case: Satoshi Machida, “Who Supports Nuclear Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan’s Nuclear Armament,” Asian Journal of Political Science 22, no. 2 (May 4, 2014): 128–46. [63] Although not his primary goal, the study would have benefited from more discussion on the evolving nuclear strategy for China, e.g., as done in Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, “China’s Evolving Strategic Deterrence Concepts and Capabilities,” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1 (Jan. 2, 2016): 117–36. Roehrig is on solid ground building from Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (Oct. 1, 2015): 7–50. But there is more movement apparent in Chinese doctrine even in their perspective. This contributes to his somewhat overly optimistic conclusions, as discussed below. [64] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 183. [65] My own work on such interlocking effects is presented in Christopher P. Twomey, “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers,” Asia Policy, no. 11 (2011): 51–78. [66] And Taiwan as well; see discussion below. The best discussion of this is found Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (July 2016): 7–48. [67] On the recent shifts in the military balance between the U.S. and China in potential areas of contestation, see Eric Heginbotham et al., The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Rand Corporation, 2015). [68] And I certainly do not. M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-Intervention,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Jan. 10, 2015): 171–87. [69] On the enduring utility of gray zone strategies, see Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competition: Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War,” Naval War College Review 70, no. 3 (Summer 2017): 39-61. [70] Gordon Chang, “The Failure of Deterrence in Korea,” World Affairs, March 26, 2013 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/failure-deterrence-korea. [71] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 147. [72] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 186. [73] Christopher P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). [74] Roehrig, Japan, South Korea and the United States Nuclear Umbrella, 194. [75] The extensive advanced fuel cycle work in Japan and South Korea are important tangible expressions of nuclear signaling in those countries, emphasizing their ongoing concerns Tristin Volpe conceptualizes such programs as supporting “latent” nuclear capabilities that generate significant political benefits. Tristan A. Volpe, “Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency,” Security Studies 26, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 517–44. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => Table of Contents [contents] => 1. Introduction, by Matthew Fuhrmann 2. Nuclear Umbrella or Nuclear Albatross? by Eric Gomez 3. The Nuclear Umbrella Is Necessary, But Is It Adequate? by Andrew O'Neil 4. Is It Time to Rethink the "Nuclear" in "Nuclear Umbrella"? by Crystal Pryor 5. Stable Umbrellas: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? by Christopher P. Twomey ) ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 468 [post_author] => 137 [post_date] => 2018-02-13 04:00:33 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-02-13 09:00:33 [post_content] => According to most theories of nuclear proliferation, North Korea did not stand much of a chance of successfully acquiring nuclear weapons. As an economically backward, neopatrimonial regime subject to the threat of preventive strikes and war, North Korea should have failed. Few theories gave it a sporting chance of successfully nuclearizing. Yet here we are, staring down an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-sized barrel of the world’s 10th nuclear weapons power.[1] 2017 was a banner year for the North Korean nuclear weapons program, as Kim Jong Un sprinted to develop a range of missile capabilities — including a credible ICBM capability — and a thermonuclear weapon. A program that was once derided as a joke, especially after its first purported nuclear test in 2006, is now anything but that. Why did academic theories of nuclear proliferation so seriously underestimate North Korea, and how should we adjust our theories to better account for future nuclear proliferators, so that we do not repeat that mistake? Understanding why academic theories failed to forecast North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is important for reasons of both policy and scholarship. From a policy perspective, theories of proliferation ideally would help governments forecast the most probable future proliferators, such that decision makers could design effective policy interventions ahead of time, either to help forestall acquisition or prepare for its consequences. The fact that academic theories generally failed to predict North Korean acquisition calls into question whether they can reliably serve this sort of role. From a more parochial scholarly perspective, identifying why academic theories failed to forecast North Korean acquisition of nuclear technology is important, particularly in the context of the recent “renaissance” of nuclear security studies.[2] Given the large sums of money and human effort that have gone into studying nuclear proliferation in the last decade, the academic community needs to be clear and accountable in identifying not only our advances, but also our failures and blind-spots. We begin this article by tracing North Korea’s nuclear program through time, discussing the various moments when it began, halted, and could have been potentially stopped, and then, finally, taking a look at its final sprint to the nuclear weapons finish line. We then take stock of how various theories of nuclear proliferation fared in predicting North Korea’s success in acquiring nuclear weapons. Few fare well, particularly those theories that focused on North Korea’s security environment, access to technology and foreign supplies, and regime type. Theories examining North Korea’s orientation toward the international economy and the United States fare better, but even these do not provide full explanations for North Korean behavior. Next, we discuss how to move forward as a research program, given that nuclear proliferation is both a rare event and not a fully predictable process. This is not a call to abandon current theories of proliferation by any means, but is instead intended as a wake-up call — academic theories underestimated North Korea, and they therefore need to be adjusted to take into account what we have learned from this failure. Specifically, we argue that academic theories should reconsider the role of threats of military force, economic development, foreign technological support, and regime type, and place greater emphasis on the ability of proliferators to prevent or withstand the pressure of coercive nonproliferation measures. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for nonproliferation policy, arguing that the North Korea case underlines the limits of export control policies and unilateral sanctions, the importance of timely policy intervention and inducements, and the fragility of nonproliferation bargains to domestic political dynamics.

A Brief History of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The Early Years: January 1960-January 1992 North Korea’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons began in the early 1960s, when it requested Soviet and Chinese help with developing a nuclear weapons program. Both declined, but Moscow agreed to train North Korean nuclear scientists and help Pyongyang develop a peaceful nuclear program. After China tested its first nuclear device in October 1964, North Korea approached Beijing with another request for aid in nuclear weapons development, which was again refused. Over the next decade and a half, North Korea continued unsuccessfully to seek nuclear assistance from abroad, including from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and, again, from the Soviet Union and China. By the end of the 1970s, North Korea decided to pursue a program on its own, with Kim Il Sung ordering the development of a gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, which could be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.[3] North Korea deliberately chose a reactor design that used natural uranium and did not require heavy water, thus minimizing dependence on external supplies.[4] Indeed, in describing North Korea’s program more than a decade later, a U.S. official observed, “Of all the nuclear weapons programs in the Third World, this is the most indigenous.”[5] By the mid-1980s, the reactor at Yongbyon was complete. Meanwhile, the United States and Soviet Union began to take notice of North Korea’s suspicious nuclear activities. In 1985, at Washington’s urging, Moscow convinced North Korea to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in exchange for a Soviet agreement to provide power reactors.[6] In September 1986, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report concluded that, “whether [or not] the current nuclear developments in North Korea reflect a nuclear weapons program, they represent a considerable developing capability.” However, the same report noted, “If North Korea intends to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it has made its job much more difficult by signing the NPT.”[7] By 1988, despite having signed the NPT, North Korea still had not reached a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Meanwhile, signs emerged that Pyongyang might be building a reprocessing facility, which could be used to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel. This combination of red flags led the CIA to observe that “close scrutiny of the North’s nuclear effort is in order,” even though it admitted, “we have no evidence that North Korea is pursuing a nuclear weapon option.”[8] The following year, after a Washington Post story drew attention to North Korea’s reprocessing facility and potential nuclear weapons program, North Korea publicly denied that it was seeking nuclear weapons.[9] Around this time, the U.S. government concluded that North Korea was indeed pursuing nuclear weapons.[10] That conclusion was bolstered by evidence that North Korea was testing sophisticated conventional explosives at Yongbyon, indicating that Pyongyang could be developing an implosion-type nuclear weapon.[11] Over the next two years, North Korea’s sense of insecurity sharpened, as its Soviet ally collapsed and both Russia and China sought to improve relations with Seoul. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia worked to convince North Korea to accept IAEA safeguards. But Pyongyang demanded the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the peninsula along with a negative security assurance as a precondition for accepting any such safeguards.[12] When the IAEA Board passed a resolution in September 1991 calling on North Korea to implement a safeguards agreement, a North Korean official suggested his government would only do so if the U.S. “nuclear threat” dissipated and “if the pressure put upon us is removed.”[13] [quote id="1"] A few weeks later, as part of an initiative to cut the U.S. nuclear arsenal globally as the Cold War wound down, President George H.W. Bush announced that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from foreign bases. This led the North Korean government to announce, “If the United States really withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea, the way of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord will be opened.”[14] U.S. government officials around this time also were considering an initiative whereby both South and North Korea would be asked to commit to not reprocess spent nuclear fuel, which would help address proliferation risks but would go beyond North Korea’s obligations under the NPT.[15] U.S. nonproliferation efforts finally bore fruit in late 1991, when North Korea agreed to accept IAEA safeguards and reached an agreement with Seoul under which the two countries pledged not to develop nuclear weapons.[16] The leaders of North and South Korea also agreed to a nonaggression pact.[17] The nuclear agreement, formally concluded in January 1992, additionally required the two Koreas to refrain from enrichment, reprocessing, and hosting nuclear weapons, to be verified by bilateral inspections.[18] In the same month, as a gesture of good will toward Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul announced that they would cancel their joint military exercises for the year, leading North Korea to finally sign an IAEA safeguards agreement.[19] The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis: February 1992-May 1994 The momentum toward nonproliferation and improved relations on the Korean Peninsula did not last long. In February of 1992, as North Korea stalled on ratifying the safeguards agreement, U.S. officials warned that Pyongyang might only be a few months away from a rudimentary weapons capability.[20] Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence suggested that North Korea was continuing construction on its reprocessing facility, hardening it against potential attack, and perhaps removing equipment prior to inspections.[21] In the spring of 1992, North Korea finally ratified the safeguards agreement, submitted its declaration of nuclear activities to the IAEA, and allowed inspections, but this only roused further concerns. Inspectors uncovered several inconsistencies in the North Korean declaration, found evidence that equipment had been removed from the reprocessing plant (which North Korea had previously denied existed), and were refused access to several undeclared sites suspected of storing nuclear waste. IAEA analysts also determined that North Korea had likely produced more than the small amounts of plutonium to which it had admitted.[22] Over the course of that summer, the United States, Russia, China, and Europe all pressured North Korea to comply more fully with the IAEA. Meanwhile, China restored diplomatic relations with South Korea and Russia began to loosen ties with Pyongyang.[23] As an October 1992 U.S. Defense Department memo observed, “What is becoming clear is that North Korean non-cooperation is more evident as IAEA becomes more aggressive in its inspections.”[24] In early 1993, with the Clinton administration now in office, the United States and South Korea announced that they would hold their annual military exercise — which had been canceled the year before — making reference to North Korea’s lack of full compliance with the IAEA and North Korea’s failure to agree to a bilateral inspection regime with South Korea. For its part, the IAEA demanded that North Korea allow special inspections of its suspected nuclear waste storage sites, giving Pyongyang 30 days before it would refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[25] In March, as the military exercise began, North Korea declared it would withdraw from the NPT in 90 days, leading the IAEA Board of Governors to turn over the issue to the UNSC. After China signaled it would not support sanctions against North Korea, the United States again turned to diplomacy, offering to hold talks with Pyongyang on a range of issues — including military exercises, security assurances, and nuclear inspections — if it would be accommodating on the nonproliferation issue.[26] Although China opposed North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, it feared that strong sanctions might cause the regime to collapse, leading to a refugee crisis on its borders.[27] Over the summer of 1993, talks with the United States led North Korea to suspend its NPT withdrawal. The United States agreed to help North Korea acquire light-water power reactors in exchange for North Korea’s cooperation with inspections.[28] By the end of the year, however, North Korea was again dragging its feet on inspections, seeking a broader grand bargain with the United States as its price for cooperation.[29] At the same time, U.S. officials concluded that North Korea may have already acquired enough plutonium for a nuclear device,[30] causing the United States to try to line up support for sanctions at the United Nations, an effort again obstructed by China.[31] After North Korea agreed to allow new IAEA inspections in March 1994, the United States and South Korea announced that they would suspend their joint military exercises and hold additional talks with Pyongyang.[32] But North Korea blocked inspectors from visiting parts of its reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, leading the IAEA to pull out its team.[33] This, in turn, led Washington to cancel scheduled talks with North Korea, announce that it would indeed hold its military exercise with South Korea, and begin reinforcing its military posture in the region, including moving Patriot missile batteries to South Korea.[34] With North Korea warning that the peninsula was “on the brink of war,” China again signaled opposition to U.N. sanctions.[35] Soon thereafter, Secretary of Defense William Perry publicly stated that a military strike was a possibility if diplomacy and sanctions failed.[36] After another U.S. negotiation attempt failed, North Korea began unloading spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor,  laying the groundwork for the separation of additional plutonium. In June, IAEA Director Hans Blix declared that the agency had permanently lost the capability to verify whether North Korea had diverted nuclear materials for use in a weapons program. As tensions continued to rise, the United States proposed an arms embargo against North Korea at the United Nations, while both South and North Korea prepared for possible military conflict.[37] The Agreed Framework and its Demise: June 1994-March 2003 The North Korean nuclear crisis was only defused when former President Jimmy Carter traveled to North Korea in June and met with Kim Il Sung. Carter identified a potential bargain that would involve the United States agreeing to hold high-level talks with Pyongyang in exchange for a North Korean commitment to allow IAEA inspections, to not refuel its reactor, and to refrain from further reprocessing of spent fuel.[38] A few weeks later, Kim Il Sung died and was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il, who finished the nuclear negotiations his father had started.[39] In October 1994, after several months of negotiations, the United States and North Korea concluded the Agreed Framework. The deal required Pyongyang to freeze operation of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, agree to inspections, remain in the NPT, move toward implementation of the 1992 denuclearization pact with South Korea, and not reprocess any more spent fuel. In exchange, Washington agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, to help it acquire two light-water power reactors, and to move toward broader improvements in relations, including increased diplomatic contacts, removal of sanctions, a negative security assurance, and, ultimately, normalization of relations.[40] By the late 1990s, however, the Agreed Framework had run into difficulties. Partly due to congressional opposition, the United States was behind in delivering the promised benefits to North Korea.[41] In particular, the United States was late in starting construction on the light-water reactors and had been repeatedly late in providing oil. It also had lifted few sanctions and had maintained North Korea on the list of state sponsors of terror. Meanwhile, there were no substantial moves toward normalization.[42] Then, in 1998, the United States detected the construction of a large underground complex in North Korea, which officials worried might be a covert nuclear site.[43] That same year, North Korea tested a new medium-range ballistic missile, the Taepodong-1, firing it over Japan and into the sea.[44] The test was especially concerning because it indicated that North Korea would soon have the ability to target all of Japan.[45] Washington responded by threatening to scuttle the Agreed Framework, leading North Korea to allow an inspection of the underground site in question. Although no evidence of nuclear activity was found, U.S. intelligence soon began to notice indications that North Korea was procuring components for an enrichment program, possibly with aid from Pakistan.[46] Indeed, around this time, North Korea began receiving assistance in enrichment from the AQ Khan network.[47] Despite these challenges, a few signs of cooperation emerged at the tail end of the Clinton administration. Clinton put former Secretary of Defense William Perry in charge of coordinating North Korea policy, who worked toward renewed cooperation.[48] Instead of confronting North Korea over its rudimentary enrichment program and threatening to pull out of the Agreed Framework, the Clinton administration decided to pursue additional negotiated agreements. After all, North Korea had technically been complying with its obligations under the Agreed Framework, which focused on its plutonium program — a far bigger proliferation threat than its nascent enrichment program at the time.[49] In late 1999, Pyongyang agreed to a missile test moratorium in exchange for the easing of U.S. economic sanctions,[50] and in late 2000, the United States and Pyongyang held a series of high-level meetings, including a trip by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to North Korea to discuss the missile issue.[51] In December 2000, with his administration’s time running short, President Clinton decided to pause the negotiations, putting the ball in the court of the incoming George W. Bush administration.[52] [quote id="2"] The Bush administration, opposed to a policy of accommodation toward North Korea, initially halted negotiations and insisted on harsher terms, including broader inspection rights and limits on North Korea’s conventional force posture.[53] In October 2002, after the 9/11 attacks and North Korea’s inclusion in the Bush administration’s “Axis of Evil,” the United States accused North Korea of running a secret uranium enrichment program. Recriminations and threats between the two sides soon caused the Agreed Framework to break down, leading North Korea to kick out inspectors, withdraw from the NPT, and restart nuclear activities at Yongbyon.[54] The Bush administration, for its part, cut off oil shipments and suspended construction on light-water reactors in North Korea.[55] North Korean officials began citing U.S. military actions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq as justifying their need to develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, there are indications that Kim Jong Il was seriously concerned about the prospect of U.S. military action in 2003.[56] Why did the Agreed Framework break down? It seems reasonable to conclude that both sides bear some of the fault. Although North Korea clearly violated at least the spirit of the agreement by starting a secret enrichment program, it is also clear that the United States was not following through on its own obligations. The key problem, as Siegfried Hecker points out, was that “Washington saw the Agreed Framework primarily as a nonproliferation agreement,” while North Korea “viewed the political provisions of the Agreed Framework, which called for both sides to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations, to be the heart of the pact.”[57] This fundamental asymmetry in how the Agreed Framework was understood may help explain both the failure of the United States to pursue broader improvements in relations in a timely fashion, as well as the North Korean decision to pursue an enrichment capability when the Agreed Framework was not playing out as it had envisioned. It also suggests that a desire for improved relations with Washington has been an important motivation for North Korean decision-makers, which perhaps implies that “carrots” are as or more important than “sticks,” in dealing with Pyongyang, a point we return to below. Crossing the Finish Line: April 2003-December 2017 Despite withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea continued to seek economic, diplomatic, and security benefits in exchange for limiting its program, threatening to test a nuclear device or export nuclear materials if its demands were not met.[58] While the Bush administration would not agree to these demands, it did begin negotiations with Pyongyang in the context of the Six-Party Talks, beginning in August 2003 and continuing until 2009. These talks were organized and hosted by China and also included South Korea, Japan, and Russia.[59] At the end of 2004, the IAEA Director concluded that North Korea likely possessed enough plutonium for four to six bombs.[60] The following year, U.S. intelligence detected the construction of a tunnel that could be used for a nuclear test, while Pyongyang continued to demand concessions from the United States, including the provision of power reactors, which had been promised in the Agreed Framework.[61] In September 2005, during the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea committed in principle to denuclearization in exchange for political and economic concessions.[62] Nevertheless, despite this progress, the United States imposed sanctions on entities involved in North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and levied an array of financial sanctions intended to cut down on Pyongyang’s illicit economic activities.[63] In July of 2006, with the Six-Party Talks on hold due to North Korean opposition to America’s sanctions policy, Pyongyang tested six missiles, leading the UNSC to impose sanctions banning missile-related trade with North Korea.[64] In early October, North Korea warned it would soon conduct its first nuclear test, citing U.S. hostility and sanctions as justification.[65] A few days later, despite international warnings, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, although the low yield suggests the device did not work as intended, measuring less than one kiloton.[66] The UNSC responded by imposing new sanctions on North Korea, covering trade in armaments and luxury goods, although provisions allowing for the inspection of North Korean cargo were weakened by Russian and Chinese opposition.[67] Soon thereafter, at Chinese prodding, Pyongyang announced it would return to the negotiating table.[68] In February 2007, an agreement was reached by the six negotiating parties, which called on North Korea to freeze its plutonium program and accept inspections at Yongbyon in exchange for the lifting of certain U.S. sanctions, the provision of fuel oil, economic aid, Washington taking North Korea off its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and movement toward normalization of relations with the United States.[69] After North Korea began to receive sanctions relief, it started to implement its side of the deal in the summer of 2007. The following summer, the Bush administration further eased sanctions, but stalled on removing North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.[70] In September, North Korea blocked IAEA inspectors from monitoring Yongbyon, displeased that the United States had not yet delivered some of the promised benefits.[71] After a deal was struck on verification measures the following month in exchange for North Korea’s removal from the state-sponsor-of-terrorism list, Pyongyang backtracked on the agreement, leading the United States to suspend the provision of fuel.[72] [quote id="6"] Tensions continued after the Obama administration entered the White House in 2009, with North Korea testing a Taepodong-2 missile in April of that year, which led the UNSC to tighten the enforcement of missile sanctions. North Korea responded by escalating the situation further, kicking out inspectors, pulling out of negotiations, and warning it would resume its nuclear program.[73] On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, with a yield estimated between two and eight kilotons, leading the UNSC to pass additional sanctions, including a wider arms embargo and tighter financial restrictions.[74] The following year, Pyongyang revealed a centrifuge enrichment plant at Yongbyon, which could allow it to produce highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.[75] North Korea also committed two armed provocations in 2010, sinking a South Korean vessel and shelling the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong.[76] For the duration of its time in office, the Obama administration adopted a policy of “strategic patience” toward Pyongyang, increasing the diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea in an effort to convince the regime to return to the negotiating table while hoping for a change in regime orientation. After Kim Jong Un succeeded his father in December 2011, the United States and North Korea reached the short-lived Leap Day Agreement in February 2012, whereby North Korea temporarily limited its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for economic aid, a deal that Pyongyang soon violated. From this point onward, North Korea declined to seriously negotiate, focusing instead on building up its nuclear and missile capabilities.[77] This uncompromising North Korean posture has continued under the Trump administration, which has adopted a strategy of both sanctions and threats of preventive military force.[78] Between 2010 and 2017, North Korea conducted four nuclear tests (one in 2013, two in 2016, and one in 2017). The most recent test, in September 2017, is estimated to have well exceeded 100 kilotons in yield, suggesting North Korea has developed a thermonuclear or boosted fission device.[79] During the same period, North Korea conducted more than 80 missile tests, including several that demonstrate the country’s ICBM capability, putting the U.S. homeland within striking distance.[80] In 2017, the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that North Korea may possess as many as 60 nuclear weapons.[81] North Korea achieved this impressive progress in its nuclear and missile programs despite steadily increasing international sanctions pressure, including six rounds of U.N. sanctions and gradually escalating U.S. sanctions.[82] The most recent U.N. sanctions, passed in August and September 2017, prohibited the import of North Korean coal, iron, lead, seafood, and textiles, and limited North Korea’s ability to buy oil and refined petroleum.[83]  Yet these stronger measures have almost certainly come too late — no country has ever given up an indigenously developed nuclear arsenal of this size and sophistication.

How Did Academic Theories Perform?

Why North Korea pursued nuclear weapons is hardly a puzzle. The country finds itself in one of the most dangerous security environments in the world, facing a conventionally superior, nuclear-armed American-South Korean alliance on its borders. Since the end of the Korean War, which ended in armistice and not a peace agreement, both the North and the South have openly called for reunification. The pursuit of nuclear weapons — if it were successful — would provide North Korea with, at the very least, invasion insurance. This is not to say that there are not reinforcing domestic political motivations. Nuclear weapons have become a symbol of the Kim regime’s legitimacy and power. North Korea’s nuclear program also makes it far more relevant in global affairs than it otherwise would be, giving it a kind of status. But the primary motivation is security, to deter against a conventional invasion by the United States and efforts by South Korea to reunify the Korean Peninsula on Western terms. [84] It is somewhat surprising, then, that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons only popped on the radar screen of the United States intelligence community in the late 1980s. In 1982, a CIA report analyzing the next decade of nuclear proliferation concluded that, despite interest in reactors, “we have no basis for believing that the North Koreans have either the facilities or materials necessary to develop and test nuclear weapons.”[85] By the mid-1980s, however, North Korea’s development of a nuclear reactor started raising concern that Pyongyang might be pursuing nuclear weapons, though the intelligence community still doubted that North Korea would risk nuclear pursuit given its vulnerability and the prospect of reactive South Korean proliferation.[86] Twenty years later, North Korea would test its first fission device. Thirty years later, North Korea would undeniably become the world’s 10th nuclear weapons power. Few theories of nuclear proliferation, if any, gave North Korea a chance of reaching that milestone. Below, we catalog how academic theories fare in predicting North Korea’s chances of successfully acquiring nuclear weapons. To be clear, we focus on theories that purport to explain the acquisition of nuclear weapons (or lack thereof), as opposed to the related literature on why states pursue nuclear weapons. Moreover, we limit our discussion to theories that are intended to apply generally to all countries, as well as theories that are intended to apply to specifically to countries like North Korea. In other words, these are fair tests of the theories under consideration; we are applying the theories to a case in which they are intended to apply. [quote id="3"] Realist theories on nuclear proliferation assume that states acquire nuclear weapons for security purposes. Indeed, quantitative studies have found that states in enduring rivalries and with more military disputes are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons.[87] In their most extreme form, realist theories argue that if a state has a strong enough security imperative, nothing can stop them from acquiring the bomb. According to Kenneth Waltz, for example, “no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined to do so.”[88] Yet there is something fundamentally unsatisfying about this argument, since it is impossible to measure a state’s level of determination with any degree of certainty, thus rendering the theory tautological. If a state does acquire nuclear capabilities, it was really determined; if it does not, it must not have been very motivated. Moreover, there are many countries in highly threatening security environments that have pursued and not acquired the bomb, including South Korea, Taiwan, West Germany, Iraq, and Iran. The most complete realist model for what states might successfully acquire nuclear weapons is offered by Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro.[89] They argue that states must have both a willingness and opportunity to proliferate — that means they need a security motivation to proliferate, but the breathing room to do so without facing preventive war (or the credible threat of war) from an adversary. States without reliable allies will, therefore, be more willing to pursue nuclear weapons. This is where Debs and Monteiro place North Korea. They write:
Taking stock, our strategic theory of proliferation accounts for North Korea’s nuclearization. Pyongyang’s security concerns vis-à-vis the South and the United States, combined with the absence of a reliable ally since at least the end of the Cold War, account for Korea’s willingness to proliferate. Its ability to inflict high costs on its adversaries using conventional weaponry deterred counterproliferation military action, granting North Korea the opportunity to become, as of this date, the latest state to have built the bomb.[90]
At first glance, this appears to be a compelling argument; North Korea was strongly motivated by its security predicament to pursue nuclear weapons and was able to do so because it could deter counterproliferation efforts with its conventional threat to Seoul. Yet there are a couple problems with this argument. First, there are a variety of states with similar security motivations, but which failed to successfully acquire the bomb, for example Iran and Iraq. Both countries could hold valuable American allies or assets at risk conventionally, or even worse, with chemical weapons, if the United States attempted a preventive strike. Iraq and Iran (thus far) have failed to successfully acquire nuclear weapons, yet North Korea did. Second, when applied to North Korea, the argument relies on an almost circular claim that the U.S. was deterred from taking military action against North Korea because it never carried out a military attack. Yet the United States seriously considered ordering a military strike on the Yongbyon Reactor in 1994.[91] As Van Jackson demonstrates, North Korea perceived this as a credible threat due to a combination of factors, including U.S. military exercises with South Korea and the recent use of force in the Gulf War. Indeed, according to the testimony of defectors, Kim Jong Il (then head of North Korean military forces) “spent much of March 1993 in a military bunker, issuing commands to field units, a curious action if North Korea did not anticipate the possibility of conflict.”[92] The threat of military force, combined with Jimmy Carter’s intervention and the subsequent offer of inducements, led to the Agreed Framework, which successfully froze North Korea’s plutonium program. Certainly the potential for retaliation against Seoul induced caution in American decisionmakers, yet this is beside the point, since Debs and Monteiro’s theory requires only that the proliferator perceive a credible threat of force. North Korea also likely perceived a credible threat of force in 2003, as noted above, but persisted with its nuclear program anyway. Even this more complete security model does not explain how North Korea defied the odds, when other similarly vulnerable states — all of whom had the ability to lash out conventionally or with chemical weapons — failed to acquire nuclear weapons. A strict test of the preventive war mechanism would underestimate North Korea’s probability of acquiring nuclear weapons. A second family of theories focuses on the ability of authoritarian states to successfully manage a nuclear weapons program. In short, none of these models gave North Korea a fighting chance of succeeding. The most prominent example of this theory is Jacques Hymans’s work in Achieving Nuclear Ambitions.[93] Hymans argues that authoritarian regimes, especially neopatrimonial regimes — where networks based on personal ties make up the regime and its power base — are particularly bad at managing complex projects such as nuclear weapons programs that require cooperation and coordination between scientists, industrial and engineering organizations, and the military. Dictatorships are often too paranoid and incompetent to successfully manage such projects, according to Hymans. [quote id="4"] North Korea is the poster boy for this theory. Hymans argues that North Korea “is the ideal-typical case of neopatrimonialism,” where top-down meddling in programs makes it ripe for spectacular failure in projects as complex as nuclear weapons.[94]At the time his book was published, in 2012, Hymans denied that North Korea was actually a nuclear weapons power. He wrote that the October 2006 nuclear test “was an embarrassing technical failure”[95] and the second one in 2009 “was at best only the most minimal of successes.”[96] Hymans further argued that “it remains unclear if North Korea does or does not yet have an operational nuclear arsenal that it could use in battle.”[97] However, tests are only failures if nothing is learned from them. It is clear that North Korea learned a lot from each of these tests and, in its subsequent nuclear and missile tests, has demonstrated an ability to reach thermonuclear yields in the hundreds of kilotons. It also likely has the capacity to deliver its nuclear weapons to regional targets if not the continental United States. Hymans’ theory predicts, at best, “the project’s snail’s pace of progress,” arguing that “it seems reasonable to assume that maintaining the snail’s pace would be the most North Korea could hope for. Moreover, Pyongyang has proved such an inveterate bluffer in the past that we should stop gasping in fear every time it threatens the world with yet another technological ‘breakthrough.’”[98] And yet, history has proven this argument wrong. The 2017 summer sprint in North Korea’s nuclear and missile program was a clear breakthrough — one cannot bluff intercontinental ranges and thermonuclear yields, which speak a universal language. To his admirable credit, however, Hymans develops a falsifiable and testable theory and is willing to make predictions based on it. Unfortunately, North Korea is clearly an outlier for his theory — the pathologies of the Kim regime may have stymied food production, but not the nuclear weapons program — which once again defied the theoretical odds. A second theory in this family of models is Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer’s work on Iraq and Libya, which similarly focuses on authoritarian regimes’ inability to manage nuclear weapons programs.[99] However, Braut-Hegghammer’s argument focuses not on interference in such programs, but on neglect by weak states with personalist regimes, where power is primarily invested in the hands of one leader rather than a political party or other large group. According to her theory, the capacity of weak states is often restricted by constant efforts to prevent the next coup, which leads to the neglect of projects as complex as nuclear weapons. She argues that Saddam and Gaddafi “lacked the capability even to pay close attention to the performance of these programs because they had weakened their states to strengthen their own hold on power.”[100] Drawing on principal-agent theory, Braut-Hegghammer argues that, rather than meddling in their nuclear programs as Hymans suggests, Saddam and Gaddafi failed to monitor it closely enough, allowing scientists to run their own fiefdoms and sell snake oil to these leaders, which in turn resulted in both countries’ failure to successfully develop nuclear weapons. She writes:
weak states often lack the institutional resources to set up and operate nuclear weapons programs. This is particularly problematic in so-called personalist regimes, such as Iraq and Libya, whose leaders undermine formal state institutions and seek to govern through informal structures of patronage and control.[101]
Although the Kim dynasty is clearly dominated by one-man rule and invests a lot of energy in  preventing coups,[102] Braut-Hegghammer in fact argues that her theory does not apply to North Korea, which she classifies as a “strong state.”[103] This is debatable. Certainly, the North Korean regime is stronger than many observers believed, given that it has, for decades, defied predictions that it would collapse.[104] Yet if North Korea is truly a strong state, it is puzzling that it was not able to prevent hundreds of thousands (and perhaps millions) of its citizens from dying from famine in the 1990s.[105] As David Kang argued in 2012, the evidence suggests that “North Korea is both strong and weak,” and that the state has weakened further in recent decades, stating, “Largely as a result of weakened state control, the economy has experienced increases in commercialization and marketization in recent years.” This, in turn, has “shriveled the central government’s control over the periphery.”[106] Yet, precisely as the North Korean state has weakened, it has made the most dramatic strides in its nuclear weapons program. At the very least, this trend would seem to contradict the pattern expected by Braut-Hegghammer’s theory. The theories described above, which base predictions of the likelihood of acquisition on either security imperatives or regime type, in fact vastly underpredict North Korea’s probability of acquiring nuclear weapons. Similarly, supply-side or diffusion theories also fail at providing a satisfying explanation of North Korea’s nuclear accomplishments. For example, quantitative studies have found that wealthy (or at least moderately wealthy) countries are significantly more likely to acquire nuclear weapons,[107] yet North Korea acquired these weapons despite being one of the poorest countries in the world. Matthew Fuhrmann’s more nuanced supply-side argument focuses on foreign technical support, contending that North Korea “further underscore[s] the significance of the technical base resulting from atomic assistance,” with the North Koreans receiving Soviet assistance in the 1950s and 1960s.[108] The first problem with this argument is that while it might predict that North Korea would succeed, it should also predict that other countries in threatening security environments that received foreign assistance would acquire nuclear weapons, for example Germany, Japan,  South Korea, and Egypt. The second issue is that North Korea did not in fact receive an especially large amount of foreign assistance. Indeed, according to the main metric Fuhrmann uses to measure foreign support — the number of nuclear cooperation agreements — North Korea received far less foreign assistance than the aforementioned countries, and also received significantly less than countries like Ireland, Portugal, and Indonesia, as well as recent proliferators like India, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. Matthew Kroenig’s supply-side theory emphasizes the role of sensitive nuclear assistance in facilitating nuclear acquisition, which he defines as the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technology or bomb designs.[109] While North Korea did receive aid in uranium enrichment technology from the AQ Khan network, this does not explain North Korea’s initial acquisition of nuclear weapons, which relied on plutonium [not highly enriched uranium (HEU)] from an indigenously built reactor and reprocessing facility. Indeed, starting in the 1970s, Pyongyang had “minimal foreign assistance” to its nuclear program, using publicly available information to mimic the designs of British reactors and a Belgian reprocessing facility.[110] A related theory by Michael Horowitz argues that the diffusion of 1950s-era military technology to a state like North Korea should not be surprising.[111] Horowitz writes: “How hard is it actually for a determined proliferator to acquire nuclear weapons? The answer? Not as hard as you might expect. And this becomes clearer when you think about the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the context of other military technologies.”[112] Horowitz himself admirably concedes, however, that the diffusion argument suffers the same problem as supply-side explanations: It overpredicts success. He goes on to point out that “simply importing ‘normal’ military technology diffusion models, while helping us understand North Korea, would probably overpredict proliferation in general, particularly in light of international efforts to make weapons acquisition harder. States such as Iraq and Libya tried but failed to acquire nuclear weapons.”[113] It is not as if we, the authors of this article, were right about North Korea either. Co-author Vipin Narang, in his 2014 book on nuclear strategy, essentially punts on North Korea by claiming it was unclear what its nuclear strategy — if any — was at the time of writing.[114] In his work on strategies of nuclear proliferation, Narang argues that North Korea’s probability of success was heightened because it was able to avail itself of a “sheltered pursuit” strategy, enjoying protection first from the Soviet Union and then China. This in turn enabled Pyongyang to proliferate under the cover of its allies — developing the plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons—before shifting to a “hiding” strategy, exemplified when it cheated on the Agreed Framework to develop a secret uranium enrichment pathway.[115] Here, Narang argues that it was the protection from China that helped stave off a United States attack, not just the threat North Korea posed to Seoul. But even this argument likely underpredicts North Korea’s probability of success, because while sheltered pursuit can often succeed, North Korea’s relationship with China has been peculiar in the post-Cold War era, forcing the Kim regime to at times pursue a hiding strategy. Hiding strategies are very risky if discovered, and North Korea’s hidden program was discovered before it even tested its first fission device. What seems to have deterred the United States from attacking North Korea after the 2002 discovery of the hidden enrichment program was the fear that the North had reprocessed enough plutonium from its sheltered pursuit days for several nuclear bombs — not just the conventional threat to South Korea. Essentially, North Korea’s hidden enrichment program was discovered too late to prevent it. While this framework gets some features of North Korea’s behavior correct, the North Korean case is again unique and defies most theoretical predictions. In general, academic theories of nuclear proliferation sorely missed the mark when it comes to North Korea. It is only one case, to be sure, but it is clearly an important one. However, this sober assessment is not meant to suggest that we should abandon our efforts to theorize about the causes and process of nuclear proliferation. Of the 30 or so states that have begun nuclear weapons programs, 10 succeeded in acquiring them. In other words, it is still a relatively uncommon event, and our theories are necessarily probabilistic. Nevertheless, it is notable how few theories gave North Korea a good chance of acquiring the bomb. [quote id="5"] So what can we learn from this outlier? It is important to note here that an outlier case does not disconfirm any theory. All of the theories discussed above make significant contributions toward explaining and predicting certain cases of nuclear proliferation. With that said, it is useful to examine what adjustments to our theories might be advisable based on the North Korean case. We believe the North Korean case illustrates several dynamics worth incorporating into academic theories of proliferation. First, it shows that the threat of preventive war, even when perceived as credible, has limits as a counterproliferation tool. At several points, North Korea viewed the threat of an American attack as credible, and yet it continued its nuclear program, or else only agreed to limits on that program after receiving significant inducements (in the case of the Agreed Framework). Second, it shows that states can still successfully play a cat-and-mouse game of plausible deniability with hidden programs — as South Africa and Pakistan once did with enrichment programs, and North Korea did with both its reactor and its uranium enrichment program. Third, states that can avail themselves of a “sheltered pursuit” strategy — finding a great power patron, although not necessarily an ally, that is willing to essentially underwrite its illicit behavior and protect it from coercive nonproliferation efforts, have a higher chance of succeeding. It is hard to imagine North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons absent Soviet and then Chinese shelter. While China does not relish a nuclear-armed North Korea, and has become increasingly more disturbed by North Korean behavior over time, it has, for the most part, not been willing to use intense pressure against North Korea over this issue. China fears a North Korean regime collapse that would result in large refugee inflows and the possible stationing of U.S. troops along its border following Korean reunification.[116] The states that enjoy such shelter are few and far between, but there will undoubtedly be others. Fourth, even poor states with domestic political pathologies do not need substantial foreign assistance to successfully acquire nuclear weapons. While impoverished and/or authoritarian countries have acquired nuclear weapons before — India, Pakistan, and China, for instance — they all did so with substantially greater foreign support than North Korea received. The point of this exercise is not to dismiss any theories of nuclear proliferation, but rather to take stock of how to adjust these theories in systematic ways to account for how North Korea succeeded, while fully conceding that the proliferation process is unpredictable and probabilistic and that outliers will always exist. It is a worthwhile endeavor to see how the academic community could have better predicted North Korean nuclearization — because there will likely be other proliferators like North Korea in the future. When taken in combination with Mark Bell’s recent work showing that many of the quantitative correlates of nuclear proliferation are not reliable predictors,[117] our examination of the North Korea case suggests that we, as scholars, should be more modest about our theories’ predictive capacities.

Implications for Nonproliferation Policy

In addition to its implications for academic theory, North Korea’s acquisition of a sophisticated nuclear weapons capability has important implications for nonproliferation policy. For one thing, the North Korea case demonstrates that supply-side measures like export controls are insufficient, even against countries with poor economies. Nuclear technology is 70 years old, and North Korea has demonstrated it is possible to construct the facilities needed to produce fissile material indigenously, based on open-source information. This is true not just for the gas centrifuge, as Kemp has demonstrated,[118] but also for the plutonium path to the bomb that North Korea followed. Indeed, North Korea’s focus on domestic development of nuclear weapons, consistent with its self-reliant, or Juche philosophy, likely made it better able to adapt to technical challenges when compared to countries like Libya and Iraq, which relied more heavily on foreign imports. Moreover, the fact that North Korea indigenously developed a nuclear reactor and reprocessing facility in secret, rather than publicly constructing them under the guise of a nuclear energy program, allowed its nuclear program to make greater progress before the international community could react effectively.[119] A second policy implication is that early detection and policy intervention are crucial if nonproliferation success is to be achieved. Compared to other proliferators, North Korea was relatively successful at concealing its nuclear capabilities and intentions. Partly for this reason, strong international pressure was only mobilized in the early 1990s, when North Korea was quite close to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons. Indeed, one could argue that even the Agreed Framework came too late, in that North Korea may have already obtained enough plutonium for a couple nuclear devices. The failure of early detection gave policymakers little margin for error, making it easier for North Korea to succeed in its nuclear quest. Third, international sanctions have important limitations when dealing with extremely isolated countries like North Korea. Unilateral U.S. measures, or even joint measures with allies, only go so far when dealing with a country like North Korea, whose political and economic system is designed on the principle of self-reliance. This is consistent with research on nonproliferation by Etel Solingen and Nicholas Miller, whose theories predict North Korean resilience to economic and political pressure, although they focus on outcomes rather than the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[120] As an inward looking regime, Solingen correctly argues that “North Korea has defied political and economic sanctions from great powers and international institutions, allowing state agencies and industries responsible for productive and distributive functions to benefit from international closure.”[121] Relatively insulated from the international economy to begin with, North Korean leaders were willing to sacrifice the well-being of their population while the regime devoted extraordinary resources to its nuclear weapons program. Miller likewise argues that North Korea was relatively invulnerable to sanctions, although he attributes this primarily to Pyongyang’s lack of dependence on the United States, the main enforcer of the nonproliferation regime. Miller’s argument also identifies a scenario where sanctions might have worked against North Korea: namely if they had been multilateral and stronger in scope. However, U.N. nuclear sanctions were not even imposed until North Korea already acquired nuclear weapons in 2006. Moreover, despite its recent cooperation at the United Nations, China has repeatedly dragged its feet on implementing sanctions over the years, dramatically increasing its trade with North Korea between 2006 and 2014.[122] Akin to the notion of “sheltered pursuit,” sanctions face long odds of success if a proliferator is insulated from the international economy and if its primary ally refuses to implement sanctions until it’s too late and then violates the spirit of those sanctions. Fourth, if export controls and sanctions are unlikely to succeed against isolated adversaries like North Korea, and if credible threats of force have been insufficient in the past, more attention should be given to inducements and diplomacy as possible solutions. Although it is politically challenging, both internationally and domestically, to be seen as “rewarding” proliferators by offering inducements, the history of the North Korea case shows that the greatest restraints on its nuclear program were in fact achieved when Washington offered substantial inducements, i.e., the 1994 Agreed Framework. Although North Korea violated the spirit of this agreement by starting a secret enrichment program, the United States also failed to fully live up to its end of the bargain by repeatedly delaying delivery of the promised inducements. Fifth, and relatedly, the North Korea case highlights the fragility of nonproliferation bargains due to changes in the domestic and international political landscape, a dynamic that makes such bargains hard to reach in the first place. The Agreed Framework — the closest the international community came to preventing North Korea from acquiring a credible deterrent — ultimately was hampered by domestic opposition in the United States by Republicans, who opposed the agreement and later slowed its implementation.[123] This case has obvious parallels to the Iran deal, a nonproliferation bargain whose future is in jeopardy due to consistent Republican opposition, which, as in the case of North Korea, is inflamed by missile tests and extraneous bilateral issues. The fate of the Agreed Framework, along with the U.S. decisions to topple regimes in Iraq and Libya despite their WMD disarmament, raises real questions about the viability of nonproliferation deals with adversaries in the future. This leaves us, unfortunately, with an unhappy conclusion: The sort of diplomatic bargains that are needed to deal with proliferators like North Korea will be increasingly difficult to reach and sustain.

Conclusion

The fact that academic theories mostly underestimated North Korea’s chance of successfully acquiring nuclear weapons gives us an opportunity to audit our theories and adjust them based on lessons from this important case. The biggest theoretical lessons from the North Korean example are the following: 1) that our theories may overestimate the power of preventive war threats in deterring states from pursuing nuclear weapons, 2) that determined leaders, even in dysfunctional authoritarian regimes, are not always doomed to fail in this pursuit, and 3) that even poor countries can succeed at acquiring nuclear weapons based on indigenously developed technology. The policy implications are equally grim. Given enough breathing room, even a poor a state that wants nuclear weapons badly enough can acquire them, defying sanctions and threats of force — particularly if it has an ally to shelter it from a strong multilateral coalition. While offering inducements to adversary proliferators may stand a better chance of success, this is politically challenging for countries like the United States; moreover, the credibility of American diplomatic assurances is increasingly shaky. Given the various pathways to the bomb and the geopolitical fractures that proliferators can exploit, we should not assume that what has so far been a rare event — nuclear proliferation — will always continue to be so.
Nicholas L. Miller is assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. His book, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, is forthcoming with Cornell University Press.
 
Vipin Narang is associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
ISSN (Print): 2576-1021 ISSN(Online): 2576-1153
Image: Wikimedia Commons
[post_title] => North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from its Successful Nuclearization? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => north-korea-defied-theoretical-odds-can-learn-successful-nuclearization [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-03-22 13:00:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-03-22 17:00:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?p=468 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea's successful nuclearization? [pubinfo] => [issue] => Vol 1, Issue 2 [quotes] => Array ( [0] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => The United States and Russia worked to convince North Korea to accept IAEA safeguards. ) [1] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => Perhaps “carrots” are as or more important than “sticks,” in dealing with Pyongyang. ) [2] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => Few theories of nuclear proliferation, if any, gave North Korea a chance of reaching that milestone. ) [3] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => The pathologies of the Kim regime may have stymied food production, but not the nuclear weapons program. ) [4] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => In general, academic theories of nuclear proliferation sorely missed the mark when it comes to North Korea. ) [5] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => The Bush administration further eased sanctions, but stalled on removing North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. ) ) [style] => scholarly [type] => Scholarly [style_label] => The Scholar [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => 529 ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 137 [2] => 71 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] Although there are only nine nuclear-armed states today, North Korea is the tenth to acquire. South Africa acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1970s and gave them up in the early 1990s. [2] See Stephen Walt, “A Renaissance in Nuclear Security Studies?” Foreign Policy, Jan. 21, 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/21/a-renaissance-in-nuclear-security-studies; and Scott Sagan, “Two Renaissances in Nuclear Security Studies,” H-Diplo/ISSF Forum on “What We Talk About When We Talk About Nuclear Weapons, June 14, 2014, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/31776/h-diploissf-forum-%E2%80%9Cwhat-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-nuclear. [3] Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 127-128. [4] Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007), 333; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 234. [5] Don Oberdorfer, “N. Korea Seen Closer to A-Bomb; U.S. Officials Say Weapon Capability May Come in Months,” Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1992, A1. [6] Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 3. Also see Jonathan Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 94. [7] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “North Korea: Potential for Nuclear Weapon Development,” Sept. 1986, in “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record,” ed. Robert Wampler, National Security Archive (hereafter NSA), Electronic Briefing Book (EBB) no. 87, doc. 7. [8] CIA, “North Korea’s Expanding Nuclear Efforts,” May 3, 1988, in “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record,” ed. Robert Wampler, NSA, EBB no. 87, doc. 10. [9] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)/CIA, “Trends,” Aug. 9, 1989, in “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record,” ed. Robert Wampler, NSA, EBB no. 87, doc. 14. Also see Don Oberdorfer, “North Koreans Pursue Nuclear Arms; U.S Team Briefs South Korea on New Satellite Intelligence,” Washington Post, July 29, 1989, A9. [10] William Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?,” In The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, eds. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 164-5. [11] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, 6. [12] Reiss, Ambition, 230-237. [13] Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea Balks at Nuclear Accord; Government Cites Outside ‘Pressure,’ Says Signing is Still Possible,” Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1991, A10. [14] T.R. Reid, “West [Europeans], Asians, Welcome Bush’s Arms Initiative; Changes Could Reduce Pressure on Leaders in South Korea, Japan,” Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1991, A33. [15] NSA, EBB 610, doc. 2. [16] Robert Carlin, “North Korea,” Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwak (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 137-8; and Reiss, Ambition, 238-9. [17] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, 10. [18] "Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Jan. 20, 1992, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-peninsula. An agreement on inspections was never reached. [19] Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons,” 165; and Carlin, “North Korea,” 139. [20] Don Oberdorfer, “N. Korea Seen Closer to A-Bomb; U.S. Officials Say Weapon Capability May Come in Months,” Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1992, A1. [21] Richelson, Spying, 519. [22] Richelson, Spying, 517-518. [23] Reiss, Ambition, 241-3. [24] Memorandum, William T. Pendley to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, “Subject: North Korea Nuclear Issue — Where Are We Now?” Oct. 27, 1992, in “Engaging North Korea: Evidence from the Bush I Administration,” ed. Robert Wampler, NSA, EBB no. 610, doc. 11. [25] Reiss, Ambition, 247-250. [26] Reiss, Ambition, 250-253. [27] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, 31. [28] Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons,” 169. [29] Reiss, Ambition, 256-7; and Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons,” 170-1. [30] Richelson, Spying, 522-3. [31] Julia Preston, “China Breaks Ranks on N. Korean Nuclear Plants; Beijing Refuses to Join U.S., Others in Security Council in Pressuring for Inspections,” Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1994, A24. [32] Thomas Lippmann and T.R. Reid, “N. Korea Nuclear Inspection Begins; U.S. Agrees to Suspend War Games with South Korea to Ease Tensions,” Washington Post, March 4, 1994, A1. [33] Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons,” 172; and Reiss, Ambition, 265-6. [34] Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons,” 173; and Reiss, Ambition; 266. [35] T.R. Reid, “North Korea Warns of ‘Brink of War’; Christopher: Sanctions Will Be Considered if Impasse on A-Sites Continues,” Washington Post, March 23, 1994, A23. [36] Don Phillips, “Sanctions a First Step, U.S. Warns North Korea,” Washington Post, April 4, 1994, A1. [37] Drennan, “Nuclear Weapons,” 173-5; and Reiss, Ambition, 268-271. [38] Reiss, Ambition, 272. [39] Pollack, No Exit, 117. [40] International Atomic Energy Agency, “Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” in “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record,” ed. Robert Wampler, NSA, EBB no. 87, doc. 17. Also see Pollack, No Exit, 114. [41] Siegfried Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” Daedalus 139, no. 1 (2010): 49. [42] See Maria Ryan, “Why the US’s 1994 Deal with North Korea Failed — and What Trump Can Learn From It,” The Conversation, July 19, 2017, https://theconversation.com/why-the-uss-1994-deal-with-north-korea-failed-and-what-trump-can-learn-from-it-80578. [43] Richelson, Spying, 527. [44] Robert D. Walpole, National Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, “North Korea’s Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,” Dec. 8, 1998, in “North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record,” ed. Robert Wampler, NSA, EBB no. 87, doc. 19. [45] Sheryl WuDunn, “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory,” New York Times, Sept. 1, 1998, A6. [46] Richelson, Spying, 528-530 [47] Pollack, No Exit, 135. [48] Pollack, No Exit, 128. [49] See Jeffrey Lewis, “Revisiting the Agreed Framework,” 38 North, May 15, 2015, http://www.38north.org/2015/05/jlewis051415. [50] David Sanger, “Clinton is Ready to Scrap Some North Korea Sanctions,” New York Times, Sept. 14, 1999, A14. [51] Hecker, “Lessons Learned,” 49-50; and Pollack, No Exit, 128-129. [52] David Sanger, “Clinton Scraps North Korea Trip, Saying Time’s Short for Deal,” New York Times, Dec. 29, 2000, A11. [53] Michael Gordon, “U.S. Toughens Terms for North Korea Talks,” New York Times, July 3, 2011, A9. [54] Richelson, Spying, 530-532; Hecker, “Lessons Learned,” 50; and Pollack, No Exit, 139. [55] Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, “Case 50-1 and 93-1,” Peterson Institute for International Analysis, May 1, 2008, https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/case-50-1-and-93-1. [56] Pollack, No Exit, 141-142. [57] Hecker, “Lessons Learned,” 49. [58] Richelson, Spying, 532. [59] Pollack, No Exit, 144. [60] David Sanger and William Broad, “North Korea Said to Expand Arms Program,” New York Times, Dec. 6, 2004, A6. [61] Richelson, Spying, 536-7. [62] Hecker, “Lessons Learned,” 50. [63] Hufbauer et al., “Case 50-1 and 93-1.” [64] Hufbauer et al., “Case 50-1 and 93-1.” [65] David Sanger, “North Koreans Say They Plan a Nuclear Test,” New York Times, Oct. 4, 2006, A1. [66] Richelson, Spying, 558; Hufbauer et al., “Case 50-1 and 93-1”; and Mary Beth Nitkin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2013, 15. [67] Hufbauer et al., “Case 50-1 and 93-1.” [68] Joseph Kahn and Helene Cooper, “North Korea Will Resume Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, Nov. 1, 2006, A1. [69] U.S. Department of State, “North Korea — Denuclearization Action Plan,” Feb. 13, 2007, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm. [70] Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Jan. 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2007. [71] Steven Lee Myers and Elaine Sciolino, “North Koreans Bar Inspectors at Nuclear Site,” New York Times, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/world/asia/25korea.html. [72] Arms Control Association, “Chronology.” [73] Hufbauer et al., “Case 50-1 and 93-1.” [74] Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean and Missile Diplomacy,” January 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. [75] Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ian E. Rinehart, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, Jan. 15, 2016, 12. [76] Arms Control Association, “Chronology.” [77] Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., “North Korea,” 6-7. [78] See, for example, Steve Holland and Idrees Ali, “Trump: Military Option for North Korea Not Preferred, But Would be ‘Devastating,’” Reuters, Sept. 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/trump-military-option-for-north-korea-not-preferred-but-would-be-devastating-idUSKCN1C026A [79] Arms Control Association, “Chronology.” [80] See the CNS North Korea Missile Test Database, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database. [81] Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima, and Anna Fifeld, “North Korea Now Making Missile-Ready Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, Aug. 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.d073bd77edf8. [82] Arms Control Association, “Chronology.” [83] Arms Control Association, “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Jan. 2018, accessed Jan. 29, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea#res2375,. [84] On North Korean motives, see Scott D. Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): 85; Pollack, No Exit, chapters 2-3; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 118-140; and Victor Cha, “What Do They Really Want? Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” Washington Quarterly 32, No. 4 (2009): 119-138. [85] CIA, “A 10-year Projection of Possible Events of Nuclear Proliferation Concern,” May 1983, 5, NSA, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk02.pdf. [86] CIA, “North Korea: Potential for Nuclear Weapons Development,” Sept. 1986, NSA, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk07.pdf. [87] See Sonali Singh and Christopher Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 859-885; and Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007): 167-194. [88] Kenneth Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, by Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2003), 38. [89] Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). [90] Debs and Monteiro, Nuclear Politics, 297. [91] Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington DC: Brookings Press, 1999), Ch. 4. [92] Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 159-160. [93] Jacques E.C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). [94] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 253. [95] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 251. [96] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 252. [97] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 252. [98] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 254. [99] Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016). [100] Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics, 1. [101] Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics, 6. [102] See Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 66-68. [103] Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics, 224. [104] See Byman and Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy,” and Jong Kun Choi, “The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea,” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 4 (2015): 57-72. [105] Kang, “Normal,” 153-156. [106] David Kang, “They Think They’re Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea — A Review Essay,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011-2012): 145, 169. [107] For example, Singh and Way, “Nuclear Proliferation,” and Jo and Gartzke, “Weapons Proliferation.” [108] Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 190. [109] Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). [110] See Siegfried Hecker, Sean Lee, and Chaim Braun, “North Korea’s Choice: Bombs Over Electricity,” The Bridge 40, no. 2 (2010): 6. Also see Pollack, No Exit, 94-95. [111] Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); also see Michael C. Horowitz, “How Surprising is North Korea’s Nuclear Success? Picking Up Where Proliferation Theories Leave Off,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/how-surprising-is-north-koreas-nuclear-success-picking-up-where-proliferation-theories-leave-off. [112] Horowitz, “How Surprising.” [113] Horowitz, “How Surprising.” [114] Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). [115] Vipin Narang, “Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb,” International Security 41, no. 3 (Winter 2016-2017): 110-150. [116] On China’s views on North Korea’s nuclear program, see Kihyun Lee and Jangho Kim, “Cooperation and Limitations of China’s Sanctions on North Korea: Perception, Interest and Institutional Environment,” North Korean Review 13, no. 1 (2017): 28-44; and Andrew Kydd, “Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification,” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015): 63-77. [117] Mark Bell, “Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2015): 520-529. [118] R. Scott Kemp, “The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 39-78. [119] On the effectiveness of a covert rather than overt proliferation strategy, see Nicholas L. Miller, “Why Nuclear Energy Programs Rarely Lead to Proliferation,” International Security 42, no. 2 (2017): 40-77. [120] Solingen, Nuclear Logics; and Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Solingen’s primary dependent variable is the pursuit (rather than acquisition) of nuclear weapons. Miller’s primary dependent variables are pursuit and the success or failure of U.S. sanctions. [121] Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 138. [122] See Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 27, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship. Also see Lee and Kim, “China’s Sanctions.” [123] See, for example, Van Jackson, “Threat Consensus and Rapprochement Failure: Revisiting the Collapse of US-North Korea Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => [contents] => ) ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 450 [post_author] => 133 [post_date] => 2018-02-07 04:00:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-02-07 09:00:31 [post_content] =>

1. Introduction: North Korea is Still the Land of Lousy Options

By Van Jackson North Korea has become the most pressing security threat facing the Trump administration. It can now strike U.S. territory in the Pacific — and perhaps even the continental United States — with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. North Korea has long been known as the “land of lousy options,” and a bipartisan failure of U.S. foreign policy spanning every presidential administration since the end of the Cold War would seem to demonstrate as much. But what should be done? Charting a near-term and long-term path forward requires answering some basic questions that have mostly eluded the public debate on North Korea policy. This roundtable aims to rectify that. Each of the contributors to this discussion the problem North Korea poses in broadly similar terms, they reveal some divergences on what U.S. goals should be and how to achieve them. The End-State Should the United States be pursuing denuclearization of North Korea? Kyle Haynes of Purdue University argues that it is a dangerous “pipe dream.” John Warden of SAIC and Vincent Manzo of CNA assume Haynes is right, jumping directly to the problem of damage limitation and deterrence. Adam Mount of the Federation of American Scientists agrees that denuclearization is unachievable, but maintains that the United States cannot entirely abandon that goal because of the potentially damage to U.S. alliances and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Kelly Magsamen of the Center for American Progress avers the question of denuclearization, but advocates prioritizing deterrence and containment. Striking a tone that is neither optimistic or pessimistic on denuclearization, Stephan Haggard of the University of California-San Diego urges focusing on the near term. By focusing primarily on current events, Haggard’s analysis takes a different tack than Mount but ends up in a similar place: The United States should avoid chasing denuclearization with any kind of urgency, but neither does it have to abandon it as a long-term goal. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security writes in favor of the Trump administration’s end-state of denuclearization, a goal that every president since the end of the Cold War as sought. But if denuclearization is unachievable, what should be the aim of U.S. policy toward North Korea? All the authors agree that the United States cannot afford to be single-minded, and must instead manage multiple priorities that occasionally compete with each other. There is also a consensus that slowing or halting North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear weapons is not only advisable but essential. Deterrence of major conflict and regional stability are also high on everyone’s list, though those goals immediately raise the question of how they are best achieved. The Approach   The contributors diverge most on the means of U.S. strategy. Cronin broadly supports the Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” toward North Korea, but believes there must be a point at which the United States pivots to diplomatic engagement for the policy to payoff. Denuclearization, he argues, will not happen except through diplomacy. Haggard, Magsamen, and Mount, despite harboring objections to “maximum pressure,” find common cause with Cronin in supporting pressure that takes the form of economic sanctions, if not the administration’s talk of war. Magsamen and Mount in particular both advocate shifting to a strategy the deters North Korea while making the regime’s life as difficult as possible — by using coalitional diplomacy to deny the regime any financial, technical, or political benefits as long as it retains a hostile nuclear posture. The other contributors also find fault with “maximum pressure” and support dialogue with North Korea in their own ways, but emphasize military capabilities to a greater degree than Haggard. Warden and Manzo in particular provide an elaborate analysis that concludes the United States ought to be pursuing damage limitation capabilities, including long-range precision-strike weapons and ballistic missile defenses. They believe the combination of superior offensive and defensive conventional military capabilities will better strengthen deterrence and mute any rash overconfidence that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal might otherwise endow it with. Attacking North Korea Two questions have dominated news coverage about the Trump administration’s North Korea policy. Is denuclearization worth starting a war over? And should the United States give North Korea a “bloody nose?” Sen. Lindsey Graham has argued that a war in Korea would be preferable to allowing North Korea to retain nuclear weapons.[1] Magsamen gives the most elaborate attack on the fallacious reasoning that leads to such a conclusion, but each contributor to this roundtable shares her view, at least implicitly. A preventive war against North Korea would be a war of choice, and the ultimate failure of national security policy. Similarly, none advocate for limited strikes of any kind unless North Korea attacks first. The proactive use of military force is here incongruent with the priority of deterrence. Lingering Doubts Three lingering questions give reason for enduring pessimism about the ability to achieve much more than deterrence of major conflict. First, on what basis can Washington expect to establish credible commitments with Pyongyang? Cronin, Magsamen, Mount, Haggard, and Haynes all urge strategies that require negotiations with North Korea to freeze or rollback its nuclear program, but none provide either evidence or a rationale that would allow us to believe in negotiations. Indeed, North Korea’s long history of violating its own commitments raises valid concerns about the ability to build any future on a negotiated settlement. This does not mean that negotiations are impossible, but advocating for them requires a significant burden of proof rather than faith. Second, how can coercion produce a sustainable outcome? Haggard, Magsamen, and Mount stress diplomacy to a greater degree than the other contributors, yet even they support an extensive campaign of pressure on North Korea. Given Pyongyang’s history of responding to pressure with pressure,[2] it is unclear why we should believe that any strategy requiring a squeeze of North Korea will yield a desirable long-term change in either Pyongyang’s behavior or its strategic calculations. As one of the seminal works on deterrence long ago observed, deterrence is a means of buying time, not an end in itself.[3] We should all be troubled by the consensus among contributors here that deterrence is America’s most important priority in Korea. At best, deterrence enables a strategy that ameliorates the conditions that give rise to the need for deterrence in the first place. But no such strategy has been proposed. The deterrence imperative itself leads to a final reason for pessimism. What must the United States do, and avoid doing, in order to deter major conflict? Haggard avers this question entirely. Cronin and Mount also stay relatively silent on it, though they believe deterrence is a foremost priority. Magsamen offers plausible ingredients for a deterrence strategy — containment, pressure, diplomacy, and alliance management — but the relative importance of each factor is unclear. Haynes suggests that proportionality between threats and goals matters, but does not specify how threats should be levied or bounded. Warden and Manzo provide the greatest detail in justifying their theory of deterrence — a mix of precision-strike capabilities will mitigate any advantage North Korea seeks in resorting to nuclear conflict and therefore deter it from doing so. But this theory rests on a questionable assumption, that North Korea will perceive the balance of forces accurately and draw the conclusions from U.S. capabilities that we wish them to draw. If Warden and Manzo’s assumption is incorrect, their prescription will actually undermine crisis stability and prime deterrence to fail. Takeaways If there is anything that Trump administration officials can take away from this expert discussion, it should be that diplomacy has popular backing, even if it goes nowhere. Deterrence is achievable, and preferable to a war of choice. And just because North Korea remains the “land of lousy options” does not make it any more reasonable for policy to drift toward “bloody noses” and preventive wars.  Mere talk of it is ill-advised. To the extent it reflects the administration’s true intentions, it represents an egregious mismatch between ends and means. If, by contrast, war talk is nothing more than coercive bluffing, it is doomed to fail and risks eroding U.S. credibility in the process.   Van Jackson, PhD, is an associate editor at the Texas National Security Review and a senior editor at War on the Rocks. He is also a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, as well as the Defence & Strategy Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies.

2. Maximum Pressure: A Clarifying Signal in the Noise of North Korea Policy 

By Patrick M. Cronin At the height of the Roman Empire two thousand years ago, the Stoic philosopher Seneca counseled that any quest for a fulfilling life should begin with a clear objective: “Our plans miscarry because they have no aim. When a man does not know what harbour he is making for, no wind is the right wind.”[4] Seneca may as well have been advising policymakers on dealing with North Korea. The objectives of Washington’s North Korea policy run the gamut from the plausible to the unthinkable. In the main, the Trump administration’s national security team supports the goal of deterring the outbreak of major war, a bedrock of bipartisan national security policy for 65 years.[5] Both the Obama and Trump administrations have engaged in various shows of force and enhanced military exercises to underscore deterrence and an ironclad alliance commitment. As America’s top officer in Korea has explained, the purpose of joint U.S.-South Korean exercises is to serve the overriding goal of maintaining “a credible deterrent.”[6] As North Korea approaches its declared goal of possessing long-range, nuclear-armed missiles, analysts have stressed two different approaches to diplomacy. Some advocate avoiding tension by emphasizing diplomatic engagement. Although the engagement element of U.S. North Korea policy remains muted, even President Trump has urged North Korea to “come to the table and make a deal.”[7] Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has hinted at diplomatic flexibility, provided the ultimate destination remains the denuclearization of the peninsula.[8] An alternative approach uses diplomacy as a means of compelling Pyongyang to abandon nuclear weapons through diplomatic pressure and economic isolation.[9] This has been a central feature of the Trump administration’s strategy of maximum pressure. Finally, administration officials have occasionally suggested that deterring war may not be sufficient, and that instead the United States may consider an objective of denying Kim Jong-un nuclear weapons through military action, including the possibility of a preventive decapitation strike.[10] President Trump has instructed the Armed Forces to prepare military options should they be necessary. Secretary of Defense James Mattis emphasizes diplomacy, but he has also made clear that the military must prepare for all contingencies: “What does the future hold? Neither you nor I can say, so there’s one thing the U.S. Army can do, and that is you’ve got to be ready to ensure that we have military options that our president can employ, if needed.”[11] Yet, policymakers have not reached a consensus on any one of these various approaches (deterrence, diplomatic engagement, diplomatic pressure, and military action). While the fear of nuclear war drives the North Korea issue to the top of many debates, the absence of any broad agreement on the feasible and desirable aims of U.S. and allied North Korea policy contributes to some of the worst-case analyses that often fill our inboxes and social media feeds. Lacking a desirable aim (but leaving plenty of opportunity for error), our North Korea policy seems dangerously adrift. Aiming for Peace, Order, and Influence To reach a consensus, we need to begin with a shared understanding of the threat North Korea poses to preserving peace, prosperity, and freedom. From that baseline, we should be doing whatever necessary to prevent Pyongyang from undermining the achievements for which our forebears sacrificed so much. North Korea’s nuclear buildup is a barometer by which to gauge the decline of both the rules-based postwar order and America’s influence. Its imminent acquisition of nuclear-tipped missiles capable of hitting the American homeland presently challenges regional and international security.[12] Emboldened by a variety of new military means, the 34-year-old Kim may rely even more on brinkmanship and coercion to disrupt development on and around the peninsula. Such recklessness could trigger war through miscalculation. Even short of war, Pyongyang’s success in building an arsenal of nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and cyber weapons could accelerate an arms race in Northeast Asia and lead to the proliferation of deadly new weapons around the globe. With peace, order, and influence at risk, the United States has several realistic options for dealing with North Korea. This begins with deterring North Korean aggression. We know how to do this. By remaining strong and actively engaged, and working in close concert with our allies, we can continue to preserve the peace. However, because North Korea’s threat to regional order transcends the challenge of deterrence, the United States should also seek to use a combination of pressure and diplomacy to contain and eventually eliminate the most pernicious threats to our homeland, our allies, and innocent civilians on the peninsula and elsewhere. The Logic of Maximum Pressure and Engagement The Trump administration’s North Korea policy is based on a thorough interagency review conducted early in 2017 and managed by a group of seasoned professionals, including the National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, and the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also happens to be Commander of the United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command in Korea. The policy of maximum pressure and engagement on which they settled is also anchored in strong alliances with South Korea as well as Japan. President Trump’s successful visits to both Tokyo and Seoul in November punctuated the high degree of continuity in America’s regional security policy, notwithstanding widespread concerns about U.S. reliability and power. Because North Korea threatens the world and not simply the United States and its allies, a successful policy requires greater international effort, particularly from China. The multi-pronged U.S. strategy designed to thwart North Korea's nuclear ambitions centers on the application of ever-greater economic pressure, which in turn requires compelling China to curb trade with Pyongyang. Although China is North Korea’s main trading partner, the Trump administration’s approach has compelled it to support various sanctions, which include cutting back coal imports from North Korea to agreeing to reduce energy exports to the Kim regime. China prefers to hedge its bets, calibrating the diplomatic support it offers the United States while ensuring that it does not suddenly and dangerously destabilizes the Kim regime.[13]  This latter proclivity may explain, at least in part, December 2017 reports that Chinese ships were seen trading with North Korea on the high seas in contravention of United Nations Security Council resolutions.[14] Trading in a way that appears designed to evade inspection, on the high seas, fuels speculation that China is merely claiming to crack down on North Korea while continuing to support the regime. It is the latest in a history of Chinese transgressions undermining U.S. efforts on North Korea. This leaves the United States with little alternative to imposing penalties on any entities engaging in illicit trade with North Korea, even China. In other words, more secondary sanctions are required.[15] Without diplomacy to contain North Korea’s threat and preempt an ever-tightening turning of the screw on North Korea’s economy, this dysfunctional pattern will continue as the administration’s pressure strategy moves forward. This is likely to beget a tired pattern of U.S.-China jostling over North Korean sanctions: U.S. officials expose instances of China's (and Russia’s) illicit trade with North Korea; China denies that it is doing anything illegal; the United States imposes limited secondary sanctions on Chinese entities; and China expresses outrage, combined with a pledge to penalize the offending businesses and curtail trade with North Korea. Time is Running Out for Whom? Many contend that time is running out to avert potential conflict on the Korean peninsula.[16] If there is a clock ticking, however, it is ticking most loudly for China.  While the United States and South Korea can live with long-term deterrence and defense, China stands to lose the most from a military buildup in Northeast Asia. Over time, the policy consequences of having to deter and contain a nuclear-armed North Korea will harm China. Can some combination of pressure, especially economic sanctions, and diplomacy avert a future that threatens vital U.S. interests? We will never know unless we try. If North Korea continues deploying nuclear weapons despite a maximum pressure and engagement strategy, the logical next step is deterrence and containment, not a preventive war. A preemptive attack on North Korean missiles about to strike the United States or its allies would contain the North Korea threat, and possibly even deter future missile strikes. But that is a world away from a preventive attack that targets cold missiles in the ground, which would be more likely to escalate to general war. The resulting catastrophe would be much worse than living for a while longer with a nuclear North Korea. Survival appears to be the lowest common denominator that unites all regional actors. This irreducible point brings the discussion back to Seneca. Above all else, we must first know what aim we seek to achieve. While there is no more immediate threat to regional peace and security than that posed by North Korea, we should avoid rushing headlong into a war of choice. How successfully Washington manages the North Korea problem – mostly through deterrence and containment, but also through timely diplomacy when the opportunity arises – could well determine the legacy of the Trump administration’s policy in Asia. If we head toward the right port, we should be able to discover favorable winds.   Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is the Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, D.C.  He can be reached at pcronin@cnas.org and followed on Twitter at @PMCroninCNAS.

3. The Trump Administration and North Korea: A Happier New Year?

By Stephan Haggard Despite important developments in North-South relations in the first week of 2018, any analysis of North Korea must begin with the intractable nature of the problem. Kim Jong Un has doubled down on North Korea’s nuclear program, dramatically accelerating the pace of missile testing to extend their range and reliability. In his 2018 New Year’s address, Kim suggested that the country has “completed” its nuclear program. Although most Western analysts believe there is a fundamental contradiction between pursuit of the country’s nuclear program and economic development, Kim Jong Un does not seem to think so. Indeed, in 2013, he rolled out a strategic concept – the so-called byungjin line--which outlined simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic reconstruction. To date, the regime has shown little interest in returning to multilateral talks on denuclearization. And even if such talks were to resume – currently a long shot – it would take a substantial amount of time before North Korean capabilities were significantly reduced. The military options are also frustrating. Secretary of Defense Mattis has no doubt outlined them to President Trump, but preventive action or pre-emption faces a fundamental dilemma. Limited precision strikes would signal the seriousness of U.S. intent, and might be crafted to minimize the risks of all-out retaliation. But such limited strikes would not fundamentally degrade North Korea’s program and would certainly not eliminate it entirely. However, a more comprehensive military approach runs risks that would fall largely on our South Korean allies, who have insisted that they be consulted on any such action. It is wrong to say that the United States has no military options. Nonetheless, the curse of geography – the proximity of North Korean artillery to Seoul – creates limits that are well-understood on both sides. The optimal approach is therefore one that allows existing initiatives to play out. As implausible as a resolution of the North Korea challenge seems, the broad approach pioneered by the Obama administration and continued in important respects under President Trump might still yield fruit. Maximum Pressure and Engagement: A Reversion to the Mean? Given the diplomatic and military constraints, it is not surprising that the Trump administration is pursuing more mainstream approaches to the Korean peninsula for the time being. After a presidential campaign in which Seoul and Tokyo were treated in casual fashion, the administration has undertaken a succession of assurance tours through the two capitals; Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary Mattis, Vice President Mike Pence, and eventually the President himself all made such visits. Yet, not all is well in the two relationships, particularly on the economic front. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is still smarting from his failure to keep the United States in the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement faces substantial uncertainty. But the president’s team has undone at least some of the damage of the campaign, and thanks to North Korea the two Northeast Asian alliances have even strengthened. The reversion to the diplomatic mean is also evident with respect to core features of strategy toward the North Korea nuclear issue. The Trump administration denounced “strategic patience,” the Obama-era approach that combined diplomatic and economic pressure with a willingness to resume the Six Party Talks. In fact, the Trump administration’s re-christened “maximum pressure and engagement” has, in practice, differed little from strategic patience. In particular, despite the president’s tough talk, Secretary Tillerson has repeatedly restated a willingness not only to talk to North Korea, but to address North Korean – and Chinese – concerns. For example, the secretary has committed to the so-called “Four Nos”: that the United States does not seek regime change, collapse, or accelerated unification, and that it has no ambitions to station troops above the 38th parallel were North Korea to suddenly collapse. Yet the Trump administration’s strategy does depart from Obama’s in two significant ways. The first is the disquieting tendency on the part of the president to issue challenges and even threats, including personal taunts. Such plain talk could introduce uncertainty and ultimately facilitate talks. Yet many of the president’s tweets simply cut against more considered policy pronouncements emanating from elsewhere in the administration, sewing confusion about U.S. objectives and strategy. To the extent they have been threatening, they have probably motivated Kim Jong Un to accelerate his nuclear program rather than to slow it down. The second change in policy is much more consequential, and must be credited with significantly increasing economic pressure on North Korea. In early 2016, Congress granted the Obama administration wide authority to deploy secondary sanctions, using access to the U.S. financial markets as leverage to punish third parties doing business with North Korea. President Obama was reluctant to fully exploit this authority, but the Trump administration ramped up these efforts over the course of 2017, culminating in a wide-ranging executive order that granted the administration the authority to target virtually any entity doing business with North Korea. Although probably not enough to constrain North Korea on their own, the secondary sanctions have taken place in the context of shifts in Chinese thinking that are fundamentally changing North Korea’s economic prospects. The China Card North Korea played a surprisingly important role in efforts to get U.S.-China relations back on track after Trump’s early unforced errors on the Taiwan issue. President Trump not only took a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen but appeared to back away from the One China policy, a bedrock of US-China relations. The implicit deal coming out of the Mar-a-Lago summit in April was that the administration would put its protectionist economic agenda vis-à-vis China on hold in return for help on North Korea. Evidence that China was taking the issue seriously came in the form of two wide-ranging United Nations Security Council resolutions in 2017 that put an unprecedented squeeze on North Korea. Building on two resolutions passed in 2016, Chinese policy shifted in an important way: For the first time, Beijing agreed to sanction commercial trade, as opposed to goods that could be tied directly to the missile and nuclear programs. Securing Chinese cooperation at the U.N. Security Council has to be viewed as a significant diplomatic win for the Trump administration. China has always demanded its own quid-pro-quo on North Korea, however. It sees military options as unacceptable and holds that denuclearization must take place through a negotiated settlement that would address the interests of all parties. The Chinese (and Russian) proposal involves a simple trade: North Korea would place a moratorium on its nuclear and missile testing and the United States US would suspend its annual military exercises with South Korea. The Trump administration has been rightly reluctant to buy into this idea, but the reason is not just its resemblance to outright extortion. It is unclear how the parties will transition from a short-run confidence building measure—the suspension for suspension--to talks that would actually address the nuclear question. If North Korea wants to hold talks-about-talks only to reveal that they have no intention of discussing their weapons programs, what is the point? Unfortunately, neither the United States nor China has put adequate effort into outlining the parameters of talks, a necessary step for moving them forward. Until recently, the question was indeed one of strategic patience: How long would it take for sanctions to bring North Korea back to the table? Many analysts believed that China would never let North Korea collapse, that sanctions would never work because of the capacity of the regime to impose costs on its population, or both. To be sure, China has been cautious both in crafting U.N. Security Council resolutions and with respect to enforcement. But the North Korean economy is much more open than it was at the onset of the nuclear crisis in the George W. Bush administration, and much more vulnerable to the gradual squeeze that is currently underway. With Japan and South Korea moving toward embargo, and the patience of other countries drying up, North Korea has become almost entirely dependent on its commercial relationship with China. Even with smuggling and lax enforcement, it is hard to imagine North Korea will not be forced to evaluate its strategy in the face of a sanctions regime that threatens to cut off as much as one half of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Hidden reserves have allowed North Korea to maintain an appearance of normalcy. But the sanctions pressure on North Korea is clearly starting to have effect. If sustained by China, North Korea could possibly experience an old-fashioned balance of payments crisis as it ran out of the ability to finance its imports. Such a development would have wide-ranging effects across the entire economy. Developments in the New Year Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address touted the country’s nuclear program and was defiant in the face of economic challenges. However, with other diplomatic avenues shut off and the effects of sanctions looming, it was only a matter of time before the regime sought to exploit South Korean President Moon Jae In’s deep commitment to engagement. Predictably, proposals to improve relations carried poison pills. Noting that both the seventieth anniversary of North Korea and the Winter Olympics fall in 2018, for example, Kim issued a more-or-less open threat to the games in his New Year’s address: that the physical security of the games could not be guaranteed. The speech went on about solving problems “by ourselves,” transparently seeking to diminish the US role and weaken the alliance. The price tag for North Korea’s participation in the Olympics was that the United States and South Korea postpone their upcoming military exercises. Perhaps to the surprise of all involved, the Trump and Moon administrations had the confidence to reach an understanding to delay – although not cancel – upcoming exercises, setting in motion an unanticipated set of events. North and South reopened a hotline and Kim promised a ministerial-level delegation. Initial negotiations sought to focus modestly on the logistics of getting North Korean athletes to Pyeongchang. But given that only a handful of athletes were qualified for the Games, it was clear that the ambitions of all parties were much wider. Although the United States convened a conference in Canada to coordinate on sanctions, President Trump subsequently endorsed wider North-South talks after some in his administration openly voiced caution. Where might this go? It has been an open secret since mid-December that the Moon administration was seeking an agreement on the exercises, and that he had discussed the issue during his summit with Xi Jinping after the initial proposal had been made to the United States. The agreement is significant since the guts of the joint Chinese-Russian proposal centers on suspending exercises in return for a suspension of missile and nuclear tests. Chinese authorities have already jumped to the wrong conclusion: that recent developments demonstrate Washington’s willingness to endorse China’s dual-suspension proposal. That is almost certainly a bridge too far, and South Korea and the United States will almost certainly maintain the pressure on North Korea to come to the table or face continuing isolation. But we should listen to Deng Xiaoping: You cross the water by feeling for the stones. The decision on suspending exercises around the Olympics could well be a stone.   Stephan Haggard is the Sallye and Lawerence Krause Distinguished Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California San Diego. With Marcus Noland, he is the author of three books on North Korea: Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform (2007); Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (2011) and Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements and the Case of North Korea (2017).

4. Risk and Reward in the Korean Nuclear Crisis

By Kyle Haynes The ongoing crisis on the Korean peninsula has increased the risk of nuclear war to the highest level in decades, perhaps since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The risk of catastrophic conflict was bound to increase as North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities developed to the point of being able to strike U.S. territory. But many of the Trump administration’s critics have highlighted the ways in which the President’s bellicose rhetoric has further increased the chances of war in Korea.[17] These critics are correct – Trump’s threats do make war more likely. But the substance of these criticisms is misplaced, or at least incomplete. The Trump administration has badly erred, but not because it has made threats that risk inadvertent escalation. Risk is an unavoidable, indeed an essential component of coercive diplomacy. Rather, American threats have foolishly focused on the pipe dream of denuclearization instead of more attainable goals like deterring North Korean aggression and limiting the growth of its nuclear and ICBM capabilities. In coercive diplomacy, risk is essential to any reward. But by focusing on unattainable objectives, the administration is mismatching ends and means, disproportionately raising the risk of war while promising very little payoff in return. In short, many of the Trump administration’s tactics can be found in the standard coercive diplomacy playbook. But these tactics are being badly misapplied in pursuit of objectives that are either trivial or completely unattainable. A better strategy requires a more measured, disciplined use of threats designed to accomplish important, but achievable policy goals. Below, I lay out a set of core American objectives in the North Korean crisis, and highlight those that are realistic enough to warrant the substantial risk of catastrophic war. American Objectives The United States should have four principal security objectives on the Korean peninsula. The first is denuclearization, which would entail the removal of nuclear weapons from North Korea’s military arsenal. The second is a more limited variant of the first: to slow, stop, or otherwise limit the development of North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. The third is to deter any aggression that North Korea might seek to commit under the cover of its new nuclear capabilities. The final U.S. objective is to avoid an unacceptably costly war. To date, the administration has only been unequivocal about its pursuit of the first while variously conflating, ignoring, or eliding the other three. There are fundamental tradeoffs between some of these objectives. In particular, forcefully pursuing the first three necessarily risks sacrificing the fourth. In extremis, the United States is clearly capable of denuclearizing North Korea by force. But doing so would require a massive preventive attack that would kill millions of North Koreans and likely result in retaliatory nuclear strikes on U.S. allies, if not the U.S. homeland. The United States could also radically reduce the short-term risk of conflict by ceasing its efforts to roll back or limit North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, but this would entail abandoning some of Washington’s most important regional security objectives. On the other hand, there are important synergies among these objectives as well. Limiting the development of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal makes it easier to deter aggression, and deterring aggression of course reduces the risk of war. In evaluating which of these objectives warrants incurring a heightened risk of potentially cataclysmic war, we must understand these tradeoffs and complementarities, and soberly evaluate the costs, risks, and likelihood of success that each one entails. Denuclearization Achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would yield greater security benefits for the United States than any of the other objectives listed above. It is also the least realistic of these objectives. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate deterrent and security guarantor for any state. It would be foolhardy for Kim Jong Un to abandon his nuclear deterrent in exchange for security guarantees, as there would be little stopping the United States from reneging on these guarantees the moment Pyongyang scraps its last nuclear warhead.[18] The North Korean leadership clearly recognizes this, regularly remarking on the irrationality of Muammar Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Ukrainian leaders who voluntarily abandoned their nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs, only to be subsequently attacked by foreign adversaries.[19] Limitation Limiting the growth of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities is a realistic objective, but accomplishing it will require the U.S. to make significant concessions, potentially including a peace treaty that formally recognizes the regime in Pyongyang and the cessation of joint military exercises with South Korea.[20] Furthermore, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to agree to any limitation that seriously undercuts his ability to deter an unprovoked attack. But North Korea already possesses upwards of 60 operational nuclear warheads, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) likely capable of striking the entire United States.[21] And while its targeting capabilities and reentry vehicles are as yet unproven, North Korea has already reached the point where any would-be attacker runs a substantial risk of suffering nuclear retaliation. As such, Kim Jong Un could soon view his own nuclear deterrent as sufficiently advanced that he would trade away further development for some offsetting concession. Deterrence North Korea’s nuclear arsenal may embolden it to attempt acts of provocation aimed at “decoupling” the United States from South Korea or other regional allies. North Korea could even launch a conventional attack aimed at unifying the peninsula, holding its nuclear weapons in reserve and threatening to strike the American homeland if U.S. forces becomes involved. And while Pyongyang may attempt limited escalations to probe American resolve, deterring more significant aggression is essential to upholding America’s regional interests. Fortunately, history indicates that prudently firm deterrent strategies can effectively prevent such actions. Some would argue that Kim is “irrational” or otherwise “undeterrable.” These arguments often cite Pyongyang’s habit of making bombastic threats, or Kim’s apparent penchant for executing high-level officials in bizarre and grotesque ways, as evidence that he fundamentally does not value human life.[22] But effective deterrence does not require a leader to value their citizens’ lives. It requires them to value their own, which Kim Jong Un certainly appears to do. And there is no surer way for Kim to bring an end to his own regime, and his own life, than starting a full-scale war with the United States. Averting War Finally, and most intuitively, it is clearly in American interests to prevent a costly war on the Korean peninsula. Even before Pyongyang successfully tested an ICBM capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, Defense Secretary James Mattis suggested that a war with North Korea would be “catastrophic” and entail “the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.”[23] Reasonable people might differ regarding the precise level of costs and casualties they find tolerable. But all would agree that the United States should pursue its other objectives while minimizing expected casualties, physical destruction, and economic disruption. Calibrating Risks and Rewards The Trump administration’s core dilemma on the Korean peninsula is a familiar one, harking back to debates between the “deterrence” and “spiral” models of international conflict.[24] The deterrence model argues that states need to project strength and resolve in order to deter aggressive states from acting on their hostile intentions. The spiral model, conversely, suggests that such projections of strength risk unduly threatening states that have no aggressive intentions, and seek only self-protection. Facing such benign actors, bellicose policies seeking to deter aggression might only succeed in provoking spirals of unnecessary hostility that ultimately lead to a war neither side wants.[25] Deterrence, denuclearization, and limitation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities all will require the United States to project strength and threaten painful consequences if Pyongyang does not accede to American demands. But by their very nature, these threats increase the risk of inadvertent escalation and even full-scale war. Indeed, as Thomas Schelling argued, coercive threats between nuclear powers generate leverage precisely because they entail a heightened risk of mutual disaster.[26] This is the core logic of “brinkmanship” as a tactic in coercive diplomacy. The question is whether these threats also increase probability of Pyongyang making some significant policy concession that would enhance American security and offset the risks inherent in this escalatory rhetoric. If not, then the risk simply promises no compensating reward. But to date, the Trump administration has focused its coercive demands on denuclearization, with comparatively little attention focused on deterrence and even less on limiting the further development of Pyongyang’s nuclear and ICBM capabilities.[27] This emphasis is doubly problematic. It aims at an objective that, as argued above, is entirely unattainable through diplomatic means. It is also disproportionately likely to result in war, as Pyongyang knows that it will never accede to the Trump administration’s key demand. And knowing that American policymakers will find diplomacy to be futile, Pyongyang’s estimate of the likelihood of war will increase without offering any corresponding policy concessions. This may be yet another example of Trump’s favored “anchoring” negotiation strategy – making an outlandishly aggressive opening offer in order to shift the perceived range of feasible negotiating outcomes in your favor. Experimental evidence demonstrating this tactic’s effectiveness is impressively robust.[28] But the primary drawback of anchoring is that an adversary may interpret the aggressive opening offer as an indication of irreconcilability, and simply walk away from negotiations. Best case, this simply gives North Korea time to further expand its nuclear and ICBM capabilities. Worst case, Pyongyang interprets the Trump administration’s unreasonable opening offer as a sign that it has given up on diplomacy and is bent on military action. Given the risks, if the Trump administration’s denuclearization demands are simply an attempt at anchoring, they are an extremely dangerous and misguided form of it. But ultimately, any attempt at coercive diplomacy with North Korea is going to entail some heightened risk of war. Making these risks worthwhile requires the United States to apply the leverage generated by its escalatory tactics toward significant but achievable policy objectives. A Realistic Negotiating Strategy The Trump administration needs a clearer and more focused coercive strategy. Escalatory threats can be useful, but they must convey a clear set of realistic demands. The administration should focus its demands on halting North Korean missile and nuclear tests (limitation) and warning against acts of aggression toward American allies in the region (deterrence). These objectives are attainable and promise meaningful security benefits. Furthermore, they can be pursued simultaneously, and there are significant complementarities between them. The foremost U.S. security objective should be to deter North Korean aggression by reaffirming America’s commitment to its regional allies and developing or reinforcing the military capabilities necessary to maintain escalation dominance across all potential stages of a military conflict.[29] Irrespective of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, America’s regional interests will remain largely intact if North Korea does not attempt any serious acts of aggression, intimidation, or subversion under the cover of its nuclear deterrent. Based on decades of Cold War standoffs across the globe, the U.S. foreign policy community is steeped in experience when it comes to deterring insecure and ideologically hostile regimes. Furthermore, America’s regional alliances date back decades, its economic ties to East Asia are enormous, and tens of thousands of American troops remain deployed across the region. The Trump administration is taking up the task of deterring Pyongyang with a massive reserve of credibility already in the bank. And while Trump may have already squandered much of his own credibility, these pre-existing structural factors should make deterring North Korean aggression a perfectly manageable task. Next, limiting the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM capabilities may be feasible depending on how much nuclear capability the United States is willing to tolerate. Given the Trump administration’s rhetoric, leaders in Pyongyang might reasonably believe they need to significantly increase the size and sophistication of their strategic arsenal to deter an American attack.[30] The Kim regime’s intense insecurity likely means that it would require enormous concessions and guarantees in order to limit its nuclear arsenal around its current levels. This is theoretically and technically possible, though the political obstacles would be significant. And importantly, time is not on America’s side if it wishes to limit Pyongyang’s capabilities. Negotiations would need to begin quickly, given the pace of North Korea’s nuclear development under Kim Jong Un. Generating Risk, Using it Rationally The Trump administration’s strategy has significantly increased the risk of conflict on the Korean peninsula. In itself, this is not necessarily ill-advised. The question is whether this risk is being carefully calibrated, and whether the potential leverage derived from it is being utilized effectively in order to extract meaningful concessions. In this regard, the Trump administration’s strategy has been a mess. Vague, bellicose threats are often made via Twitter, with little consultation among allies and advisers. More importantly, the ostensible objectives of these threats are often either unrealistic or trivial. No coercive threat will ever persuade Kim Jong Un to give up his nuclear arsenal. And deterrence aimed at preventing North Korea from “threatening” the United States simply does nothing to further core American security interests. The Trump administration is thus ratcheting up the risk of war on the Korean peninsula without a corresponding diplomatic strategy that promises meaningful concessions as a result. The White House should promptly initiate talks aimed at halting, and potentially rolling back, the development of North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM programs, beginning with a moratorium on testing these capabilities. It should also redouble the U.S. commitment to deterring North Korean aggression. Judging by Pyongyang’s historical penchant for escalatory behavior and its desire to break up the U.S.-South Korea alliance, there is good reason to believe the North Koreans will attempt limited probes and isolated acts of aggression in an attempt to assess American and South Korean resolve in this altered strategic setting. Early crises will establish precedents and expectations that may have implications for decades. Reinforcing clear red lines and establishing tolerable bounds for North Korean provocations early on will be enormously important. Trump’s belligerent rhetoric has raised the risk of war-by-miscalculation to the point that it may yield significant diplomatic leverage with Pyongyang going forward. Policymakers must apply this leverage in ways that maximize the security payoff while minimizing the risk of actual war. This requires emphasizing deterrence and limitation, not denuclearization. Risks are inevitable in the Korean crisis. Using them effectively to gain the greatest security payoff possible is the Trump administration’s big test – one that it failed during its first year.   Kyle Haynes is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University. His research focuses on interstate signaling in both crisis bargaining and reassurance situations. Follow him on Twitter @kyle_e_haynes

5. North Korea Requires Deterrence and Containment, Not Bombing

By Kelly Magsamen *A prior version of this article appeared as written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 30, 2018. North Korea poses a serious threat to the United States and our allies. North Korea is the country violating multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. And Kim Jong Un is a ruthless tyrant building nuclear weapons on the backs of his oppressed people. I worked the North Korea challenge every day in my years at the Department of Defense, so I am deeply familiar with the adage that North Korea is the land of lousy options. There are no easy solutions or silver bullets. But I do believe there are some basic ingredients to a sound strategy: To its credit, the Trump administration has had some important achievements on increasing pressure on North Korea, including strong United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions and pushing China further along. In some ways, these are extensions of the Obama administration’s strategy and I believe more can be done to increase pressure. However, the Trump administration’s strategy has also been plagued by incoherence and neglect on many of these other fronts — and as a result, the sum has not been greater than its parts. With tensions high and increasing talk of preventive U.S. military action, I am deeply concerned about the prospect of war with North Korea — whether by miscalculation or by design. The question we should be asking ourselves is whether initiating armed conflict with North Korea is necessary or advisable to advancing long-term U.S. national security interests. I believe that after a thorough analysis of the likely costs of preventive war, and a careful examination of the alternatives, it is nearly impossible to conclude that the preventive use of force is advisable or even the least bad option in terms of advancing our interests and minimizing risk. There is a role for the military instrument to play — it is essential for deterrence credibility, the defense of our allies, and to back up diplomacy. But use of force should always be of last resort. If there is an imminent threat to U.S. forces in Korea or Japan or elsewhere in the region, or against the U.S. homeland, our right to self-defense is clear and absolute. However, there are sound reasons why multiple administrations have refrained from using force preventively — it would likely be catastrophic in human, economic, and strategic terms, not to mention illegal. The Human Costs Estimating the human costs of war is always an imperfect exercise. Much depends on assumptions and scenarios. However, even a limited military strike would likely escalate quickly into a regional conflagration. South Korea would likely face an artillery barrage on Seoul, if not a nuclear or chemical attack from the North. According to the Congressional Research Service, between 30,000 and 300,000 people could die within days of the conflict.[31] In addition to 28,500 U.S. military personnel and thousands of their dependents, there are approximately 100,000-500,000 American citizens living in South Korea. North Korea’s ballistic missiles can also range Tokyo, the world’s largest city, putting millions at risk. Hawaii and Guam — where millions of American citizens reside — are at the top of the North Korean target list. Inside North Korea, a major humanitarian crisis would likely unfold in the aftermath of the use of force. Food supplies and basic health care would be scarce, exacerbated by massive refugee flows numbering in the millions. Hundreds of thousands of political prisoners and detainees would also need critical attention. Post-conflict security demands would be similarly daunting. North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world: over a million strong with more than seven million reservists. Including troops and reservists, that is nearly 25 times the size of the Iraqi army in 2003.[32] Even as foreign forces worked to seize nuclear sites and materials, stocks of chemical weapons would be scattered around the country, along with caches of conventional weapons in underground tunnels and facilities. Surviving factions could ignite civil war and insurgency. As a result, according to some estimates, stabilization and peacekeeping tasks could require more than 400,000 troops.[33] This does not even begin to address the complex governance issues that would instantly emerge. We have encountered questions on unification, demobilization, and transitional justice in prior conflicts — a few of the many lessons from our experiences in Iraq — and have not acquitted ourselves well in dealing with them. The Economic Costs On the potential economic costs of war, let us start with a few simple facts: If nuclear conflict were to occur, the RAND Corporation estimates that such an attack would cost at least 10 percent of the ROK’s GDP in the first year alone and that those losses would likely be extended for at least ten years. And these estimates do not even include a strike on Hawaii or Japan.[34] Further, direct costs to U.S. taxpayers of a war with North Korea would be significant. According to another 2010 RAND report, estimates for long-term reconstruction of the Korean Peninsula top $1 trillion.[35] The Strategic Costs The strategic costs of preventive war with North Korea would be quite consequential for long-term U.S. interests, even assuming military success. Three questions factor most in my mind:
  1. What will be the long-term impact on our alliances? If a military strike is conducted without the concurrence of the ROK and Japan, you can expect an end to the alliance relationships as we know them in Asia and probably around the world. A preventive war without the full support of our Asian allies would likely do lasting damage to trust in America — not just in Asia, but globally. Without our alliances and partnerships, the United States’ role as a Pacific power would be fundamentally diminished for the long term.
  2. What will China and Russia do? China will almost certainly intervene into a destabilized North Korea, creating both military and political obstacles for the United States. It is likely that China will seek to occupy North Korea, at a minimum to prevent a complete state collapse and to secure nuclear sites. A long-term Chinese presence in North Korea — and it would almost certainly be long-term — has implications for our alliance with the ROK and our interests in Northeast Asia. And in a worse-case scenario, absent substantial strategic and tactical deconfliction in advance, a potential U.S.-China conflict could easily materialize. Russia, which shares a small land border with North Korea, will most certainly oppose U.S. intervention and continue to play spoiler alongside China.
  3. What would be the opportunity costs for the United States? This question never gets enough attention. War with North Korea would become the central preoccupation of the president and his national security team for the duration of his term — crowding out all other issues and limiting strategic bandwidth for the United States to deal with challenges like Russia, China, and Iran. If great power competition with China and Russia are indeed central to U.S. national security strategy, then war with North Korea would almost certainly distract U.S. resources and focus and increase China’s opportunities in the region. From a basic force management perspective, hard trade-offs would need to be made with respect to forces and capabilities in other theaters.
Examining the Argument for Preventive Use of Force There are some who argue that preventive use of force is the least bad option. They predicate this view in part on an assumption that Kim Jong Un is not a rational actor and therefore deterrence is not a reliable option for preventing a nuclear first strike against the United States. They also suggest that once North Korea achieves a full intercontinental ballistic missile capability, Kim Jong Un will use that capability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk while forcibly unifying the Korean Peninsula. While no one can credibly predict North Korean intentions, and while the possibility of nuclear coercion is real, there are some empirical weaknesses in this line of argument. Let me break it down. First, history shows otherwise. While reunification remains the stated objective of both North and South Korea, the credible threat of American and ROK firepower has prevented North Korea from pursuing that reunification by force since 1953. More than 28,000 U.S. troops remain on the Peninsula today, backed up by our extended deterrence commitment that would bring to bear the full spectrum of American power. Strengthening our deterrence credibility starts not with an overt demonstration of U.S. power in defense of our own citizens and interests, but with the credibility of our commitment to defend the citizens and interests of our allies. A preventive attack would undermine America’s deterrence strategy by showing that we are willing to sacrifice our allies, essentially decoupling them ourselves. Second, there are the basic military realities. Some have suggested that “war over there is better than war over here.” But let us be honest: North Korea already has the capability to hold U.S. interests at risk in the Pacific — with nuclear-tipped missiles that can reach Hawaii and Guam where millions of American citizens live, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of American civilians living in both Korea and Japan. So, war over there would also potentially cost millions of American lives. Third, the arguments for preventive use of force are predicated on ultimately unknowable determinations on Kim Jong Un’s rationality. What would be the objective and how would we effectuate the desired outcome, especially if he is irrational? Much will depend on Kim Jong Un’s perceptions of our intentions. So if we assume Kim Jong Un is indeed an irrational actor, why would we think that he would exercise restraint when presented with a limited U.S. military strike? This is the central flaw in the argument for the “bloody nose” approach. Escalation is extremely likely and deterrence cuts both ways. Finally, there are real questions about the effectiveness of preventive use of force. What would a limited strike ultimately seek to achieve? If it is to show we are serious and to force Kim Jong Un to the negotiating table, it is unlikely that he will oblige. If the objective of a strike is to take out his nuclear and ballistic missile programs, then that is not a limited military option. In my judgment, that would be a full-scale war, and in that case, we would need to have high confidence that we were able to hit all out targets and that the nuclear, chemical, and ballistic programs could not be reconstituted. In fact, in a letter to Congress last year, the Pentagon itself estimates that eliminating all of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities would require an actual ground invasion.[36] What are the other options? National security decision-making often forces us to choose the least bad option.  Make no mistake that with North Korea there are no good options and that all of them carry risk. But by far the worst is war. In my view, the least bad option is to contain, deter, pressure, and vigorously try to open a genuine diplomatic process. So where does that leave us? To begin with, we need to refresh our approach to diplomacy and make clear to North Korea that the door is open. We all know that diplomacy with North Korea has a checkered past, but it must be the leading line of the U.S. effort if for no other reason than that diplomacy is the necessary predicate to all other options. And while North Korea has demonstrated little interest in meaningful diplomacy over denuclearization, we need to be clear, persistent, and creative about how we approach any negotiations. There has been significant confusion over U.S. intentions in this regard. We also need to consider that at the heart of the North Korea crisis is a security dilemma, not just an arms control and proliferation problem. We need to think creatively about how to address that dilemma in concert with our allies — including what assurances we would be prepared to offer in exchange for meaningful and verifiable limits on their nuclear program. Diplomacy is only likely to be successful if it begins without preconditions and moves in stages of confidence-building. We should also be positioning ourselves to shape any negotiations to our advantage and not allow the North Koreans to seize the initiative. For this to be possible, I would encourage the Trump administration to appoint an experienced high-level envoy that has the unambiguous backing of the White House to coordinate diplomacy and messaging with our allies and who would be dedicated full time to the pursuit of negotiations. Second, we should consider a shift in our strategy vis-à-vis China. While the Chinese do not share our long-term interests on the Korean Peninsula, they do worry about two things: secondary sanctions and American encirclement. On the sanction front, the administration has only just begun to get serious with China, and the United States should pull every non-military pressure lever it has over North Korea before putting American lives on the line. Critically, China can cut off North Korea’s oil supplies, but it has not yet done so. The Trump administration should substantially ratchet up the costs to Beijing if it continues to supply fuel not only to the North Korean economy but to its military as well. Further, the Chinese need to look out around the region and see the negative effect that a nuclear-armed North Korea will have on their long-term objective to impose a sphere of influence in their near periphery. We should consider what additional force posture is necessary to contain and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea and we should not hesitate to move forward with it, whether that takes the form of an additional THAAD battery on the Peninsula, support for Japanese acquisition of key capabilities, or additional U.S. air, naval, and ground forces around the region. As the United States bolsters deterrence and containment against North Korea, U.S. policy must send the unmistakable signal to China that, if the threat from North Korea remains, the United States will strengthen its military posture in Northeast Asia. We also need to work harder to improve Japan-ROK relations and further operationalize trilateral cooperation — not just to prevent North Korea from driving wedges, but China as well. Third, we are likely to find ourselves in a containment and deterrence scenario and we should begin conceptualizing what would be necessary, in that scenario, to limit risk. This is obviously no one’s preferred outcome and it has potential downsides. But given the challenges of diplomacy with North Korea and given the overwhelming risks of war, I think we also need to be realistic. What would an active containment and upgraded deterrence strategy look like that would minimize risk, protect our long-term strategic interests, and could be executed in concert with our allies? We need to be thinking hard about how to upgrade our extended deterrence commitments to our allies, how to improve conventional deterrence, and how to craft a much more integrated and enhanced counter-proliferation framework. A war of choice with North Korea would be the option of highest risk. It would be unlikely to advance U.S. long-term strategic interests, and in my view, could potentially mortally wound them. Given the stakes involved with the use of force, the Trump administration owes our military and the American public the planning and preparation that, frankly, was absent with Iraq in 2003. *Portions of this article previously appeared in The Hill on December 1, 2017, with Ely Ratner. Kelly Magsamen is Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress. She previously served as the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

6. The Least Bad Option: Damage Limitation and U.S. Deterrence Strategy toward North Korea

By Vince A. Manzo and John K. Warden The Trump administration is right to be alarmed by the breakneck advancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. But by treating North Korea’s push toward an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as a crisis rather than a component of a long-term challenge, the Trump team is stumbling toward an unnecessary war. Senior officials appear to be coalescing around the wrongheaded conclusion that the United States cannot deter a nuclear-armed North Korea and are reportedly contemplating limited military action that would carry significant risk of escalation to a catastrophic war.[37] Fortunately, the United States has acceptable options between the insupportable extremes of preventive war or capitulation to Pyongyang’s most far-reaching demands. Rather than trying to “solve the problem,” the Trump administration needs a long-term strategy for managing the threat. The administration’s goals should be to deter war, mitigate the risk of nuclear escalation, and assuage South Korean and Japanese concerns. To achieve these goals, the United States must demonstrate that it will oppose armed aggression in the face of increasing nuclear risk. Maintaining robust “damage-limitation capabilities” that can significantly limit North Korea’s ability to conduct successful nuclear strikes against the United States and its allies should be the Trump administration’s long-term priority. The Extended Deterrence and Assurance Challenge The risk associated with North Korea’s advancing nuclear weapons program is not that Pyongyang will conduct a bolt-from-the-blue strike against the United States. Rather, the concern is that North Korea will launch conventional attacks against Japan and South Korea backed by nuclear threats. To continue to uphold its extended deterrence commitments, the United States must be willing to step into the crosshairs of an increasing number of North Korean ICBMs on behalf on an ally. This is an extraordinary commitment, and one that Pyongyang, and possibly Seoul and Tokyo, may come to question. As North Korea’s nuclear capabilities improve, Pyongyang is likely to become more ambitious. Pyongyang likely has – or will develop – a strategy for using its nuclear weapons capability to reshape the political arrangement on the peninsula.[38] If Pyongyang is confident that it can threaten nuclear escalation to deter the United States and South Korea from pursuing regime change, then it is likely to be more willing to initiate provocations, escalate crises, and risk war.[39] In the worst case scenario, North Korea may come to think that it can invade and conquer South Korea while using nuclear threats to deter U.S. intervention.[40] Short of that, the Kim regime has intermediate objectives: weakening the U.S.-South Korea alliance, reducing U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula, dividing South Korea and Japan, and extracting economic concessions.[41] A related concern is that Seoul and Tokyo may come to doubt U.S. security guarantees. They may fear that the United States would fail to honor its security commitment and conclude that they need their own nuclear weapons to deter North Korea. Perhaps more likely, Seoul might conclude that it needs to take matters into its own hands in a crisis by conducting a unilateral, conventional strike targeting Kim Jong Un or key leadership around him. Alternatively, Seoul might agree to a North-South confederation or a substantially reduced U.S. military presence; Tokyo might deny the use of its territory for U.S. military operations on the Korean peninsula. The United States, therefore, must convince Pyongyang, Seoul, and Tokyo that it will oppose North Korean aggression. The United States can deter North Korea from starting a war or using nuclear weapons.[42] But doing so will require a determined effort to shape Pyongyang’s calculus. The U.S. and allied goal should be to convince the Kim regime that its nuclear weapons are an insurance policy against an unprovoked invasion rather than a license for conquest. The Case for Damage Limitation A central element of U.S. long-term strategy for deterring a nuclear-armed North Korea and assuring South Korea and Japan should be to maintain robust “damage-limitation capabilities” to keep pace with North Korea’s advancing nuclear forces. By damage-limitation capabilities, we mean military capabilities that would allow the United States – in a conflict – to use offensive and defensive means to significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to conduct successful nuclear strikes against it and its allies. Broadly, these capabilities would include three key elements: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to locate and track North Korean nuclear forces, strike capabilities to disable nuclear-armed delivery vehicles or disrupt their command and control, and defenses to intercept nuclear-armed missiles once North Korea has launched them. Of course, the United States has significant ISR, strike, and missile defense capabilities today. But as North Korea’s nuclear weapons force becomes larger and more sophisticated, the United States will need to keep pace, which will require examining North Korean nuclear forces as a network and ensuring that the United States has the appropriate tools to exploit weak points. One key shortcoming of the current U.S. posture is an overreliance on nuclear weapons to conduct strikes against North Korea’s nuclear forces.[43] Massive nuclear strikes may not be credible in Pyongyang’s eyes, making it critical that the United States improve its conventional options, particularly against high-value targets like ICBMs. This might involve the deployment of additional strike platforms to the Korean peninsula or the fielding of intercontinental-range conventional strike capabilities.[44] Robust damage-limitation capabilities will help the United States disabuse Kim Jong Un of the idea that he can use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to terminate a conventional conflict. Pyongyang knows it cannot match the full military potential of the United States. As a result, Kim has incentives to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces and bases in the region, while relying on the threat of significant nuclear attacks against U.S. and allied cities to convince the United States to stop fighting.[45] But if Kim and his advisers fear that the United States will execute strikes to destroy their nuclear forces – either to preempt its nuclear use during a conventional conflict or to retaliate against a limited nuclear strike –then they will have dramatically less confidence in their ability to coerce or intimidate through the threat or use of force. Recognizing this military disadvantage, Pyongyang will be less likely to go on the offensive, in peacetime or in crisis, or to attempt to end a conflict by conducting limited nuclear strikes. Washington, on the other hand, would have greater confidence in its ability to deter – and if necessary mitigate – nuclear escalation, which should increase U.S. willingness to stand with allies in the face of aggression. For allies, U.S. damage-limitation capabilities would help to assure them of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence despite advancing North Korean nuclear capabilities.[46] Lastly, damage-limitation capabilities provide Washington with an option to reduce harm to the United States and its allies. A conflict on the Korean peninsula could spiral out of control despite U.S. efforts to de-escalate. Imagine North Korea launching several nuclear strikes and preparing more, regardless of the consequences. In this scenario, the United States and its allies may determine that deterring the next wave of nuclear attacks is not viable and instead seek to disarm North Korea’s nuclear forces. The right mix of offensive and defensive capabilities would save thousands if not millions of American, Korean, and Japanese lives. There are, of course, risks associated with the pursuit of damage-limitation capabilities against a nuclear-armed adversary. The disadvantages have persuaded the U.S. government to accept a relationship of mutual vulnerability with Russia, and some scholars argue that pursuit of improved damage-limitation capabilities against China would be counterproductive.[47] For North Korea, however, the likely benefits outweigh the risks. Objection One: Not Required to Deter One objection is that the United States does not need damage-limitation capabilities to deter North Korea. This argument posits that a reliable forward military presence combined with the threat of an “effective and overwhelming” response to North Korean nuclear use is both necessary and sufficient to deny North Korea the ability to conquer territory and deter it from conducting nuclear strikes. This argument is half-right. The United States should pursue an improved conventional posture on the Korean peninsula and robust damage-limitation capabilities. But one is not a substitute for the other. A forward military posture would cause Pyongyang to think twice before undertaking conventional military aggression, but would not eliminate the possibility of war. Moreover, threats of an overwhelming response may not be sufficient to deter North Korean nuclear use absent significant damage-limitation capabilities. In an escalating conventional conflict, the Kim regime might be tempted to try to coerce Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to accommodate its demands through limited nuclear strikes. If Pyongyang believes that it can reliably threaten several major U.S. cities, it may doubt that Washington will follow through on its threat of overwhelming retaliation, instead expecting accommodation. With robust damage-limitation capabilities, the United States can credibly threaten to preempt North Korea’s nuclear missiles and intercept most of those that survive, thus reducing the vulnerability of the United States. As a result, North Korea would be less confident that it can coerce capitulation. Objection Two: Triggers an Unwinnable Arms Race A second objection is that pursuit of damage-limitation capabilities would trigger an unwinnable arms race. This objection involves two claims. First, an arms race with North Korea would leave the United States and its allies worse off because striking North Korean nuclear forces is too difficult and U.S. missile defenses are too limited, particularly compared to the lower cost of fielding additional missiles. Second, U.S. damage-limitation capabilities would only be meaningful if the United States were supremely confident that a comprehensive strike against North Korean nuclear forces would be at or near one-hundred percent effective. Improving U.S. long-range strike and missile-defense capabilities would, indeed, incentivize Pyongyang to quantitatively and qualitatively improve its nuclear forces. But with North Korea – unlike Russia and China – this is not a competition the United States should avoid. Pyongyang is already trying to increase the survivability, reliability, and yield of its nuclear forces and is not going to reverse course. But the United States and its allies have a massive advantage over North Korea in financial and technical resources that they can use to make it harder for the North to maintain a survivable reserve of nuclear forces in war. North Korea is following the path of previous nuclear powers to keep its nuclear forces survivable: It is hiding key capabilities in dispersed, hardened facilities that are difficult to strike and is taking advantage of ground-based, mobile launchers that are difficult to find. In time, North Korea is likely to deploy nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on submarines that are also difficult to locate. Holding these forces at risk is hard but not impossible. Against a far superior competitor in the Soviet Union, the United States was able to use intelligence capabilities to track and target mobile missiles and submarines.[48] Today, improvements in technology are making it easier to find and strike mobile and hardened targets even against sophisticated, determined competitors.[49] North Korea is a far smaller country than either Russia or China, with far less transportation infrastructure, less experience operating mobile missiles and submarines, and a significantly reduced ability to deny the United States overhead and airborne ISR. If the United States and its allies dedicate significant resources to the effort, they can substantially improve their ability to find, track, target, and strike North Korea’s mobile missiles and submarines. Regarding missile defense, critics are correct to note that deploying additional missiles and countermeasures is cheaper than fielding reliable defenses and to warn of the limitations of current U.S. missile defense systems. But if Washington prioritizes realistic improvements in its homeland defense system, it can mitigate North Korea’s ability to reliably threaten the continental United States.[50] In addition, the United States, South Korea, and Japan can improve their combined regional missile defense posture by investing in proven systems and exploring new capabilities. To be clear, the United States will never be one-hundred-percent confident that it can comprehensively disarm North Korea’s nuclear forces. Fortunately, the purpose of pursuing additional damage-limitation capabilities is not to justify preventive war but rather to reduce the level of nuclear risk that the United States and its allies must take on in an escalating conflict with North Korea. There is an immense difference between an adversary that might be able to destroy a handful of U.S. cities and an adversary that could reliably threaten scores. Absolute security from North Korea’s nuclear weapons is unobtainable, but reducing U.S. and allied vulnerability is a realistic goal. Objection Three: Incentivizes North Korean Nuclear Use A third objection is that a damage-limitation posture would increase the likelihood of North Korea using a nuclear weapon in a conflict. It posits that if Kim Jong Un fears that the United States will destroy his nuclear forces, then he might feel pressure to use his nuclear weapons before he loses them. This conflates North Korea’s fear of regime change with its fear of strikes against its nuclear forces and, as a result, gets the relationship between U.S. damage-limitation capabilities and North Korea’s incentive to use nuclear weapons backward. Kim’s primary goal in a conflict with the United States would be regime survival. North Korea, therefore, requires a war strategy that coerces the United States and its allies to limit their ambitions, not because they are incapable of pursuing regime change in North Korea, but because they calculate that the risk is not worth the benefit. If the Kim regime fears that South Korea and the United States are going full bore toward regime change, nuclear escalation is a logical strategy. By raising the specter of an escalating nuclear war, Pyongyang would force Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to reconsider whether the benefits of dislodging the regime are worth the likely catastrophic costs. But Pyongyang would also understand that nuclear escalation is an extremely risky strategy. In crossing the nuclear threshold, North Korea would contravene a long-held international norm against the use of nuclear weapons and cross a U.S. red line, ensuring that Washington has a stronger interest in pursuing regime change than at the outset of the conflict. Robust U.S. ISR, strike, and missile defense capabilities would make coercive nuclear escalation significantly riskier for Pyongyang. This damage-limitation posture would undermine Kim’s confidence that, by escalating a conflict to the nuclear level, he can convince the United States to stand down out of fear. As a result, in both crisis and conflict, a Kim regime interested in survival would have a reason to find less risky ways out of crisis. On the other hand, U.S. damage-limitation capabilities would increase Pyongyang’s concerns about America’s pursuit of regime change. Therefore, the requisite mix of offensive and defensive capabilities must be supplemented by a deliberate effort to assure the Kim regime that it has an off-ramp during conflict. Effective deterrence hinges on the promise of reciprocal restraint. As long as their wartime objectives remain limited, the United States and its allies must clearly signal to the Kim regime – in word and deed – that they are not interested in pursuing regime change unless North Korea conducts nuclear attacks first.[51] Engaging in peacetime diplomacy with North Korea to guard against misperception and miscalculation and reduce the likelihood of localized, escalation-prone conflicts would also help establish an understanding of reciprocal restraint based on clear deterrence thresholds. The Land of Bad Options Every approach to countering a nuclear-armed North Korea entails risk. But in the land of bad options, deterrence reigns. A U.S.-led deterrence strategy is our best hope for preventing North Korea from achieving its revisionist objectives at an acceptable cost to the United States and its allies. But it will only be effective if we prioritize maintaining robust damage-limitation capabilities to keep pace with North Korea’s advancing nuclear forces.   Vince A. Manzo (manzov@cna.org) is a Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis. John K. Warden (jkwarden@gmail.com) is a Senior Policy Analyst on the Strategic Analysis & Assessments team at Science Applications International Corporation. The views expressed are their own.

7. Managing a Nuclear-Armed North Korea: Deter, Contain, Constrain, Transform

By Adam Mount U.S. policy on North Korea has failed. For more than 25 years, the United States and its allies have worked to prevent North Korea from achieving a deliverable nuclear capability. Over the first year of the Trump administration, rapid advancements in missile technology have brought North Korea to this threshold. The program is too advanced, too dispersed, and too valuable to the regime for us to quickly eliminate it through diplomatic or military means on acceptable terms. As a result, the United States and its allies are now forced to manage a nuclear-armed North Korea that deters aggression and other destabilizing behavior, contains illicit activity from spreading beyond its borders, and encourages the transformation of the regime over time. Each month that passes that has the United States clinging to an outdated, invalid policy is one that runs a severe risk of war and allows North Korean activities to go unaddressed. The regrettable fact is that a nuclear-armed North Korea exists and is not being managed. U.S. policy During its first year in office, the Trump administration has finally prioritized North Korea on the U.S. agenda. Yet, an inflated assessment of U.S. leverage, coupled with a poor policy process, has prevented additional resources and attention from transforming the standoff. The Trump team has manufactured a military and economic crisis they hope could force North Korea to capitulate. In its formal public statements and in a series of highly inflammatory statements on twitter, the administration has claimed that Pyongyang cannot be deterred, and that the United States will not tolerate vulnerability to North Korean missiles. In so doing, the administration is attempting to convince North Korea that failure to denuclearize will lead to war. If this effort were coordinated effectively and launched a decade ago, it may have stood a decent chance of success. However, both the execution of the policy and the state of North Korea’s capabilities are proving to be fatal complications. In their more lucid moments, administration officials claim that, once heightened economic sanctions have an opportunity to take hold, they intend to convene denuclearization negotiations. Yet, these moments of clarity are almost immediately obscured by contradictions, reversals, and vague threats of war that lack credibility or clear terms.[52] There remains a very real and entirely unacceptable possibility that influential groups in the administration prefer war or could talk themselves into one.[53] The mixed messages allow Pyongyang to temporize and select the interpretation of U.S. policy they consider most advantageous. Washington has not forced Pyongyang to respond to a credible negotiations proposal that stands a realistic chance of halting North Korea’s rapid development of a nuclear arsenal that the Kim regime sees as critical to domestic legitimacy and international survival.[54] North Korea will continue to develop, test, and operationally deploy these systems in the coming months and years.[55] Instead of forcing North Korea to capitulate to U.S. demands, the Trump administration’s belligerent posturing has deliberately eroded stability on the peninsula, significantly raising the risk of an accidental or deliberate conflict. At the same time, the exclusive and hopeless fixation on immediate denuclearization has prevented the United States and its allies from confronting the evolving North Korean threat. Despite a great deal of rhetoric, the Trump administration has done very little to actually address North Korea’s development of intermediate and intercontinental missiles and its demonstration of a more destructive nuclear device. Despite the regime’s dramatic nuclear and missile advancements over Trump’s first year in office, and despite ongoing improvements in its submarine, special operations, cyber, and artillery capabilities, U.S. force posture has not adapted. North Korea’s technical developments are invalidating the basic assumptions of U.S. policy toward the regime. Strategies predicated on coercing Pyongyang into negotiations to eliminate its nuclear arsenal now appear untenable, at least for the medium term. On the other hand, a military strike – whether to degrade North Korean forces or to coerce the regime – is unlikely to eliminate its programs and would in all likelihood incur unbearable humanitarian, economic, and strategic costs.[56] For the foreseeable future, the world will face a regime that possesses the capability to strike U.S. and regional targets with a nuclear weapon. Policy planning in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo has not kept pace with Pyongyang’s rapid evolution, leaving the conversation marked by inertia. Because denuclearization has been the overriding objective, the United States and its allies have made little progress on developing a coordinated and sustainable North Korea strategy. Though a remarkably broad, bipartisan array of experts have proposed components of that strategy, very little is known about the constellation of concepts, principles, and policy options necessary for managing a nuclear-armed North Korea. The priorities of deterring, containing, constraining, and transforming a nuclear-armed North Korea should animate that effort. Deter The overwhelming imperative for the foreseeable future is to continuously deter a highly capable, rapidly evolving military adversary from aggression against U.S., South Korean, and Japanese targets, as well as other extremely destabilizing actions.[57] The United States and its allies will have to accept the necessity of sustainably deterring a novel adversary – one that is armed with nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional standoff retaliatory capabilities, highly capable in cyber, but also conventionally inferior.[58] North Korea is rapidly expanding its capacity for provocation and aggression on land, at sea, in space, and in cyberspace. The United States and its allies must retain the capabilities necessary to credibly retaliate in response to any such aggression. However, the high potential for escalation means that defeating and defending against these attacks will be critical to protecting allied civilians and servicemen. Nuclear deterrence will remain a part of allied posture for the foreseeable future, but is not sufficient to defend against North Korean aggression at lower levels of conflict, which will require that joint conventional forces remain capable and ready. As the North Korean threat evolves, so must the allied defensive posture. The alliance should consider new deployments of unambiguously defensive forces, including anti-submarine warfare, anti-special operations forces, cyber-defense, as well as measures to ensure that U.S. forces from anywhere in the world can reach South Korea to reinforce allied positions despite North Korean attacks. Deterrence of coercive or limited chemical and biological attacks also demands considerably more attention. It is not enough to deter aggression. Beginning immediately, the allies must work to deter North Korea from other extremely destabilizing and dangerous activities, including an atmospheric nuclear test, continued ballistic missile overflights of Japan, and proliferation of fissile material or nuclear weapons technology. Contain                                                                                    Despite its diplomatic isolation, the regime in Pyongyang has never confined its activities to its own borders. North Korean operatives are growing increasingly adept at acting across the globe, spreading financial crimes, smuggling illicit goods, procuring and exporting military equipment, placing North Korean workers in foreign countries to gain currency, stealing funds from banks through cyber intrusion, and a myriad other illicit activities.[59] North Korea has already sold nuclear technology abroad and may well continue to do so. A sustainable strategy must work ceaselessly to contain North Korea’s destabilizing criminal behavior abroad. In addition to the ongoing activities immediately above, the allies will have to contain types of potential instability, including assassination of North Korean defectors or foreign citizens abroad, attacks against shipping or other economic activities in Asia, cyberattacks against regional infrastructure, and disruption of civilian or military space operations. Sanctions will be an important tool in this effort, as U.S. laws and U.N. members work to encourage countries to restrict these activities. While the Trump administration has stepped up sanctions enforcement efforts, most existing sanctions are still calibrated to apply political and financial pressure to coerce North Korean denuclearization. Adjustments will be necessary to calibrate sanctions to deny and contain North Korean illicit behavior. Negotiations will also be an important component of containing North Korea and so must cover more than a single-minded insistence on denuclearization. The immediate priorities should be to open military-to-military communication channels to prevent North Korean missiles from overflying Japan and avert the first atmospheric nuclear test since 1980.[60] Constrain Deterrence and containment will be ongoing challenges requiring consistent attention to prevent a catastrophe. The United States and its allies should buttress its deterrence and containment posture with efforts to constrain the regime’s ability to challenge it. Sanctions impose severe constraints on scarce petroleum supplies that the North Korean military relies on to train and operate; the allies should preserve this advantageous position if possible. Maintaining these restrictions could facilitate deterrence over the long run. Negotiating conventional arms control measures can also help to constrain North Korea’s ability to threaten and aggress against allied forces, without forcing us to recognize their nuclear capabilities. Preventive restrictions can also be sustained and expanded on North Korea’s ability to spread cyber, financial, and illicit transfers. For example, all countries should retain limits on North Korean diplomatic staff stationed around the world who arrange illicit transactions. If at some point there is evidence that Pyongyang is rolling back these illegal activities, it may be possible to lift certain constraint restrictions without requiring that we abandon containment measures, or nuclear, missile, or human rights sanctions. In this way, preventive restrictions afford leverage. Transform Even if North Korea is rendered incapable of exerting destructive influence in its region and the world, the existence of a highly militarized, totalitarian state that commits crimes against humanity will remain morally, practically, and legally unacceptable. Any transformation of North Korea will have to occur as the result of an internal process, but South Korea and the United States should seek effective ways of assisting this process. At the very least, allied policies should not inhibit transformation. In South Korea, ongoing research into unification issues has yielded an understanding of North Korean economic and diplomatic issues that is generally absent in the United States. Concerted attempts to penetrate the regime with information about the outside world is an important first step, but not a complete strategy.[61] Is there a virtue to permitting trade from allies or nonaligned countries over the long run, or would continued restrictions constitute leverage to force nuclear weapons back onto the negotiating agenda? Can diplomatic initiatives stabilize the security relationship or advantage moderate voices among ruling elites? The questions will be critical to achieving U.S. and allied objectives over the long run. Lastly, management of a nuclear-armed North Korea requires strong alliances. Each policy decision discussed above will have to be coordinated with Seoul and also with Tokyo. It will require difficult conversations about economic and diplomatic initiatives, deterrence, and counter-provocation planning (including counterforce, damage limitation, and assassination). Divisions within these alliances or between Seoul and Tokyo will afford North Korea unacceptable opportunities to aggress or escape containment.[62] Twenty years ago, it was already cliché to say North Korea was at a crossroads. While Pyongyang has chosen its path and moved rapidly ahead, the United States and its allies still stand at the crossroads wishing that nothing had changed. U.S. strategists in particular are poorly equipped to cope with a failure of a critical policy. As a nation, we want to hear that there is a solution, a way to rectify a setback and make a decisive adjustment to our policy. Yet when the basic assumptions and objectives of a strategy are no longer valid, a failure to replace it will cause irreparable damage to American interests. Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea will be an arduous task. As Washington comes to recognize that North Korea’s nuclear capability cannot be eliminated on acceptable terms, there will be an impulse to withdraw from the issue and move on to soluble problems. Neglect would allow Pyongyang to improve its military position, illicit networks, and coercive leverage, seriously worsening the greatest external threat to American national security. A sustainable and tolerable management strategy will be difficult to devise, and even more difficult to implement. It will require consistent attention, considerable resources, and constant vigilance to a thankless and unpopular task. Yet, having failed, we are left with no choice but to manage an unacceptable situation as best we can. Adam Mount, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists. [post_title] => Policy Roundtable: Are There any Good Choices When it Comes to North Korea? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => policy-roundtable-good-choices-comes-north-korea [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-02-12 12:13:03 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-02-12 17:13:03 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?post_type=roundtable&p=450 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => roundtable [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => We asked a group of experts to weigh in on the North Korea crisis. [pubinfo] => [issue] => [quotes] => [style] => roundtable [type] => Policy [style_label] => Roundtable [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 133 [1] => 134 [2] => 132 [3] => 24 [4] => 48 [5] => 129 [6] => 131 [7] => 130 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] Uri Friedman, “Lindsey Graham: There’s a 30% Chance Trump Attacks North Korea,” The Atlantic (December 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/lindsey-graham-war-north-korea-trump/548381/. [2] Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). [3] Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 5. [4] Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, Volume II, translated by Richard Mott Gummere (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2016; first published by G. P. Putnam’s Sons in 1918), 182. [5] For example, speaking to U.S. and ROK troops at Yongsan in Seoul, Secretary of Defense James Mattis explained the purpose of maintaining deterrence: “Ultimately our diplomats have to be backed up by strong soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines…. So they speak from a position of strength, of combined strength, of alliance strength. Shoulder to shoulder, (South Korea) and the US together.”  Quoted in Euan McKirdy, “US Defense Secretary James Mattis at Korean DMZ: ‘Our goal is not war,’” CNN, October 27, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/mattis-south-korea-dmz/index.html. [6] General Vincent K. Brooks, quoted in Jim Garamone, “Dunford: U.S.-South Korean Alliance Ready to Defend Against North Korean Threat,” DoD News, August 14, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1277384/dunford-us-south-korean-alliance-ready-to-defend-against-north-korean-threat/. [7] Demetri Sevastopulo and Bryan Harris, “Trump Calls on North Korea to ‘Come to the Table and Make a Deal,” Financial Times, November 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/8a8eb006-c36a-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656. [8] Jesse Johnson, “In a Move That Could Alienate Japan, Tillerson Says Willing to Talk to North Korea ‘Without Preconditions,’” The Japan Times, December 13, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/13/asia-pacific/apparent-shift-tillerson-says-u-s-willing-talk-north-korea-without-preconditions/#.WkwI2yOZN-U. [9] The Trump administration often declares that the goal of a maximum pressure strategy is the denuclearization of North Korea.  For instance, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin cites this objective when explaining the imposition of new sanctions.  See “U.S. Announces Sanctions on North Korea Missile Makers,” The Guardian, December 26, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/27/us-announces-sanctions-on-north-korea-missile-makers. [10] Responding to a reporter’s question about preparing for preventive war, National Security Advisor Lt. General H. R. McMaster replied, “The president’s been very clear about it. He said he’s not going to tolerate North Korea being able to threaten the United States.”  See David E. Sanger, “Talk of ‘Preventive War’ Rises in White House over North Korea,” The New York Times, August 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/world/asia/north-korea-war-trump.html?_r=0. [11] Robbie Gramer and Paul McLeary, “Trump Touts Military Option for North Korea That Generals Warn Would be ‘Horrific,’” Foreign Policy, October 9, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/09/trump-touts-military-option-for-north-korea-that-generals-warn-would-be-horrific-war-with-north-korea-nuclear-pentagon-defense-asia-security/. [12] While most analysts believe nuclear deterrence could be maintained even if North Korea fielded intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Senator Lindsay Graham has made clear the concern about letting Kim Jong-un have the ability to strike U.S. territory with nuclear weapons.  “Even if it means thousands, hundreds of thousands of people over there get hurt to protect America. Now that's the choice that the president has to make. I stand with him. The best outcome is not to have a war. I don't want a war, he doesn't want a war, but we're not going to let this crazy man in North Korea have the capability to hit the homeland. We're not going to live this way,” Senator Graham has said. See Jamie McIntyre and Travis Tritten, “North Korea says new ICBM with ‘super-large heavy warhead’ completes its nuclear force,” Washington Examiner, November 29, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/north-korea-says-new-icbm-with-super-large-heavy-warhead-completes-its-nuclear-force/article/2177020. [13]  Kambiz Foroohar and David Tweed, “China to Back Fresh UN Sanctions on North Korea Fuel,” Bloomberg Businessweek, December 21, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/china-is-said-to-back-fresh-un-sanctions-on-north-korea-fuel. [14] Emily Rauhala, “Trump said China was caught ‘red handed’ selling oil to North.  Beijing denies it did anything wrong,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/trump-said-china-was-caught-red-handed-selling-oil-to-north-korea-beijing-denies-it-did-anything-wrong/2017/12/29/89bc3a22-ec73-11e7-891f-e7a3c60a93de_story.html?utm_term=.9db949deaaea. [15] For an informed way to pursue secondary sanctions as part of a comprehensive pressure strategy, see Bruce Klingner, “How to Stop North Korea: Use the ‘Python Strategy,” The Heritage Foundation, December 5, 2017, http://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/how-stop-north-korea-use-the-python-strategy. [16] See, for example, Carlo Munoz, “H.R. McMaster: Time Running Out for China on North Korea,” Washington Times, December 12, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/12/hr-mcmaster-time-running-out-for-china-on-n-korea/. [17] Delury, John. “Take Preventive War with North Korea Off the Table.”  Foreign Affairs. (August 22, 2017). Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-08-22/take-preventive-war-north-korea-table [18] Fearon, James. “Rationalist Explanations of War.” International Organization. 49, no. 3 (1995) 379-414; Powell, Robert. “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization. 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203. [19] Aspen Security Forum. “At the Helm of the Intelligence Community.” (July 21, 2017.) http://aspensecurityforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/At-the-Helm-of-the-Intelligence-Community.pdf. Ellick, Adam and Jonah Kessel. “From North Korea, With Dread.” The New York Times, November 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/28/opinion/columnists/missile-test-north-korea.html?_r=0. [20] Hass, Ryan and Michael O’Hanlon. “Despite H-Bomb Test, Negotiate with North Korea – But from a Position of Strength.” Brookings Institution. (September 6, 2017). https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/06/despite-h-bomb-test-negotiate-with-north-korea-but-from-a-position-of-strength/. [21] Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima, and Anna Fifield. “North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say.” The Washington Post. August 8, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.7ffa46e97fdb [22] ABC News. “This Week Transcript, 8/13/17: Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Anthony Scaramucci.” August 13, 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-13-17-lt-gen-mcmaster-anthony/story?id=49177024 [23] Face the Nation. “Transcript: Defense Secretary Jim Mattis.” May 28, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-defense-secretary-james-mattis-on-face-the-nation-may-28-2017/ [24] Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). [25] Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics. 30, no. 2 (1978) 167-214; Glaser, Charles. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics. 50, no. 1 (1997) 171-201. [26] Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. (New Haven. Yale University Press: 1966) [27] United States, and Donald Trump. National Security Strategy of the United States: The White House. (2017); Mattis, Jim and Rex Tillerson. “We’re Holding Pyongyang to Account.” The Wall Street Journal. August 13, 2017.  https://www.wsj.com/articles/were-holding-pyongyang-to-account-1502660253 [28] Beggs, Alan and Kathryn Graddy. “Anchoring Effects: Evidence from Art Auctions.” American Economic Review. 99, no. 3 (2009) 1027-1039. [29] Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. (New York, Routledge: 1965). [30] DeYoung, Karen. “Mattis and Tillerson Move to Clarify Administration Policy on North Korea.” The Washington Post. August 17, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/mattis-and-tillerson-move-to-clarify-administration-policy-on-north-korea/2017/08/17/f363d888-836c-11e7-b359-15a3617c767b_story.html?utm_term=.1da7c454c468 [31] Kathleen J. McInniss et al, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2017). [32] Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Iraq’s Pre-War Military Capabilities,” CFR Backgrounder (February 3, 2005), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-iraqs-prewar-military-capabilities. [33] Jennifer Lind, “The Perils of Korean Unification,” The Diplomat (February 23, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-perils-of-korean-unification/. [34] Kathleen J. McInniss et al, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2017). [35] Bruce W. Bennett, Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). [36] Dan Lamothe and Carol Morello, “Securing North Korean Nuclear Sites Would Require a Ground Invasion, Pentagon Says,” Washington Post (November 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/securing-north-korean-nuclear-sites-would-require-a-ground-invasion-pentagon-says/2017/11/04/32d5f6-c0cf-11e7-97d9-bdab5-0ab381_story.html?utm_term=.8a54d9233d25. [37] Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “Time Running Out to Avoid War with North Korea, U.S. Official Says,” Newsweek, December 12, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/time-running-out-avoid-war-north-korea-us-official-says-745914; Ben Riley-Smith, “US making plans for a ‘bloody nose’ military attack on North Korea,” The Telegraph, December 20, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/20/exclusive-us-making-plans-bloody-nose-military-attack-north/. [38] B.R. Myers, “North Korea’s Unification Drive,” Royal Asiatic Society-Korea Branch, December 19, 2017, Somerset Palace, Seoul, South Korea. Lecture. Available at: http://sthelepress.com/index.php/2017/12/21/north-koreas-unification-drive/. [39] Scott M. Bray, “Speech at the Institute for Corean-American Studies: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Capabilities,” June 26, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/20170726-NIM-East-Asia-Speech-to-ICAS-on-North-Koreas-Nulcear-and-Ballistic-Missile-Programs.pdf. [40] Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?” Political Science Quarterly 117, Iss. 2 (2002), p. 224, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/798181/full. [41] Max Fisher, “North Korea’s Nuclear Arms Sustain Drive for ‘Final Victory’,” The New York Times, July 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile.html?_r=0. [42] Ken E. Gause, North Korea’s Provocation and Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime (Arlington VA: CNA August 2015), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2015-U-011060.pdf. [43] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Growing Danger of a U.S. Nuclear First Strike on North Korea,” War on the Rocks, October 10, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/the-growing-danger-of-a-u-s-nuclear-first-strike-on-north-korea/. [44] John R. Harvey, “Negating North Korea’s Nukes,” Defense News, February 15, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2016/02/15/commentary-negating-north-koreas-nukes/; M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo, Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability? (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, February 2011), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-263.pdf. [45] John K. Warden, “North Korea’s Nuclear Posture: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Deterrence,” Proliferation Papers, Ifri, March 2017, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/warden_north_korea_nuclear_posture_2017.pdf; Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 62-80. [46] Sugio Takahashi, “Thinking about the Unthinkable: The Case of the Korean Peninsula,” in North Korea and Asia’s Evolving Nuclear Landscape, NBR Special Report #67 (Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, August 2017), http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=954. [47] Department of Defense, Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, June 12, 2013), p. 3, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf. Charles L. Glaser and Steven Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD: Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward China,” International Security 41, Iss. 1 (Summer 2016), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00248. [48] Austin Long and Brendan Ritterhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, Iss. 1-2 (2015), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150. [49] Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, Iss. 4 (Spring 2017), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273; Brendan Ritterhouse Green, Austin Long, Matthew Kroenig, Charles L. Glaser, and Steve Fetter, “The Limits of Damage Limitation,” International Security 42, Iss. 1 (Summer 2017), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_c_00279. [50] Thomas Karako, Ian Williams, and Wes Rumbaugh, Missile Defense 2020: Next Steps for Defending the Homeland (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies April 2017), pp. 52-122, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170406_Karako_MissileDefense2020_Web.pdf?rgfZJOoY5AJY5ScsfZQW8z7Bn7dtSlrr. [51] Vincent A. Manzo, “After the First Shots: Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia,” Joint Forces Quarterly 77 (April 2015), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/581877/after-the-first-shots-managing-escalation-in-northeast-asia/. [52] Laura Rosenberger, “How President Trump could tweet his way into nuclear war with North Korea,” Washington Post, July 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/07/05/how-president-trump-could-tweet-his-way-into-nuclear-war-with-north-korea/; Kori Schake, “What Total Destruction of North Korea Means,” The Atlantic, September 19, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-trump-united-nations-kim-jong-un-nuclear-missile/540345/. [53] Kori Schake, “The North Korea Debate Sounds Eerily Familiar,” The Atlantic, December 8, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/north-korea-iraq-war-george-w-bush-trump/547796/. [54] Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, “North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74(1), 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1413062. [55] Jon Wolfsthal, “Give Up on Denuclearizing North Korea,” The Atlantic, July 28, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/give-up-on-denuclearizing-north-korea/535347/; Mira Rapp-Hooper, “America Is Not Going to Denuclearize North Korea,” The Atlantic, November 29, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/north-korea-icbm-kim-trump-nuclear/547040/. [56] Abraham M. Denmark, “The Myth of the Limited Strike on North Korea,” Foreign Affairs,” January 9, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-01-09/myth-limited-strike-north-korea; Van Jackson, “Want to Strike North Korea? It’s Not Going to Go the Way You Think,” Politico, January 12, 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/12/north-korea-strike-nuclear-strategist-216306. [57] Abraham Denmark, “The U.S. Can’t Get Rid of North Korea’s Nukes Without Paying a Catastrophic Price,” Foreign Policy, September 15, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/15/the-u-s-cant-get-rid-of-north-koreas-nukes-without-paying-a-catastrophic-price/. [58] Rebecca K.C. Hersman, “North Korea, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Instability: Strategic Issues for Managing Crisis and Reducing Risks,” US-Korea Institute, June 2017, http://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NKIP-Hersman-062117.pdf. [59] Andrea Berger, “A House Without Foundations: The North Korea Sanctions Regime and Its Implementation,” Royal United Services Institute, June 2017, https://rusi.org/publication/whitehall-reports/house-without-foundations-north-korea-sanctions-regime-and-its. [60] James Acton, “Some Nuclear Ground Rules for Kim Jong Un,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/16/some-nuclear-ground-rules-for-kim-jong-un/; Joshua Pollack, “US should start talking with North Korea to prevent nuclear war,” New York Daily News, August 8, 2017, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/u-s-start-talking-north-korea-prevent-nuclear-war-article-1.3394949. [61] Tom Malinowski, “How to Take Down Kim Jong Un,” Politico, July 24, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411. [62] Adam Mount, “How to Put the US-South Korean Alliance Back on Track,” Foreign Affairs, June 28, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-06-28/how-put-us-south-korean-alliance-back-track. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => Table of Contents [contents] => 1. Introduction, by Van Jackson 2. Maximum Pressure: A Clarifying Signal in the Noise of North Korea Policy, by Patrick M. Cronin 3. The Trump Administration and North Korea: A Happier New Year? by Stephan Haggard 4. Risk and Reward in the Korean Nuclear Crisis, by Kyle Haynes 5. North Korea Requires Deterrence and Containment, Not Bombing, by Kelly Magsamen 6. The Least Bad Option: Damage Limitation and U.S. Deterrence Strategy toward North Korea, by Vince A. Manzo and John K. Warden 7. Managing a Nuclear-Armed North Korea: Deter, Contain, Constrain, Transform, by Adam Mount ) ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 308 [post_author] => 93 [post_date] => 2017-11-01 03:45:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-11-01 07:45:07 [post_content] => Editorial Note: It is our pleasure to present our first book review roundtable, in which one or two books are reviewed by various experts from their perspectives. Van Jackson, one of our associate editors and senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, chairs this first roundtable. In this and our other book review roundtables, the authors of the books will be given an opportunity to respond.

1. Introduction: To War or Not to War? U.S.-Chinese Relations as the Central Question of Our Times

By Van Jackson The future of the Asia-Pacific hinges, to a great extent, on the interaction of U.S. and Chinese foreign policy. Yet articulating what either state’s foreign policy will or ought to be requires assessing a number of connected and underlying issues, including the trajectory of U.S. and Chinese power, the balance of resolve between them, and the durability of an international rules-based order. The disagreements that have surfaced about these analytical issues provide a useful way of understanding the vast disparity in the content of scholarly counsel on U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. Enter the four contributors to our roundtable review of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? and All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power, by Graham Allison and Thomas Wright respectively. Each one teases out the relative merits of the advice these books offer to policymakers. In so doing, however, our contributors reveal just how much the big questions about U.S. foreign policy and the future of Asia hinge on debatable assumptions and historical interpretations. Each emphasizes different analytical assumptions and insights from the two books that, in turn, suggest different answers to the question of what the United States ought to do. Do the United States and China feel structural pressures that favor war, or are they deterred from war while still experiencing a high-stakes competition? Our contributors disagree. The former argument resonates with Australian National University’s Hugh White, who believes the United States is in a competition with China that it cannot win short of disastrous war, while Neville Morley — a classicist at the University of Exeter — challenges the logic of such a claim. Mira Rapp-Hooper of Yale and Rosemary Foot of Oxford suggest the United States and China share incentives to cooperate as much as they share incentives to fight, making it unlikely that structural pressures will determine Asia’s future. The contributors also raise questions about the uses of history to illuminate the present moment. Morley takes issue with Allison’s use of historical analogy between today and Thucydides’ time, in part because of how the world has changed, but also because of the analytical distortions that arise from admitting evidence from the highly contested historiography of the Peloponnesian War generally. Foot, Morley, and Rapp-Hooper all find fault in Allison’s interpretation of specific historical cases occurring between the Peloponnesian War and today. Foot in particular comments on the multi-causal narrative that Thucydides himself presents, an implicit criticism of modern scholars and policymakers quick to reduce his monumental History of the Peloponnesian War to a sparse structural model. And yet White dissents, believing the present moment ought to be simplified from the complexity of modern life to a historical essence—the balance of resolve between the United States and China. Finally, on the question of lessons for U.S. policy, the contributors render different assessments. While the power transition thesis convinces White that the only way for the United States to avoid a conflict is to cede ground to a rising China, Rapp-Hooper views Wright’s “responsible competition” approach as the necessary path forward. If anything, Rapp-Hooper sees the competitive approach Wright recommends as insufficient to preserve U.S. centrality amid China’s growing sphere of influence in Asia. She makes the same observation as Foot: that “responsible competition” differs little from President Barack Obama’s policy of “rebalancing” to Asia. Morley, meanwhile, cautions that a belief in structurally induced conflict could lead to prescriptions for “military expansion and more aggressive responses to perceived challenges” rather than accommodation. Indeed, the entire realist theoretical tradition has been built on such expectations. The question hovering over both Destined for War and All Measures Short of War is how to view and respond to the present moment in world politics. This roundtable review suggests neither book has the answer, but both are a good place to start.

2.Two Differing Views on U.S.-China Conflict Find Common Ground in their Solutions

By Rosemary Foot Inter-state war is on our minds again, despite the decline in the incidence of such conflicts. This is hardly surprising. Sweden’s fears of Russia in the face of its belligerence in the Baltics are steadily and understandably rising; in East Asia North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons’ programs evoke spine-chilling language and threaten dystopian outcomes. Two stimulating and timely books, Graham Allison’s Destined for War  and Thomas J. Wright’s All Measures Short of War,[1] are similarly preoccupied by the prospects for major inter-state conflict. Both focus on the possibility of war, especially between China and the United States, though they align themselves at different points on the spectrum in relation to those prospects. For Allison, “a disastrous war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than most of us are willing to allow.”[2] Indeed, Allison reinforces the sense of this possibility in his choice of title for the book, in his inside flap description which warns that “China and the United States are heading toward a war neither wants” and in his constant reminders that 12 of the 16 cases of power transition that are in his and the Belfer Center’s “Thucydides’s Trap Case File” (TTCF)[3] have resulted in war. The most salient frame for understanding what is going on, Allison argues, is the structural crisis that accompanies a power transition between rising and status quo powers, especially when the former is dissatisfied, and the latter in decline. Allison’s world-view encompasses much of Thucydides’ perspective on the ways of the powerful: the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must. Wright, on the other hand, writing about China, Russia, and parts of the Middle East (especially Iran), argues that the future challenge to the United States will not take the form of a major conflagration because all of the great powers want and intend to avoid it. Instead, they will “compete fiercely to gain an upper hand in ways short of a major war.”[4] For this, they will use a range of measures including coercive diplomacy, economic leverage, cyber tools, and perhaps even engaging in proxy wars. Wright also exhorts his readers to focus their attention at the regional level, for it is the “health of regions” that will determine the overall condition of global order. When it comes to China, Wright suggests the United States needs to view Beijing primarily as a peacetime test that pertains almost entirely to East Asia and that pits China’s preference for a spheres-of-influence system against the continuation of the U.S.-led liberal world order. At the global level of the international system, he notes areas where China is either deeply integrated or willing to cooperate. But within its own region, the country is enacting a strategy that represents a subtler contest of U.S. predominance: Beijing is working, Wright states, to avoid a war that would be “massively counterproductive” in order to achieve its primary goal of gradually shifting the balance of power in its favor.[5] Wright’s frame of reference is the emergence of a geo-political competition in global politics reminiscent of the Cold War. However, if we add to that the characteristics we associate with globalization, this becomes a global arena where Beijing and Washington — to recast Thucydides for the contemporary era — cooperate where they can and compete where they must. Thus, the two books have different visions of the current order and its proneness to war. Moreover, with respect to the U.S.-China relationship, where Allison sees America in decline and a wrenching power transition in progress, Wright sees the United States not in decline, but rather as a key actor in shaping the condition of regional order(s), the outcomes of which define and constitute the global system. Despite these different assumptions, however, the two authors come together in unexpected ways. These instances of overlap emerge most obviously when both engage in commendable attempts to find a way out of this dangerous era in world politics. Allison, in particular, has taken on a mission to educate the elites in both China and the United States about the dangers they face if they get this relationship wrong. And he seems to have caught the ear of policy makers on both sides, with top Chinese and U.S. officials referring to the concept of the Thucydides Trap, and the need to avoid its pitfalls.[6] In addition, Allison urges the need for deeper reflection on a range of strategies to deal with these challenging circumstances, which include accommodating China, working to overthrow the party/state regime, crafting a form of Cold-War style détente and redefining the relationship such that it encourages the two countries to work together to address a number of severe 21st-century global problems. Wright’s main aim is more straightforward and is designed to encourage U.S. policy makers to recognize the benefits the country has derived from playing a pivotal role in supporting the liberal international order, although this task is proving increasingly difficult in the Trump era. But he also advocates that a policy of “responsible competition” be developed in the U.S., in which the areas of competition are restrained by internal and external balancing strategies and U.S. allies play important roles. The desired outcome is to create a “global situation of strength” to incentivize competitors to cooperate on key global issues. Since either accommodating China or working for regime overthrow seem unlikely to be high on Allison’s list of preferred strategies, the remaining options appear to land him quite close to the position that Wright is advocating. There are yet other areas where the two authors come together. One is in their assessments of China’s strategy. As stated earlier, Wright notes Chinese efforts and desire to shift the balance of power in its favor.  To do this, he argues, Beijing will work to ensure it makes marginal gains that are without major consequence. Surprisingly, given Allison’s preoccupation with war as a likely outcome, he also argues that China seeks victory “not in a decisive battle but through incremental moves designed to gradually improve their position,”[7] often referencing Sun Tzu to illustrate the historical basis for this preference. In addition, both Allison and Wright acknowledge that war may come through miscalculation. On the economic front, they both tend to treat that dimension of the Sino-American relationship not as a basis for cooperation, but more as a source of tension, complaint or leverage. [quote id="1"] Both Destined for War and All Measures Short of War are rich and provocative contributions to the debate about one of the most crucial issues in global politics. However, there are some inconsistencies in the arguments and points that are underdeveloped. In Allison’s book, for example, there is a tension between his argument concerning power transition and that relating to his assessment of China’s strategic world-view, outlined briefly in my previous paragraph. The conclusion to the book unexpectedly downplays the causal role of severe structural stress as the likely trigger for a Sino-American conflict, reminding us that Thucydides’ history “provides a factual record of the choices Pericles and his fellow Athenians made of their own free will,” noting that “Different choices would have produced different results.”[8] However, the main concern with Destined for War relates to the thorny issue of case selection and interpretation. Consider the former Soviet Union, a major dissatisfied power that was overtaken in size by China, Germany, and Japan in the late 20th century, and yet, does not qualify for consideration in the Thucydides’ Trap Case File. Russia is not rising but has been in economic and demographic decline for some time. Nevertheless, Moscow remains capable of testing and undermining many of the central pillars of the post-war order, including non-use of force except in self-defense, the inviolability of territorial integrity except in extreme conditions, and the capacity of institutions built for deterrence to hold the ring. These are critical challenges that are capable of transforming the post-1945 world order. Indeed, the Russia example and others like it raise a number of issues about the cases chosen for placement in the TTCF. Such critiques of case selection and the ambiguities that arise from power measurement have been made before: Steve Chan, for example, in his valuable examination of power transition theory published in 2008, notes that the United States by the 1870s had overtaken the United Kingdom to become the world’s largest economy with the most dynamic industries, but was not recognized as a central contender prior to 1914. If it had been so recognized, then Germany’s overtaking of the U.K. would not have qualified as a central transition challenge on which to concentrate.[9] The example of World War I and Germany’s rise is also worth deeper exploration given that several prominent scholars have offered other explanations for that devastating conflict, many of which point to Germany’s fear of Russia’s rising power.[10] Allison himself at times concedes the historical complexity of the matter of causation, though the topic is not given sufficient emphasis because of his overwhelming determination to focus on the Anglo-German power transition. Another potential case is that of Japan, which posed a major economic challenge to the United States from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. Japan’s rise to become the second largest economy in the world does not feature in this first stage of Allison’s project; yet the country’s rise led Paul Kennedy to feature a cartoon on the dust jacket of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers showing a Japanese national supplanting “Uncle Sam” from the pinnacle of power.[11] More importantly, Tokyo’s rise led U.S. policy makers and commentators to rage against a Japan that allegedly had taken advantage of the liberal order, failed to offer reciprocal benefits and, in addition, had worked to subvert that order through its continued adherence to a value system antithetical to America’s own. Apparently, some 68 per cent of Americans in 1990 believed Tokyo’s economic threat to be greater than that of the military threat from the former Soviet Union.[12] According to Wright, Bill Clinton’s main challenger in the democratic presidential primaries, Paul Tsongas, used as his slogan “the Cold War is over and Japan won.”[13] Neo-realist international relations scholars fully expected Tokyo quickly to acquire the full spectrum of great power capabilities, raising — for the neo-realists at least — the distinct possibility of a future war between the United States and its formal ally. That conflict between Japan and the United States did not come to pass, of course. Factors aiding the move towards stability and peace included the Clinton administration’s decision in 1995 to undertake a detailed review of its East Asian strategy as well as the Japanese government’s decision the same year to conduct its first comprehensive defense review in 20 years. The two governments thus confronted the broader implications of their seriously strained relationship and, in 1997, adopted revised guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. This case, among others, raises the central importance of issues other than structural stress during transitions in power as potential triggers for war, such as state agency, strategic choice, and historical context. There is also the matter of Thucydides’ own interpretation of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides actually offers a multi-causal explanation of that war, including the pressure of allies, Pericles’ refusal to give way over Megara, and a range of grievances. Nevertheless, the Athenian general insists that the dominant reason for Sparta’s decision to go war against Athens was the fear that growing Athenian power inspired, despite there being no direct evidence offered for that Spartan perception, or a weighing of this conclusion against other plausible explanations. Allison promises to consider a number of additional cases in the next stage of the power transition project. However, the problem is that his elaboration of the Thucydidian foundation, based on an “unacknowledged” cause, as Thucydides puts it, together with the “12 out of 16 cases” refrain, have both been promoted with such vigor that this interpretation may have begun to take on the status of an iron law. Perhaps it should be viewed instead as something that is as malleable as copper. Although Wright’s thesis is more compelling, he too could have dug a little deeper into various components of his argument. His statement that the United States is not in decline is nowhere seriously investigated, but his argument about U.S. promotion of “healthy regions” requires the dependability and application of a wide range of U.S. power resources — both material and social. He also argues that, until recently, there was a “great convergence” toward the liberal international order. This is typical of the assumptions made in the early post-Cold War era and reflects the fact that too many of us in the West have relied heavily on those writings that come predominantly from within our own geographic regions. Those writing outside of the liberal West have long been offering competing conceptions of justice in a post-colonial world, especially once the redistribution of power and globalization of technology had generated greater opportunities to express a range of interests and values. Finally, Wright’s definition of “responsible competition” sounds remarkably similar to the Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” strategy. That Obama strategy combined elements of balancing, the development of networked relationships with allies and friendly states in the Indo-Pacific, frequent summitry, and the search for areas of cooperation with Beijing. However, it was viewed in China as threatening — a form of encirclement and containment. Wright could profitably explain why his version of this strategy might have a more positive outcome. Both books also would benefit from a deeper exploration of the Sino-American economic relationship. Certainly, both governments may seek to use some dimensions of that economic relationship for the purposes of competition and leverage, but the relationship is also vital to Beijing and Washington in ways that constrain that leverage. The U.S.-China Business Council estimates that U.S. exports to China will rise from $165 billion in goods and services in 2015 to about $525 billion in 2030 — a faster rate of growth in exports than available elsewhere in the world. In 2016, some 29 states in the United States exported goods worth more than $1 billion to China and 12 states exported services worth more than $1 billion.[14] On the other side of the economic ledger, economic performance remains vital as a form of political legitimacy for a Chinese government determined to break out of the “middle-income” trap. This makes the country reluctant to disturb relations with its major trading market and growing investment partner. Chinese cumulative investment in America has gone from virtually nothing in 2000 to over $100 billion in 2016.[15] Moreover, there is a steady move in academic circles and countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to explore the consequences of China’s central involvement in global supply chains, often as final assembler of inputs that originate elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. China’s envelopment in networked trade imposes political constraints, and should also change our estimates of the true size of the U.S. trade deficit with China, cutting it in half if we take into account the foreign components of the products China sells in America. Those working on the globalization of production describe economic interdependence as qualitatively different from past forms of such interdependence, implying that references to Norman Angell’s The Great Illusion should be laid to rest. As John Ravenhill has argued, the implications of this networked production for the outbreak of conflict are potentially profound. Not only would there be damage to or loss of access to export markets, but also loss of access to inputs, to distribution and marketing channels, as well as to brand names, all of which critically affect levels of international economic competitiveness.[16] Robert Jervis wrote in 2011 that optimism is “generally derided in the cynical academic community,”[17] and there is little to be optimistic about these days. However, we could conduct a thought experiment and begin our consideration of the contemporary Sino-American relationship from the basis of the elements that help with the management of these great power relations and that may even result in something between cooperation and a cold peace. We could start with the question, what is it that engenders cooperation despite geopolitical competition? This approach could form a useful alternative to an assumption of the deep-rootedness of conflict and the movement toward war. We may end up in a similar place; but by approaching the relationship from these perspectives we may better understand the decision-making dilemmas of policymakers who have to operate within a complex and hybrid world order.

3. History Can’t Always Help to Make Sense of the Future

By Neville Morley What does history, let alone the history of classical antiquity, have to offer the study of contemporary global politics? It’s common practice in this context to invoke George Santayana, who wrote: “those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.” (Graham Allison paraphrases this in Destined for War as “only those who fail to study history are doomed to repeat it”).[18] The conventional understanding of Santayana’s claim departs a fair distance from his original discussion in The Life of Reason, where he focuses on humans learning from their own experiences as the basis of progress, an idea he subsequently applies by extension to the “life-cycle” of nations and religions.[19] Santayana then offers a Nietzschean counterpoint about the necessity of forgetting and the dangers of a vain repetition of the past, because “in a moving world, readaptation is the price of longevity.” In brief, this maxim is not about history in any scholarly or literary sense, and, insofar as we might want to read it in those terms anyway, it offers a warning against assuming that the past can tell us all we need to know to make sense of the present. Obviously, the idea of learning from history or applying it to present-day problems can’t be dismissed simply on the basis of the deficiencies of its favorite slogan. It isn’t only historians, desperate to defend their corner against the encroachments of other disciplines and the demands of governments that justify their existence, who make such claims about the usefulness and relevance of knowledge about the past. Our sense of ourselves, as individuals, social groups, or nations, is grounded in stories we tell or are told about where we have come from; and the attempt to learn from experience and precedent, to pose counterfactuals like “if we had done this, then x would have happened” or “unless we do this, y will occur,” is an established pattern of human thought. Indeed, academic historians are as likely to find themselves criticizing the way that others are using the past, objecting to excessive simplification and insisting that “it’s actually more complicated than that,” as they are to be promoting themselves as purveyors of “lessons from the past” or “applied history.”[20] The most straightforward role for historical knowledge is broadening our understanding of the present by exploring how it came to be: the origins of institutions, the background to relations between states, the roots of ruling ideas and assumptions, and so forth. Thomas Wright’s All Measures Short of War offers a clear example of this, establishing his view of the current state of the world through a survey of key global developments over the past few decades, especially in relation to his core theme of the end of convergence and the changing nature of geopolitical competition. Of course, like any account of the past, this is a version rather than the version, emphasizing some events rather than others and offering his interpretation of the connections between them; criticism of his argument from those with deeper specialist knowledge than I possess will certainly include, if not focus upon, alternative accounts of this period of history, and therefore draw different conclusions about the present. The timeframe of Wright’s analysis is, uncontroversially, restricted to the recent past. He makes passing reference to the wider context of modernity, the period of technological, economic, and societal change that has made such global convergence and interdependence possible, but his focus is primarily on the events of a few decades — long enough to detect significant medium-term changes rather than getting caught up in the flood of individual events, short enough so that these changes don’t disappear from view. He offers a few broader historical generalizations — “History suggests that instability is at its greatest in the early phases of a new paradigm,” “what was it about an age of convergences that distinguished it from all other eras in modern history?” or “historical order is created by powerful states — it never emerges organically or by accident” — but these are presented as starting points for detailed discussion of the present situation rather than as the foundations of substantive claims or normative laws. The function of such phrases is primarily rhetorical, to present certain observed tendencies in the present as predictable and others as unusual or unprecedented, and above all to emphasize the complexity of the world and the openness of the future: we can’t reduce everything to single relationships or simple invariable principles. We need to look at the situation in sufficient depth and detail to discern what is actually going on. One welcome consequence of this focus on recent history is the absence of essentializing claims about “the Chinese world view” or “the nature of the Chinese state,” based on a schematic and patchy overview of several thousand years of history.[21] It wouldn’t occur to anyone working on such a topic to generalize about “American attitudes” as something unchanging since the 18th century — indeed, it seems likely that Wright’s emphasis on continuity of policy across the 42nd, 43rd, and 44th presidencies will strike some as excessively simplified, ignoring significant differences for the sake of generalization — let alone to interpret U.S. foreign policy in terms of values and concepts extracted from ancient Greek philosophy. The idea that the decisions of the Chinese regime can be usefully anticipated through a broad-brush summary of Confucianism is surprisingly prevalent and it’s nice not to have to wade through another version. Allison’s Destined for War makes far stronger claims for the continuing relevance of the past as a guide to the future, and moreover a different kind of claim: not only that the prior history of a state or a situation can illuminate its present, but also that entirely unconnected events in the more distant past can illuminate our present. In terms of its content, this approach is familiar to mainstream social science: a normative principle is elaborated in the present and, if framed in sufficiently general and transhistorical terms (for example, general realist principles of International Relations, rather than a context-specific idea like nuclear deterrence), it can be applied to past societies as well. This is sometimes done as an aid to historical interpretation — historians argue extensively about whether or not modern social scientific theories and concepts can usefully be applied to pre-modern and non-western societies — sometimes as a form of disciplinary imperialism (as the essayist Thomas de Quincey once proudly declared, offering his reading of an obscure passage of the ancient philosopher Theophrastus, “it was not Greek, it was political economy, that could put it to rights!”), and sometimes as a source of confirmatory evidence for the theory.[22] The crucial issue is always how far one emphasizes continuity — the existence of a universal human nature or of the eternal validity of certain principles of economic behavior, that provides grounds for viewing different historical contexts as sufficiently comparable — and privileges this over change and the undeniable differences between historical societies. Yet Allison’s presentation of his revised version of power transition theory is rather different from the norm; the central idea of Destined for War is presented as arising from the study of the past rather than being applied retrospectively to it. Indeed, he goes further: the central idea is one that was first developed nearly two and a half thousand years ago, and is now seen to have been fully endorsed by subsequent events. Not only does Allison name his idea “Thucydides’s Trap,” he persistently invokes the fifth-century BCE Greek author by quoting him at the head of every chapter, creating the impression that Thucydides had foreseen everything and had already formulated insights that go to the heart of our present situation. There is a long tradition of readers feeling that they recognize their own times in Thucydides’ account of the war between the Athenians and the Spartans: his depiction of civil war in Corcyra has spoken to the experiences of warring Italian city states, the wars of religion in Germany, and the French Revolution, for example, while the Melian Dialogue is evoked in every confrontation between a greater and a lesser power, most recently in Ukraine, the Greek economic crisis, and Brexit negotiations.[23] The idea that Thucydides was a pioneering political theorist rather than a “historian” is also not new; for nearly a century, especially in the developing field of international relations, he has been read as someone whose primary aim was to identify normative laws of inter-state relations or political systems — “ever since the days of Thucydides…” has become a cliché of Realist analysis.[24] This is despite the fact there is no statement or elaboration of any such laws in his account beyond a few pithy aphorisms — most of them spoken by Thucydides’ characters, and therefore not to be taken at face value or assumed to reflect his own views. The modern view of Thucydides, inside and outside academia, is to a great extent based on the circulation of such maxims as “the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must,” many of them based on questionable translations of the original Greek, and a fair number of them spurious (such as the line about “peace is only an armistice in an endless war” featured in the recent Wonder Woman film). [quote id="2"] Thucydides was not a modern social scientist — but he was not a modern historian either, despite the claims of 19th century readers that he had pioneered “History as science.”[25] In important respects, he was sui generis even in relation to his own times. One way in which his work is more consonant with social science than with conventional historiography is that, however one translates the convoluted syntax of 1.22.3, he clearly did intend his account of past events to be useful, to provide knowledge or understanding that extends beyond the facts as an end in themselves.[26] Thucydides believed in the existence of recurrent patterns in human events, and so he believed a detailed, accurate account of past events would allow his readers to recognize and understand such patterns. What patterns did he intend us to recognize? For Allison, Thucydides’ work is primarily concerned with the reasons why the Athenians and Spartans went to war (the fact that most of the work is concerned with the subsequent course of that war suggests that it’s about a great deal more, but certainly the cause is one of the many things Thucydides was interested in) and with identifying the true rather than merely proximate cause, the structural stress when a rising power confronts a ruling power: “What made war inevitable was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta.” Again, there are issues of translation and interpretation here.[27] Thucydides certainly distinguishes different sorts of causes, but there is ongoing debate about whether the ambiguous Greek terms he used were meant to contrast: true causes and pretexts; immediate and long-term causes; visible and less visible causes; or some combination thereof. His subsequent narrative makes it clear that it is the interaction of different factors, the structural pressures, the alleged characters of different Greek states, the personalities and decisions of key individuals, and chance events, that leads to war. Thucydides does not label this development “inevitable,” but rather “compelled” or ‘forced,” and his account constantly encourages the reader to consider how things could have turned out differently — a reading which actually suits Allison’s overall thesis better than a crude notion of deterministic structural factors making war inevitable. So, Thucydides does offer us something like the “Thucydides Trap” model, prefiguring power transition theory (as has long been claimed by scholars like Robert Gilpin).[28] This observation could have served Allison as an inspiration or theoretical grounding for a discussion of the current state of U.S.-China relations, and indeed he devotes substantial parts of Destined for War to doing precisely that — but he also seeks to argue that this is no mere theory or speculative idea, but an objective characteristic of human affairs, whose truth is established by multiple historical instances. This is potentially a stronger argument, at least for an audience who might be skeptical of “mere” theory: “history tells us” that our situation is more perilous than we realize. But it rests on a number of problematic assumptions. Allison must establish not only that Thucydides identified the underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War, but that his analysis was correct. The fact that Donald Kagan disagrees is certainly not — contra Arthur Waldron’s particularly intemperate review of Destined for War — evidence that there is no such thing as the Thucydides Trap, but it ought to raise questions about the infallibility of Thucydides’ account.[29] Thucydides offers a version of events that makes his understanding of them plausible, but it does leave certain things out and underemphasizes others.[30] The problem with the Peloponnesian War is that we have Thucydides’ account and not a lot else; fragmentary evidence that raises questions about some of what he says, and possible suspicions about his motives. As we move into later historical periods, we have vastly more evidence to draw upon, and multiple interpretations of events. This is clearly a problem for Allison’s argument as he seeks to establish the existence of a series of situations analogous to fifth-century Greece where the Thucydides Trap theory can be tested. Of course there have been multiple situations in human history which can be represented in terms of a rising power confronting a ruling power, and that is how they are represented here — but this is not the same as saying that they were like that, and they could always be represented differently. Some of these case studies seem less plausible than others, even at this high level of generality; World War I presented as the outcome of Anglo-German rivalry, with the interests and actions of the other great European powers either ignored or reduced to facets of that confrontation, or worse, the idea of the United Kingdom and France as a unitary ruling power confronting Germany in the 1990s. But even if one focuses on the instances that are more obviously bipolar, this is still a case of reading past events through the theory and representing them in those terms, then claiming that they demonstrate the theory’s validity. A similar criticism can be applied to the third stage of Allison’s argument, the claim that we are in a Thucydides Trap situation and therefore the same dynamics are more likely than not to apply. Of course the current global situation can be represented in these terms, seeing everything as secondary to the confrontation of the U.S. and China — but it can also be represented in other terms, as in Wright’s insistence on the continuing importance of different regions and multiple interdependent relationships. One might argue that Allison’s view of world politics is quite an old-fashioned one, focused on the individual decisions and actions of great powers, constrained only by their own resources and the dynamics of the relationship between them. Indeed, this is the point of the model, to reject the idea that today’s world is essentially different from the past; despite globalization and economic interdependence, despite nuclear weapons, despite cultural and intellectual changes, we remain as vulnerable as ever to falling back into war — perhaps more so, as “we” (the comfortable West, at least) have come to take a certain sort of peace for granted, just as Stefan Zweig described his own generation at the beginning of the twentieth century.[31] Allison’s claim that war may be more likely than we imagine is not in itself problematic; as Wright argues in more detail, complacent Western assumptions about interdependence being a one-way street and a source of ever-decreasing tensions are certainly questionable today. Wright does offer a more nuanced prediction that the new nationalist competition could take different forms, with actual war the most extreme possibility, where Allison offers a stark choice between war and peace — in part, one might suppose, because that is what makes sense in most historical contexts, as economic competition and cyberwarfare are essentially modern phenomena. One might also wonder about the different consequences if their warnings are taken seriously; “prepare for war” has different implications from “prepare for increased competition,” and there must be a risk that the former starts to drive military expansion and more aggressive responses to perceived challenges rather than renewed efforts to prevent conflict and escalation. What is striking about Destined for War is not Allison’s interpretation of the present situation, but the fact that he devotes so much space to alleged historical analogies — even though this opens him up to innumerable objections from historians, disputing his accounts of their periods, and to analysts of contemporary global politics, arguing that so much has changed in the last hundred years, let alone the last two and a half thousand, that past case studies have nothing useful to offer the present. Ultimately, the turn to Thucydides seems to be primarily a rhetorical move, drawing power from the claims that “history shows…” and “Thucydides says…”; the assumption that the accumulation of past experience points the way forward, and that the Man Who Knows — the powerful image of Thucydides as the illusionless, all-seeing observer and analyst of human folly, for example in Auden’s poem 1 September 1939 — has endorsed this reading of the present.
Exiled Thucydides knew All that a speech can say About Democracy, And what dictators do, The elderly rubbish they talk To an apathetic grave; Analysed all in his book, The enlightenment driven away, The habit-forming pain, Mismanagement and grief: We must suffer them all again.[32]
Would that history, much less U.S.-China relations, were so simple.

4. A Long-Term Asia Strategy is Long Overdue

By Mira Rapp-Hooper International relations scholars scarcely need a reintroduction to Thucydides’ cautionary tale of Athens and Sparta, or — given all the publicity it has received recently —  to Destined for War, Graham Allison’s swift account of the potential for conflict in the U.S.-China relationship. Thomas Wright’s All Measures Short of War is just as thoughtful, and diagnoses the nature of great power competition in the 21st century, offering a new framework for engaging in it. According to Allison, the Thucydides Trap is “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one.” He argues that under these conditions, unexpected and ordinary events alike can trigger major conflict.[33] There is a whiff of a strawman in Allison’s initial framing: he argues at once that the risk of war between the United States and China is underappreciated, and that officials in Washington oversimplify these dangers when they declare that war is “not inevitable.”[34] Policymakers do not simply reject the inexorability of conflict out of hand, of course, but have devoted substantial energy to reducing its risk through diplomatic, economic, and defense agreements. Few would quibble with the premise that a major power shift makes conflict more likely: when a great power rises in economic and military terms, it becomes able to assert its interests in new ways as it closes the gap between itself and the dominant state. The dominant state has been the one to set the rules of the international system; the rising state can now contest them, and as the power gap continues to close, each is beset with uncertainties about where and how the other intends to advance its aims. It is primarily a structural problem, fueled by major material changes, but one that usually requires misperception, inadvertence, or accident to become a war. After all, a rising power need not resort to conflict today if it will be stronger tomorrow; for the dominant state, the rationale for war may indeed exist (it is better to fight now while stronger), but the cure may also prove worse than the disease. While preventive motivations certainly factor in numerous great power wars, it is hard to point to cases where a declining power attacks a rising one with exclusively preventive designs, and rarely does a ruling state permanently derail the rise of a competitor. U.S leaders certainly do not think this possible or desirable in the case of present-day China. If the reader is familiar with this structural argument, s/he is therefore somewhat surprised to arrive at Allison’s explanation of the proximate triggers of conflict in the U.S.-China relationship — that is, the exacerbating factors that will spark the powder keg. In an unexpected deviation from most power transition accounts, Allison turns to a Huntington-like sub-thesis, arguing that Washington and Beijing may come to blows through a civilizational clash. Independent of the Thucydides Trap, Allison argues that profound cultural differences make the bilateral relationship harder to manage. There is no rule that dictates that a proximate cause of war must have the same paradigmatic origins as the structural one (cultural and material variables can happily coexist in the same thesis), but Allison does not invoke cultural variables in any of his other case studies. In the U.S.-China case, however, Allison presents a chart comparing each country’s cultural characteristics along nine dimensions, reducing each to a single word or phrase.[35] If these cultural distillations are catalysts for conflict, similar charts should appear alongside other historical examples, helping to explain both war and non-war outcomes. Allison devotes substantial energy to analyzing Xi Jinping’s “China Dream,” calling it a “civilizational creed” that aims to place China at the center of the universe, while ejecting the United States from Asia. For Allison, China’s recent foreign policy muscularity appears to be driven largely by these cultural grievances; Wright sees these more as instrumental parts of China’s effort to carve itself a sphere of influence in Asia. At times, Allison compares Xi’s “China Dream” to Trump’s “America First” catchphrase — a juxtaposition that only occasions the reader to wonder why either should be a proximate cause of war at all.[36] The analogy reminds us that both are empty political vessels into which either leader can pour his current agenda. While not nearly as mercurial as — and far more politically secure than — Trump, Xi’s articulation of the China Dream is not immutable, and it provides neither a fulsome accounting of nor indelible blueprint for China’s rise. Thucydides sympathizers are left wishing that Allison had used these pages to explore where U.S. and Chinese interests may be incompatible, as Wright’s treatment does nicely.[37]  Allison’s case studies of previous power transitions are free of civilizational arguments; cultural reductions are not terribly compelling catalysts for global conflagration. Allison’s final chapters refresh. He rejects the standard structure of the Washington-facing policy tome, declining to present a ready-packaged new strategy to govern U.S.-China relations. Instead, he draws upon his case study work to derive 12 lessons that may help the bilateral relationship.[38] In “Twelve Clues for Peace,” Allison tops his structural and cultural argument with dollops of institutionalism, as he notes the merits of mediation and the value of international organizations in mitigating friction. As Wright argues, however, Chinese leaders have tended to prefer bilateral diplomacy and deal-making to maximize their relative advantage, which may in turn mean that they are less inclined to leave their vital interests to institutions, but that does not obviate the assertion that multilateralism has proved useful in past power shifts.[39] Allison also acknowledges the important critique that the nuclear age has transformed major powers’ incentives for war, potentially making power transitions less dangerous (if higher-stake). Rather than presenting us with a roadmap for the bilateral relationship, Allison calls for a years-long strategic review — a proposition that may be politically and bureaucratically fraught in practice, particularly in an administration whose foreign policy in general and China policy in particular have been matters of intense controversy.[40] Allison’s call for a review hardly guarantees that U.S. policymakers will get the bilateral relationship “right,” but it does acknowledge the enormity of the task at hand. Allison lays out four broad lenses U.S. policymakers may adopt for the U.S.-China relationship: accommodation, undermining, a negotiated peace, or a relationship redefinition.[41] Each approach has elements that are hyper-stylized and politically difficult, but the exercise is nonetheless useful. It leads Allison to observe that America’s post-Cold War China strategy to “engage and hedge” admits everything and proscribes nothing (and that in so doing, the United States has avoided defining its strategic interests in Asia). Allison’s survey also leads him to note that American strategy has always assumed that China will grow friendlier and more democratic as it rises. It is with this very premise that Thomas Wright begins. All Measures Short of War commences with an idea gone awry. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers believed in “convergence”: as countries embraced globalization, they would become more responsible members of the international order and would liberalize domestically with time. Major powers would stop treating one another as rivals and the post-World War II order would become so universal as to survive the decline of the United States itself.[42] The convergence logic was fatally flawed, according to Wright: Some states have not perceived the U.S.-led order as benign and Russia and China in particular believe it has deprived them of the ability to craft spheres of influence. In Wright’s assessment, convergence has failed, and major powers will now compete with one another to transform world order and carve spheres of influence while avoiding serious conflict.[43] [quote id="3"] Wright seeks to diagnose the problems short of war that beset the liberal international order in three critical regions: Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Following his audit of regional events and U.S. responses, he concludes that the question facing American policymakers is whether the United States wants to remain a liberal superpower. Wright’s answer is unequivocal: a U.S.-led liberal order is more conducive to American and global interests than any other organizing principle could be.[44] He advances an approach called Responsible Competition, which he describes as a liberal internationalism for a more competitive world. In this framework, the United States would seek to prevent rivals from impinging on its vital interests, while continuing to advance its own geopolitical aims.[45] As Allison notes, however, U.S. policymakers have generally avoided defining America’s vital regional interests, and this is a necessary precursor to Responsible Competition. One need not self-identify as a liberal internationalist to judge Wright’s counsel wise. Wright’s application of Responsible Competition to Asia is uncontroversial. He argues that the United States should not allow China to carve out a regional sphere of influence, for example, by taking control of the East or South China Sea. Wright correctly observes that China requires war avoidance to achieve its goals, and that the United States has room to push back on Beijing without triggering conflict.[46] Many strategists and Asia-watchers have shared this belief for some time, although Allison might disagree, worrying that any pushback could precipitate conflict. Wright’s diagnosis is perfectly sensible, but Responsible Competition is a bit short on novelty. Wright’s counsel to U.S. policymakers is that they use alliances and arms sales to counterbalance China while reinvesting in the American-backed regional order, such as a successor trade pact to the Trans Pacific Partnership.[47] Former Obama Administration officials will find little to disagree with on this menu. Yet precisely because the failure of convergence and threat of spheres of influence are such enormous strategic challenges, one worries that a more concerted application of familiar tools cannot steady the rapidly shifting order in Asia. The task will be positively foreboding four years hence. Wright’s account is thoughtful and knits together some of the most important ideas of the day: the return of major power competition, the startling halt in liberalism’s teleology, the risks that revisionism short of large-scale conflict may pose to international order. There is, however, a nagging tension in his conclusions.  Wright asserts that the United States must remain a liberal superpower that upholds the international order with minimal dependence on illiberal actors like Russia and China — the costs of failure are simply too great. At the same time, he acknowledges that the United States can and must cooperate with China on global issues like climate change and nonproliferation, a contention with which few would disagree.[48] After all, the United States has cooperated with China in global institutions for decades, even as it has become a competitor in Asia. Yet to sanction global cooperation alongside regional competition is to admit that America’s autocratic competitors are already very much inside the international order. Wright never defines “liberal international order,” and his argument is primarily concerned with regional order, but liberal international principles will necessarily be challenged when the autocratic competitors in question are not really outsiders at all. Illiberal states like Russia and China will retain their leadership roles in global institutions, and while these may still be based on liberal principles, the institutions will not transform them. China’s managed, nonmarket economy, for example, will continue to pose challenges to the international trade regimes to which it is a party. Doubling down on liberalism won’t solve this problem. There is value in reading Allison and Wright’s accounts as juxtaposed companions. Allison tends to overstate China’s material triumph, measuring its economy in terms of GDP, for example, and declaring it will surpass the United States by 2023. In so doing, he underweights its demographic, economic, and social burdens, and may overpredict a global power transition, when in fact this is a major power shift short of full eclipse. Wright, for his part, is sunnier on the question of whether the United States can maintain its position in Asia, pointing to the fact that American primacy can be challenged without being surpassed. According to Wright, innovation, education, and soft power serve as ballasts to American influence. Allison’s quasi-structural (but paradigmatically eclectic) account bears realism’s pessimistic watermark; Wright betrays a certain optimism as he seeks to repurpose liberalism for a contested world. When it comes to an epochal strategic change like China’s rise, one can afford to be sobered and stiffened in equal measure. The question of whether the United States and China are headed for a full power transition is a profoundly important one, and has direct implications for U.S. strategy and the management of the bilateral relationship. China’s rapid ascent decidedly poses structural challenges to U.S. primacy in Asia, yet Beijing will not replace Washington as a global hegemon any time soon. The essence of the problem may therefore lie somewhere in between Allison and Wright’s distillations: how does the United States manage its role in Asia as it comes under increasing stress, knowing that it will remain globally preponderant for several decades? These are the conditions that policymakers must accept as they craft long-term strategy. To be sure, there is a risk that miscalculation could lead to conflict over the East China Sea, South China Sea, Taiwan, or the Korean Peninsula, but cultural differences seem unlikely to bring these two great powers to blows. The risk of full-blown conflict is genuine, but both understand how truly grave an outcome this would be, and nuclear weapons only induce greater caution: sub-conventional competition seems the far more likely outcome, at least for the time being. Moreover, Wright touches on, but neither author adequately explores, the fact that there are plenty of issues where these structural changes do not bring these two countries’ interests into diametric opposition. China’s desire to build new regional economic and development institutions does not directly threaten the United States, and in some areas, may complement its objectives, so long as the projects are transparent and well-governed. And even on central regional security flashpoints, the contours of U.S.-China competition are not wholly immutable: Ironically, as North Korea completes its sprint for a mature and deliverable nuclear weapons capability, they increasingly share incentives to work to restrain it, even if their interests do not converge perfectly. If the problem is narrow and lofty — who will rule Asia? — the answer is singularly fractious. If some issues are amenable to a different query — where is managed, peaceful change possible and desirable, and where do national interests prevent it? — the result is less dire. The greatest payoff to reading Allison and Wright as a pair may be the realization that two accomplished strategists with distinct worldviews have, in the end, converged on the same question: In a world of contested American primacy, where potential U.S. adversaries are sphere-of-influence-seeking autocracies, how do we structure and organize international politics? Allison and Wright are skilled diagnosticians and provide us with early guidance. They also exhort us to get to work.

5. To Deter China, U.S. Policy-Makers Need to Show that America is Willing to Go to War

By Hugh White The debate about China in and around Washington seems to be shifting. For a long time, American policy towards China has been based on the judgment that China’s rise would not require any major shifts in U.S. aims and posture in Asia.[49] The assumption appears to have been that, despite occasional nationalist stirrings, China had neither the power nor the motive to undermine an order which has been so good for China for so long. President Obama’s so-called “pivot” to Asia assumed that America could deter any Chinese bid for primacy in Asia  simply by affirming that America was determined to maintain primacy itself. The pivot was supposed to send that message with a series of low cost, low risk gestures that were expected to convince Beijing of Washington’s resolve, as well as increase China’s stake in the status quo by offering deeper bilateral and multilateral engagement and closer economic connections. But it hasn’t worked out that way. Beijing has gone its own way economically and diplomatically, and responded with a series of provocative actions which have turned the tables and tested Washington’s resolve instead. America’s weak responses have done nothing effective to stop China’s provocations. This has weakened America’s regional leadership credentials, and strengthened China’s. Thus, it has become clear that China’s challenge is much more formidable than was assumed, and that consequently an effective response will entail much greater costs and risks than most in Washington had envisaged. The questions now are what are those costs, whether or not they are justified and sustainable, and what happens if they are not? Graham Allison and Thomas Wright[50] both make important contributions, in rather different ways, to answering these questions. There is a great deal to admire in both books, and much to learn from them. Both recognize that America faces a serious challenge from China and that that means U.S. grand strategy in Asia needs to be rethought. And both understand that the risk of war with China must take a central place in assessing how best to respond. The way Thomas Wright confronts his question shows he is basically an optimist. Insofar as his book relates to Asia, Wright’s core point is that America can preserve U.S. leadership in Asia without running a serious risk of conflict. That is not because he doesn’t take China’s challenge seriously. He understands that China is serious about building a “new model of great power relations” and he recognizes that it can apply formidable power to achieving that objective. But he is optimistic that this can be managed without serious risk of war because neither America nor China want to go to war. On the contrary, both sides understand that it would be disastrously counterproductive. Hence the title of his book, All Measures Short of War. It is true that neither America nor China wants a war, but does that mean a war cannot happen? History suggests not. Wars often occur when neither side wants to fight. That’s not because they happen “by accident” — wars are always and necessarily the result of deliberate choices to fight on each side. It is because countries — or their leaders — often choose to go to war even when they don’t want to, when going to war, bad as it is, looks better than the alternative. That means the risk of war depends less on whether countries want to fight than on the chances that leaders find themselves facing this kind of choice. This is what many believe happened in the last week of July 1914.[51] None of the key players really wanted war, but each hoped they could get what they wanted without one because they expected their rivals to back off. By the time they realized the truth, their national credibility was so invested that backing down would destroy their country’s international standing, and each decided that they would go to war rather than accept that. There are uncomfortable parallels here with America and China today. Neither side wants war, but each is inclined to believe that the other side wants it even less. That leads each to believe they can achieve their objectives without risking a conflict. Every American policy-maker who assumes China will always back off has a counterpart in Beijing who believes the same of America. And such Chinese beliefs will have been reinforced by many recent features of U.S. policy and politics, both at home and abroad. The scope for mutual misperception and disastrous error on both sides, July 1914-style, is thus rather high. This leads to an important conclusion for U.S. policy-makers. If they are serious about resisting China’s challenge in Asia and preserving U.S. leadership, they will need to do a lot more to convince Beijing that America is willing to go to war to do so. The more clearly it can convince China of that, the more likely China is to be deterred from any serious challenge, and the less likely the United States will actually have to go to war to defend its role in Asia. Moreover — and this is a particularly dark thought — America must convince China that it is willing to fight a war that crosses the nuclear threshold. That is because America can no longer be confident of swift and clear victory in a localized conventional conflict with China, so any conflict is likely to escalate as, once conflict had begun, both sides would face strong pressures not to accept a stalemate which looked like a defeat. No sane leader would risk escalating a conflict with a nuclear adversary without contemplating the possibility of crossing the nuclear threshold. If the Chinese do not believe America is willing to do that, it will be that much less likely to believe that America is willing to fight at all. The situation America faces in Asia today is therefore not so different from the one it faced in the Cold War. America sustained its position on the key fronts of the Cold War in Europe and Asia against immense Soviet pressure because it convinced the Soviets, and its own allies, that it was willing to fight a nuclear war, and accept devastating nuclear strikes on the United States itself, to prevent even slight Soviet gains. It did that not just by building and deploying massive nuclear forces, but by making very clear that it had the resolve to use them. That resolve was made clear to the Soviets and to U.S. allies by generations of U.S. political leaders, who believed America’s security and, indeed, its survival as a free society, depended on preventing the Soviets from taking over key power centers in Europe and Asia. Today we may speculate about whether that was really true, but we can hardly doubt that Americans at the time believed it to be true, and that the Soviets knew this and were deterred. [quote id="4"] It seems to me that America would have to do the same kind of thing today to deter China from challenging the current U.S.-led order in Asia. Indeed, Wright himself seems to acknowledge this in an exceptionally clear passage where he sets out the “problem of revisionism” and concludes that America, facing a revisionist China, will face a series of choices between risking conflict with a nuclear power or accommodating them and undermining the order it seeks to preserve.[52] Later, when he cautions against setting red lines to check Chinese revisionism, he makes clear what choice he thinks America would make, and that threatening war to deter China would be “disproportionate, unwise and not credible.”’[53] How then is China to be deterred, and its challenge to the U.S.-led order resisted, if not by just this kind of threat? And how can such threats be made credible? Is America willing and able to do what is necessary to convince China of its resolve in Asia? It is tempting to think that this can be done on the cheap, by bluffing. But that is not a sustainable long-term posture, because it is too easy for China to detect the bluff by testing American resolve — indeed that is what it is doing in the South China Sea right now. In the long run, China will only be deterred if America is genuinely willing to fight a nuclear war to preserve the status quo in Asia. There is no consensus on this in America today. Indeed, the question has scarcely been discussed in these terms, even by the experts. Beginning this discussion is the essential starting point for deciding how to respond to China’s challenge. The outcome of such a debate is not to be taken for granted, but the fact that it has been evaded for so long suggests what the answer will be. It seems to me very unlikely that Americans will decide they are willing to shoulder again the appalling risks of nuclear rivalry unless they can convince themselves, as they did in the Cold War, that doing so is vital to their own security at home. If it is not — if, as Wright suggests, America’s stake in Asia today relates to its vision of global order rather than its own security[54] — then it seems unlikely that it would be willing to fight a nuclear war to sustain the status quo, and thus America’s chances of deterring China’s challenge in Asia are low. Here then is the real difference between today’s predicament and the Cold War. It is not, as Wright argues, that the costs of upholding the status quo are lower[55] but that the imperative to do so is lower. That is because China today, for all its strength, does not pose the kind of threat to America’s own security that the Soviets did in their heyday.  This is not just a question of whether China’s ambitions spread so far. It is also a question of power. Unlike the Soviets, or the Axis of World War II before them, China has no chance of imposing the kind of outright domination over Eurasia, which American strategists have traditionally and correctly identified as necessary to pose that kind of threat. That is because, unlike them, it faces such formidable powers as Russia, India and Europe that would resist Chinese hegemony. It won’t be enough for America to show that it is willing to use “all measures short of war” to maintain its leadership in Asia. Wright’s argument that it will presupposes the Chinese will show the same restraint. But the more confident the Chinese are of America’s restraint, the less restrained they will be. After all, the stakes for them are very high — as high as the stakes America has traditionally had in preserving the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. Those are stakes for which they would risk a great deal.  For this reason, it would be unwise for U.S. strategists to expect China to limit itself to the kind of limited confrontations that arguably characterized its border confrontations with India, the Soviets, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. The contest between the U.S. and China is not a border dispute, but a contest for primacy over an entire strategic system. Much more is at stake for both sides. Graham Allison understands this perfectly. His book extends and amplifies the warning he has been sounding for some years now about the nature of the rivalry emerging in Asia between America and China, and the dangers that it poses. The key lesson he draws from his extended analysis of analogous events throughout history is that contests between rising and declining major powers over their respective places in the international system are precisely why they have most often gone to war with one another, with disastrous consequences. Allison does not believe that the escalating rivalry between America and China makes war “inevitable.” [56] Rather, he perceives a serious risk of war when such contests arise because great powers see their deepest national interests at stake. He argues quite convincingly that this is exactly the kind of contest we now see between America and China. He rebuts the argument that China lacks the power or resolve to challenge the United States in Asia, and he sees no reason to assume that in the contest that is consequently unfolding either side will limit itself to “measures short of war.” Therefore, the danger of escalating rivalry and conflict with China is real, and the consequences of a conflict when both powers have nuclear forces is incalculable. That means our first concern must be to find ways to avoid conflict with China. All this, I think, is right. To address this question, Allison extends his work on previous episodes of great power rivalry to focus not just on those that did result in war, but also on those that did not. His aim is to help us see how competing great powers avoided war in the past, looking for lessons that apply today. Although he doesn’t put it quite this way, the key conclusion to be drawn from his study is very simple: war can be avoided when a rising power confronts an established one, but only by real compromise and accommodation on both sides. Hence while war is not inevitable when a new great power arises, major changes in the international order are. The mistake of current U.S. policy is not to see this, but instead to assume — as Wright does — that the current status quo of American leadership can be preserved without risking a major war. Americans must therefore ask themselves whether, as Allison puts it, “maintaining U.S. primacy in the western Pacific [is] truly a vital national interest?”[57] He concludes that it isn’t. He argues that America should therefore abandon its ambition to preserve the status quo, and instead accept a significant change in its role in Asia through some kind of understanding with China. In his book’s penultimate chapter, he offers several suggestions about how this might be done. He mentions accommodating China, negotiating a long peace, or redefining the relationship to focus on common threats. All of these seem to me to be versions of the same idea — to accept China as at least a co-equal leading power in Asia. That means preserving a strong U.S. role in Asia while being willing to adjust American aims and purposes to respect what China sees as its core interests and objectives in the region. But is this credible? Could America really reach that kind of understanding with China, one that would involve maintaining a major U.S. strategic role in Asia while reducing the risk of conflict?  I have argued in the past that it could, and I still believe it would be very much in Asia’s interests if it did.[58] But America’s bargaining position would be rather weak on any issue over which it could not convince China it was willing to go to war. Unless there is something in Asia that Americans can convince China they are willing to fight a nuclear war over, negotiations would be rather one-sided. America would find itself edging towards withdrawal from any substantial strategic role in Asia altogether. Allison does not really address this issue. He thus does not really confront just how stark the choices facing America in Asia today actually are. The harsh fact is that China’s rise poses a question that is more challenging even than Allison acknowledges: not whether the United States can preserve its long-accustomed primacy in Asia, but whether it can preserve any significant strategic role there at all at a cost it is willing to sustain. So, the debate in and around Washington about how to respond to China still has a long way to go. Many of us who live on the Western side of the Pacific deeply hope that, if and as that debate unfolds, America will find a way to remain a major strategic actor in Asia. But we can no longer afford to take that for granted.     Rosemary Foot was elected to an Emeritus Fellowship of St Antony's College in October 2014. She is a Senior Research Fellow at Oxford's Department of Politics and International Relations and a Research Associate at the Oxford China Centre. Previously Professor of International Relations, and the John Swire Senior Research Fellow at St Antony's College, she has been a Fellow of the College since 1990. She was Senior Tutor from 2003-2005, and was Acting Warden of the College from January-October 2012. In 2014, she held the Visiting Sir Howard Kippenberger Chair in Strategic Studies at the University of Victoria in Wellington, New Zealand, and a Visiting Fellowship at the Nobel Institute, Oslo, Norway.   Van Jackson is an American scholar, strategist, and policy expert specializing in Asian security and defense affairs. He is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, and the Defence & Strategy Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies, also at Victoria. He is also author of the Cambridge University Press book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S.-North Korea Relations. Dr. Jackson hosts the podcast series Pacific Pundit, and holds additional affiliations as an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington. He is an Associate Editor at the Texas National Security Review, as well as a Senior Editor for War on the Rocks   Neville Morley is a professor of classics and ancient history at the University of Exeter and author of such significant works on classical antiquity as Civil War and Succession Crisis in Roman Beekeeping and Thucydides, History and Historicism in Wilhelm Roscher. His main research interests are in the modern reception and reinterpretation of antiquity, especially within the social sciences and in ancient economic and social history, as well as in the theory and methodology of history more generally, and the significance of the past for the present. Dr. Morley is currently working on a book on Marx and Antiquity and a shorter account of Classics: Why it Matters, as well as developing a research project on Thucydides and modern political theory. He is an Einstein Visiting Fellow at the Freie Universitaet Berlin, as part of an ongoing collaboration with colleagues there studying change and instability in the ancient world and its modern interpretation.   Mira Rapp-Hooper is a Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, as well as a Senior Fellow at Yale’s Paul Tsai China Center. She studies and writes on US-China relations and national security issues in Asia. Dr. Rapp-Hooper was formerly a Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Fellow with the CSIS Asia Program, and the Director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. She was also a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Rapp-Hooper’s academic writings have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies, and Survival. Her policy writings have appeared in The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, and The Washington Quarterly, and her analysis has been featured in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and on NPR, MSNBC, and the BBC. Dr. Rapp-Hooper was the Asia Policy Coordinator for the 2016 Hillary Clinton presidential campaign. She is a David Rockefeller Fellow of the Trilateral Commission, an associate editor with the International Security Studies Forum, and a senior editor at War on the Rocks. She holds a B.A. in history from Stanford University and an M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.   Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. He has worked on Australian and regional strategic, defense, and foreign policy issues since 1980. He has been an intelligence analyst, journalist, ministerial adviser, departmental official, think tanker and academic. In the 1990s he served as International Relations Adviser to Prime Minister Bob Hawke and as Deputy Secretary of Defence for Strategy and Intelligence. He was the principal author of Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper. His recent publications include Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing published by Black Inc in September 2010, and The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, published in Australia by Black Inc in 2012, and by OUP in 2013. The China Choice has also been published in Chinese and Japanese. In the 1970s Hugh White studied philosophy at Melbourne and Oxford Universities. He was awarded an AO in the Queen’s Birthday honors in 2014. Image: U.S. State Department [post_title] => Book Review Roundtable: Is War with China Coming? Contrasting Visions [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => war-with-china-contrasting-visions [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-02-02 10:48:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-02-02 15:48:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?post_type=roundtable&p=308 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => roundtable [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => As China increasingly threatens to supplant America's place on the international stage, four scholars review Graham Allison's "Destined for War" and Thomas Wright's "All Measures Short of War." [pubinfo] => [issue] => [quotes] => Array ( [0] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => [T]he two books have different visions of the current order and its proneness to war. ) [1] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => There is a long tradition of readers feeling that they recognize their own times in Thucydides’ account of the war between the Athenians and the Spartans ) [2] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => Allison and Wright are skilled diagnosticians and provide us with early guidance. They also exhort us to get to work. ) [3] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => China’s rise poses a question that is more challenging even than Allison acknowledges. ) ) [style] => roundtable [type] => Book [style_label] => Roundtable [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 93 [1] => 24 [2] => 17 [3] => 15 [4] => 16 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2017); Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). [2] Allison, 184. [3] “Thucydides’s Trap Case File,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, accessed October 18, 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/case-file [4] Wright, xi. [5] Wright, 77. [6] For two examples see “Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Exclusive Interview with the Financial Times,” January 29, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1124367.shtml, and Daniel R. Russel’s remarks at “China’s Growing Pains” at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, April 22, 2016, accessed October 23, 2017, http://china.usc.edu/daniel-russel-“remarks-usci’s-china’s-growing-pains-conference”-april-22-2016 [7] Allison, 149. [8] Allison, 233. [9] Steve Chan, China, the U.S. and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique, (London: Routledge, 2008), 3-4. [10] For one recent example and one that references the “Thucydides’ Trap” see Charles S. Maier, “Thucydides, Alliance Politics, and Great Power Conflict,” in The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict, eds Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, (Cambridge, Mass: the MIT Press, 2015), 91-9. [11] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York: Vintage, 1989) [12] Michael Mastanduno, “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy,” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 73-113. [13] Wright, 9. [14] Oxford Economics, “Understanding the US-China Trade Relationship,” January 10, 2017, The U.S.-China Business Council, https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/filesOE%20US%20Jobs%20and%20China%20Trade%20Report.pdf.  See also “U.S.-China Business Council 2017 State Export Report,” The U.S.-China Business Council, accessed October 23, 2017, https://www.uschina.org/reports/us-exports/national. [15] Thilo Hanemann and Cassie Gao, “Record Deal Making in 2016 Pushes Cumulative Chinese FDI in the US above $100 Billion,” Rhodium Group, December 30, 2016 http://rhg.com/notes/record-deal-making-in-2016-pushes-cumulative-chinese-fdi-in-the-us-above-100-billion.” [16] John Ravenhill, “Production Networks in Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, eds Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 358-9. See also John Ravenhill, “Economics and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” The Pacific Review, 26, no. 1, (March 2013):1-15. [17] Robert Jervis, “Force in our Times,” International Relations, 25, no. 4, (December 2011), 410-11. [18] 2017: xvii. [19] The Life of Reason: or, the phases of human progress. Vol. I: Reason in common sense (New York: Charles Scribner, 1905), 284. [20] Useful discussions of the possible uses of history in Richard E. Neustadt & Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: the uses of history for decision-makers (New York: Free Press, 1986) and Jo Guldi & David Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: CUP, 2014). [21] Cf. T. Greer, “The Chinese Strategic Tradition: a Research Programme,” The Scholar’s Stage, May 26, 2015, http://scholars-stage.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/the-chinese-strategic-tradition.html. [22] Thomas de Quincey, Logic of Political Economy [1844], in Collected Writings, ed. D. Masson (London, 1896-97), IX, 194. On the uses of the classical past in the study of modernity, Morley, Antiquity and Modernity (Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). [23] Thucydides in the Ukraine: Sir Tony Brenton, “Putin Will Have Calculated on a Response Strong on Rhetoric,”” Financial Times, March 5, 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/22e85546-a2ef-11e3-ba21-00144feab7de. Thucydides and Greece: Johanna Hanink, The Classical Debt: Greek antiquity in an age of austerity (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 2017) and Yanis Varoufakis, And the Weak Suffer What They Must? Europe’s crisis and America’s economic future (London: Bodley Head, 2016). Thucydides and Brexit: Neil Wilson, “Brexit Talks Begin: a Modern-Day Melian Dialogue,” June 19, 2017, https://medium.com/@etx.seo/brexit-talks-begin-a-modern-day-melian-dialogue-483d51e20bee. Further examples of the application of Thucydides to the modern world are regularly collected at http://thesphinxblog.com. [24] See David A. Welch, “Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides,” Review of International Studies, 29.2 (2003): 301-319. [25] “Thucydides came to be at home in the ‘modern’ way of thinking,” claimed J.B. Bury, the leading historian in England, in 1909. The French scholar Jules Girard argued in 1861 that “he conceives of history not only as the exact science of facts, but as a new science.” Discussed, with many other examples, in Morley, Thucydides and the Idea of History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). [26] Allison’s preferred translation is clearly designed to establish Thucydides as “the original ‘applied historian’: “If my history be judged useful by those who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to understanding the future – which in the course of human affairs must resemble if it does not reflect it – I shall be content.” A more literal version would be: “If it is judged useful by those who will want to have a clear understanding of what happened – and, such is the human condition, will happen again at some time in the same or in a similar pattern – I shall be content.” The differences between these versions are not insignificant, but the central point is the same. [27] Cf. S.N. Jaffe, “The Risks and Rewards of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War,” War on the Rocks, July 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-risks-and-rewards-of-thucydides-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war/, and in more detail his new book, Thucydides on the Outbreak of War: character and context (Oxford: OUP, 2017). [28] War and Change in International Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), 191. [29] Waldron, “There is no Thucydides Trap,” http://supchina.com/2017/06/12/no-thucydides-trap/, citing Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1969). [30] It’s a little odd, for example, to see Allison’s account of the run-in to war emphasize the Megarian Decree, when this is widely identified as one of Thucydides’ most puzzling and suspicious admissions. [31] Die Welt von Gestern [1942], trans. Anthea Bell (London: Pushkin Press, 2011). [32] 1 September 1939, stanza 3, from Another Time (New York: Random House, 1940). On the modern image of Thucydides, see Morley, “The idea of Thucydides in the Western tradition,” in Christine Lee & Neville Morley, eds., Handbook to the Reception of Thucydides (Malden MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 591-604. [33] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Houghton Mifflin, 2017), xvi. [34] Allison, xvii [35] Allison, 141. [36] Allison, 133-153 [37] Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power (Yale University Press, 2017), 206-212. [38] Allison, 188-216 [39] Wright, 86 [40] Alison, 214-221 [41] Allison, 221-213 [42] Wright, 1-8 [43] Wright, 16-31 [44] Wright, 187-196 [45] Wright, 196-222 [46] Wright, 206-208 [47] Wright, 208-210 [48] Wright, 218-222. [49] See for example Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. Although this strategy has been challenged by some, the view that China posed a systemic threat has never prevailed in policy debates. See, for example, Robert Kagan, “What China Knows That We Don’t,” The Weekly Standard, January 20, 1997 http://carnegieendowment.org/1997/01/20/what-china-knows-that-we-don-t-case-for-new-strategy-of-containment-pub-266; Andrew F. Krepinevich, “China’s Finlandization Strategy in the Pacific,” Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2010, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704164904575421753851404076; and Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010).    [50] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2017; Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). [51] See for example T.G. Otte, July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War Summer 1914, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). [52]Wright, 158-161 [53] Wright, 209 [54] Wright, 154 [55] Wright, 157 [56] Allison, x [57] Allison, 235 [58] Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power, (London: Oxford University Press, 2013) ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => Contents [contents] => 1. Introduction, By Van Jackson 2. Two Differing Views on U.S.-China Conflict Find Common Ground in their Solutions, By Rosemary Foot 3. History Can't Always Help to Make Sense of the Future, By Neville Morley 4. A Long-Term Asia Strategy is Long Overdue, By Mira Rapp-Hooper 5. To Deter China, U.S. Policy-Makers Need to Show that America is Willing to Go to War, By Hugh White ) ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 129 [post_author] => 20 [post_date] => 2017-10-26 03:40:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-10-26 07:40:21 [post_content] => The great genius but also the Achilles’ heel of American diplomacy is an irrepressible “can do” optimism — a conviction that every problem has a solution, that no conflict is too wicked or too intractable to defy resolution. De Tocqueville observed that Americans “have all a lively faith in the perfectibility of man. ... They all consider society as a body in a state of improvement.”[1] That view has propelled America to great achievement in forging an era of peace and prosperity for nearly three-quarters of a century after World War II, ending wars and brokering peace among apparently implacable foes, and building institutions to tame economic cycles and interstate rivalries. Much of that optimism stems from our “eyes forward” approach to contemporary challenges, a conviction that the past is not prologue and that past performance is not indicative of future results. This optimism is rooted in our earliest experiences as a nation, a belief that the New World could and should forge a fresh approach to foreign policy, one not snared in the ancient quarrels of the Old World, but springing from an enlightened vision of harmonious relations among free peoples. It was an approach fitting for a nation whose very founding was an attempt to escape from the past. As Thomas Paine noted, “We have it in our power to begin the world over again.”[2]  The founders were not ignorant of history — they simply were determined not to be shackled by it. [quote id="3"] That inclination to put history behind us, to focus on present interests rather than past slights, has been and remains evident in the U.S. approach to East Asia. It was reflected in our willingness to enter into an alliance with Japan only a decade after it launched a surprise attack on our homeland; it could be seen in the decision to normalize relations with a Communist China which had fought us in Korea, because contemporary security and economic interests were more important than past grievances; and in the decision to reconcile with Vietnam, two decades after a bloody war came to a bitter end for the United States. But to our friends and interlocutors in East Asia, as T. S. Eliot observed, “Time present and time past Are both perhaps present in time future, And time future contained in time past.”[3] Their national narratives as well as their perspectives on self and others are deeply rooted in their historical experience. It is a history that in most cases — from China, Japan, and Korea to Thailand (Siam) and Cambodia (Khmer Empire) — is measured in centuries and even millennia. These images are powerful forces both constraining the choices available to policymakers and providing tools that policymakers can use to justify their actions and mobilize their publics. Scholars have long debated whether history influences policymakers’ perceptions and choices,[4] including whether and to what extent a historically based “strategic culture” shapes contemporary policy.[5] As Robert Jervis has written, “Previous international events provide the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can help him understand his world.”[6] Some go beyond the impact of history on individual decisionmakers to suggest that a historically based strategic culture” can shape national choices.[7]  Although there are skeptics (A.J.P.  Taylor observed “men use the past to prop up their own prejudices,”[8]), there seems to be little doubt that images of self and others drawn from the past heavily infuse the contemporary debate about the future of East Asian security. [quote id="1"] Nowhere is this more evident than in modern China. President Xi Jinping’s first evocation of the “China Dream” came in a speech pithily entitled “To Inherit From the Past and Use It for the Future, and Continuing What Has Passed in Beginning the Future: Continue to Forge Ahead Dauntlessly Towards the Goal of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People.”[9] Xi’s speeches frequently draw on historical images and experiences, contrasting the period of China’s greatness with the “Century of Humiliation” from the Opium War to the Nanjing massacre. Lessons are to be learned from both. What made China great — its military and economic strength and its distinctive culture — is to be put at the center of policy, while what made China vulnerable — weakness and the inability to resist foreign pressure — is to be avoided. At the center of this historic narrative is the danger posed by Japan. The “history issue” is not merely a scholarly debate but also informs China’s views of Japanese behavior today. China opposes Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s effort to make Japan a “normal” nation with the usual right to pursue individual and collective self-defense, because “history” shows that an unshackled Japan is inherently a threat to its neighbors and thus is not entitled to the same rights of sovereignty enjoyed by China and others. China refused to accept the Noda administration’s 2012 decision to “nationalize” the Senkaku Islands as an effort to insulate the islands from provocative actions of the far right, led by former Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara. Instead, China insisted it was proof of a more aggressive policy.[10] Nor are China’s leaders willing to let the historic lesson fade from the public mind; just three years ago, Xi led the first “national day of remembrance” for the Nanjing massacre — 77 years after the event.[11] At the speech, President Xi cautioned that “forgetting history is a betrayal.”[12] By contrast, from China’s perspective, its own breathtaking military modernization is not a threat to its neighbors (unlike Japan’s comparatively modest defense increases and operations) because “history” shows that when China was powerful in the past it did not threaten others but used its power to establish an era of peace and prosperity. Chinese officials’ resurrection of the story of Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng He over the past decade coincided with their effort to make the case that China’s growth would be a “peaceful rise.” Chinese officials regularly insist:
During the overall course of six voyages to the Western Ocean, Zheng He did not occupy a single piece of land, establish any fortress or seize any wealth from other countries.[13]
Former President Wen Jiabao cited this example to show that “Hegemonism is at odds with our cultural tradition.”[14] Of course, for Japan, history offers quite a different story. To Japan, the story of the “divine winds” — the typhoons that thwarted China’s attempt to subjugate Japan in 1274 and 1281 — is not simply a tale of Japanese heroic resistance but, perhaps more important, a caution about the risk to Japan of a powerful China.[15] For the Republic of Korea, too, history powerfully shapes contemporary policies and choices. Despite South Korea’s strong shared interest with Japan in addressing common threats, particularly those posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, cooperation is hamstrung by lingering Korean resentment of the Japanese colonial occupation and treatment of Korean “comfort women” during World War II. This grievance is apparent not only in popular sentiment but also in the actions of Korea’s leaders. It can be seen in the decision of then-President Park Geun-hye to join China in dedicating a statue to Ahn Jeung Geun, the Korean who killed Japan’s imperial governor in 1907,[16] and her participation in the World War II commemoration parade in Beijing in 2015. Other historical disputes continue to dog cooperation between the two would-be allies: a territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands[17] and even the name of the body of water between the two countries (“The Sea of Japan is established internationally as the only name” Japan’s chief cabinet secretary insisted when lodging a diplomatic protest against a South Korean video promoting the name “East Sea”).[18] Both Koreas in turn are cautious about too great a dependence on China — despite the strong economic pull exerted by Beijing — informed by a history of tensions between the two empires. The seemingly arcane dispute over whether the Goguryeo Empire was Korean or Chinese still inflames passions on both sides of the Yalu.[19] The contrast between American and East Asia worldviews was evident during the meeting between Xi and President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. In recounting the meeting, President Trump told The Wall Street Journal
[Xi] then went into the history of China and Korea. Not North Korea, Korea. And you know, you’re talking about thousands of years … and many wars. And Korea actually used to be a part of China. And after listening for 10 minutes I realized that not — it’s not so easy. [20]
It could be seen in President Trump’s suggestion during the U.S. presidential campaign that it might be a good thing for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons instead of relying on U.S. extended deterrence — a suggestion that sent shock waves through East Asia.[21] Ironically, the contemporary political identity of each of the key countries of North East Asia was forged through a dramatic leap to “escape history.” For China, the strategy of leaders as diverse as Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong was not to find solutions for China’s problems in its past but, rather, to denigrate the past and to look to other models to achieve security and prosperity. Sun looked to the West, while Mao found inspiration in the Soviet Union during the early years of the People’s Republic.[22] Similarly, Meiji Japan reacted to growing pressure from the West in the mid-19th century not by trying to strengthen the traditional approaches of the shogunate that had successfully resisted foreign invasion in the past but by dramatically embracing modernity and key aspects of Western institutions and strategy, borrowing heavily from Germany, which — under Bismarck — had thrown off its own feudal past to achieve independence, unification, and prosperity. This move to “escape the past” was replicated again after World War II; under the tutelage of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Japan adopted Western institutions and strategies as varied as labor unions and women’s suffrage.[23] More recently, South Korea — the 19th-century “Hermit Kingdom” — propelled itself to the front ranks of the global stage by following in Japan’s footsteps to embrace democracy and integration in the global economy. Why does history have such a hold on contemporary relations in East Asia? After all, in other regions and other times, historic enemies have reconciled in the face of compelling contemporary challenges. Think France and Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after World War II. [quote id="2"] Some might argue that the talk of history is mere rhetoric — that international relations theory would predict tensions between Japan and China in terms of the inevitable conflicts between a rising power and an established one. Others might point to domestic politics and the mobilization effect of using historic images to rally support for the governing parties based on patriotism and the need to unite against a foreign threat.[24] For many leaders in the region, bitter historic memories provide a convenient anchor (“useful adversaries” in Tom Christensen’s evocative characterization) for nationalist policies.[25] Such policies in history textbooks can indoctrinate future generations into stereotypes of others.[26] Undoubtedly, all these forces are at work. But there is reason to believe the structural tensions are exacerbated by the historic context.[27] As one scholar has observed:
the rivalry context may play a causal role in determining which arms race, power transition, etc., escalate to war.... That past conflicts condition current ones and future expectations, that leaders learn realpolitik lessons, and that peoples learn to hate each other all mean that theories of enduring rivalries are historical theories.[28]
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest the propensity for the diversionary use of force is more likely in the context of historic rivalries. “[L]eaders can capitalize on a hostile interstate environment where the relevant target public may be persuaded to consider alleged threats plausible”[29] — and the historic experience appears to establish the plausibility of the threat. Of course, the past is not necessarily prologue. At times, countries in the region have been able to overcome historic suspicions. Consider for example the decades of Sino-Japanese reconciliation that followed normalization in the 1970s, which featured little of the rhetoric of historic grievance. Similarly, Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia have improved dramatically despite the legacy of the East Asia Prosperity Sphere and the occupations of World War II. But during periods of change and uncertainty about the present and future intentions of key countries in the region, past behavior offers a convenient answer for political leaders and for publics to answer the inherent ambiguity of future actions. Thus, while one can argue about whether the perpetuation of historic grievances is cause or effect, their persistence contributes to the precarious situation in East Asia. And in the absence of concerted efforts by regional leaders to counteract this dynamic, the risk only grows of a vicious cycle leading to conflict. Fortunately, there have been a few hopeful signs. Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s statements in connection with the 70th anniversary of World War II, along with the decision (at least up to now) not to repeat the 2013 visit to the Yasakuni shrine, have helped bring about more measured Sino-Japanese relations.[30] Positive change can be seen in a joint ceremony in September 2017 to commemorate the 45th anniversary of Sino-Japanese relations — an event to mark the 40th anniversary in 2012 was cancelled after the Japanese purchase of the Senkakus[31] — and Abe attended a similar event in Tokyo.[32] With the election of a new president in South Korea, and the possibility of new mandates for Xi following the 19th Party Congress in October and for Abe in the upcoming Diet election, the key leaders will be well positioned to take steps to overcome the historical legacies (or, at a minimum, to avoid fanning the historical flames further). The challenges facing East Asia are severe enough without having to refight past wars. At the same time, the U.S. administration must recognize the ever-present shadow of the past as this country seeks to build a sustainable long-term policy toward the region. President Barack Obama’s visit to Hiroshima in 2016 demonstrated that it is possible to be cognizant of the past without being trapped by it. In recent years, calls have grown for a more systematic effort to overcome U.S. ahistoricism. The proposal by Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson for a White House Council of Historical Advisers reflects one such effort. But their suggestion focuses primarily on learning from historical analogy, proposing that
the charter for the future Council of Historical Advisers begin with Thucydides’s observation that “the events of future history … will be of the same nature—or nearly so—as the history of the past, so long as men are men.”
But the problems of history in East Asia are of a different kind. The tensions between China and Japan, or between Korea and Japan, are not “of the same nature” as rivalries in other contexts; rather, they are specific to the history of these nations and these peoples. What is needed are policymakers who understand “deep” history, or “the ways in which policymakers underst[and] the historical context from which the current conflict arose.”[33] In this respect, the current disdain for the value of long-serving career officers in the Foreign Service, with deep grounding in the languages, culture, and history of key countries and regions, poses a serious risk to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, the Trump administration’s proposal to eliminate U.S. government funding for the Fulbright Hays regional studies program under Title VI of the Higher Education Act is deeply shortsighted.[34] One dinner with Xi Jinping is not enough to compensate for the loss of generations’ worth of insight if the United States is to navigate the perils of East Asia in the 21st century.   James B. Steinberg is University Professor of Social Science, International Affairs, and Law at Syracuse University, where he was dean of the Maxwell School from July 2011 until June 2016. Prior to becoming dean, he served as deputy secretary of state (2009 to 2011). From 2005 to 2008, he was dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. From 2001 to 2005, Steinberg was vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.  Steinberg served in a number of senior positions under President Bill Clinton, including deputy national security advisor and director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Steinberg’s most recent books are A Glass Half Full: Rebalance, Reassurance and Resolve in the US-China Relationship and Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the 21st Century, both with Michael O’Hanlon. Steinberg has an A.B from Harvard University (1973) and a J.D. from Yale Law School (1978). ISSN (Print): 2576-1021 ISSN(Online): 2576-1153 Image: Wikimedia Commons [post_title] => Too Much History: American Policy and East Asia in the Shadow of the Past [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => much-history-american-policy-east-asia-shadow-past [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-03-22 13:05:41 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-03-22 17:05:41 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?p=129 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => East Asian countries have a tendency to recall their historical grievances with rival nations, thus increasing the risk of eventual conflict. American policy toward East Asia, on the other hand, tends to have too short of a memory. [pubinfo] => [issue] => Vol 1, Issue 1 [quotes] => Array ( [0] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => China’s leaders [are not] willing to let the historic lesson fade from the public mind. ) [1] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => The “history issue” is not merely a scholarly debate but also informs China’s views of Japanese behavior today. ) [2] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => That inclination to put history behind us, to focus on present interests rather than past slights, has been and remains evident in the U.S. approach to East Asia. ) ) [style] => strategist [type] => Strategist [style_label] => The Strategist [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => 460 ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 20 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Saunders and Otley, 1835). [2] Thomas Paine, Common Sense, Appendix to the Third Edition (Philadelphia: W. and T. Bradford, 1776). [3] T.S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton,” Four Quartets (London: Faber and Faber, 1936). [4] See, for example, Robert Jervis, “How Decisonmakers Learn From History” in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). [5]In a seminal piece, Jack Snyder defined strategic culture as “the sum total of ideas, conditioned responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or initiation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.” Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica CA: RAND 1977). The concept has since evolved to embrace approaches to national security more broadly. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013). [6] Robert Jervis, “How Decisonmakers Learn From History” in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). [7] For a discussion of strategic culture and its applicability to China’s grand strategy, see Alaistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). On the impact of strategic culture on U.S.-China relations, see James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 38-40. [8] Jervis, “How Decisionmakers Learn From History,” 217. [9] It is noteworthy that Xi’s initial articulation of the China Dream was a speech at an exhibition called “The Road to Revival,” dedicated to the history of China’s victimization from the Opium Wars through World War II by the West. See Camilla T.N. Sorensen, “The Significance of Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ for Chinese Foreign Policy: From ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui’ to Fen Fa You Wei,’” Journal of China and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2015), https://journals.aau.dk/index.php/jcir/article/viewFile/1146/967. See also Benjamin Carlson, “The World According to Xi Jinping,” The Atlantic, September 21, 2015,  https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/xi-jinping-china-book-chinese-dream/406387/. [10] One writer has suggested that China’s anger over the decision was exacerbated by the fact that it came during a period when China typically commemorates the Japanese aggressions of the 1930s and 1940s. See Scott Cheney-Peters, “How Japan’s Nationalization Move in the East China Sea Shaped the U.S. Rebalance,” The National Interest, October 26, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-japans-nationalization-move-the-east-china-sea-shaped-11549. [11] Agence France-Presse, “China Holds First Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day,” The Telegraph, December 13, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11291820/China-holds-first-Nanjing-Massacre-memorial-day.html. [12] Ben Blanchard, “Set Aside Hate, China’s Xi Says on Nanjing Massacre Anniversary,” Reuters, December 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan/set-aside-hate-chinas-xi-says-on-nanjing-massacre-anniversary-idUSKBN0JR03F20141213. [13] See Steinberg and O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve, 39-40. Many commentators have questioned the accuracy of the official Chinese version of Zhang He’s voyages. For the exposition of China’s peaceful rise, see Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, September-October 2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-great-power-status. [14] Denny Roy, Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 28-29. [15] During the Mongol dynasty, Emperor Kublai Khan mounted two attempts to conquer Japan. On both occasions the effort was thwarted by typhoons (“kamikaze” or “divine wind”) that severely damaged the Mongol fleet and saved Japan from invasion. [16] Emily Rauhala, “Why a Korean-Chinese Statue Is Upsetting Japan,” Time, November 25, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/11/25/why-a-korean-chinese-statue-is-upsetting-japan/; Steven Denney and Christopher Green, “National Identity and Historical Legacy: Ahn Jung-geun in the Grand Narrative,” SinoNK, June 2014, http://sinonk.com/2014/06/06/national-identity-and-historical-legacy-ahn-jung-geun-in-the-grand-narrative/ [17] Japan claims that it established sovereignty over the islands in the 17th century. See “Japanese Territory: Takeshima,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed September 2017, mofa.go.jp. Korea argues that Japan has long acknowledged Korea’s sovereignty; “Not only has the East Sea designation been in continuous use for over 2,000 years, it is also inappropriate to name a sea after a single country.” “Dokdo and the East Sea,” Korea.net, accessed September 2017,  http://www.korea.net/Government/Current-Affairs/National-Affairs?affairId=83. [18] See “South Korea Video Renaming Sea of Japan Fuels Tension,” Japan Times, Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/22/national/politics-diplomacy/south-korea-video-renaming-sea-japan-fuels-tension/. Tellingly, the video was titled “East Sea: The Name From the Past, of the Present and for the Future,” claiming that the body had been named the East Sea for 2,000 years. [19] Taylor Washburn, “How an Ancient Kingdom Explains Today's China-Korea Relations” The Atlantic, April 15, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-an-ancient-kingdom-explains-todays-china-korea-relations/274986/. [20] “WSJ Trump Interview Excerpts: China, North Korea, Ex-Im Bank, Obamacare, Bannon, More,” The Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2017/04/12/wsj-trump-interview-excerpts-china-north-korea-ex-im-bank-obamacare-bannon/. [21] “Now wouldn’t you rather in a certain sense have Japan have nuclear weapons when North Korea has nuclear weapons” Donald Trump, Town Hall, moderated by Anderson Cooper, CNN, March 29, 2016. See also “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on his Foreign Policy Views,” The New York Times, March 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?_r=0; Austin Ramzy, “Comments by Donald Trump Draw Fears of an Arms Race in Asia,” The New York Times, March 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/asia/donald-trump-arms-race.html. [22] Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2012). [23] Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of the most prominent essayists of the Meiji era, summed it up simply: “In Japan’s present condition, there is nothing in which we may take pride vis-à-vis the West. All that Japan has to be proud of is its scenery.”  (quoted in James L. McLain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 2002)). On the influence of the Prussia experience on Meiji state building, see McLain, Japan: A Modern History, pp 191-197.  For an account of the “McArthur constitution” which re-established Japan’s political institutions along U.S. and Western parliamentary lines, see McLain, Japan: A Modern History, pp 537-550. [24] There is extensive literature on the “diversionary” effect in international relations. [25] Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). [26] The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center conducted an intensive three-year project examining the role of history textbooks in the formation of historical memory about World War II in East Asia. The results were published in 2011. See Gi-wook Shin and Daniel C. Schneider, eds., History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (New York: Routledge, 2011). Interestingly, the study found that Japanese textbooks “do not highlight patriotism, revisionism or nationalism,” in contrast to the more “passionate” accounts in Korea and China, where nation building and national-identity formation are more central. See Yves Russel’s review of the book in China Perspectives 2 (2014), 79-81, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/6494. [27] Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 14; Sara McLaughlin and Brandon Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Use of Force,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 937-61. [28]  Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 213. [29] Andrew J. Enterline and Kristian S. Gleditsch, “Threats, Opportunity, and Force: Repression and Diversion of Domestic Pressure, 1948-1982,” International Interactions 26, no. 1. 28 (2000). [30] Tomohiro Osaki, “Abe and His Cabinet Steer Clear of War-Linked Yasakuni Shrine on Anniversary of World War II Surrender,” Japan Times, August 15, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/15/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-cabinet-steer-clear-war-linked-yasukuni-shrine-anniversary-world-war-ii-surrender/. [31] “Five Years After Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands,” Japan Times, September 11, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/09/11/editorials/five-years-nationalization-senkaku-islands/. [32] Charlotte Gao, “Abe Makes a Surprise Appearance, Hails 45 years of Japan-China Relations,” The Diplomat, September 29, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/abe-makes-a-surprise-appearance-hails-45-years-of-japan-china-relations/. [33] James B. Steinberg, “History, Policymaking and the Balkans: Lessons Imported and Lessons Learned,” in Hal Brands and Jeremy Suri, eds. The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016): 238. As I note in the chapter, this is similar to what Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May called “issue history”; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1988). [34]  Thomas P. Pepinsky, “The Federal Budget’s Threat to Foreign Policy,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 16, 2017, http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Federal-Budget-s-Threat/239796. See also Nathan J. Brown, “In Defense of Area Studies,” The Washington Post, October 30, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/30/in-defense-of-u-s-funding-for-area-studies/. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => [contents] => ) ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 284 [post_author] => 102 [post_date] => 2017-10-25 03:45:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-10-25 07:45:32 [post_content] => Robin Collingwood, a British historian and philosopher, saw history as a reservoir of knowledge gained through instructive re-enactment. Consider Julius Caesar’s decision to “cross the Rubicon” with his army and challenge his Roman Republic. To understand Caesar’s choice, “This implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it.” The work of the historian in this case is not mere reproduction or description. To offer insight, “this re-enactment is only accomplished … so far as the historian brings to bear on the problem all the powers of his own mind and all his knowledge of philosophy and politics.” Such critical analysis “is not something secondary to tracing the history of it. It is an indispensable condition of the historical knowledge itself.”[1] This essay offers a micro-historical reconstruction of a fateful choice made by the United States. Satisfactory reconstructions of this kind are rare. When it comes to historical episodes of import, even those that have been extensively written about and researched, it is often difficult to identify when the critical choices actually occurred. It is even more difficult to reconstruct, with a policymaker’s eye, the information available at the time, the institutional context and the plausibly available alternative courses of action. This essay analyzes the U.S. decision to take the Philippines. It was fateful. Since the decision was followed by an ugly war, it seemed even at the time to symbolize a loss of American innocence, or worse, in the country’s dealings with the world. By 1934, when the Philippines seemed to be a strategic millstone and the United States chose a path to full independence for the islands, the majority Democrats in Congress led the way, eager to gain American “freedom from the colony.”[2] But before America could gain this “freedom,” the American presence in the Philippines became a great pivot point of world history. In 1940 and 1941, Japanese naval planners concluded that any move through the South China Sea into the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and British Malaya had to include an attack on American bases in the Philippines. To the Japanese, this conclusion meant that, if they moved south, war with America was unavoidable. They then developed a war plan that included an opening attack on Pearl Harbor as well as the Philippines.[3] After World War II, the American presence across the Pacific was vastly enlarged in every way. During and after the Vietnam War, historians again looked back at the 1898-99 decision to take the Philippines. They viewed it as a sort of original sin, one that now seemed to have foreshadowed all the other sins to come. As in the story of how America stepped across the Pacific, the grand strategies in U.S. international history usually have had a traumatic birth. Grand strategies do not typically arise from visionary thinking about the future. They arise instead from the collective experience of some great disturbance, looking backward at some catalytic episode that practically everyone remembers. As people try to make sense of what has just happened, they construct quick and understandable rival narratives to explain that past, the present and maybe the future. The shorthand narratives become entrenched, decaying into shibboleths — until the next trauma displaces them. Meanwhile, historians can slowly try to reconstruct what really did happen in the first place. Yet the rewards of micro-historical reconstruction of fateful choices can be great. The episodes are usually ones that people, including most historians, think they already understand. But in my experience the more one digs, the stranger the stories get. That is, the fateful choices become more lifelike, more interesting and more truly educational. The Philippines decision was made, principally, by President William McKinley. For generations, McKinley himself and the way he made this decision have seemed like an opaque blur. Some historians see McKinley as a dupe of clever would-be imperialists such as the young Theodore Roosevelt and his influential friend Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge. Or they see him as driftwood pushed about by domestic politics or by great cultural or economic currents, like an American search for new markets in places like China. Or they regard him as a kind of pious nincompoop who, as one standard work puts it, permitted “missionary and business expansionists to persuade him of what he may already have believed.”[4] There is a quote, supposedly from McKinley, that is the perfect caricature. It has McKinley describing how he “went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance” until he saw
that there was nothing left to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men, for whom Christ also died.
For generation on generation this quotation has been repeated in innumerable accounts, including standard history textbooks. It is catnip for a teacher, a vivid quote to spark up a lecture. Even though the source of the quote, repeating years later what he thought McKinley had said, has long been suspect, that should hardly get in the way.[5] In the Philippines case, part of the cartoon is the image of President McKinley himself. There is that dreamy missionary zeal. There is also the view, as another standard work put it, that McKinley “simply lacked ideas …. as usual, he was bereft of ideas.”[6] Even those historians who are more sympathetic to McKinley, either seeing him as a hidden mastermind or agreeing that he seems to have had little choice, have not adequately understood his decision-making process in this case. As this article will show, McKinley made, in fact, five distinct sets of choices. In each he went through a fairly involved set of consultations, gathering information and weighing alternative courses of action. [quote id="1"] In his first major public address after his decision, in Boston on February 17, 1899, before a huge crowd gathered in a large hall, McKinley’s tone was somber. He gave the crowd not one whit of self-congratulation. “I do not know why in the year 1899 this republic has unexpectedly had placed before it mighty problems which it must face and meet,” McKinley announced. “They have come and are here and they could not be kept away.” It was the just-concluded war with Spain. “Many who were impatient for the conflict a year ago,” McKinley went on, “apparently heedless of its larger results, are the first to cry out against the far-reaching consequences of their own act.” Here he was referring to the opposition Democrats and Populists — then a third party with a strong following in the rural Midwest and South. In early 1898 the Democrats and Populists, along with many members of his own Republican Party, had joined the clamor for war with Spain. Then, clearly referring to himself and his conservative Republican allies who had been less interested in war or expansion, McKinley reminded his audience, “Those who dreaded war most and whose every effort was directed to prevent it, had fears of new and grave problems that might follow its inauguration.” McKinley did not offer his audience much optimism. He did not borrow so much as a word from the political or economic arguments that the expansionist jingoes had been making to defend the taking of the Philippines. Instead, his message was that “Grave problems come in the life of a nation” and that “the generation on which they are forced cannot avoid the responsibility of honestly striving for their solution.”[7] It remains then to better understand just how these “grave problems,” seemingly so unavoidable, had actually arisen.  Why, in a war to end years of bloody fighting and devastation in nearby Cuba, did the United States end up becoming the ruler of the faraway Philippine Islands? True, the Filipinos, like the nearby Cubans, had also rebelled against Spanish rule. But hardly anyone in the United States had noticed or cared. Also, the Philippines were really far away. They were a month’s journey by steamship from California. They were a vast chain of thousands of islands. Their population was large, about 10 percent of the population of the entire United States (about 7.5 million at a time when there were 75 million in the United States). Moreover, the United States had no colonial service. Its regular Army was tiny, about 28,000 strong. So, simply on these bare facts, an American conquest of the Philippines would seem absurdly impractical. How and why then did the United States of America take such a fateful step across the Pacific?

Dewey to Manila, April to May 1898

If there was a war with Spain, everyone knew the issue would be Cuba. Since the 1820s, Spain’s only remaining colonies in the Western Hemisphere were Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Cubans had rebelled and fought a “10 years war” from 1868 to 1878. War broke out again in 1895. Years of violence across the island had become a bloody stalemate. Neither side could defeat the other. Spain would not grant independence. The Cubans would not settle for anything less. It was obvious to Americans at the time that the United States might get pulled in. There was no mystery there. Any administration from that day to this, confronted with such awful conditions in that enormous neighboring island, would be arguing about whether or how to try to stop it. And back then Cuba was much more important to America than it is today. Many Americans had direct interests of every kind on both sides. The Cuban rebellion was headquartered in New York City. Many of the rebel leaders were American citizens. They called loudly for American intervention to stop the suffering. In 1898, the opposition Democrats and Populists were united in favor of intervention in Cuba. It is easy to see why. Flip through the pages of the Congressional Record of the time. The volume might fall open to remarks such as these, from a Kansas congressman, a Populist, that the past two years have been “years of blood and carnage; two years of nameless atrocities practiced upon the innocent and helpless portion of the Cuban population; two years of waiting and vacillation on the part of our Government; two years of our quiet consent to these butcheries.” The congressman suspected that McKinley stood by because he and other conservatives were “under the powerful influence of bond syndicates” that had loaned money to Spain and were “being controlled more by commercial considerations than by the interests of humanity and the cause of freedom.”[8] While the Democrats called for war, the majority Republicans were split. Conservative Republicans tended to see the war fever as a press-fueled distraction from more important matters. They thought a war might be bad for business. President McKinley had little desire for war and little interest in expanding America’s domain. His most trusted advisers felt the same way.[9] McKinley was a private man of relatively modest personal means. He was devoted to his wife, an invalid whose health had broken after the death of their child. He was the last American president whose demeanor and values would now be called Victorian. He was soberly dressed, very concerned for the proprieties of public appearance and behavior, religious, dignified, and virtuous. Outsiders often misjudged McKinley. Careful, gentle and conscientious in his personal manner, he was often assumed to be dull and weak. He was neither. McKinley probably had more personal experience as a front-line combat soldier than any American president in history except for George Washington. The last veteran of the Civil War to serve as president, he had experienced that war from start to finish. He had enlisted as a private in a regiment from his native Ohio. He had been promoted after a display of personal heroism on the terrible battlefield of Antietam, driving a supply wagon forward to beleaguered front-line troops under heavy enemy fire, an episode that stayed in the memories of all who witnessed it. Much of his fighting was as a cavalryman in the campaigns of the Shenandoah Valley, ending the war with the rank of major. One old comrade from the war wrote to McKinley after he was elected president, confessing that, “I knew you as a soldier, as a congressman, as a governor, and now as president-elect. How shall I address you?” “Call me Major,” McKinley replied. “I earned that. I am not so sure of the rest.”[10] Returning after the war to his native Ohio, the major became a lawyer, gaining renown for defending striking miners. As a Republican politician, he was mentored by some of Ohio’s most famous officeholders, including Presidents Rutherford B. Hayes and James Garfield, men who had known McKinley during the war. McKinley’s father had been an ironworker and McKinley’s politics were the politics of economic growth and tariff protection of American business. McKinley held his seat in Congress in a battleground district of a battleground state. In the tightly matched politics of the 1880s and 1890s, Ohio was usually the crucial swing state (along with New York and Indiana). McKinley held on because he could reach some Democratic and independent voters. He was known as an honest man. His political style was not fiery or inspiring; it was amiable and deliberate. One of the great journalists of his generation, William Allen White, recalled an interview with President McKinley. He went to the president’s modest home in Canton, Ohio. By then a heavy man but “never paunchy,” McKinley was clean-shaven and immaculately dressed. He laid his cigar aside so it would not show in a picture. “We must not let the young men of this country see their President smoking!” “I was sweating,” White recalled, “for it was a hot day. He was stainless, spotless, apparently inwardly cool and outwardly unruffled. I thought then, and I think now, that he sensed what I was seeking and guarded it from me, maybe consciously.” White recalls that “his mistrust was sweet and friendly and was revealed only by the guarded complacence in what he said. He refused to tousle his hair politically. He was the statue in the park speaking.”[11] That was the McKinley outsiders saw. His path to the presidency had not been easy. The nomination fight inside the Republican Party had been the hardest part. To win, McKinley had taken on his party’s leading political bosses. Through a political adviser, businessman Mark Hanna, McKinley had been offered a deal. If he promised to make one of the bosses the secretary of the Treasury, the boss would help clear the way for McKinley to get the nomination. One of those present remembered that, hearing this offer, “McKinley’s face grew serious — in fact, hard.” He remained silent for a while and then said, “Mark, some things come too high. If I were to accept the nomination on those terms, the place would be worth nothing to me and less to the people. If those are the terms, I am out of it.” McKinley and his allies had gone on to win the party nomination by beating the party bosses. They had outfought them with an extraordinarily well-organized grass-roots effort among the state party conventions.[12] McKinley came to the presidency hoping to concentrate on domestic matters, working closely with Congress. Most congressmen liked him. One frequent opponent (Sen. George Hoar of Massachusetts) acknowledged that McKinley’s “great wisdom and tact and his delightful individual quality” gave him unusual influence.[13] The waspish Henry Adams, a longtime White House watcher from his perch on the other side of Lafayette Park, usually reflected the “smart” Washington view that McKinley was little more than an amiable figurehead. Adams got some advice from his longtime friend John Hay, who had been an aide to Lincoln and was then in London as McKinley’s ambassador to Britain. Hay warned Adams.
[D]on’t you go to making mistakes about McKinley! He is no tenderfoot — he has a habit of getting there. Many among the noble and the pure have had occasion to change their minds about him.[14]
Taking office in 1897, McKinley had chosen a Cabinet with carefully balanced political interests. McKinley soon came to regret some of these choices. At the State Department, McKinley had already been working around his senile secretary, John Sherman. He replaced Sherman as soon as the war with Spain began in April 1898. For McKinley, getting his War Department ready for war was a hard problem. His secretary of war, Russell Alger, was a former governor of Michigan. The War Department’s deputy head (then called the “adjutant-general”) was a general named Henry Corbin. The U.S. Army then had only 28,000 regulars, scattered around the country in 78 posts; the largest had a garrison of fewer than 850. The Army had leveled off at this strength since the mid-1870s. It was about one-twentieth the size of the German army and a good deal smaller even than the army of Mexico. It was not “that there was opposition to a proper military establishment,” Corbin recalled later, “but rather that the people as a whole were indifferent about it, fascinated, as they were, with the wonderful growth and development of the country then going on.” Corbin had seen combat both in the Civil War and later skirmishes against Indian tribes. Where he could, he had arranged peace with Indians. He would have preferred peace with Spain. With the Civil War 33 years in the past, Corbin thought most Americans had forgotten what real war was like. “Only the poetry and fiction of war existed; the actual hardships and privations of war our young men knew nothing about.”[15] [quote id="2"] Fortunately for McKinley, the first actions in any war with Spain would fall to the Navy. The Navy would be ready. It had been developing plans for a possible war with Spain for years, after the Cubans began their latest revolt. Naturally its plans mainly focused on operations in the Caribbean. Also fortunate for McKinley was that Secretary of the Navy John D. Long was the president’s close friend. Raised in Maine, Long had made a legal and political career in Massachusetts. An occasional poet and playwright, Long had a gracious style that made him a popular speaker of the Massachusetts House, then governor, then member of Congress. It was in the House of Representatives during the 1880s that Long and then-Rep. McKinley became friends. Long’s deputy at the Navy Department was a young up-and-comer from New York, Theodore Roosevelt. A prolific writer, Roosevelt had written a good history of the naval War of 1812 and was devoted to naval readiness. McKinley and Long knew that Roosevelt was an outspoken expansionist. They had appointed him as a concession to the lobbying efforts of Roosevelt’s similarly inclined friend, Massachusetts Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge. Long, who was nearly 60, enjoyed Roosevelt, who was about to turn 40. Long regarded his deputy about the way a parent might regard an exceptionally precocious but somewhat wild teenager. To his diary, Long appraised Roosevelt as a man “so enthusiastic and loyal that he is in certain respects invaluable; yet I lack confidence in his good judgment and discretion. [Roosevelt] goes off very impulsively …. He has been of great use; a man of unbounded energy and force, and thoroughly honest — which is the main thing. … His forte is his push. He lacks the serenity of discussion.”[16] As the Navy planned for a war in the Caribbean, one of the lesser planning problems among its officers was: In a war with Spain, what should be done with the Navy’s Asiatic squadron? Since the 1830s the U.S. Navy had maintained a few warships in Pacific waters to protect American merchantmen from pirates and show the flag. The ships usually called at ports in China and Japan, and occasionally in Korea. In the Navy’s first plans, the Asiatic squadron would go after Spain’s ships and its Pacific base in the Philippines, in Manila Bay. That way the squadron could eliminate the Spanish threat to America’s Pacific commerce. Also, any gains in Manila might then become bargaining leverage for peace talks. This sort of logic was familiar to any student of the only recent transoceanic naval wars anyone could study, the wars of the rival empires long ago during the age of sail. Some naval officers had another idea for the Asiatic squadron: Send it all the way to the Atlantic Ocean to attack Spain’s Canary Islands, near the Spanish coast. But this idea seemed too risky and impractical.[17] Long relied on the career officials running the Navy bureaus. A special planning board had junked the Canary Islands attack idea by the summer of 1897. It went back to the Manila Bay objective, which would attack the nearby enemy and might give the Americans “a controlling voice, as to what should become of the islands, when the final settlement was made.”[18] Why do anything with the Asiatic squadron at all? Why not just let them keep sailing around doing what they usually did? There were two problems, which can be summarized in shorthand as coal and neutrality. This was an age in which the steamships ran on hundreds of tons of coal, which had to be regularly resupplied from a place where thousands of tons of coal could be stored and transferred into ship bunkers. Coal was not the only reason for a base or friendly port. The ships also needed access to repair facilities as well as occasional supplies of food and water. But coal was the most complex problem, in part because it was so difficult to store and transfer large amounts of coal at sea and to transfer it between ships. In East Asia, the United States “had no docking or coaling facilities for its handful of vessels and was completely dependent upon the British and the Japanese for these services.”[19] If war broke out with Spain, the U.S. squadron on the East Asian coast could sail the 700 miles from Hong Kong to Manila in less than a week, with all the coal its ships could carry. But unless the ships could secure a new base, they would have to sail around for a few weeks until the coal and other supplies ran low and then go off to some place where they could put thousands of tons of coal back in their fuel bunkers.  The closest American coaling station was in Hawaii, established by agreement with the Hawaiians in 1887. Then there were the problems of neutral rights. If there was a war with Spain all the usual ports of call for America’s Asiatic squadron — Hong Kong, Singapore and Nagasaki — would be in neutral countries such as Britain and Japan. Under the prevailing understanding of neutral rights, rights the United States had loudly insisted upon during its civil war, a neutral country could not host and supply ships of a power that was at war. If the ships of the belligerent power did not leave, the neutral power would have to intern them and their sailors. That meant that the neutral power would impound the ships and hold the sailors until they could be returned home in some neutral way. In short, the Asiatic squadron would not be able to stay where it was, based in Hong Kong. The squadron would have to leave. Where could it go after sailing around for a while? The only possible places would be to the nearest American coaling station, which was thousands of miles away in Hawaii, or go all the way home to the nearest U.S. naval base, in California. If that happened the Asiatic squadron might play no useful part in the war at all. Worse, the squadron’s withdrawal thousands of miles away would then open up the Asiatic shipping lanes to a potential Spanish attack on American merchantmen, since the Spanish did have an Asiatic base, in Manila Bay. The only other choice was for the squadron to attack Manila Bay. There it could try to blockade the Spanish for a few weeks, until the American squadron ran short on coal and had to run home. Or, more risky, the squadron could attack the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay and try to seize it to turn it into an American base. There was then little geopolitics or grand strategy in the paragraph of the Navy plan that dealt with the Asiatic squadron. There was a more banal question: What are we going to do with the Asiatic squadron during a war with Spain? Something had to be found for the ships to do. They could not just hang out in East Asia because of the neutrality problem in the region’s ports of call. So, unless they had an object, the handful of warships would have to spend a month sailing home and effectively sit out the war. If the Navy did not want to bring the ships the long way home, it had to find something for them to do in the Atlantic, like the Canary Islands scheme, or else send them to attack Manila. Of those two options, Manila was judged to be more practical, if risky. That risky option was therefore what the Navy expected the Asiatic squadron to do. It was led by Commodore George Dewey, a 60 year-old Vermonter who had been in the Navy since he arrived at the Naval Academy at age 17. He had last seen combat in the Civil War. But he had wanted this sea duty and he had an aggressive spirit. That was the spirit needed for this mission, which had a bit of a “win or die” atmosphere about it. If something went badly wrong with his attack, he would be thousands of miles away from any U.S. base to which he could retreat. [quote id="7"] When war came, the main U.S. naval forces were concentrated in the Caribbean and the Atlantic to be ready around Cuba. The five remaining battleships were assigned to the Caribbean and Atlantic. So were most of the modern cruisers. Of the 15 modern (armored or protected) cruisers in the Navy, Dewey’s squadron had only four. In principle, Dewey’s squadron could still outgun the Spanish ships in Manila Bay. But Dewey’s ships had to run through the entrance to the bay, which could easily be covered by shore batteries and mined. Then, even if they ran that gauntlet, Dewey’s ships would have to pummel the Spanish vessels that might be supported by shore batteries. The Spanish understood all of this. They too had expected and planned for possible war with the United States. They had developed the right kind of defensive plans for Manila Bay. But the Spanish had not implemented those plans. They had not installed enough of the needed artillery, observation posts or mines. An intrepid American consul in Manila observed the Spanish preparations and kept Dewey informed, escaping Manila to join Dewey just as the war began.[20] After a mysterious explosion sank the U.S. battleship Maine, then visiting Havana harbor, on February 15, 1898, preparations for a war with Spain quickened. Dewey had been told to gather his squadron in Hong Kong and prepare. There is an often-repeated story about how Roosevelt and Lodge schemed to send orders to Dewey to attack the Philippines on a day in February while Long was out of the office. The story is a myth that Lodge embellished in a later memoir. In fact, the orders that went out when Long was out that day had followed up on prior plans. Long reviewed them on his return to the office.[21] Relations were broken and war began on April 21. That day Long walked over to see President McKinley. It was a short walk. Back then the White House had no West Wing. Long would have strolled on a short path by some gardens between the State, War and Navy Building over to the door to the executive mansion. He was used to this. He would sometimes go over at night, dropping in on his friend to join a family dinner or while the president was reading the paper in the evening. The Navy Department, the State Department and the War Department were housed in the new ornate building completed in 1888, just west of the White House. Called the State, War and Navy Building until after World War II, this is now the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (and has been taken over by staff in the Executive Office of the President). Before walking to the executive mansion Long had discussed the first set of war orders with his Naval War Board. Then he and McKinley strolled for an hour that afternoon through the streets of Washington. The months leading to war had taken a toll on McKinley. He seemed visibly careworn and losing sleep. Long noted to his diary that the president “opens his heart to me, with reference to the struggle through which he has been and the anxiety it has involved.” Probably during this walk, Long explained that the Navy’s long-standing plans were to send Dewey on to Manila to attack the Spanish forces there. McKinley took this in. But he “preferred to consider the matter a little longer.” A couple of days later, there was still no approval from McKinley. There is no evidence about why he hesitated. Then news arrived from Dewey. As expected, the British governor in Hong Kong had just communicated the order: Dewey and his warships must leave their neutral harbor immediately. Neutral harbors in China and Japan were also expected to be unavailable, except as way stations home to America. On Sunday, April 24, Long went back to the White House and reviewed the situation with the president. Now the matter was urgent. What else could Dewey do but go on to Manila Bay, as planned? Long’s staff had drafted the order. The president finally approved it.[22] It took about a week for the Asiatic squadron to reach Manila Bay. On May 1, Dewey’s ships fought their battle. During the night, the Americans slipped into the bay without interference. The Spanish warships were engaged. All were sunk or disabled. Not one American life was lost. What a victory! From top to bottom the country was relieved and electrified by the news. Now what? What could Dewey’s squadron do next? The Navy had not planned for this. The Spanish garrison in Manila remained intact. It did not surrender. Dewey could put some Marines ashore at the Cavite Navy Yard, about eight miles from Manila. He could hang around for a while, patrolling the bay and maintaining a blockade. But he could not remain for months unless he could secure control of the port and its facilities. Dewey could not capture Manila. After hanging around in Manila Bay for a couple of weeks, Dewey cabled home that even if the Spanish surrendered he could not hold Manila without getting some troops. He estimated the Spanish troop strength at about 10,000 men. There were numerous Filipino rebels hemming in the Spanish by land, “although they are inactive and making no demonstrations.” Dewey asked for a “well equipped force of 5000 men.”[23] McKinley had anticipated this request. He had decided to send out an expedition to hold Manila, which Dewey’s victory had not quite placed in U.S. hands. A few months later McKinley would smilingly tell a friend, “If old Dewey had just sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would have saved us.” But recounting the matter later in 1898 to a more knowledgeable group, McKinley was less airy. The problem, McKinley explained, was that the battle had
taken place at Manilla and not on the high seas[.] Manilla became a question from which we could not escape. Dewey had to go there to find the Spanish fleet. … [A]nd having destroyed their fleet Dewey found [Manila] to be the safest and indeed the only harbor open to him as by laws of neutrality he was excluded from all other countries[’] ports.[24]
Once the post-battle situation became clear, an expedition was put together to secure American occupation of the port. The Army had no plan whatsoever for the Philippines. It began looking frantically for regiments and officers that could go help hold on at least in Manila until there was a peace conference. The Army made its estimates of how many troops were needed to be sure of defeating a Spanish force of about 10,000 troops. The Army and Navy agreed to send some 15,000 to 20,000 troops, including many of the new volunteers enlisted for the war, to have enough soldiers to outnumber the Spanish. The Army’s commanding general, Nelson Miles, clarified the expedition commander’s mission. His orders told the commander, Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, that this was not some force “expected to carry on a war to conquer an extensive territory.” The expedition was only to establish “a strong garrison to command the harbor of Manila” and to relieve the burden on Dewey’s sailors and Marines.[25] The expedition went out in three waves as the Navy scrounged ships to carry and escort them.[26] The first group sailed at the end of May and arrived in Manila Bay on July 4. The remaining troops, including Maj. Gen. Merritt, arrived later in July. Waiting for the expedition week after week, Dewey’s situation was uneasy. Word spread that the Spanish were sending a naval force out to recapture Manila and that the force would include battleships that could outgun anything in Dewey’s force. Dewey’s ships might have to retreat. If American soldiers arrived, they might have to fade into the hills.[27] Meanwhile, warships from Germany, Britain, France and Japan arrived in Manila Bay. All these countries already had nearby bases in East Asia. These four squadrons waited watchfully, like carrion birds circling in the sky over a fallen animal. The German force alone was significantly more powerful than Dewey’s squadron and, as I discuss below, it was Germany that had the most ambitious designs for the Philippines. The potential longer-term significance of American occupation of this port began to dawn on both the McKinley administration and the American public. In the United States, the news of Dewey’s victory had set off a whirl of speculation. Some wondered whether the United States should even try to take the islands as a possession. All sorts of pressures in the United States were building about the future of the Philippines. For decades Americans had been arguing about how to assert themselves in the world. The American population was one of the largest in the world, and the U.S. economy was already the world’s largest. But no one was quite sure what being a world power meant. The 1890s had been a decade of great contrasts of old ways and new machines, as well as all sorts of domestic scars and divisions — old wounds of North and South plus new wounds from battles between labor and management in all the new industries. Amid this division, perhaps because of it, shows of patriotism, parades and flag-waving were so common and exuberant as to almost seem neurotic, as if a frantic outward display of pride and union was the constant, soothing balm applied to ease so much inward pain and striving. [quote id="3"] Some leading Americans had looked for ways the country could show off, could test its strength. But against whom? For what? [28] Meanwhile, for nearly 20 years since the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the great European powers had been racing to expand their empires, competing in a frenzied land grab to include every open scrap of earth in the world. These scrambles had mainly focused on Africa and Asia. By comparison the Americans had seemed passive, preoccupied with what was going on in their own vast country. “As of the early 1880s educated Americans nearly all doubted the value of colonies and regarded efforts to conquer other populations as morally wrong.” But, reading the news of an apparent imperialist consensus in Europe, especially among British Liberals, during the 1880s and after the former “unanimity” of American opinion leaders “had begun to break down.”[29] Some outspoken men believed that the United States had to join this global imperial race and try to catch up. These advocates were called “jingoes,” a derision to mock such “by jingo” enthusiasms. The jingoes had applauded in 1893 when Hawaii’s American planters and professionals had engineered a coup to overthrow Hawaii’s native government. The leaders of the new government wanted to bring Hawaii into the United States. As noted earlier, Hawaii had the only U.S. coaling station in the Pacific and it had long been under American protection. But this Hawaiian government’s pleas for annexation had been tabled for nearly five years. The jingoes did not control the Republican Party in Congress or in the White House. McKinley had finally sent a Hawaiian annexation treaty to the Senate. But McKinley did not expect two-thirds of the Senate to ratify the treaty and he did little to press it.[30] When the war began, however, Congress immediately moved on the long-simmering Hawaiian question and annexed the islands. A public debate about the Philippine islands had begun. Yet in secret, McKinley wanted to use the Philippine position as a bargaining chip, just as the prewar Navy plans had envisioned. He was prepared to give the islands back to Spain, if that would indeed bring about “an honorable and durable peace.” McKinley left in his papers an undated note in which he had jotted: “While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want.”[31]

The Secret Offer, May to June 1898

As spring turned to summer, McKinley’s main worry was about how to land troops and win the battles in Cuba. When war came, Alger, the secretary of war, was overwhelmed by his job. The Army had begun the war with no particular plans for how to fight it. To the better-prepared Navy Secretary, Long, it seemed the Army was “ready for nothing at all.”[32] As if to underscore this point, just as the war was getting underway the Army’s commanding general, Nelson Miles, wrote to McKinley opposing any expedition to Cuba during the summer of 1898. “This letter reached the President two or three days after war had been declared,” Corbin later recorded privately. “It shocked him beyond words. Only on one other occasion did I see him show more feeling. Among other things he said, ‘God willing and not failing us, we shall end the war before the General would have us begin operations. He little understands me; no more does he know the temper of our people. I deplore the war, but it must be short and quick to the finish.’”[33] With Alger difficult and Miles untrustworthy, McKinley decided to oversee the War Department as directly as he could. He personally supervised the Cuban campaign plan. To help, McKinley relied on Corbin, who was always just a short walk away in the new building west of the executive mansion. At the Navy Department, Long grew wearier as the conflict went on. With his young deputy, Roosevelt, off to the Army, his new deputy turned out to be very competent. But Long himself flagged. By mid-May, a McKinley aide observed,
Secretary Long moves along quietly. He is not sure-footed as his friends would have us believe. He hesitates, questions too much, seems hampered by too great conservatism and often he seems to be in the position of the surgeon who fails of … ‘nerve’ and decision at the critical moment.[34]
McKinley ordered the creation of a War Room in the executive mansion. It was staffed with clerks and telegraphers; large maps were hung with pins stuck in to show the positions of troops and ships. McKinley would often be there, reading cables as they came in and studying the maps.[35] McKinley’s style of leadership was not charismatic. He did not point the way and rally the troops. Cabinet meetings remained informal. McKinley might open with a story to put others at ease. His was another kind of leadership style — that of a judge. People would make their arguments. He would hear them out, not revealing his own views until the time for decision. When all had spoken, McKinley would state a decision and go around asking, “You agree?” To one of McKinley’s aides, the president “is the strong man of the Cabinet, the dominating force; but with it all, is a gentleness and graciousness in dealing with men that some of his greatest victories have been won apparently without any struggle.” His later secretary of war, Elihu Root, remembered McKinley as a “man of great power because he was absolutely indifferent to credit. His desire was to ‘get it done!’ He cared nothing about the credit, but McKinley always had his way.”[36] The new secretary of state, William Day, was used to McKinley’s style. A former judge from Ohio, Day had been the deputy to his aged predecessor in the job, John Sherman. From the start, it was Day who had done most of the foreign policy work for the president. As soon as war began, McKinley pushed Sherman out and Day took over the top job. A small-framed, thin-faced mustachioed lawyer nearing 50, Day had long been a fact-finder for McKinley on many problems. He was discreet and thorough. McKinley’s secretary noted, “Here is a quiet, one might almost say country, lawyer who has so conducted the foreign affairs of this administration as to win unanimous commendation.”[37] As soon as he was elevated, Day named his deputy, picking the best expert on international law that he could find. This was a bearded, stocky former State Department official (and Democrat), a Columbia professor named John Bassett Moore.[38] Day and Moore were McKinley’s allies when he made his high-risk move to use the Philippines as a bargaining chip. After the Spanish defeat at Manila Bay, there was turmoil in Madrid. London got word that the queen regent and key ministers might be ready for a deal, to give up Cuba in exchange for peace. The British came to the U.S. ambassador in London, John Hay, who relayed the private question: What peace terms might America accept?[39] Moore promptly drafted an answer. Terms could be generous “if immediately proposed by Spain, directly or by some mediator.” Spain would evacuate Cuba. The United States would manage a transition of power to the Cubans. Spain would cede Puerto Rico to the United States. If the Spanish did that, then the Philippines would “be allowed to remain with Spain.” In the Pacific the United States would only want “a coaling station,” either in the Philippines or in the neighboring Spanish-held Carolines island group.[40] On May 11, about a week after news had arrived about Dewey’s naval victory in Manila Bay, Day put this proposal for a deal before the Cabinet. Alger disagreed, but there is no evidence why. There the matter rested for a couple of weeks. McKinley was preoccupied with plans to launch a large U.S. expedition to eastern Cuba. This expedition was to land near the port of Santiago de Cuba, where the Navy had just bottled up the fleet that Spain had sent to Cuba. It was a risky plan, relying on a lot of improvisation and luck. The Americans would try to establish a firm hold in eastern Cuba and put off the huge challenge of trying to take on Havana, where the Spanish had the bulk of their strength.[41] Once that expedition plan was set, the diplomats went back to the peace move. Day’s plan now was to bypass the Cabinet and take the proposed bargain directly to McKinley. He would leave it to the president to “ascertain what his ‘jingos’ thought about it.” Day was “very strongly opposed to retaining the Philippines, except possibly some coaling station in them, upon any terms.” Day met with McKinley. They agreed on what to do. Day then instructed Hay, his man in London, to float the deal. The president, “speaking for himself, would be inclined to grant terms of peace” with the Philippines to remain with Spain, ceding only a coaling station, if Spain would give up Cuba. This deal would avoid the need for “further sacrifice and loss of life.” But Day asked Hay to warn that “Prolongation of war may change this materially.” To help make sure the proposed deal got through to Madrid, Day apparently also privately briefed the British ambassador in Washington. That envoy informed his French, German and Austrian colleagues. Thus the terms soon became known on the diplomatic circuit, though there was nothing in public that linked the offer directly with McKinley. Nor is there any evidence that this secret diplomatic move was discussed with other members of McKinley’s Cabinet. No one appears to have known about McKinley’s personal authorization except for Day and Moore in Washington, and Hay in London. Day reminded Hay to hide McKinley’s hand in this. The proposal to give up the Philippines could not be seen as “coming from us.”[42] Secrecy for McKinley was vital; he was taking a great risk by making this offer. Spain was the enemy. Its rule in Cuba was regarded as a loathsome tyranny. Its rule in the Philippines was getting similar attention. The jingoes, like Lodge and Roosevelt (then a colonel helping to lead a volunteer regiment preparing to go to Cuba), already felt strongly that, whoever ended up with them, the Philippine Islands had to be taken from Spain. Roosevelt, writing to Lodge from his Army camp in Texas on May 19, advised: “do not make peace until we get Porto Rico, while Cuba is made independent and the Philippines at any rate taken from the Spaniards.” He repeated this suggestion to Lodge on May 25.[43] To many Americans it would already have seemed wrong, even immoral, for America to hand Manila and the Philippine Islands back to Spain under any circumstances. To make it worse, the American president was the one suggesting this. Disclosure of McKinley’s move could have set off a terrific political storm. Further, Spain had not yet asked for peace or tabled any ideas. The Americans feared that making the first move would signal weakness or unreadiness to fight. So the plan was for the terms to be passed secretly to the Spanish. Then the Spanish would make the proposal, knowing that it was likely to be accepted. The first part worked. The terms were passed to Spain and its friends in Europe.[44] [quote id="4"] The second part failed to launch. The Spanish preferred to keep fighting. They had been encouraged by a naval skirmish in May and hopeful that the latest group of ships sent to Cuba might do well. They had belatedly dispatched another squadron to the Philippines. Instead, during June, Spain’s main diplomatic move was to ask the other great powers to join its fight in the Philippines, to mount a joint military intervention to take over Manila. “Spain,” Hay reported, “was not yet sensible enough to ask for peace, on even the most reasonable terms.” The secret offer dissipated. Day thanked Hay for his handling of “this most delicate matter.”[45]The war continued. There were more Spanish defeats. By the end of June, the American expedition to eastern Cuba had landed. The siege of Santiago de Cuba by land and by sea had begun. In the first days of July, American troops seized the high ground near Santiago in the fights at San Juan Heights and Kettle Hill. The Spanish fleet in Santiago went to sea and accepted battle. On July 3 it was destroyed. The remaining garrison in Santiago de Cuba surrendered. The other Spanish fleet, the one that had been sent to the Philippines, stopped. As a neutral power, the British refused to allow the Spanish warships to pass through the Suez Canal. The Spanish recalled the fleet to Spain, now worrying that the Americans might attack Spanish home waters.[46] From the Philippines came more news. A native Filipino government had declared its independence. Its soldiers were fighting as America’s friends, alongside the troops of the newly arrived U.S. expedition. The option of returning the islands to Spain had become a good deal more complicated.

Terms for an Armistice, July to August

During the summer of 1898 Americans started learning a lot more about the Spanish possessions in the Pacific. At the beginning of June, Albert Shaw, the editor of the Review of Reviews, one of the most-read news digests in America, observed, “A few weeks ago the great majority of the people of the United States knew nothing about the Philippines except in the vaguest possible way.” Now a great many American families were becoming aware of it because some of their young men were being deployed across the Pacific in a far-reaching expedition “absolutely without any precedent in our national history.”[47] Shaw’s digest, like many newspapers, included articles that described the situation in the Philippines. McKinley himself read these and other articles, leaving behind clippings or references to some notable articles in his papers. Anyone reading the articles in Shaw’s Review, or any other major newspaper, would learn that the Philippines was a group of islands with 6 million to 8 million inhabitants. The native racial background was given as “Malay,” with deep hostility among native groups in different portions of the islands (Tagal versus Visayan versus Moro, for example). They would also learn that a substantial number of Chinese and Chinese-descended families dominated the retail trade as well as a handful of foreign trading houses, mainly British. There were few available experts on the Philippines in the English-speaking or scholarly world. The best account to appear in English that summer in any source, in or outside of government, was an article from one of those few experts, an Englishman, John Foreman. He had long known Spain and the Philippines as a businessman and explorer, as a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, and he knew the Filipino revolutionary leaders too. McKinley read Foreman’s article.[48] Every account, including Foreman’s, stressed Spanish misrule. Spanish rule was portrayed as anti-modern and purely predatory. It had added little of value and it had stunted development and education in the islands. Local priests, the friars, routinely abused their authority, answerable to no law but that of their protective bishops, while there was a veneer of mediocre Spanish administrators who were corrupt, lethargic and cruel. Therefore, the Filipino revolutionaries were usually portrayed sympathetically. Foreman, for instance, regarded the young rebel leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, as a “smart, intelligent man, of a serious mien” with a real following, especially among the Tagal elite in Luzon. Aguinaldo was a “would-be reformer” who had resorted to force out of necessity. Yet every account also stressed that the local inhabitants were not nearly ready for or capable of self-government. Spain had created no intermediary institutions — no native assemblies or cadres of trained officials. There was the condition of the population, the absence of any infrastructure for modern government, and the deadly hostility among the different ethnic groups in the islands. Foreman concluded: “At first, no doubt, the islanders will welcome and co-operate in any arrangement which will rid them of monastic oppression. The Philippine Islands, however, would not remain one year a peaceful united Archipelago under an independent native government. It is an utter impossibility.” Worse, Foreman noted,
If the native Republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough to protect itself against foreign aggression. … I entertain the firm conviction that an unprotected united Republic would last only until the novelty of the situation had worn off. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, declare its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before that took root America, or some European nation, would probably have interfered.
For the readers of his day, Foreman did not need to do more than gesture at the recent record of what had happened in other lands that had thrown off Spanish rule. Throughout their adult lives, his 1898 readers had read accounts of the revolutions, civil wars, and foreign interventions that tormented Latin America throughout the 19th century, in every liberated province of the former Spanish empire. The possibility of foreign intervention was not abstract. During the 1880s and 1890s, every habitable rock on Earth had been claimed. Americans could remember having been caught up briefly in a strange little 1888 crisis involving British and German claims over the tiny islands of Samoa. Outside of the Qing Empire in China and the Kingdom of Siam (a kind of demilitarized zone between the British in Burma and the French in Indochina), there were no spots in East Asia and the Pacific that were not in European or Japanese control. The German, British, French, and Japanese warships were anchored watchfully in Manila Bay. Of these the German squadron was the most intimidating presence. This was no accident. From the outset of the crisis the German navy minister, unbeknownst to the United States, was “firm as a rock in his conviction that we must have Manila and that this would be of enormous advantage to us.” Kaiser Wilhelm II considered it “the first task of German diplomacy … to obtain naval bases in the Far East.”[49] The Philippines problem had arisen in what, in 1898, was probably the part of the globe most likely to set off a worldwide war. The breakup and possible partition of China seemed imminent. Korean independence was tenuous and near the most volatile spot on Earth, the place where the next general war then seemed most likely to break out. It was, a veteran British leader secretly confided, a crisis “pregnant with possibilities of a disastrous kind; and it might result in an Armageddon between the European Powers struggling for the ruins of the Chinese Empire.”[50] This was the Far Eastern crisis: the simmering cauldron of Qing, Russian, Japanese, German, and British interests in northeast China and Manchuria. During the spring of 1898 Hay had sent a handwritten letter directly to McKinley, outside of official channels. “The conditions of things in China is to the last degree serious,” he had warned. “[T]he present crisis is considered by English statesmen one of the gravest of our times.”[51] So far, the United States had endeavored to stay clear of this Far Eastern broil. The British secretly asked the Americans if they would consider joint action to protect everyone’s trading rights in China. The McKinley government had turned down the British request. But it obviously did not want to make the situation worse and trigger a possible world war.[52] The British ambassador to Germany had confided to Hay the British government’s hope that the United States would just keep the Philippines. There was, he said, “not a power in Europe [that] would seriously object to that disposition of them, while any other [choice] might disturb the peace of the world.”[53] Foreman thought a foreign power should establish a protectorate over the Philippines. That power would organize a largely native government while providing overall direction and defense. Foreman did not believe the Americans were up to the job. England, he thought, “would probably find it a less irksome task.” Shaw’s conclusion, in the Review of Reviews article mentioned earlier, was similar to Foreman’s, except that he thought America had to assume the burden.[54] All these considerations also had to account for a new factor. The Filipino insurgents had announced their own government. In late May, Aguinaldo and a number of his colleagues had returned to the Philippines from exile, encouraged by the U.S. consul in Hong Kong and aided by Adm. Dewey. Digesting all this, officials in Washington realized that the insurgents had to be taken into account. Yet the United States wanted to do nothing to foreclose its options. They cautioned Dewey, the expedition commanders, and their diplomats. All said they had made no compromising pledges to the insurgents. Dewey added: “In my opinion these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.”[55] In mid-July, the Spanish were ready to talk about peace, using France as their diplomatic channel. The first step was to arrange terms for an armistice, while a peace treaty could be negotiated. From his perch in the Senate, Lodge weighed in about what he thought the terms should be. Lodge’s position was intricate. He wanted the United States to take all of the Philippines from Spain but then keep only the island of Luzon. Cede the rest to Britain, he argued, in a deal to get more Caribbean islands. Lodge spent hours in meetings and dinners lobbying McKinley and Day. They gave him the impression that they were still making up their minds.[56] McKinley and Day wanted to hear what John Hay thought, from London. Hay still liked the earlier idea of giving the islands back to Spain if there could be some “strong guarantee of fair treatment of natives” and a ban on Spain selling the islands to some other power (such as Germany). Hay reported that the British did, though, “prefer to have us retain Philippine Islands, or, failing that, insist on option in case of future sale.” The German government’s interest in getting something was all too evident.[57] What about Japan? The Japanese ambassador in Washington advised that “the Japanese government would be highly gratified if the United States would occupy the Islands.” The ambassador very politely added that “it would not be as agreeable to the Japanese Government to have them turned over to some other power.”[58] Hay’s views remained “conservative” (the usual adjective for Republicans not among the jingoes). But he was not sure his position was still workable. Reading that industrialist Andrew Carnegie was against the United States taking the Philippines, Hay wrote to Carnegie, “I am not allowed to say in my present fix, how much I agree with you. The only question in my mind is how far it is now possible for us to withdraw from the Philippines. I am rather thankful it is not given to me to solve that momentous question.”[59] On a hot July afternoon, McKinley invited his Cabinet members to join him on a Potomac River cruise on the presidential yacht. He wanted them to discuss peace terms. The Cabinet had longer arguments about this topic, mainly about the Philippines, than about any other subject during McKinley’s presidency. McKinley’s Cabinet, sitting together on the yacht on the Potomac, began its discussion. Day led off. He was still for giving the islands back to Spain, except for a coaling station. About half the Cabinet (including Navy Secretary Long) agreed with him. Those on the other side pointed out that returning the islands to Spain would seem appalling, given the sort of Spanish misrule that had led to war over Cuba. One Cabinet member quoted a distinguished senator who was against American expansion but still said he would “as soon turn a redeemed soul over to the devil as give the Philippines back to Spain.” Opinions wavered. The agriculture secretary wanted to keep all the islands and evangelize them. But he altered his views as he learned more about the Filipino insurgency. War Secretary Alger went back and forth. Another Cabinet member spoke for keeping Luzon and setting up a protectorate for the rest. The interior secretary saw great commercial opportunities and wanted to hold the islands. One of the more capable Cabinet members, the attorney general, also thought the United States should keep them all. The Treasury secretary, on the other hand, argued for complete withdrawal and returning all of the Philippines back to Spain. Through all this, hour after hour, McKinley offered little comment. He just kept the discussion going. The next day the arguments continued. As they kept going over the problems, several began emphasizing that the government needed more information about the situation, including the advice of people on the scene such as Adm. Dewey. At this point the U.S. government had not yet received a single serious written analysis of the situation in the Philippines, nor any recommendations, from any of its officers posted there.[60] Humility and caution prevailed. Defer, wait for more information from the field: That was the consensus. Peace commissioners would be appointed. They would sort out the Philippines problem as they got more information back from the islands. Beyond Spanish evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico and an island in the Ladrones (Marianas) that turned out to be Guam, the cease-fire terms for the Philippines were simple. The United States would occupy “the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.”[61] McKinley and Day gave the terms to the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, representing Spain. Cambon complained that the terms were harsh. McKinley replied that Spain could have had a much better deal had it sought peace sooner. The armistice and cease-fire was signed on August 12. At the end of August, the Americans controlled and protected the city of Manila and surrounding waters. Little more. Aguinaldo’s revolutionary government was taking control of the rest of the surrounding island of Luzon. It organized a congress to meet in the government’s improvised capital, Malolos. Aguinaldo sent a message to the foreign powers reiterating the new government’s independence. They ignored him. No foreign country would recognize his government. The Spanish still held the Visayan islands south of Luzon, including Panay. Spain also retained nominal control of the large Muslim “Moro” islands in the south. Picking the peace commissioners, McKinley immediately put his most trusted aide, Day, in the lead. Moore would be the commission’s secretary. To go to Paris for the negotiations, Day would have to resign as secretary of state. John Hay was asked to come back to Washington and take over the State Department in Day’s place.[62]

Gen. Greene’s Mission and the Decision to Take the Philippines, August to October 1898

After the July debates, the Cabinet and McKinley agreed it was most important to get information and recommendations from the Americans who were on the scene in the Philippines. Of these men, none turned out to be more influential than a brigadier general named Francis Vinton Greene. It was an illustrious name. Greene came from one of the most respected military families in America. His grandfather was Nathaniel Greene, one of the most celebrated generals in the Revolution. His father had been a general during the Civil War, commanding a Union brigade at Gettysburg. Following the family tradition, Francis Greene had graduated from West Point in 1870 at the top of his class. Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, he had been one of the surveyors on a renowned expedition during the 1870s in the Rocky Mountain West. As a staff officer in the War Department Greene had become close to President Ulysses S. Grant as well as to Gens. William Sherman and Philip Sheridan and other leading officers of the day. In these years, he first met the young naval officer George Dewey. Greene was assigned to go out and observe the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. He witnessed the principal campaigns and wrote a book about the war that became a standard account, establishing a unique reputation as a soldier-scholar. Greene left the Army in 1886 to go into business in New York City. Running an asphalt paving company, he became a powerful force in all the civic improvement and road-building issues of that city and beyond. That connected him well to local Republican politics. He was also elected colonel of one of New York’s militia regiments, the 71st New York. As war with Spain threatened, one of Greene’s friends, Theodore Roosevelt, pleaded with the colonel to accept him as a deputy in that regiment, a lieutenant colonel, if war came. (Roosevelt ended up finding such a place in a different regiment, commanded by Leonard Wood.) When the war did come, as Greene and his regiment readied for service in Cuba, Greene was ordered to command one of the brigades being assembled for the Philippines. It was not a hard call for Corbin at the War Department.  Corbin would later privately record that he regarded Greene as “one of the most competent soldiers I have ever known.”[63] After a difficult siege in the rainy season and a brief assault, Greene’s brigade and the other American troops had accepted the surrender of Manila. Greene, who could speak Spanish and French, was promptly put in charge of all the finances of the Philippine administration. He met with all the Spanish officials and leading private bankers and took actions to head off a financial crisis. This was the context when McKinley asked Dewey to provide his best advice about the situation in the Philippines. He asked Dewey to even consider returning to Washington to report directly to him on this vital matter. Dewey sent a brief reply, noting the desirability of Luzon but saying nothing about the revolutionary government that had been created by Aguinaldo. Dewey said he hoped he would not have to go to Washington while matters remained “in present critical condition.” Dewey, Army expedition commander Merritt, and Greene conferred. They decided that Greene should be the man to go to Washington.[64] News arrived of the armistice with Spain. Outside of official channels, Greene received a telegram from a well-connected associate. It advised him that the war was considered closed. Commissioners would determine the disposition of the Philippines. Greene’s friend thought the Army would just retain a garrison there. This informal news shocked the commanders in Manila. They feared the United States was planning to withdraw from the islands and thought that leaders in Washington did not understand the “critical” situation. On August 25, Merritt and Greene fired a salvo of telegrams to Washington through official and unofficial channels. In one, Greene asked his friend to go see Corbin as soon as possible, to even see President McKinley if necessary. He recommended that the president should send for “a competent and responsible person immediately” to come and brief them — either Maj. Gen. Merritt or himself, going to Washington or to Paris (to see the commissioners). Greene also cabled Day and Hay to the same effect. Washington reacted promptly. Merritt was ordered to turn over his command to a newly arrived major-general, Elwell Otis, and hurry at once to Paris. There he could brief the peace commissioners. Greene was ordered to Washington “by first transport.” Dewey said his views would come back with Greene. He again called for holding on to Luzon. He wrote little about politics or practicalities. The Filipinos, he did add, “are gentle, docile and under just laws and with the benefits of popular education would soon make good citizens” with capacities for self-government superior to the Cubans. On August 30, the day after he received his order from Washington, Greene boarded a steamship for Hong Kong. Boarding the ship with Greene was Aguinaldo’s representative, Felipe Agoncillo, who also hoped to see and influence the American president. Greene liked and respected Agoncillo. During the weeks of traveling the two men frequently dined together and chatted. Greene brought with him every book and relevant document he could find. He used the ensuing weeks of travel to draft a detailed report for McKinley, more than 60 pages, on “The Situation in the Philippines.”[65] Knowing how long his trip would take, Greene sent a preview. On September 5, as he changed ships in Nagasaki, Greene personally encoded an unusual telegram sent outside of standard Army channels. Written in the tightly abbreviated style of telegrams in that era, Greene sent his message directly to Day. It read:
Rep of Aguinaldo with me. Comes solely on his own responsibility. In my opinion Spanish Power Philippines dead. Any attempt revive it will result Civil War, anarchy and foreign intervention.
Once the 13,000 Spanish prisoners already in American hands were sent home, “Aguinaldo’s army will probably dissolve. He cannot maintain independent gov’t without protection of some strong nation.” Therefore: “Only safe course is for United States to hold islands and not divide them. British sentiment will support this unanimously. Have expressed these views Admiral Dewey. He fully concurs.”[66] Thus for the first time, in early September, McKinley and Day finally received a very plain statement about what their commanders in the Philippines thought about the points they and their Cabinet colleagues had been debating. In addition to the substance of this advice, McKinley would have realized its political significance. He could presume that eventually such advice would become publicly known. It would not be easy for the president to break with the advice he had received from his men on the spot, including the new national hero (Dewey). McKinley was still not quite convinced. Later in September, he convened his freshly appointed peace commissioners to discuss their instructions. Out for a carriage ride with one of them, a vigorous expansionist, McKinley seemed (to his companion) to be “timid about the Philippines.” To him, McKinley seemed “oppressed with the idea that our volunteers were all tired of the service and eager to get home. ‘The whole shooting match wants to quit,’ was the way he expressed it.” McKinley thought the country was in no mood for further military operations, including fights for expansion. At the meeting, the expansionist commissioners debated Day, whom McKinley had put in charge of the delegation. Day had not budged from his view that the United States should take as little as possible. To Day, the Americans had only liberated Manila. They had no obligations beyond that. Washington, Day argued, had to place some limit on humanitarian enterprise:
Because we had done good in one place [Cuba], we were not therefore compelled to rush over the whole civilized world, six thousand miles away from home, to undertake tasks of that sort among people about whom we knew nothing, and with whom we had no relation.
McKinley summed up. He could see why many Americans found the acquisition of territory naturally attractive. But he thought these attractions would wear off “when the difficulties, expense and loss of life which it entailed, became more manifest.” However, McKinley said he could no longer see how to return liberated Manila to Spain. Flowing from that, it also seemed doubtful to hold Manila without holding more of the surrounding island of Luzon. “Beyond this he did not seem inclined to go.” He then drafted the commission’s instructions accordingly. He privately told Day that, if territory was returned to Spain, it would be good to try to get some guarantees about the treatment of the inhabitants.[67] After four weeks of travel by ship and railroad, Greene’s train steamed into Washington on September 27. Greene went straight to the White House. McKinley practically cleared his schedule for him. Greene met for two hours with McKinley on the day he arrived. He delivered his report, which the president read and reviewed with him. The report was clear and vividly written. The next day McKinley had a copy of it sent to Paris for the commissioners, commending it to them. The next morning Greene was back at the White House, now joined by the new secretary of state, Hay. He stayed for lunch. Greene was back yet again in the evening, now joined by his wife, for a visit that mixed business and socializing. Two days later Greene was at the White House for still more discussions. Greene also arranged for McKinley to meet with his traveling companion, Aguinaldo’s representative Agoncillo. Greene joined that meeting too. Agoncillo was received purely as a private traveler since neither the United States nor anyone else had recognized his revolutionary government. While en route to Washington, Agoncillo had also previewed his position. Meeting with reporters he outlined that, above all, his government wanted absolute independence. If absolute independence was not possible, the next preference was to become a protectorate of the United States. A third preference was to be an American colony or, worse still, a British one. What they could not accept was any return to Spanish rule.[68] [quote id="5"] In their meeting Agoncillo told McKinley about the revolution and the new government. McKinley was noncommittal. Agoncillo’s written position was passed along to the commissioners in Paris, Agoncillo’s next destination.[69] In his own meetings with McKinley, in addition to going over his long report, Greene boiled down the options he thought were left to the United States. He wrote these out separately, as follows:
There are five courses open to us in the Philippines: first, to return them to Spain, which would mean Civil War for we have destroyed Spanish authority in the Philippines; second, to hand the Philippines over to the Filipinos, which would mean anarchy for they are at present incapable of self-government; third, to hand the Islands over to Germany or Japan, either one of which could probably take them over, but this would be an act of cowardice of which we are incapable; fourth, to put the Islands under some form of joint protectorate like that which was established [by Britain] for Egypt in 1882, but this has not proved successful and has resulted in one nation taking the whole responsibility; fifth, to take all the Islands as possessions of the United States and gradually work out their destiny, and this is the only proper solution.
McKinley read this over and over again, in silence. Then “with that kindly smile which was so characteristic of him,” he observed “gently,” that: “General Greene, that is very advanced doctrine. I am not prepared for that.” McKinley asked Greene if he knew what instructions he had just given to his peace commissioners. Greene did not. McKinley summarized his instructions as having been “to take the City and Bay of Manila and such additional portions of the Island of Luzon as they think necessary for naval purposes, and to return the rest of the Islands to Spain.” This summary by McKinley is somewhat different and narrower than the language he had signed off on September 16. But Greene’s account may give a truer sense of what McKinley actually had in mind.[70] Greene then set out to change McKinley’s mind, to persuade him that the United States had to take control of the whole Philippines. He went over all that he had done and learned in his six weeks in the Philippines. He talked about how he had used his Spanish to have long exchanges with all the prominent Filipinos in Manila and how he had spent more time learning from Agoncillo. Therefore he had to disagree, “respectfully but with extreme urgency.” Greene had time to go into great detail about his analysis of the situation during the three extended meetings he had with McKinley, each of which were two to three hours.  It was, as Greene had explained in his written report, a situation “without precedent in American history.” There were more than 7 million people in the Philippines. Manila, a city of 400,000, was already under U.S. military rule. All of this had been ruled by a Spanish officialdom of no more than 30,000, most of whom were now trying to escape back to Spain. “The Spanish officials have intense fear of the Insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, with a virulence that can hardly be described.” The Spanish could neither cope with the insurgents nor surrender to them. An attempted restoration of Spanish power would produce “civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the Islands which they would not allow to be destroyed.”[71] As for the Revolutionary Government of Aguinaldo, Greene assessed that it would be a “Dictatorship of the familiar South American type …. a pure despotism.” He saw “no reason to believe that Aguinaldo’s Government has any elements of stability.” Aguinaldo was a young man of 28. Though Greene thought Aguinaldo was able, Greene did not think he could command wide or enduring support. Also, the insurgents were purely “Tagalo” in ethnic composition. Greene did not assume that the Visayans, more numerous than the Tagalos, would fall in line. There were plenty of fault lines for conflict among “the thirty races in the Philippines, each speaking a different dialect.” Greene believed the United States could gain the support of the educated and propertied Filipino elite, since they “fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone.” Their ideal for this was a Philippine Republic under American protection, “much as they heard is to be granted to Cuba.” On this desire for a protectorate, “all are agreed” among the Filipino elite. Only Aguinaldo and his inner circle were doubtful. But, Greene argued, the protectorate option was harder than it might seem. “[I]t is difficult to see how any foreign Government can give this protection without taking such an active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to governing in its own name and for its own account.”[72] Just taking only some portion of Luzon would, Greene had written, be “a terrible mistake” for all, including for McKinley’s presidency. It could embroil the United States in a conflict with another country that later intervened in the other islands. What if Aguinaldo and the insurgents did not accept U.S. rule, even temporary rule? Greene admired the way the insurgents had fought the Spanish:
Nevertheless from daily contact with them for six weeks I am very confident that no such results could have been obtained against an American Army, which would have driven them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerrilla warfare. If they attack the American Army, this will certainly be the result, and while these guerrilla bands might cause some trouble so long as their ammunition lasted, yet with our Navy guarding the coasts and our Army pursuing them on land it would not be long before they were reduced to subjection.
McKinley gave Greene ample time to describe the situation and make his case. At the time, Greene thought that he had not been convincing enough. He thought he had “utterly failed to shake” the president’s reluctance to take the Philippines. Looking back on it years later, Greene saw that perhaps his seeds had borne fruit after all. He recalled that, as the two men parted at the end of September, McKinley said he intended to start a trip to the West to make a series of speeches about the unexpected results of the war. Smiling, he told Greene, “Perhaps when I come back I may think differently from what I now think.”[73] McKinley kept gathering information. During early October, Day and Moore sent him detailed, substantive reports from Paris summarizing what the commissioners had learned from Merritt and other experts, including Foreman. All of the information gathered in Paris seemed to line up with what McKinley had heard from Greene. A report given great weight by Merritt was the view of the Army’s lead surgeon in the Philippines, Frank Bourns. Bourns had spent years visiting the islands as a scientist during the early 1890s. Returning with the Army, Bourns had taken charge of public health in the Philippines after the American occupation of Manila. He had worked directly with Filipino leaders to make progress. From Paris, Bourns was reported as believing that “if a few ambitious insurgent Chieftains could be disposed of, masses of natives could be managed by the United States. Considers natives incapable of self-government because of lack of good examples, lack of union in Luzon and throughout Archipelago, and existence of race, tribal and religious differences.”[74] Outside of formal channels, McKinley had access to a more unvarnished side of Bourns’ views. Someone had given the president part of a lengthy private letter Bourns had written from Manila. In this letter Bourns did write that “these people could be managed if properly handled.” Yet Bourns was angry about the attitudes of his fellow Americans. He warned that none of the other American officers, with one exception, “seem to have cared to inform themselves either of the character of the people or their desires, nor do they even care to explain our desires and intentions.” In his letter, left in McKinley’s papers, Bourns bluntly sized up the situation this way:
Aguinaldo has the whole Philippine population at his beck and call. He is the successful man and has the successful man’s influence. The lower classes have a blind confidence in him. With the middle classes it is an ambitious confidence; that is they do not know quite enough to understand that an independent government cannot long continue to exist and are anxious to see it, because they expect to get the plums. With the well educated and wealthy people it is merely a question of expediency; they support the Philippine Government so that they may influence it for the best. I venture to say that ninety-five percent of them at heart want to see American protection, and a good many of the most influential want to see annexation, but the masses of the people know nothing about Americans and think we are just like the Spaniards. Our officials take no trouble to educate them; our men simply refuse to have anything to do with them, will not recognize them nor write to them officially, and many of the line officers, such as colonels, majors, and captains, treat them as cattle to be knocked around as suits their pleasure.
Of course, Bourns wrote, “This is all wrong.” If the United States did not do better, Bourns feared that it would find itself in a war with the Filipinos. Yet Bourns thought the problem was still manageable. With some “tact and patience,” and attention to the Filipinos, “the whole Filipino government could be swung our way without bloodshed.”[75] In mid-October, having received no further guidance from Washington, Dewey weighed in again. He sent a terse cable pleading for a decision about the Philippines “as soon as possible, and a strong government established.” In Luzon, Dewey wrote, Spanish authority had been “completely destroyed.” Outside Manila, “general anarchy prevails.” The islands to the south would soon fall into the same state. “Distressing reports have been received of inhuman cruelty practiced on religious and civil authorities in other parts of these islands. The natives appear unable to govern.”[76] McKinley left Washington for about 10 days in October, traveling around the Midwest to rally support for the upcoming midterm elections. It was during this trip that McKinley began to speak publicly, in vague terms, about American duty and unexpected obligation. At one point some scholarly opinion tended to think McKinley was trying to gauge public opinion. In fact he was deciding how to lead it, and lead it toward the conclusion firming up in his own mind.[77] By the time he returned to Washington, McKinley had decided that there was no good middle ground. No government had recognized Aguinaldo. With the notable exception of Germany, the other great powers seemed to prefer American control now that Spanish rule was gone.[78] Back in Washington, Secretary of the Navy Long wrote to his wife,
If I could have had my way, I wouldn’t have had the war, and I wouldn’t have been burdened with Porto Rico or Cuba or the Philippines. They are an elephant, just as everything else is an elephant that disturbs the even tenor of our national way, but there they are, and my shoulder goes to the wheel.
McKinley cabled the commissioners: “We must either hold [the Philippines] or turn them back to Spain.” McKinley now saw “but one plain path of duty — the acceptance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more serious complications — administrative and international — would follow any other course."[79] A few weeks later, McKinley talked privately to a colleague about how he had worked through the arguments. The islands could not go back to Spain. If they went to another European power “we should have a war on our hands in fifteen minutes” and the United States would be responsible, having let it happen just to escape responsibility for its actions. McKinley reviewed the geography of the islands. He discussed why it had seemed so difficult to separate them. His visitor congratulated McKinley on his decision and remarked on what great confidence the people had in him. McKinley was having none of it:
Yes that confidence, that awful confidence. Consider what a burden that imposes on me. I almost wish these questions were not so much left to the decision of any small number. I can foresee for myself and for the people nothing but anxiety for the next two years.[80]

The Attempt to Negotiate a Peaceful Settlement With the Filipinos, January to June 1899

Analysts of the American choice in the autumn of 1898 can easily overlook that there was no ready way the U.S. government could simply turn the Philippines over to the revolutionary Filipino republic, even if it wished to do so. Under international law and in the view of other powers, the Philippines was still sovereign territory of Spain, as was Cuba, until they were lawfully ceded to another recognized government. No foreign government had recognized the Filipino republic or had any plans to do so. If the United States refused to take the islands, it would be leaving them with Spain. Even U.S. recognition of the Filipino republic, if America had wished to offer it, might not have disturbed other powers’ belief in Spain’s claim. If tired Spain wanted to give up its territories in the Pacific, the German government was already secretly discussing with Spain its hopes to get them. And Spain did end up selling to Germany all its Pacific territories that were not ceded to the United States — the Caroline, Palau and Marianas island chains (except for the island of Guam).[81] If the United States wished to grant self-government to the Filipinos it would have to do what it was doing with Cuba: first take legal control of the territory, then decide what to do. That is what McKinley had decided to do. The United States took over sovereignty of the Philippines, paying $20 million to Spain as compensation. Then President McKinley planned to decide what to do in a negotiation with the Filipinos. The treaty of peace went to the U.S. Senate for ratification. A two-thirds majority was needed. Opponents fought hard for votes to block ratification. Some opposed taking the Philippines because they were anti-imperialist. Racism influenced arguments all around — “white man’s burden” arguments on one side; “we don’t want to have anything to do with them” on the other. Both sides argued business advantages or disadvantages. Progressive reformers tended to support the treaty.[82] As McKinley worked on how to organize governance of the Philippines with the Filipinos, he was working on a similar problem with Cuba. The two cases might seem different since Congress had decreed that Cuba was to be assured independence. But, despite that apparent difference in the legal situation, McKinley appears to have adopted the same basic approach for both cases. Both had been ceded to the United States. In both, McKinley set up interim U.S. military governments. He wanted to then replace these with local self-government. The new Cuban government took office in 1902.  Cuban independence, promised by the prewar Teller Amendment, was granted with conditions imposed by another act of Congress, the Platt Amendment. The new Cuban government agreed that it would not submit to control by another foreign power and that it would not take on unpayable foreign debts (which could lead to such control). It granted America the right to intervene “for the preservation of Cuban independence” and granted naval basing rights to the United States. Many Cubans found these conditions offensive. But, seen from Washington, this outcome was a defeat for the hopes of the jingo faction. The jingoes had schemed to maneuver the United States into annexing Cuba. They failed. American military occupation wound up its work in 1902. The United States did have to intervene in civil conflict in 1906 but withdrew after order was restored. The Platt Amendment had ultimately been supported by anti-imperialists such as George Hoar because of a
general recognition that the amendment represented a true compromise. It promised to give the Cubans real internal self-government. … Besides, no one could find an alternative that had any reasonable chance of acceptance in both Cuba and the United States. [83]
As with his plans for the Cubans, McKinley hoped to work out a plan of government peacefully with the Filipinos. As he assembled a commission to do this on his behalf, McKinley issued repeated instructions to his commander in Manila, Gen. Otis, to occupy strategic points in the islands but do everything necessary to avoid conflict with the insurgents. Otis was to be “firm but conciliatory.” The interim military rulers were to aim at some sort of “benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule” for “the greatest good of the governed.”[84] This goal was necessarily vague. To lead his commission, McKinley did not choose an expansionist. He did the opposite. He called on Jacob Gould Schurman, the president of Cornell University. McKinley knew Schurman had been opposed to territorial acquisitions; they had exchanged letters about it in August. Schurman was startled to be asked to lead such a commission. Meeting McKinley in January 1899, he said straight out, “To be plain, Mr. President … I am opposed to your Philippine policy: I never wanted the Philippine Islands.” “Oh,” McKinley answered, “that need not trouble you; I didn’t want the Philippine Islands, either … but in the end there was no alternative.” McKinley reviewed his reasons. Now Schurman had to work out what government should come next. He recalled that McKinley’s mind was entirely open on how to settle the governance question. “It was still open to us, in dealing with the Filipinos, to grant them independence, to establish a protectorate over them, to confer upon them a colonial form of government” or even to consider statehood. “Absolutely nothing was settled.” Schurman confirmed that his commission would be McKinley’s eyes and ears. He was instructed to heed the aspirations of the Philippine people “en masse” along with the various “tribes and families which compose that heterogeneous population.” Schurman helped select the other commissioners and they left America at the end of January 1899.[85] Meanwhile, McKinley asked Gen. Greene to give him some more help. He wanted Greene to talk to and reassure Aguinaldo’s envoy, Agoncillo, who had returned to Washington. Getting his instructions from the president, Greene gathered that what McKinley intended for the Philippines was to build up a large system of public education with “a constantly increasing participation in civic rights and duties, starting with local government and then progressing to the governance of all the islands.” Greene was taken aback by McKinley’s plan. To Greene, it seemed like “a novel experiment” and a risky one: “Englishmen of long experience in colonial affairs doubted its wisdom.” To Greene, McKinley’s ideas seemed unprecedented. “Self-government has hitherto grown up from the bottom; McKinley planned to donate it from the top.” Despite his doubts, Greene followed orders. He met with Agoncillo in January 1899. He outlined American hopes. Greene urged Agoncillo to wire Aguinaldo and help head off a conflict. Agoncillo refused to do it. He feared that if he sent such a message the revolutionaries back home would regard him as a traitor. He could do nothing, he said, “unless the United States could grant absolute independence to the Filipinos under American protection against foreign nations.” It is again worth noting Agoncillo’s language: “absolute independence” yet with “American protection.” There was an obvious tension between these two goals that would have to be worked out, presumably in negotiation. But Greene had no authority to preempt what the Schurman commission might work out. So Greene argued that, at this stage, Washington could not simply grant independence. The Filipinos should trust the U.S. government “to work out such a scheme of government as would be most suited to their conditions.” He warned that if the Filipinos attacked the Americans, the results would be disastrous. Agoncillo said that even to relay such a message would be the end of his career.[86] Readers today should not assume that any negotiated agreement on Filipino self-government in some form of American protectorate was ruled out by the prevalence of racist American attitudes toward the Filipinos. Such attitudes were certainly a serious obstacle to understanding. Some advocates of American expansion were Anglo-Saxon racial exceptionalists, such as Roosevelt, Lodge, and the still-emergent Albert Beveridge, as were some presumed experts on the Philippines. Yet there is not good evidence that such racial views were held by McKinley and his inner circle. In the context of his party, McKinley himself had been relatively forward on defending the rights of African-Americans in the South and had made news by meeting with African-Americans during the 1896 campaign. Corbin had come from an abolitionist family background, had commanded a “colored” regiment during the Civil War (clashing with another such commander whom Corbin thought had needlessly risked his “colored” troops), and had been critical of officers in the Indian wars who had sought conflict rather than compromise. Long wrote of the Anglo-Saxon character, but he diarized admiringly about black troops in U.S. service and detested Southern racial practices.[87] [quote id="6"] Among the presumed experts on the Philippines, Foreman, Greene, and Bourns all made strong, sympathetic connections with many Filipinos. Foreman and Bourns were openly scornful about ignorant Americans who would not take the trouble to understand the Filipinos.[88] Schurman and his fellow commissioners started their journey across the Pacific. War started before they arrived. McKinley can perhaps be excused for not realizing that war in the Philippines might be imminent. He might well have thought he had more time. Again and again he had instructed his field commander, Gen. Otis, to “proceed with great prudence, avoiding conflict if possible … be kind and tactful, taking time if necessary to accomplish results desired by peaceful means.” Otis was repeatedly also urged to rely on Bourns, whose views had obviously impressed someone in Washington. Otis had reassuringly reported that “order prevails.” His messages discussed the tension but also conveyed that conditions were “quiet” or “improving.”[89] It was early in February 1899, while Schurman and his commissioners were on their steamship, that news flashed to Washington that fighting had begun. McKinley had been working on the speech he was to give in Boston in a couple of weeks. His assistant brought in the dispatch with the tragic news. McKinley stopped his work. He read and reread the wire. He sat well back in his chair and finally said,
It is always the unexpected that happens, at least in my case. How foolish those people are. This means the ratification of the treaty; the people will understand now, the people will insist upon its ratification.[90]
Two days after the fighting started, on February 6, the U.S. Senate voted 57-27 to ratify the peace treaty, a margin of only one vote more than the required two-thirds. The Senate debate had been eloquent and well-covered in the nation’s newspapers. Every imaginable argument had been made for why America should expand across the Pacific; every argument had been made for why it should not. Now the Senate had decided. McKinley had spent much of the past month talking to the senators. Between the loud arguments of the imperialists and anti-imperialists, the “truly decisive figures” were the “conservative men” of the Senate. These men had shown no enthusiasm for expansion. Like McKinley himself, these senators had “resisted war with Spain almost to the bitter end” and they had grave doubts about the Philippines. They had finally gone along with this “radical” treaty because they had decided to follow the lead of their president.[91] McKinley continued to remain open-minded about the political future of the Philippines. In his February 17 Boston speech, the one that was so somber in tone, he said:
No one can tell to-day what is best for them or for us. I know no one at this hour who is wise enough or sufficiently informed to determine what form of government will best serve their interests and our interests, their and our well-being.
But his audience should be sure, he added, “No imperial designs lurk in the American mind.” To this at least, the audience applauded.[92] The fighting in the Philippines escalated into a full insurgent offensive against Manila. The insurgent attack was bloodily defeated. The campaigning began. By the time Schurman and his fellow commissioners finally arrived, the war had been underway for a month. Even under these circumstances, there was an episode that showed how close the two sides might have been to a negotiated agreement on a model similar to that which was worked out for Cuba. Schurman proposed, with McKinley’s approval, that an American governor-general, appointed by the president, would rule with a Cabinet he would select and grant Filipinos “the largest measure of local self-government consistent with peace and good order.” The Filipino Revolutionary Congress voted unanimously to accept these terms. The revolutionary Cabinet was replaced on May 8 by a new “peace” Cabinet. Aguinaldo sent word to Schurman that his new Cabinet was “more moderate and conciliatory.” His envoy revealed that Aguinaldo was prepared to drop his demand for independence and accept American sovereignty. Determined to fight the Americans, the violent-tempered commander of Aguinaldo’s revolutionary army, Gen. Antonio Luna, arrested the leaders of this new peace Cabinet. Aguinaldo went along with this. The previous Cabinet returned to power. Part of this battle was an increasingly bitter struggle among Filipinos in Luzon about who would collect taxes, own land, and wield police power when Spanish colonial rule collapsed. The war continued. The next month, in June 1899, Aguinaldo, or at least his inner circle, apparently arranged the assassination of Gen. Luna. It was too late. By this time, Schurman was being challenged within his commission by its other members, which included Otis. Schurman wanted to enlarge guarantees of Filipino participation and was open to a cease-fire while negotiations went on. His colleagues now preferred “prosecution of the war until the insurgents submit.” McKinley was caught between his desire for peace with “kindness and conciliation” and his readiness to send whatever forces were needed to end the fighting if Filipino resistance continued. McKinley ended up deferring to Otis. Schurman returned home toward the end of 1899, his mission a failure.[93] That war unfolded over the next three years about the way that Greene had foretold it might in his September 1898 report to McKinley. The Filipinos were soon driven “into the hills.” Conflict quickly degenerated into savage guerrilla fighting. Deprived of access to outside arms by American control of the sea, after a few years practically all resistance collapsed. By this time most of the Filipino elite had decided to work with the American government. Filipino soldiers fighting alongside the Americans were key to the U.S. victory.[94] The war devastated regions, divided Filipinos against each other, and led to many atrocities. Thousands of American soldiers died, as did many more thousands of Filipinos.[95] After Schurman returned home, McKinley tried again. To lead this second commission McKinley picked a federal appeals judge, one sitting on the same circuit court to which Day (returned from Paris) had been appointed. Day arranged an introduction. All were impressed with this young judge, William Howard Taft. It was Schurman all over again. McKinley asked Judge Taft to lead the commission. Taft answered, “Why, Mr. President, that would be impossible. I am not in sympathy with your policy. I don’t think we ought to take the Philippines.” “Neither do I,” McKinley retorted. “But that isn’t the question. We’ve got them. What I want you to do now is to go there and establish civil government.”[96] Taft’s work outlived McKinley, who was assassinated in September 1901. The civilian Taft commission clashed with the U.S. military and some jingo sentiment, but it forged a consensus that worked for Americans and a great many Filipinos, especially the much-discussed Filipino elite. That elite class, the ilustrados, continued to dominate the country’s politics, before and after independence. U.S. military rule ended in 1901. Taft became a civilian governor. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created a Bill of Rights and a process for nationwide elections. This codified an American protectorate with increasingly Filipino self-government. More legislation in 1916 advanced that objective. Advocates on both sides of the Pacific, including Filipinos, argued about whether or when to end the American protectorate and fix the date for full Filipino independence. The argument was settled in 1934. The Philippines transitioned to commonwealth status with full independence set for 1944 — a date delayed until 1946 because of another war.

Alternative Futures?

Studying the exercise of judgment, the main purpose of this essay is to offer a more educational “re-enactment” of a fateful choice, in light of the information and possibilities reasonably visible at the time. Carefully reconstructed, without the blinding effect of hindsight, McKinley does seem to have made remarkably deliberate, thoughtful choices at all five stages of his Philippines decisions. At each point he also improvised to get the best information he could from a system that did not naturally provide it. Whether, in hindsight, these decisions turned out to be “right” or “wrong” is a different question.  That question is worth a brief epilogue. After all, historians are like most citizens: They tend to praise ill-judged decisions that they think turned out well and condemn well-judged decisions that they think turned out badly. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to argue about McKinley’s decisions. Critics can stress the subsequent agony of the Philippine-American war, the legitimacy of Filipino aspirations, and note the patronizing incompetence of many American administrators. [quote id="8"] Yet it is still hard to sketch a plausible alternative path, one more peaceful and more prosperous, for an immediately independent Philippines. The self-government concerns were real. Such a Philippines would have had no American shield from other foreign intervention. That danger also was real. The German Empire snapped up all the Spanish Pacific possessions it could get, all that Spain had not ceded to the United States. The Filipinos also would not have had the trade openings to the American market that their business leaders considered vital. Nor would they have had the benefit of later American nation-building efforts and infrastructure investments, which were substantial.[97] It is not hard to imagine alternative paths that could have been worse, perhaps much worse. The histories of other lands liberated after longtime Spanish rule, from Mexico to Argentina, offer a picture book of tragic examples. And, as in much of Latin American history, arguments about alternative Filipino futures soon focus more attention on the fault lines within Filipino society itself, such as the divide between pro-American ilustrados and others. Such fault lines produced a nationwide insurgency after 1946 (the “Huk” insurrection). They remain fault lines in Filipino life today. Assessing the alternative futures for the United States are another matter. Americans could have shrugged and regarded the future of the islands and its inhabitants as someone else’s fault and someone else’s problem. The United States would have had little or no Filipino blood directly on its hands. American soldiers would not have engaged in a bitter war, stained by outrages of every kind. McKinley did not take the Philippine islands because he was confident that America would gain power or profit by it. In every aspect of his public and private life, McKinley was a man, like many then, who tried to live by codes of duty. In his Boston speech, McKinley explained his conception of America’s duty “after freeing the Filipinos from the domination of Spain” to prevent a descent of the islands into violent anarchy. He told his audience, frankly, that “It is sometimes hard to determine what is best to do, and the best thing to do is oftentimes the hardest. The prophet of evil would do nothing because he flinches at sacrifice and effort, and to do nothing is easiest and involves the least cost.” For McKinley, circumstances had placed the United States into a position of responsibility. To him and many of his contemporaries, abandoning the islands to their fate would not have ended that responsibility. It would merely have shirked it. Was the acquisition of the Philippines good for the United States? The liability side of the ledger is clearest: the horrors of the war and the burdens of occupation. The islands were never great net boons to U.S. trade. Nor was Manila a key to the China trade. The U.S. position in the Philippines did extend American military power across the Pacific in a new and lasting way. In the short run, the United States used this base to help with the multinational intervention during the Boxer crisis of 1900 in China. But later that year, after the immediate crisis had passed, McKinley pulled most U.S. troops out of China, over the bitter objections of Secretary of State Hay. McKinley did not wish to use those troops as chess pieces in the great game over China’s future.[98] There would come a time, though, when the U.S. military presence in the Philippines did change the course of the history of the world. But no one in 1899 could foresee how the American presence in the islands would figure in the analysis of grand strategists in Tokyo, studying their options during 1941.     Philip Zelikow is the White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia.  He has also served at all levels of American government.  He began his professional career as a trial and appellate lawyer in Texas and, after returning to graduate school and then teaching for the Navy, he joined the Foreign Service and served as a career diplomat.  He was posted overseas and in Washington, including service on the National Security Council staff for President George H.W. Bush.  His Ph.D. is from Tufts University's Fletcher School.  Since leaving regular government service in 1991 he has taught and directed research programs at Harvard and at Virginia.  At Virginia he directed the Miller Center of Public Affairs from 1998 to 2005.  While there, he directed the 2001 commission on national election reform, chaired by former Presidents Carter and Ford, that led directly to passage of the bipartisan Help America Vote Act of 2002.  He returned to full-time government service from 2003 to 2004, to direct the 9/11 Commission and again from 2005 to 2007 to serve as Counselor of the Department of State, a deputy to Secretary Rice.  In later academic service at Virginia, Zelikow was the dean in charge of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (2011 to 2014).  He was a member of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board for President Bush (2001to 2003) and for President Obama (2011 to 2013) and a member of the Defense Policy Board (2015 to 2017).  He has also advised the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s program in global development (2007 to 2012). His books include Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (1995, with Condoleezza Rice); The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (2001, with Ernest May); Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (rev. ed., 1999, with Graham Allison); and America's Moment: Creating Opportunity in the Connected Age (2015, drafted on behalf of the Markle Foundation group, "Rework America"). ISSN (Print): 2576-1021 ISSN(Online): 2576-1153 Image: Cornell University Library [post_title] => Why Did America Cross the Pacific? Reconstructing the U.S. Decision to Take the Philippines, 1898-99 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => america-cross-pacific-reconstructing-u-s-decision-take-philippines-1898-99 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-03-22 13:06:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-03-22 17:06:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?p=284 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => A closer examination of what led President William McKinley to take the Philippines reveals a series of deliberate and thoughtful choices that have often been overlooked or ignored. [pubinfo] => [issue] => Vol 1, Issue 1 [quotes] => Array ( [0] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => Grand strategies do not typically arise from visionary thinking about the future. They arise instead from the collective experience of some great disturbance... ) [1] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => For McKinley, getting his War Department ready for war was a hard problem. ) [2] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => For decades Americans had been arguing about how to assert themselves in the world. ) [3] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => The proposal to give up the Philippines could not be seen as “coming from us.” ) [4] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => However, McKinley said he could no longer see how to return liberated Manila to Spain. ) [5] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => Yet there is not good evidence that such racial views were held by McKinley and his inner circle. ) [6] => Array ( [author] => [style] => right [text] => The months leading to war had taken a toll on McKinley. He seemed visibly careworn and losing sleep. ) [7] => Array ( [author] => [style] => left [text] => McKinley did not take the Philippine islands because he was confident that America would gain power or profit by it. ) ) [style] => scholarly [type] => Scholarly [style_label] => The Scholar [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => 458 ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 102 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History [1936-1940], edited by Jan van der Dussen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 215; see also William Dray, History as Re-Enactment: R.G. Collingwood’s Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). "In imagining how things might have been different, the restrained counterfactualist tries to understand better what actually did happen." Allan Megill, Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 153. Following on work by James Fearon more than 20 years ago, there is also growing acceptance in political science that "[c]ounterfactuals can alert us to the possible operation of dynamics and pathways that we would otherwise be prone to ignore,” Robert Jervis, “Counterfactuals, Causation, and Complexity,” in Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, eds. Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 309-16. [2] Frank Hindman Golay, Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 443. From the 1920s until 1941, the U.S. Army’s top strategic planners had been pressing for a withdrawal from the Philippines and adoption of an Alaska-Hawaii-Panama defensive perimeter in the Pacific. Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 182-83. [3] On this logic chain in the Japanese war planning, see, for example, Tsunoda Jun, “The Navy’s Role in the Southern Strategy,” trans. Robert Scalapino, in The Fateful Choice: Japan’s Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941, ed. James William Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 244-48. [4] George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 320. [5] The original source is a 1903 article by James Rusling, recounting a meeting with President McKinley in November 1899. “Interview With President McKinley,” Christian Advocate, January 22, 1903. Rusling was no official; he had been at the White House with the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church and years later wrote up what he recalled for a church newspaper. McKinley was a lifelong Methodist. He had hosted a substantial White House reception for the committee the previous evening and this committee of Methodist bishops and church leaders had come to see the president and deliver a formal resolution of thanks. According to Rusling, McKinley asked the committee to play a role helping the Army vet people being appointed as Methodist chaplains (one such had just been court-martialed for misconduct). Since the Philippines issue was then much in the news, McKinley added an explanation of the reasons for his decision, which he had made a year earlier. In Rusling’s account, it is impossible to tell whether the high religiosity and florid prose is Rusling’s gloss (it turns out that Rusling had a characteristic style in these things) or was the style McKinley chose to adopt for this particular group. It is certainly not the way McKinley spoke about these matters to his colleagues in government. Yet it is, of course, the florid style and the religiosity that have given the quote its persistent allure. There are much more contemporaneous and detailed accounts of McKinley explaining his reasons, displaying quite a mastery of the substance, without any such diverting artifice or haloed color. See Ephraim K. Smith, “‘A Question From Which We Could Not Escape’: William McKinley and the Decision to Acquire the Philippine Islands,” Diplomatic History 9, no. 4 (October 1985): 363-75; see also Lewis Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), 109. [6] Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989), 108, 113. Karnow’s work is deservedly well-regarded. But, shaped by his own experience with the Vietnam War, Karnow also exemplifies the jaundiced mind-set. For background on the historiographical debate, see James Field Jr., “American Imperialism: The ‘Worst Chapter’ in Almost Any Book,” and comments by Walter LaFeber and Robert Beisner, American Historical Review 83 (June 1978): 644-83; and Ephraim Smith, “William McKinley’s Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands,” in Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath, ed. James Bradford (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 205-50. [7] The details of the Boston speech are all from a pamphlet prepared at the time that included photographs of the hall and the text of McKinley’s address as taken down by The Boston Globe. Souvenir of the Visit of President McKinley and Members of the Cabinet to Boston, February 1899 (Boston: Home Market Club, 1899). [8] Rep. Jeremiah Botkin, Congressional Record, April 12, 1898, 4149, 5151. [9] Another reason the war over Cuba is not mysterious is because the quality of historical work on the events leading to war is now very high. John Offner devoted much of his professional life to a thorough scouring of the evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. His account of the diplomacy and the run-up to the war is definitive. See John Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States & Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). [10] H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Kent: Kent State University Press, rev. ed., 2003), 26. The best biographies of McKinley are this one and the knowledgeable, beautifully written evocation by Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959). Nick Kapur has placed McKinley’s character firmly in the Victorian cultural context (including that era’s ethic of exhibiting manliness with rationality and self-restraint, rather than strenuous demonstration) along with other aspects of his values, including the then-common belief in arbitration of international disputes. Nick Kapur, “William McKinley’s Values and the Origins of the Spanish-American War: A Reinterpretation,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 2011): 18-38 (though Kapur can’t resist the silly Rusling quote). [11] William Allen White, The Autobiography of William Allen White (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 333. [12] Karl Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley: Why the Election of 1896 Still Matters (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015) offers the most detailed account of McKinley’s road to the candidacy, which was a much more challenging path than the one he faced in the general election against Bryan. The quote on McKinley’s reaction to the 1895 proposal conveyed by Hanna is on page 134. [13] Morgan, William McKinley, 210. [14] Hay to Adams, May 9, 1898, in Letters of John Hay, vol. 3 (New York: Gordian Press, 1969) (reprinting a privately printed collection of 1908), 122. [15] On the size of the U.S. Army, see Edward Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 3-4. Corbin quoted from his private autobiography, completed in 1906, 83 and 88, filed in the Corbin Papers, Box 11, Library of Congress. [16] John Davis Long, America of Yesterday: As Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long, ed. Lawrence Shaw Mayo (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly, 1923), 168-69, 186, 188 (entries for April 25 and May 5, 1898). [17] The authoritative source is John A.S. Grenville, “American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896-1898,” Journal of American Studies 2, no. 1 (April 1968): 33-47; see also John A.S. Grenville & George Berkeley Young, “The Influence of Strategy Upon History: The Acquisition of the Philippines,” in Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 267-76. Grenville’s 1966 account is useful but was partly superseded once he discovered the work of the 1897 Sicard Board, as recounted in his 1968 article. See also David Trask, The War With Spain in 1898 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 77-78; and Mark Hayes, “War Plans and Preparations and Their Impact on U.S. Naval Operations in the Spanish-American War,” March 1998, available in the online reading room of the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC). [18] The quote is from the Sicard Board plan of June 1897. The Philippines operations are treated in just one paragraph in the plan. Grenville, “American Naval Preparations,” 43. [19] Seward Livermore, “American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East, 1850-1914,” Pacific Historical Review 13, no. 2 (June 1944): 113, 116; see also John Maurer, “Coal, Oil, and American Naval Strategy, 1898-1925,” Naval War College Review 34, no. 6 (November 1981): 60, 62. [20] Ronald Spector, Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1974), 42-54. [21] See Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, 276-78; Trask, The War With Spain, 80-81. On Long’s review of what Roosevelt had done, see Long, America of Yesterday, 168-70. [22] Long, America of Yesterday, 184; John Long to Agnes Long, October 9, 1898, Long Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 79, 355-57; Whittlesey to Long, August 22, 1901, Spanish-American War — Battle of Manila Bay, NHHC (online document collection). [23] Dewey to Long, May 15, 1898, Spanish-American War — Blockade and Siege of Manila, NHHC (online document collection). [24] “If old Dewey …,” H.H. Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recollections of Our Presidents (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923), 68. Kohlsaat was an old friend, owner of the Chicago Times-Herald. McKinley’s more serious explanation was recorded in a detailed handwritten memorandum written by Chandler Anderson immediately after a meeting with President McKinley on November 19, 1898. Anderson was an attorney, secretary to the Anglo-American Joint High Commission, which had recently been appointed to arbitrate various disputes embroiling the United States and Canada. In his meeting with McKinley, Anderson was accompanying one of the commissioners, an influential Boston Republican, Thomas Jefferson Coolidge. Anderson’s record of the meeting, in his papers at the Library of Congress, was discovered by Ephraim Smith, who reprinted the memo in full in his article “‘A Question From Which We Could Not Escape,’” 368-71 (quote on pages 369-70). [25] On the orders and the estimative process to arrive at troop numbers, see Merritt to McKinley, May 13, 1898; Merritt to Corbin, May 17; Miles to Alger, May 18, all in Department of the Army, Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 643-44, 648-49, 654, 665. [26] The framing of the expedition is handled well in Leech, In the Days of McKinley, 210-11. For the details see War Department memo for Alger for the Cabinet meeting, May 17, 1898, forwarded by Alger to Corbin on May 25; Adee to Alger, May 21 (conveying Dewey information on Spanish strength); Dewey to Long, May 27 (forwarded to Alger); Corbin to Merritt, May 29, in Army, Correspondence, vol. 2, 654, 665, 675, 680. [27] On the situation in Manila Bay and the danger of the Spanish expedition led by Adm. Camara, see Trask, The War With Spain, 372-81. [28] For example in 1895, during the administration of Grover Cleveland, there had been a brief scare about war with Great Britain because the British Empire was supposed to have been bullying Venezuela over a boundary dispute. The furor, ostensibly an invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, by which the United States opposed European imperial ventures in the Western Hemisphere, was more a complaint about supposed British haughtiness. Business and political leaders on both sides had intervened to calm the situation. But, as much as any other episode, it was the neurotic quality of this Venezuela crisis that caused one perceptive historian of the period, Richard Hofstadter, to shake his head about an apparent sort of national “psychic crisis.” Richard Hofstadter, “Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” in The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 145-87. Kristin Hoganson recasts the psychic crisis as a gender crisis for males seeking martial tests to reaffirm their manhood. She is convincing that gendered insecurities were among the many insecurities of the age. But such insecurities were nonpartisan; they could be found on all sides of the war and expansion issues, and many who supported war in Cuba were against expansion. Her argument does not help much to explain the very specific choices made about the Philippines. Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Hofstadter’s essay is still a convincing general scene-setter for the period. The best analysis of American public opinion about imperial expansion in this period remains Ernest May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (Chicago, Imprint Publications, rev. ed., 1991). It is a study of the origins and transmission belts for elite opinion. May shows an elite consensus against such expansion before the mid-1890s. The anti-expansionist consensus returned by the early 1900s. In between, the elites were split. This invited the wider public to pick a side. See also the cultural survey of Gilded Age attitudes toward the world thoroughly canvassed in Frank Ninkovich, Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1890 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); and the fine period portrait in David Traxel, 1898: The Birth of the American Century (New York: Random House, 1998). [29] May, American Imperialism, 166. [30] Ernest May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), 122-23. [31] “While we are conducting war …,” Charles Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), 165. [32] Long, America of Yesterday, 183 (entry for April 20). [33]Corbin added that, after getting this letter, “while treating the General [Miles] with the consideration due his rank and position, [McKinley] never sought his advice and never gave it any weight when offered.” Autobiography, Corbin Papers, 88-89. [34] George Cortelyou journal entry, May 15, 1898, George Cortelyou Papers, Library of Congress. Cortelyou was McKinley’s main secretary, preparing and handling correspondence and paperwork. Cortelyou made his journal notes at the time in shorthand; they were typed up much later. [35] Leech, In the Days of McKinley, 232-38. [36] “Strong man,” Cortelyou Journal, Cortelyou Papers, June 17, 1898, Library of Congress. The Root quote is from Morgan, William McKinley, 210-11. Cortelyou commented to his diary that “The President is alert and when all the facts are known it will be seen how well he has kept the reins in his own hands.” Cortelyou Papers (entry for August 8). [37] Cortelyou Papers, April 16, 1898; for a contemporary and flattering biographical sketch of Day, see Henry McFarland, “William R. Day: A New Statesman of the First Rank,” Review of Reviews (U.S.) (September 1898): 275-79. [38] Moore impressed Long too. “The most accomplished man that has yet been connected with that Department,” he noted in his diary. Long, America of Yesterday, 189 (entry for May 6). [39] The question was posed to Hay on May 8 by Joseph Chamberlain, the very pro-American colonial secretary. Hay’s original message relaying the question did not name Chamberlain as the source; Day asked for this clarification and Hay provided it. See May, Imperial Democracy, 224; Offner, An Unwanted War, 198. [40] John Bassett Moore Papers, Box 192, Library of Congress. In early June, Moore wrote out a private memorandum for the record, preserved in his papers, in which he carefully recounted the chronology of the work on this peace move. [41] See Trask, The War With Spain, 172-73. [42] Moore Papers, Library of Congress, quoting from his private memorandum and from his appended copies of the “terms of peace” message from Day to Hay, June 3, 1898; Hay’s reply of June 6; and Day’s explanation to Hay, June 7. Had these terms been shared with other Cabinet members, such as Long, or had there been a Cabinet meeting on it, there would likely have been reference to it in one of the various diaries kept by Long, or by the Cabinet’s de facto secretary, Cortelyou, or by Charles Dawes, among others. Offner notes how the peace terms were separately provided to, and reported home by, the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote. An Unwanted War, 200. Offner does not discuss the extraordinary political risk McKinley had undertaken by secretly advancing such terms. Consciousness of this risk is obvious in Day’s June 7 message to Hay. To counter the image of a weak McKinley and show how assertive he was, Lewis Gould argues that the preparation of the Philippine expedition in May shows that from May 2 onward, McKinley never gave “serious consideration to relinquishing the archipelago.” Gould’s wish to rehabilitate McKinley’s leadership is a good one. But this particular argument is contradicted by the peace terms McKinley secretly outlined to the great powers, via Day, on June 3, and other episodes later. Gould is aware of some of this secret diplomacy but does not reconcile it with his argument. Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley, 63. That McKinley would undertake such a move, at such risk, validates Gould’s argument about McKinley’s vigor, but in a different way. And McKinley was not nearly done musing about the future of the Philippines. [43] Lodge, replying to Roosevelt’s first letter on May 24, seemed confident that the administration was making due haste to send a large expedition to the Philippines, but Lodge said nothing about the future of the islands. He agreed about Puerto Rico — that is the context for his oft-quoted remark about the administration agreeing with his “large policy.” Henry Cabot Lodge and Charles Redmond, eds., Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, vol. 1 (New York: Da Capo, 1971, orig. 1925), 298-301. [44] Day to Hay, June 7, in Moore Papers. Hay passed along these cautions to the British prime minister, Lord Salisbury, who had already passed on the American peace terms to the Austrians having relied, Salisbury explained, on the parallel report he had received from Pauncefote about these terms. [45] Hay to McKinley, June 10, 1898, reprinted in Olcott, Life of McKinley, vol. 2, 131-32; Offner, An Unwanted War, 200-03; Trask, The War With Spain, 425-26, 607 note 6. [46] On the war developments in July 1898, the standard account remains Trask, The War With Spain. [47] Albert Shaw, “The Progress of the World,” Review of Reviews (U.S.) (June 1898): 643, 651-52. See also the articles on the Philippines that Shaw included in that issue. [48] John Foreman, “Spain and the Philippine Islands,” Contemporary Review (July 1, 1898): 20. There were hardly any books about the Spanish colony, only one comprehensive study having come out in the last 50 years. A few years later Foreman himself remedied this gap, publishing the most comprehensive study of the islands then available. The Philippine Islands (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 3rd ed., 1906). Cortelyou recorded getting the full article for McKinley. The president had already been reading excerpts from it and wanted to see the rest. Cortelyou journal, August 1, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers. Foreman’s views were more nuanced and informed than those of American “experts” whose views were in wide circulation that summer. Of these the most prolific was a zoologist named Dean Worcester, who had made a scientific expedition to the Philippines during the early 1890s. Worcester offered vivid and extreme views of Spanish misrule and Filipino incapacity. See “Spanish Rule in the Philippines,” The Cosmopolitan, October 1897, 587 (written with his traveling companion, Frank Bourns, who would return to the Philippines with the Army expedition in 1898); “Admiral Dewey and the Philippines,” The Independent, May 12, 1898, 5; “In Manila: First Half,” The Independent, June 16, 1898, 5; “A Pen Picture of Manila,” New York Daily Tribune, June 24, 1898. Worcester would later be enlisted into U.S. administration of the islands. The recently departed, now returned, American consul in Manila, Oscar Williams, had been there only about a month. He also wrote of cruel and “barbarous” Spanish misdeeds and repeatedly extolled America’s opportunity to take over the islands. E.g., Williams to Day, May 12, June 16, and July 2, 1898, in U.S. Senate, Message From the U.S. President Transmitting a Treaty of Peace … and Accompanying Papers, 55th Congress, Senate Doc. 62, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 327-31 (hereafter cited as Peace Treaty Papers). [49] On the views of the naval minister, Alfred von Tirpitz, as characterized in the memoir of Foreign Minister (and later Chancellor) Prince Bernhard von Bulow, and the quote from an instruction to the German ambassador in Washington, see May, Imperial Democracy, 228-29. [50] Lord Rosebery, 1895, quoted in T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1. [51] Hay to McKinley, March 26, 1898, in Day Papers. This and other handwritten letters appear to have been turned over to Day after McKinley read them. [52] The British had made their request for joint action on China in early March 1898, conveyed directly by their ambassador to McKinley. Otte, The China Question, 112. [53] Hay to McKinley, June 30, 1898, in Day Papers. In his June 30 letter Hay commented that he was writing to McKinley in this way to avoid making an official record. In that era, all regular reports to the secretary of state (and the secretaries of war and the Navy) were usually published after a short interval. Hay wanted to keep the British request for joint action in China out of the official record so that an American rejection would not become public and thereby embarrass the British. The issue of American action to keep an open door in China would return to the agenda in 1899 and 1900. At that time — perhaps remembering the Monroe Doctrine example of John Quincy Adams in 1823 — Hay (by then the secretary of state) and McKinley would act unilaterally. They would also stress an interest in preserving an independent China from partition. That latter object was not so important to London. [54] Foreman, “Spain and the Philippine Islands,” 29-30; Shaw, “The Progress of the World,” 652-53. [55] See, e.g., Day to Pratt, June 16, 1898; Dewey to Long, June 27, 1898, both in William Day Papers, Library of Congress. [56] Lodge to Roosevelt, June 24, July 12, and July 23, 1898 (in the last, Lodge writing that the president’s “imagination is touched by the situation [in the Philippines], and I think he grasps it fully”), in Lodge and Redmond, eds., Selections From the Correspondence, 313, 323, 330. Roosevelt replied at one point that “the average New York [political] boss is quite willing to allow you to do what you wish in such trivial matters as war and the acquisition of Porto Rico and Hawaii, provided you don’t interfere with the really vital questions, such as giving out contracts for cartage in the Custom House and interfering with the appointment of street sweepers.” Roosevelt to Lodge, July 31, 1898, ibid., 334. On Lodge’s proposal to keep Luzon and make a deal with Britain for the rest, William Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 115. [57] The naval moves and some of the diplomacy were evident. What the Americans did not know was that, in mid-August, the Germans began secret negotiations with the Spanish that would end with German acquisition of all the islands in the Spanish East Indies that the U.S. did not get under the peace treaty. In this fashion the Germans acquired the Caroline Islands, the Palau Islands, and the Marianas, except for Guam. This added to their already substantial Pacific possessions in New Guinea, the Marshall Island,s and the Bismarck Archipelago. See Pearle Quinn, “The Diplomatic Struggle for the Carolines, 1898,” Pacific Historical Review 14, no. 3 (September 1945): 290-302. [58] Day memo for the record, July 15, 1898, in Day Papers. [59] Hay to Day, July 28, 1898, in McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; Hay to Carnegie, August 22, 1898, Letters of John Hay, vol. 3, 129-30 (emphasis in original). [60] I do not count, and do not think anyone in Washington counted, the dispatches of Consul Williams (cited above) as a serious analysis of the situation. So far, Dewey had not offered any substantial assessments beyond the military strength of the Spanish forces. [61] On the Cabinet discussions, see Olcott, Life of William McKinley, vol. 2, 61-63; Offner, An Unwanted Peace, 213-17; Long, America of Yesterday, 210 (entry for July 27). Olcott based his account on interviews with several participants in the Cabinet meeting. The quote from the senator is from Olcott, as is the conclusion that the wait-for-more-information view was the one “which finally prevailed.” The evolution of the draft armistice terms was interesting. On his stationery, McKinley noted the essence of each planned term. For the article on the Philippines he scribbled: “The military possession of Manila city & port until a commission determines the whole matter as to [indecipherable, perhaps “the claims”] insurgents etc.” Moore then drafted an elaboration of this, saying the commissioners would figure out what the United States was “justly entitled” to have and “taking into consideration the rights and claims of the Philippine insurgents and any duty which the United States may be under to them and the future security and good government of the islands.” The language about U.S. entitlement and insurgent claims was lined out during the next edit. Then, after further discussion, the whole article was simplified to the form finally adopted, except that the word “disposition” was originally proposed as “possession.” The drafting process indicates the thrust of the discussion. Notes are in the Cortelyou Papers. McKinley’s key aide, Charles Dawes, debriefed by one of the Cabinet members, noted at the time in his diary, “the Philippines situation to be subject of consideration by a commission of Americans and Spaniards. While the President is very conservative in his belief as to the policy of handling the Philippines situation, he wants the facts to be carefully considered, without the consideration involving the loss of any present advantage.” Charles Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years, ed. Bascom Timmons (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1950), 166. [62] For the other commissioners, McKinley initially started out with a list of conservatives, without any known jingoes already advocating acquisition of the Philippines. McKinley’s initial preferences, on July 31, were to supplement Day with William Allison (leader of the Republican Senate caucus), Supreme Court Justice Henry Brown, George Hoar (Massachusetts senator known to oppose expansion), and either Elihu Root (prominent New York lawyer), Chauncey Depew (a railroad magnate then seeking entry into public life), or a California Republican, George Gorham, to replace Hoar if Hoar was disqualified by his public stance. He was also considering his former ambassador to Spain, Stewart Woodford. Dawes, Journal, 167 (entry for July 31). The president did not fully revise these selections until more than a month later, in early September. It was then that he supplemented Day with three expansionists, though their specific views on the Philippines were still evolving: Whitelaw Reid (prominent editor, former minister to France and the 1892 Republican vice presidential candidate), Cushman Davis (senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), and William Frye (another Republican senator). Then he added a conservative Democratic senator he respected, a known anti-annexationist, George Gray. [63] On Greene’s background, there are various stories in The New York Times and other papers, including his obituary published on May 16, 1921. Greene’s father was George Sears Greene, whose distinguished Civil War record included a critical role in the defense of Culp’s Hill on the second day of the Gettysburg battle. His brothers had distinguished records too; one was the executive officer of the USS Monitor. Francis Greene’s first book was F.V. Greene, The Russian Army and Its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878 (New York: D. Appleton, 1879). Greene’s correspondence with Roosevelt is in Box 2 of the F.V. Greene Papers, New York Public Library. In one of these letters, Roosevelt wrote to Greene: “I don’t want Cuba. But in strict confidence (for to say this publicly would make me look like an Evening Post jingo) I should welcome almost any war, for I think the country needs one ….” He thought a war might come with Japan and “least improbable” was war with Spain. TR to Greene, September 23, 1897. Corbin’s comment on Greene is in the private autobiography, page 90, in Corbin Papers. [64] See Allen to Dewey, August 13, 1898; Dewey to Long, August 20, 1898, in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898, vol. 2: Appendix to the Bureau of Navigation report, 55th Congress, House Doc. No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), 122-23; Greene diary, Box 4, Greene Papers (entry of August 18 discusses the conference with Dewey and Merritt). [65] Greene diary, (entries for Augugst 25, 26, 28, 29, 30 and associated papers), Greene Papers. Greene’s well-connected associate is identified in his diary only as ALB, whom I have not been able to identify. Another source is a detailed private memoir of this part of Greene’s service, which he presented in 1915 as an address on “The Future of the Philippines” to the New York City Republican Club, also in his papers. Other sources: Army, Correspondence, vol. 2, 764-65; Dewey to Long, August 29, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers. Initially, Dewey told Greene that he was “greatly disturbed” that Greene would be leaving Manila, given the situation, but that he would ask Washington to place Greene in “supreme command” of the U.S. expedition in the Philippines. Just before Greene left, Dewey told Greene he had decided not to write a cable requesting that Greene be put in command of the Philippines (replacing Otis) “on account creating bad feeling in Army.” Greene diary. [66] Greene to Day, September 5, 1898, with Greene diary, Greene Papers. Greene preserved the original ciphered version, showing his work. It is reasonable to assume the message was received, at least by the recipient telegraph office, given the protocols of transmitting important cables in this era. I have not found this message in Day’s papers, but Day does not appear to have preserved unofficial messages of this kind. Greene had exchanged unofficial messages with Day the week before; those are not preserved in Day’s papers either. Assuming Day did receive the message, he would have shared it with McKinley. Based on Greene’s later discussions with McKinley at the end of September, Margaret Leech discussed how influential Greene was in her 1959 book, In the Days of McKinley, 331, 334-36. But later scholars touched lightly or not at all on his role, and neither she nor others had explored Greene’s papers. So, for example, Leech was not aware of this earlier message of September 5, which McKinley presumably knew about (along with Dewey’s August 29 cable) before he prepared instructions to the peace commissioners on September 16. [67] All quotations are from Whitelaw Reid’s diary. H. Wayne Morgan, ed., Making Peace With Spain: The Diary of Whitelaw Reid, September-December 1898 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), 25, 28, 30-31 (entries for September 14 and 16). McKinley had recently made a similar comment to Cortelyou, that “the people could be trusted but were hasty and unreasonable some times … the clamor would soon be for the return of our troops from Porto Rico and Manila.” Cortelyou diary (entry for August 23), Cortelyou Papers. When McKinley put Reid on the peace commission, he may not have realized how expansionist Reid’s views had become.  His earlier public comments had emphasized “grave apprehensions” and been more ambivalent. Whitelaw Reid, “The Territory with Which We Are Threatened,” Century (September 1898): 788-794. In the instructions to commissioners Moore drafted them to say that the U.S. would “be content with” Luzon; Reid intervened to rewrite this as “cannot accept less” than Luzon. McKinley went along with this. But McKinley’s typed and annotated further suggestions, passed to Day, also mentioned that if territory were returned to Spain, “a guarantee of kindlier government to the people and of larger civil and religious liberty to the native population is important.” Day Papers. Many years later, Moore recalled McKinley’s “public spirit, courage, integrity, and delicate sense of honor.” Moore to Wilder Spaulding, August 17, 24, 28, 1940, Box 161, Moore Papers. [68] The interview is in “Failure for Agoncillo,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 28, 1898, 7. As would be evident later, an American protectorate was an idea that Aguinaldo was ready to consider. Agoncillo had been learning from Greene too, during their trip, sharing a sense of mutual respect. But Agoncillo also was urging Aguinaldo to acquire all the arms he could, just in case. Agoncillo’s side of the story, including his reports to Aguinaldo, are discussed in the conscientious history later written by a descendant of his family, Teodoro Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 321-28. [69] Greene diary (entries for September 27, 28, 29, 30; October 1, 3, 4); Greene, “The Future of the Philippines,” 11-12, 16, 18-19, Greene Papers. The five-page record of the Agoncillo-McKinley meeting is in the McKinley Papers, along with an accompanying memorandum Agoncillo presented. For Agoncillo’s papers forwarded by Greene, see Peace Treaty Papers, 429-31. For a sympathetic portrayal of Agoncillo (but with a number of inaccuracies), see Esteban De Ocampo with Alfredo Saulo, First Filipino Diplomat: Felipe Agoncillo (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1976), especially 82-87. [70] Greene, “The Future of the Philippines,” 17 (emphasis in original). This little memoir/address of 1915 was carefully prepared for a knowledgeable audience. One of McKinley’s more influential Cabinet members, former Attorney General John Griggs, was there. It is evident from the text that Greene, a professional engineer and sometime historian, drew from his contemporary notes and other documents in drafting this account. Ephraim Smith quotes the slip of paper where Greene listed these five options, but Smith believed they were part of his full report, which was then amended before being sent on to Paris. Smith, “‘A Question From Which We Could Not Escape,’” 372, note 25. Greene’s 1915 address explains that this was a separate document he had prepared just for McKinley. He had already cabled the essence of this argument to Day on September 5. [71] F.V. Greene, “Memoranda Concerning the Situation in the Philippines on August 30, 1898,” September 30, 1898, 35 (typescript with handwritten annotations), Cortelyou Papers. The report was sent to the commissioners and was included with the official documents in McKinley’s report to Congress accompanying the peace treaty. Peace Treaty Papers, 404-29. [72] Greene, “Memoranda,” 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46. Greene’s assessment of the views of the Filipino elite appears to have been accurate. See Teodoro Agoncillo, Malolos, 317-18, 327, 374-76. On the question of whether Luzon could be separated from the other islands, McKinley had also sought advice in a meeting with a well-placed shipping executive who knew the Pacific trade. He heard from this source that it was not feasible to take just Manila or Luzon because of Manila’s role as a hub in inter-island trade and tariff collection. Pierre Smith to McKinley, September 15, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers. [73] Greene, “The Future of the Philippines,” 20, Greene Papers. [74] Merritt’s testimony and the expert statements are in Peace Treaty Papers, 362-83 (including the separate written statements from Greene, Bourns and Bell), 441-71 (Foreman statement). For the way these views were summarized for McKinley, which is what is quoted in the text, see Day to Hay, October 7 (Commission report no. 3) and October 9, 1898 (Commission report no. 8), in Hay Papers, Library of Congress; see also Reid to McKinley, October 4; Reid to Hay, October 16, 1898 (letters that would have arrived at least a week later), in David Contosta and Jessica Hawthorne, eds., Rise to World Power: Selected Letters of Whitelaw Reid (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1986), 44-46. The reports coming in from Gen. Otis in Manila were also upbeat, more so than Dewey’s October 14 wire, discussed below. E.g., Otis to Corbin, October 19, 1898, in Cortelyou Papers. [75] The undated letter from Maj. Bourns is in the Cortelyou Papers, General Correspondence, quotes are from Pages 2 and 6 of the letter. The name and position of the author is penned on the last page, in what looks like McKinley’s handwriting. The letter opens to its unnamed addressee with the warning, “Will write a bit this morning about things political, but this must all be confidential and not under any circumstances for publication.” It will help to place Bourns a bit by understanding that in this era Army surgeons were major figures in the life of Army posts. They could have influence and relationships with commanders well beyond their formal rank. It is possible that Bourns knew Corbin or one of Corbin’s officers and that the letter was conveyed to McKinley through this back channel. Bourns had traveled to the Philippines in the early 1890s with Dean Worcester, whose tone in writing about Filipinos was more supercilious. The other Army officer Bourns referred to in his letter as really understanding Filipinos was Maj. J. Franklin Bell. Bell had become Merritt’s chief of intelligence, working beyond American lines and with the insurgents. Bell also provided a statement for the commissioners, cited above, and had worked with Greene. Bell would go on to become a major figure in the Philippine-American war and eventually rise to Army chief of staff. [76] Dewey to Long, October 14, 1898, in McKinley Papers (this appears to have been relayed to McKinley just after his departure on his trip). [77] Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley, 104 and, for more details about this electoral trip and the themes McKinley emphasized, 103-06; see also “Philippines: President Determined to Demand Archipelago,” The New York Times, October 16, 1898, clipping in McKinley Papers. [78] See John Offner, “Imperialism by International Consensus: The United States and the Philippine Islands,” in Daniela Rossini, ed., From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy (Staffordshire: Keele University Press, 1995), 45-54; for more on the Spanish view of the negotiation, also see Offner, “The Philippine Settlement: The United States, Spain, and Great Britain in 1898,” in Luis Gonzalez Vales, ed., 1898: Enfoques y Perspectivas (San Juan: Academia Puertorriquena de la Historia, 1997), 353-70. [79] Long quoted in Trask, The War With Spain, 466. For McKinley’s instructions: Hay to Day, October 28, 1898, in State Department reports, Papers Relating to the Treaty With Spain, 56th Congress, 2nd session, Senate Doc. No. 148 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 37-38. The instructions had already been drafted by McKinley (a handwritten draft is in his papers) for Hay to send when the cabled recommendations of the commissioners began coming in. Hay held off on sending the instructions until McKinley had read the recommendations. Hay to McKinley, October 27, 1898, in McKinley Papers. But there is no sign that McKinley materially changed the substance of his original draft. A draft October 26 instruction, included mistakenly in the 1898 FRUS volume and often quoted by historians, was in fact not the one that McKinley sent. Richard Leopold, “The Foreign Relations Series: A Centennial Estimate,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 49, no. 4 (March 1963): 595, 598-99 no. 12. Three of the commissioners had recommended taking all the islands. Not knowing his president’s wishes, Day had held to the original view of no more than Luzon, but it seems evident that Day’s views were evolving to the necessity of taking most of the archipelago. Sen. Gray dissented, arguing that the United States had neither duty nor interests in holding any of the islands. See Peace Commissioners to Hay, October 25, 1898, in State Department reports, Papers Relating to the Treaty, 32-36; Morgan, Making Peace With Spain, 88-89 (entry for October 19). [80] Interview with President McKinley, November 19, 1898, Anderson Papers, in Smith, “‘A Question From Which We Could Not Escape,’” 369-70. [81] Japan took control of these German island possessions as a result of World War I. The United States would face the consequences of Japanese control of these island chains during World War II. [82] On the variety of elite opinion and arguments in the treaty debate, see May, American Imperialism, 192-206; David Healy, U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).  On the pro-expansion view of many reformers, see William Leuchtenburg, “Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39, no. 3 (December 1952): 483-504. An interesting example is the position of Woodrow Wilson, who by 1898 was a prestigious academic commentator on American government. Breaking with some of his fellow Democrats, Wilson publicly argued that the United States had the duty to take the Philippines (and Hawaii) in order to prevent other colonial powers from taking them. In 1901 Wilson argued, in The Atlantic, that Americans should help “undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their natural growth … inducting them into the rudiments of justice and freedom.” John Milton Cooper Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 2009), 75-76. [83] David Healy, The United States in Cuba 1898-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 167. Paul Holbo had long ago noted that McKinley had headed off would-be Cuban annexationists even before war broke out and that, “The pattern established in Cuba was important.  [McKinley] subsequently pursued a virtually identical course in dealing with the Philippine Islands.” Paul Holbo, “Presidential Leadership in Foreign Affairs: William McKinley and the Turpie-Foraker Amendment,” American Historical Review 72, no. 4 (July 1967): 1321, 1334. In his Cuba Between Empires 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 212-327, 368-70, Louis Perez, Jr. concentrates, convincingly, on the annexationist intentions of key Americans such as Gen. Leonard Wood. But his story also reveals the constant disappointment and frustration of Wood and his annexationist allies. The Cubans had something to do with Wood’s disappointment. So did McKinley. [84] Corbin to Otis, relaying McKinley’s instructions of December 21, sent December 27, 1898, in Army, Correspondence, 858-59. “Although the butt of many a sardonic comment, McKinley’s ‘benevolent assimilation’ policy was of vital importance,” Brian Linn has argued. It “established conciliation as the cornerstone of military policy in the Philippines.” Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 30-31. [85] Jacob Gould Schurman, Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1902), 2-4; Schurman to McKinley, January 11, 1899; Schurman to Alonzo Cornell, January 12, 1899, in Schurman Papers, Cornell University. The other commissioners coming from the United States were Charles Denby, who been the U.S. minister in China for 12 years and Dean Worcester, who had already been writing on the topic, a University of Michigan professor who had lived in the Philippines during the early 1890s. The remaining commissioners would be Dewey and Gen. Otis. For more on Worcester, who had been quite active calling for American acquisition of the Philippines, see Peter Stanley, “‘The Voice of Worcester Is the Voice of God’: How One American Found Fulfillment in the Philippines,” in Stanley, ed., Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 117-42. [86]For a similar account, from Agoncillo’s side, see Teodoro Agoncillo, Malolos, 357-59. Earlier, in December 1898, Aguinaldo had signaled his openness to an American protectorate of a Filipino republic, without clarifying the inherent tension between the responsibilities of a protectorate and the nature of independence. One Filipino scholar has therefore criticized Agoncillo for not sending along the American assurances he received from Greene, arguing that such assurances could have avoided the outbreak of conflict in February 1899. H.A. Villanueva, “A Chapter of Filipino Diplomacy,” Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review 17, no. 2 (June 1952): 121, 123. Teodoro Agoncillo disagreed, regarding such a conflict as inevitable and appropriate. Malolos, 710-11 note 97. By the end of 1898 Greene had been promoted to major-general and put in command of a division in Cuba, but his service there had then not been needed. Greene was very impressed by the difficulty the Americans would have faced if they had assaulted Havana. As Greene returned to civilian life, McKinley had another long meeting with him at the end of December. Greene, “The Future of the Philippines,” 12-15, 20 (reading in part from Greene to Hay, February 3, 1900), in Greene Papers. See also “History of Manila Trouble,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 5, 1899, 1. [87] See Leech, In the Days of McKinley; Corbin, private autobiography; and Long, America of Yesterday. [88] Frank Ninkovich has a thoughtful study of the spectrum of American attitudes at the time about race and foreign cultures in Global Dawn, 137-231. [89] On the suggestion to rely on Bourns, see Corbin to Otis, December 30, 1898, at Army, Correspondence, 864-65. The reports from Otis had been deceptively reassuring. He reported that the “great majority of men of property desire annexation.” Though many others sought plunder, the insurgents were divided and quarreling. There was much “suppressed excitement,” but Otis was confident his troops “can meet emergencies.” If the excitement could remain suppressed for a few days, “believe that affairs will greatly improve.” Conditions were “improving. Incendiarism and mob violence in city all that is feared.” Otis thought the insurgents wanted “qualified independence under United States protection.” The excitement was diminishing. There was “more moderation in demands.” E.g., Otis to Corbin, December 22, 30, 1898; Alger to Otis, December 30, 1898; Corbin to Otis, January 1, 1899; Otis to Corbin, January 2, 8; Corbin to Otis relaying personal message from McKinley, January 8; Otis to Corbin, January 10, 11, 14, 16 and 27, in Army, Correspondence, 860, 864-66, 872-73, 876-80, 888. [90] Cortelyou diary (entry for February 4, 1899), Cortelyou Papers. [91] On the “conservative men” in the Senate and their decisive role, May, Imperial Democracy, 261. [92] Souvenir of the Visit of President McKinley and Members of the Cabinet to Boston, February 1899. [93] On the failed peace efforts of March to June 1899 see Agoncillo, Malolos, 398-405, 515-18 (describing the strength of Filipino leaders who favored a conciliatory peace based on “autonomy”); Golay, Face of Empire, 48-51; see also Karnow, In Our Image, 150-53, 156; and, on the quarrels within the Schurman commission, engineered (in his telling) by Dean Worcester, see Stanley, “‘The Voice of Worcester,’” 128-30. Filipino historians tend to interpret the internal Filipino struggles as a class conflict between the land-owning, educated, and privileged class, which wished to get or maintain power, and the frustrations of the illiterate and impoverished peasant masses. The interests of the revolutionary peasant masses are associated by these historians with the more warlike revolutionary leader Apolinario Mabini. Those favoring peace and more willing to work with the Americans are associated with the educated or privileged ilustrado elite. Aguinaldo is portrayed trying, impossibly, to balance and lead both factions. From this view, the privileged elite “emerged as the true victors in the Philippine revolution, politically, socially and economically.” Milagros Camayon Guerrero, Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902 (Quezon City: Anvil Publishing, 2015), 164; see also Teodoro Agoncillo (an admirer of Mabini who attacks the “plutocrats” who were willing to settle for autonomy), Malolos, 463-64, 483-89. [94]Although he sides with those who fought for complete independence, Teodoro Agoncillo acknowledges that such a fight had little chance of success, given the divided views among Filipinos themselves. Malolos, 662-68. McKinley soon overhauled the War Department. He dismissed Alger. Greene was put forward as a candidate for secretary of war by Theodore Roosevelt, who advocated for Greene “with all the force characteristic of him.” But McKinley had already settled on Elihu Root, a much-admired New York lawyer whom McKinley thought might have the breadth to take on these new tasks in Cuba and the Philippines. Roosevelt later suggested that Greene should replace Otis as commander in the Philippines. But McKinley thought it would undermine the war effort to replace Otis mid-campaign. On the selection of Root, “a man of strangely strong analytical and judicial mind” who “could more thoroughly analyze a problem of government than any man I have ever known,” and Roosevelt’s push for Greene, see private autobiography of Corbin, 99-101, in Corbin Papers. On the idea of Greene replacing Otis, see Roosevelt to Hay, cc’d to Greene, July 1, 1899; Roosevelt to Greene, July 10, 1899 (McKinley spoke “most warmly” of you, but …), in Greene Papers. Greene returned to business and history writing. His last major stint in public service was a year as the New York City police commissioner. [95] The most thorough account now is Linn, The Philippine War. For an earlier and more negative appraisal see Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). [96] Olcott, Life of McKinley, vol. 2, 174-75 (based on Olcott’s interviews with Taft and Day); see Corbin autobiography, 101, Corbin Papers. In 1902 Schurman came out strongly advocating setting an early fixed date for Philippine independence. See generally Kenneth Hendrickson Jr., “Reluctant Expansionist: Jacob Gould Schurman and the Philippine Question,” Pacific Historical Review 36, no. 4 (November 1967): 405-21. Day would go on to serve as an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. After becoming president of the United States, Taft would later rejoin Day on the bench when he became the Supreme Court’s chief justice. [97] For a critical modern appraisal of the U.S. nation-building efforts, see Peter Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). For a somewhat more generous appraisal, though focused only on the period of military government, see John Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (New York: Praeger, 1973). Neither book attempts much comparative reflection on the range of possibilities presented by the course of national development in other nations that won liberation from Spanish rule during the 19th century. Historians of Latin American liberation would quickly recognize the familiar patterns of collaboration between American and Filipino elites and the stereotyping of good and “savage” segments of the population by the ruling elites of both countries, which is the pattern portrayed in Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).Filipinos ended up constructing “a unique economic system, crony capitalism, that depended on privileged access to United States markets, aid, and multilateral lending.” Filipinos did a very good job of figuring out how to manipulate U.S. policies to their advantage. Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippine Relations, 1942-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 3. Cullather is right, except that such systems of crony capitalism are hardly “unique” to the Philippines case. [98] Betty Talbert, “The Evolution of John Hay’s China Policy,” unpublished Ph.D. diss., 1974, 304-14; see also Kenton Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 151. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => [contents] => ) ) ) [post_count] => 7 [current_post] => -1 [in_the_loop] => [post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 544 [post_author] => 164 [post_date] => 2018-04-10 06:00:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-04-10 10:00:41 [post_content] =>

1. Max Boot’s Revisionist Look at Vietnam

By Mark Atwood Lawrence Could the United States have won in Vietnam if only Americans had made different decisions about how to fight the war there? For the most part, academic historians have said no. The South Vietnamese state was so flawed and the reservoir of Soviet and Chinese support for the communist war effort so vast, runs the argument, that Washington had no meaningful chance of victory, no matter how adroitly it used its vast power.[1] However, a small handful of historians has long begged to differ. These “revisionists” argue that the United States could have achieved its goal — a secure, anti-communist South Vietnam capable of enduring into the indefinite future — if only it had chosen its methods more wisely. To be sure, proponents of this outlook vary widely in their assessments of precisely what went wrong and what could have been done better. Some focus on military decisions, others on the political or diplomatic realms. But the basic point is the same: American leaders stole defeat from the jaws of victory through bad choices. The “lost-victory” argument first took root in the wartime years, when Lyndon Johnson’s critics excoriated him for failing to wage the war with sufficient boldness. It gained new traction in the 1970s, when Henry Kissinger and his supporters assailed Congress for reneging on U.S. obligations to defend South Vietnam following the 1973 ceasefire, sabotaging a peace deal that would otherwise have established a secure nation.[2] Such views gained additional legitimacy a few years later when revisionism jumped from the realm of naked partisanship into the world of history writing. In America in Vietnam, the first comprehensive revisionist account of the war, political scientist Guenter Lewy contended that the war was winnable if the United States had only prioritized counterinsurgency operations. Lewy also blamed antiwar activists for creating the myth that the United States was inevitably doomed by the complexities of Vietnamese politics.[3] Retired Army Col. Harry G. Summers Jr. followed in 1982 with On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, which took revisionism in a different direction by criticizing civilian leaders for doing too little to mobilize the American public and the U.S. military for failing to use its overwhelming conventional superiority to block the infiltration of supplies and troops from North to South Vietnam.[4] But the real heyday of Vietnam revisionism has been the last couple of decades, when a new group of authors has drawn on mountains of newly available source material to make the case in unprecedented detail. First came Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, which argues that U.S. forces fought effectively in the years after the Tet Offensive and commanded the battlefield to an extent unrecognized by the politicians who pulled the plug on the American military effort.[5] A few years later, Mark Moyar published Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, which delves into the years before the arrival of U.S. combat forces. During that time, argues Moyar, American advisers working alongside South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem made steady progress toward bolstering a viable state. But craven political leaders, abetted by self-serving journalists, torpedoed the whole enterprise by conspiring in Diem’s overthrow, an event that exacerbated South Vietnam’s problems and opened the way to disaster.[6] Now comes Max Boot’s The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, an engaging book that, like Moyar’s study, focuses on lost opportunities in the years before the major escalation of U.S. forces. But Boot makes the case in a fresh and distinctive way — through a biography of Edward G. Lansdale, one of the most fascinating and complex figures in the pantheon of American Cold Warriors. Boot makes no effort to disguise his admiration for Lansdale. The Air-Force-officer-turned-CIA-operative possessed, in Boot’s view, a unique blend of creativity, cultural sensitivity, charisma, and doggedness that made him an exceptionally effective practitioner — indeed, a “maestro” — of counter-insurgency warfare and nation-building in far-off lands. The book focuses first on Lansdale’s work in the Philippines, where he played a key role in defeating the communist Huk insurgency and in rallying Filipinos behind the pro-Western liberal Ramon Magsaysay in the 1953 presidential election. Boot then shifts to Vietnam, where Lansdale attempted to work similar magic in the mid-1950s. This mission started off well enough: Lansdale helped Diem survive innumerable threats to his rule and then lay the foundations of a secure Vietnamese state by winning over his population and suppressing communist opponents. But all this promise evaporated when U.S. leaders abandoned Diem and scrapped Lansdale’s counterinsurgency methods in favor of a conventional war that, in Boot’s view, had no chance of succeeding. Boot writes,
The course that the United States was now embarked on was not just a mistake; it was a catastrophe that would profoundly alter American foreign policy for decades to come, and it might conceivably have been avoided if only Washington policymakers had listened to the advice of a renowned counterinsurgency strategist who had been present at the creation of the state of South Vietnam.
Nor does Boot hold anything back in offering Lansdale up as a model for the 21st century. Over the years, other revisionists — mostly, like Boot, hawkish foreign policy pundits with positions at think tanks rather than academic institutions — have aimed to influence ongoing policy debates by encouraging confidence about the efficacy of U.S. power when properly applied. But Boot, who has championed counterinsurgency tactics in earlier books, takes this presentist agenda to a whole new level.[7] In Lansdale’s story, Boot contends, lie valuable lessons about how to fight insurgencies and how to shape the behavior of unreliable allies. “His practices could be emulated by contemporary advisers in countries ranging from Mali to Mexico,” the book insists. In the reviews that follow, four eminent scholars sink their teeth into Boot’s core claims about Lansdale’s accomplishments and his relevance for our own times. Each raises serious questions about Boot’s analysis, as one might expect at a time when, despite the resurgence of revisionism in some quarters, most academic specialists remain skeptical at best. But these reviews offer far more than mere reassertion of long-standing conventional wisdom. Each delves into a different aspect of the book and raises important questions relevant not just to Boot’s study but to the larger proposition that the United States possesses the power and know-how to shape foreign societies through Lansdalean arts of persuasion. The first review comes from Gregory A. Daddis of Chapman University and author, most recently, of Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (2017), which rebuts revisionist claims about the war in the early 1970s. Daddis criticizes Boot on various fronts but attaches particular importance to Boot’s thin attention to Vietnamese perspectives. The book, complains Daddis, takes an “American-centric” approach that unpersuasively casts Lansdale in the role of “enlightened imperialist” while depicting Diem as a passive and needy recipient of American advice. Daddis also contends that Boot fails to reckon with new evidence of Hanoi’s determination starting in the early 1960s to mount a major war in the South, making Lansdale’s insistence on counterinsurgency methods hopelessly ill-suited to the basic military situation. The second reviewer is Walter C. Ladwig III of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and author of The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (2017). While most reviewers of Boot’s book have understandably focused on the sections dealing with Vietnam, Ladwig offers fresh analysis by focusing on the parts concerning Lansdale’s time in the Philippines. Central to Boot’s argument is Lansdale’s alleged ability to promote constructive change in the Philippines through personal charm and gentle persuasion — a combination of traits that Boot suggests could also have worked in Vietnam if given a chance. Ladwig questions this whole chain of thinking by suggesting that, in fact, the United States got its way in the Philippines as much through coercion as through Lansdale’s friendly partnership with Magsaysay. Heather M. Stur of the University of Southern Mississippi and author of Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era (2011) provides the third review. Stur zeroes in on Boot’s extensive analysis of Landsale’s relationships with the two women in his life, his wife Helen and his mistress (and eventually second wife), a Filipina known as Pat Kelly. Boot attaches huge importance to this triangle, partly because he is the first author to use Lansdale’s extensive correspondence with both women but also because Lansdale’s conflicted affections map so neatly onto his role as intermediary between America and Asia. But Stur takes Boot to task for failing to give the women authentic agency and especially for buying into orientalist clichés about the mysterious sexual allure of Asia. Like Daddis, Stur wonders whether Lansdale was, on the whole, more an old-fashioned imperialist than the tolerant, enlightened man whom Boot describes. Finally, Jon Askonas, a doctoral student at the University of Oxford, echoes Daddis by criticizing Boot for ignoring the perspectives of the Vietnamese and other peoples on the receiving end of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency projects. But he also goes in a different direction by questioning whether Lansdale was, at the end of the day, more a shrewd student of social dynamics or a delusional oddball whose skills have been wildly exaggerated by Boot and other admirers. Fortunately, Askonas concludes, Boot’s biography is so expansive and detailed that attentive readers can reach behind Boot’s enthusiastic spin on his subject and find evidence of the less attractive possibility. Mark Atwood Lawrence is Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin and Director of Graduate Studies at the Clements Center for National Security. He is author or editor of several books about the Vietnam War, including The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. He is now working on a book about U.S. policymaking toward the developing world in the Vietnam era.

2. Vietnam and the White Man’s Burden

By Gregory A. Daddis “He was there creating Vietnam in 1954.” So proclaimed journalist Max Boot during an interview moderated by a fawning Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus at the New York Historical Society in January 2018. The topic of the evening’s discussion was Boot’s latest book, The Road Not Taken, a biographical tome on former U.S. Air Force officer and CIA operative Edward Lansdale.[8] Petraeus found Boot’s biography on Lansdale “wonderful” because it “offers lessons for the present day.” “You should know,” responded Boot. “You literally wrote the manual on counterinsurgency.” The former four-star general’s adulation should not come as a surprise. Much of the 2007 surge in Iraq, overseen by Petraeus himself, was predicated on assumptions similar to those that Lansdale held about local peoples immersed in a civil war. Internal political dissension wracked both the Iraqis and South Vietnamese. Both societies were engaged in internecine war. Both apparently required outside guidance from enlightened Americans to put their countries on a path toward democracy. One might even ask if Petraeus, reading The Road Not Taken, saw himself as part of a counterinsurgency lineage that ran from T.E. Lawrence through Lansdale to the general himself. Given Boot and Petraeus’s obvious desire to fashion Edward Lansdale into a usable figure for today’s conflicts, it seems worthwhile to question a major argument in The Road Not Taken. How responsible was Lansdale for the creation of South Vietnam? For Boot, the answer is clear. Lansdale was already his “country’s most successful political warrior” of the entire Cold War era.[9] He “masterminded the election of Ramon Magsaysay” in the Philippines, according to Boot in his New York interview. The American was a decisive factor in prevailing over the 1955 sect crisis that threatened South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem’s political future. Lansdale traveled extensively, taught “psywar” techniques to Vietnamese soldiers, wrote a counterinsurgency strategy, and “took on the herculean challenge of trying to consolidate Diem’s power.”[10] Moreover, Boot argues, Lansdale was “right to doubt Diem’s political acumen.”[11] Thus, throughout The Road Not Taken, Lansdale is portrayed as an enlightened imperialist who uses his charm and empathy to befriend local leaders and then gently guide them, as would a tolerant parent, through the tribulations of political adolescence. This American-centric view of the Cold War surely is not without precedent. Many U.S. policymakers came out of World War II with a deep-seated faith in their ability to transform societies abroad and inoculate them from the contamination of communist influence. Modernization theorist Walt Rostow argued in The Stages of Economic Growth, that “traditional” societies too could mature into modern nations if only they followed the developmental model of the United States.[12] It is no surprise that the American experience served as the model for such philosophers. Yet what if we take Boot’s claims about Lansdale and shift the lens of analysis to the Vietnamese themselves? How did local leaders view this supposedly modern-day Lawrence of Arabia? Perhaps unsurprisingly, these local leaders did not revere Lansdale in the same way Boot does. The endnotes of The Road Not Taken contain few, if any, materials from Vietnamese sources. Readers rarely hear local voices in this story except for those filtered through Americans. Like Lansdale, Boot has no fluency in the Vietnamese language (nor did Lansdale even speak French which makes one question how much insight he truly could have gained during his two-year stint in Vietnam from 1954 to 1956). A new generation of scholars on Vietnam, however, are far better equipped than Boot to judge Lansdale’s accomplishments, and they are less reverential of the American. Edward Miller, for instance, finds Diem and his inner circle crafting their own strategy for political consolidation in South Vietnam. To Miller, Diem was careful to accept any U.S. advice and support “only on his own terms, in ways that furthered his designs.”[13] Boot certainly acknowledges that Lansdale’s advice was “eclipsed by the influence of Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and his sister-in-law.”[14] But here the storyline remains firmly embedded in an American-centric worldview because Lansdale functions as a convenient North Star. “If only” Diem had been wiser, more compliant, less obdurate. If only he had listened to the wise American, things might have turned out differently. This counterfactual approach reaches its crescendo as the Lyndon B. Johnson administration decided to Americanize the war in mid-1965. If only Lansdale had been able to prevail over the bureaucracy and convince Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to embrace a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy — so admired by Petraeus — then the American war might have evolved along a different path. Yet, as Boot tells us, “McNamara had little time for Lansdale.”[15] By considering the Vietnamese perspective, such “if only” arguments ultimately fall flat. While Boot correctly argues that Diem’s coup and assassination in November 1963 proved a major turning point in U.S. decision-making on Vietnam, he errs in assuming that Lansdale’s advice continued to make sense in 1964 and 1965. In short, Boot views the war in Vietnam as static. It was not. After Diem’s overthrow, the Hanoi Politburo, now under the influence of General Secretary Le Duan, decided upon a strategy aiming for a “decisive military victory.” Scholarship based on Vietnamese rather than only American sources offers important perspective. Lien-Hang Nguyen’s excellent work on Hanoi’s wartime decision-making clearly demonstrates that Le Duan had committed in late 1964, if not earlier, to achieving a military victory in South Vietnam. In early 1965, for instance, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) doubled its ranks for what Politburo leaders feared was an upcoming battle with American troops.[16] Lansdale may not have wanted to fight a conventional war, but Le Duan certainly did. One wonders how Lansdale’s prescriptions on counterinsurgency were at all relevant to the threat of North Vietnamese regiments infiltrating down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam. Boot never says, instead placing blame on McNamara and the U.S. military commander in Vietnam, William C. Westmoreland, for committing to an ill-advised strategy of attrition. The “if only” counterfactuals stack higher and higher. Returning to Boot’s endnotes, such flawed argumentation begins to makes sense. Boot has marshaled no primary sources from the military command — no command policies, no private messages from Westmoreland to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, no after-action reports from U.S. combat units in the field. Instead, old clichés are recycled in mechanical fashion. Thus, in Boot’s storyline, Westmoreland had turned the entire South Vietnamese countryside into one ruinous “free fire zone” where “victory was a high body-count.”[17] In reality, U.S. military strategy proved far more comprehensive than Boot allows. Even before the introduction of American combat troops, Westmoreland was laying out a concept of operations that noted the dual threat to the South Vietnamese countryside — from “large well-organized and -equipped forces including those that may come from outside their country” and from “the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer.”[18] Moreover, allied pacification plans from 1964 onward consistently stressed the importance of securing the population and the importance of the political contest for the people’s loyalty.[19] To Petraeus, though, Boot offered a different, more spiteful account: Westmoreland thought “Lansdale was an idiot.” Yet, quite simply, there is not a shred of evidence in the historical record to support this bogus assertion. This is not meant to defend Westmoreland. Clearly, U.S. military strategy in Vietnam failed to achieve its aim of promoting a stable, independent, non-communist South Vietnam. Rather, a deeper analysis of the American war in Vietnam illustrates far more nuance than depicted in The Road Not Taken. But for his “if only” history to persuade, Boot requires convenient bogeymen. If only the U.S. governmental bureaucracy had listened to Lansdale. If only McNamara and Westmoreland were as discerning as Lansdale. If only the South Vietnamese had been more compliant apprentices. This last point seems most central — and most pernicious — in Boot’s admiration of Edward Lansdale. At its core, The Road Not Taken is a story of an enlightened imperialist. A white Westerner swoops in with only his wit and personal magnetism to captivate the local leaders and offer them a path toward modernity. That the traditional society never realizes its full potential has less to do with the imperialist himself than with those too feeble of mind to accept his advice and munificence. Like ancient lore passed down in an oral tradition from generation to generation, this revisionist recasting of history as a white man’s burden surely holds allure for those like Boot who aspire to a new global American empire.[20] Such narratives reinforce the nationalistic sense of self in the minds of many Americans like him. They bolster claims to American exceptionalism. But these fanciful tales also nudge the reader away from deeper questions that surely would be more profitable when studying the American experience during the Cold War era. Was it wise for the United States to intervene in a civil war over Vietnamese identity? Could a white foreigner with no language skills truly understand the local political community, which he aspired to mentor? Why, throughout the war in Southeast Asia, did far too many Americans see themselves as superior to the Vietnamese, both north and south? And how did this experience illustrate the limits of American power abroad? To engage in such a retrospective, to tackle these deeper questions, undoubtedly is an uncomfortable exercise. But history should be more than a “dose of patriotic therapy.”[21] Counterfactual storytelling based on “if only” narratives may satisfy emotionally, but they hardly impart a history that embraces complexity. Max Boot wants his reader to believe that if only Edward Lansdale had prevailed, history might have unfolded in dramatically different ways. Yet widening the historical scope to include more than just American voices, to evaluate why historical actors made the decisions they did rather than what they should have done, reveals a different, perhaps less satisfying, conclusion. Lansdale’s was a road not taken because it was a road not feasible. Gregory A. Daddis is an associate professor of history and director of Chapman University’s MA Program in War and Society. His most recent book is Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2017).

3. Friendly Persuasion is Not Enough: The Limits of the Lansdale Approach

By Walter C. Ladwig III Providing aid and advice to local governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rather than directly intervening with American forces, has recently been identified as a more cost-effective way to counter irregular threats to U.S. interests.[22] The challenge that such undertakings have repeatedly faced in the past is that partner governments often have their own interests and priorities which can diverge significantly from those of Washington.[23] Consequently, a host of observers have pointed out that while the United States has provided its partners with extensive assistance to combat insurgents and terrorist groups, an inability to convince them to adopt its counterinsurgency prescriptions or address what Washington sees as the political and economic “root causes” of a conflict has repeatedly emerged as a major impediment to success.[24] In the absence of sufficient influence to convince a local government to address these shortcomings, critics suggest that significant American aid and support can actually reduce its incentives to address domestic discontent or govern inclusively, which can render a supported regime less stable than it would have been without U.S. assistance.[25] Based on his study of the life and career of Edward Lansdale, Max Boot has suggested that future advisors can find a template for influencing local governments in Lansdale’s “art of friendly persuasion.”[26] One of the Cold War’s most colorful characters, Lansdale’s career spanned Madison Avenue, the U.S. Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Lansdale rose to prominence as the advisor, confidant, and friend of Philippine Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay during the Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946 to 1954). Under Lansdale’s mentorship, Magsaysay professionalized and depoliticized the Philippine armed forces, which enhanced their effectiveness in the field, while also working to ensure that free and fair elections in the country were not thwarted by vested political interests.[27] In 1949 the Hukbalahap guerrillas possessed some 12,000 men under arms and more than 100,000 active sympathizers.[28] By 1954, however, facing defeat on the battlefield and seeing an opportunity to achieve social change via the ballot box, the Huks were willing to give up their armed struggle. The tools Lansdale employed to influence and mentor Magsaysay were patience, understanding, and above all friendly persuasion to build trust with his counterpart. The CIA operative would later seek to employ the same means to shape the behavior of another U.S. partner in Southeast Asia, the leader of the fledgling Republic of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem.[29] In calling attention to the importance of advisory efforts, Boot does a real service. Unfortunately, a narrow focus on Lansdale himself and an over-reliance on the man’s own account of events in the Philippines leads to mistaken conclusions about cause and effect. A broader reading of U.S. involvement in the Huk Rebellion raises questions about the degree to which American influence stemmed from friendly persuasion and the utility of that technique to, in Boot’s words, “influence allies to take difficult but necessary steps such as fighting corruption without risking a blowup or backlash.”[30] Pressure Not Persuasion in the Huk Rebellion There is no question that Lansdale and Magsaysay formed a highly effective partnership that helped transform the Philippine government’s counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, at the end of the day, as secretary of national defense, Magsaysay was but one part of the administration. As my own study of U.S. patron-client relations in counterinsurgency demonstrates, their relationship was embedded in a far more coercive American influence strategy that pressured, rather than persuaded, the Philippine government to reform.[31] Despite the communist links of the Hukbalahap insurgents who were attempting to overthrow the government of President Elpidio Quirino, the American view was that the roots of the insurgency were socio-economic rather than strictly political. Guerrilla fighters primarily took up arms in response to abuses by the security forces, electoral fraud, and a lack of access to sufficient agricultural land.[32] Consequently, in countering the insurgency, as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed, “military measures … can only be a temporary expedient. Remedial political and economic measures must be adopted by the Philippine Government in order to eliminate the basic causes of discontent among the Philippine people.”[33] Unfortunately, Quirino was disinclined to undertake these redistributive reforms because the base of his ruling Liberal Party benefitted from the existing political and economic status quo. The Philippine government did eventually take steps to address some of the rural discontent driving support for the insurgency. They introduced a minimum wage for agricultural workers and significantly revised the government’s tax policy that enhanced revenue in an equitable fashion to pay for the war and enhanced social spending. These reforms, which had been opposed by the Philippine government, did not come about via friendly persuasion, but by attaching tough conditions to American aid. In the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, American assistance was “firmly conditioned on satisfactory performance by the Philippine Government,” rendering it “as a lever to obtain such performance.”[34] This lever worked. As a contemporaneous scholar of Philippine politics, David Wurfel, wrote,
Few would have dared predict six months earlier that the Philippine Congress could pass in short order two laws, such as the minimum wage and the increased corporate income tax . . . In sum, the leverage of proffered foreign aid had produced the legislative authorization for social change probably not possible otherwise.[35]
A similar approach was taken in the military realm. At the start of the conflict, counterinsurgency operations were the responsibility of the Philippine Constabulary, a national paramilitary police force whose corrupt and abusive ways created more insurgents than they captured.[36] Under the authority of the secretary of the interior, the constabulary often functioned as hired thugs for the country’s large landlords who employed them to terrorize agricultural workers. Recognizing the role of the constabulary in stimulating support for the insurgency, the commander of the U.S. Joint Military Assistance Group urged Quirino to depoliticize the force by putting them under the control of the Department of National Defense and assigning the Philippine army primary responsibility for combatting the insurgents. The Philippine president resisted because such reforms would constrain the Liberal Party’s ability to use the constabulary to suppress their political opponents — which is precisely what the American advisors intended. The United States eventually succeeded in forcing the Philippine government to restructure its armed forces, subordinate the constabulary to the less politicized Department of National Defense, and give the army the lead in counterinsurgency operations, but once again it was tough conditions on U.S. military aid — even in the face of a growing insurgent threat — not friendly persuasion that achieved the result. Magsaysay’s own rise to power from congressman to secretary of national defense was due, in part, to American coercion. This is not to say that Magsaysay was an American creation by any means—he possessed his own political base and the patronage of leading Filipino politicians—but his candidacy received a boost from U.S. pressure. The details remain somewhat murky since the American officials involved actively attempted to downplay their role to avoid undercutting Magsaysay’s credibility.[37] Douglas MacDonald recounts a claim that “President Truman sent a telegram directly to Quirino telling him to appoint Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense or risk losing U.S. military aid.”[38] Boot’s version of events echoes Cecil Currey in crediting Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant with delivering the same message, while the State Department’s Director of the Office of Philippine Affairs, John Melby maintains that he was the one to instruct Quirino that future U.S. military aid was linked to Magsaysay’s appointment.[39] When the Philippine president shrugged and replied, “You know, you’re asking me to commit political suicide,” Melby allegedly responded, “Yes, I know that, but unless you do it there’s no more American military aid forthcoming.”[40] In the face of this threat, Quirino acquiesced. Common to all of these accounts is an American threat to cut off military aid to a partner government that was on the back foot in its battle against an insurgency. This was persuasion, but it certainly wasn’t friendly. Once in office, the effect of Magsaysay’s military reforms was bolstered by American pressure being wielded on his behalf. Magsaysay managed to engender dramatic improvements in the army’s rank-and-file as well as the junior officer corps. However, the effectiveness of the military was hampered by the fact that it was still led by the architects of the Philippine government’s initial abusive and ineffective response to the Huk insurgency, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mariano Castañeda, and the constabulary commander, Brigadier Alberto Ramos. Castañeda was a corrupt yet affable figure who refused to cooperate with Magsaysay’s reform efforts and was not seen by senior Philippine leaders to be sufficiently competent for command of the military.[41] Ramos was even worse: A known Japanese collaborator, the U.S. embassy in Manila judged that “beyond protecting perpetrators of abuses,” the brigadier had “done nothing but draw his breath and his salary.”[42] Although replacing the duo might have enhanced military effectiveness, the two men had played a key role in delivering the fraudulent 1949 election to the Liberal Party. Moreover, after several recent coup attempts in the region, Quirino was particularly fearful about the loyalty of his armed forces and favored reliability over capability. Magsaysay’s predecessor as Secretary of National Defense had resigned when Quirino refused to fire Castañeda and Ramos for mismanaging the anti-Huk campaign. Magsaysay ended up issuing a similar ultimatum to Quirino, however, this time around the threat was bolstered by the American decision to condition $10 million in military aid on the immediate retirement of the pair.[43] Under duress, Quirino complied. As Magsaysay turned his attention to ensuring free and fair elections in the country, he alienated his former patrons in the ruling Liberal Party who stood to lose from legitimate polls. These senior politicians worked to constrain his authority, undo his reforms, and remove him from office. However, it was implicit and explicit threats to cut American military aid, not friendly persuasion, that shielded Magsaysay and his reform efforts from domestic political enemies.[44] Whether in the economic, the military, or the political realm, pressure not persuasion was the main source of American influence over the Philippine government. Such was the judgement of the American ambassador in Manila, Myron Cowen, who advised Washington that although the United States successfully shaped the Philippine government’s policies in a number of areas, we “must recognize that without exception, [these reforms] were made possible only by continuously applied pressure.”[45] When the Americans did not deploy pressure via conditions on aid to support Magsaysay, he was far less effective. Having won the presidency in a landslide in the 1953 election at the head of a broad coalition, it was expected that Magsaysay would continue his reforming ways from the highest office in the land.[46] With the Huk rebellion defeated, however, the United States was far less concerned about redistributive reforms in the Philippines and no longer intervened on the new President’s behalf. Consequently, Magsaysay’s various attempts at socio-economic reforms foundered at the hands of vested interests. By this time, however, Lansdale was no longer involved in events on a day-to-day basis, having been dispatched to South Vietnam by CIA director Allen Dulles. The lesson Lansdale drew from his narrow perspective in the Philippines was that a combination of patience, shared hardship, and an exhibition of sincere empathy could foster the personal chemistry necessary to influence an embattled American partner. He presumed that the trust and confidence inspired by a sympathetic advisor could lead a previously reactionary or repressive government to willingly rein in abuses by the security forces, combat corruption, implement civic-action programs (health, education, public welfare, etc.), and undertake other reforms that would rally the population to the government’s side. Consequently, Lansdale would prove to be just the first of many American officials in Saigon who would search in vain for a “Vietnamese Magsaysay” to save the country.[47] Modern Magsaysays? The purpose of recounting these events is not to quibble over the historiography of U.S.-Philippine relations, but to ask: What this can tell us that is relevant for today? Friendly persuasion was an effective influence tool in Lansdale’s relationship with Magsaysay in no small part because the latter’s interests and aims were already closely aligned with those of the U.S. Magsaysay had fought with an American affiliated guerrilla unit during World War II, he shared many of his American partners’ assessments of the problems facing the Philippines, and as a congressman, he cooperated closely with the U.S. military assistance group.[48] In short, as Douglas MacDonald writes, “…Magsaysay was an American liberal reformer’s dream come true. A dynamic, charismatic, honest and compassionate leader dedicated to democratic values is a rare commodity in any country, not just in the Third World.”[49] In contrast, more coercive strategies were necessary to influence Quirino because his interests and those of the U.S. diverged in key respects. The Philippine and American governments agreed that preventing the Huks from seizing power was important, but the way they wanted to go about it was quite different. For Quirino, maintaining his office was a competing priority and both rival political elites and the nation’s armed forces were potential threats to his power. Consequently, the types of reforms and policy changes the United States was pushing in the Philippines — redistributive economic reforms, ending patronage politics in the military, and holding clean elections — were resisted because, irrespective of their utility as counterinsurgency measures, they directly challenged the interests of his key supporters and therefore his hold on power. If you are lucky enough to have an authentic domestic reformer with no internal opposition as your partner, friendly persuasion may be an effective influence tool. It is unlikely to be sufficient, however, to convince a less enlightened leader to risk reforms that they believe could lead to their overthrow or worse. This raises a key question: In the future is the United States more likely to work with regimes whose interests are closely aligned or those who diverge significantly? To put it differently, are Magsaysays more common or Quirinos? Sadly, recent academic research on the subject suggests that the latter is far more common.[50] Advising a government in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism suffers from a phenomenon that economists call adverse selection.[51] This is a situation where, due to the specifics of a transaction, the only actors who wish to participate are “bad” ones. Adverse selection often occurs in insurance markets, like automobile insurance, where the people who most want collision insurance are those who drive a lot or otherwise self-assess that they are more likely to have accidents. If there wasn’t a law requiring people to have insurance, the people seeking coverage would not be a representative sample of all drivers, but only the riskiest ones. There is a parallel phenomenon with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.[52] Since effective, legitimate governments rarely lose control of substantial portions of their country to terrorists or insurgents, the only regimes needing external assistance to combat domestic political opponents are almost by definition flawed in some key respects—be they weak, incompetent, fraudulent, abusive, or all of the above. In turn, the same governmental shortcomings that facilitate the emergence of an insurgency also undercut the effectiveness of the counterinsurgent response.[53] Even if they have the capacity to do so, local governments are rarely eager to address such problems as their core supporters frequently benefit from the country’s political and economic status quo. It is perhaps unsurprising that after a year serving as the senior U.S. advisor to the South Vietnamese I Corps, Col. Bryce Denno cogently observed in his 1963 end-of-tour report that:
It would be a miraculous coincidence if a host nation in a war of counterinsurgency were to share identical objectives with the U.S. or arrive at identical solutions to problems that arise. Hence, it behooves the U.S. to seek ways in which it can influence the host nation to act in a manner compatible with U.S. interests in a war which we are financing to a large extent and otherwise supporting.[54]
Consequently, Denno advised his superiors:
The development of techniques and means to increase U.S. leverage in Vietnam is the single most important problem facing us there and it will be a fundamental problem in any future counterinsurgency effort in which we become involved.[55]
No matter how much aid you give a country or how many advisers you send, if you cannot prevent the local government from employing these resources to pursue its own agenda, or from prioritizing political reliability in the armed forces over military effectiveness, the assistance effort will come to naught. One does not have to revisit the unhappy American experience in Vietnam to understand the limits of friendly persuasion in such circumstances, but merely look at the recent U.S. experience in Iraq.[56] The Bush administration expected that their partner, Iraqi Prime Minister Nori al-Maliki, would embrace its strategy of overcoming the insurgency by bringing Kurds and Sunnis into the political process alongside the Shia majority. Instead, Maliki prioritized bolstering his position among radical Shia political groups, turned a blind eye to violence against Sunnis, and favored sectarian loyalists rather than professional officers in the Iraqi Security Forces.[57] The Bush administration never tried to compel Maliki to change his ways, even though his actions were undermining American efforts in Iraq.[58] Instead, the Iraqi leader was provided with unconditioned aid and support to persuade him to make better choices. President Bush personally sought to mentor Maliki and in his own words provided him with unstinting “advice and understanding” in the belief that “Once I had earned his trust I would be in a better position to help him make the tough decisions.”[59] Bush specifically notes that he “was careful not to bully him or appear heavy-handed.”[60] This approach failed to restrain Maliki’s sectarian agenda, which prevented the military gains from the 2007 surge from being translated into positive political outcomes and arguably laid the foundation for the rise of the Islamic State.[61] Toward the Future With large-scale U.S. military interventions seemingly at an end, it appears that advisory missions will be a key component of U.S. efforts in the so-called War on Terror. In a coda to his phenomenally researched and detailed account of Edward Lansdale’s career, (“Lansdalism in the Twenty-First Century”), Boot suggests that the quixotic CIA officer can provide a useful role model for future American advisors, both civilian and military.[62] Lansdale’s advocacy of patience, understanding, cultural awareness and local solutions for local problems are all to be commended. It is similarly difficult to disagree with Lansdale’s focus on the political dimensions of civil war, or as Boot writes, the belief “that there was more to defeating insurgencies than killing insurgents.” Unfortunately, Lansdale’s partnership with Ramon Magsaysay does not provide a template for addressing what Boot describes as “the key American shortcoming” in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam: “the inability to constructively guide the leaders of allied states in the direction desired by Washington.”[63] The emergence of a popular, capable, indigenous reformer in Magsaysay was a unique circumstance that is unlikely to be replicated in other settings. Moreover, whether Lansdale realized it or not, American influence over the Philippine government was primarily the result of pressure and tough conditions on aid, which strengthened Magsaysay’s hand vis-à-vis reactionaries opposed to his reforms. Lansdale’s life story makes an entertaining read and his model of friendly persuasion is a wonderful ideal, but the strategy is unlikely to be sufficient in practice. Walter C. Ladwig III is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the author of The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017) from which materials in this essay are drawn.

4. The Woman Question in Max Boot’s Tale of Edward Lansdale

By Heather Marie Stur During a party at Edward Lansdale’s Saigon villa in 1956, Lansdale performed a traditional Philippine dance called tinikling, and it was not awkward. A photograph of the moment shows Lansdale in a white tunic and cropped pants, smiling joyfully as he taught the dance to a friend. He was not an embarrassed white man clumsily attempting a native dance in a cringeworthy demonstration of good will. It was Lansdale at his most comfortable: as the life of a multicultural party where a Philippine dance broke the ice between his American and Vietnamese friends. The snapshot depicted Lansdalian diplomacy in action, in which cultural exchange on the ground with ordinary people was an essential tactic in nation-building strategy. Max Boot’s engaging biography is one of only a few works that examines Lansdale, whose belief in cultural sensitivity and commitment to individual liberty continues to inform American counterinsurgency theory. In the early 1950s, Lansdale’s successful training of Ramon Magsaysay to assume the presidency of an independent Philippines and neutralize the Hukbalahap rebellion became the model U.S. policymakers would attempt to replicate in South Vietnam. While working in Vietnam, Lansdale got closer than any other American to Ngo Dinh Diem, the man meant to be a Vietnamese Magsaysay. Things didn’t work out in Vietnam quite the way they did in the Philippines, though. Diem alienated the Buddhist opposition and was never popular with the masses. After Diem was assassinated, Washington replaced Lansdale and his CIA team with combat troops. Yet Lansdale’s influence remained in the “hearts and minds” approach to pacification that Gen. Creighton Abrams advocated. Lansdale himself spent the better part of two decades in Southeast Asia, save a brief detour to the Caribbean to try and topple Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba. From the Office of Strategic Services to the CIA, from the Philippines to Vietnam, from the United States to Asia, Lansdale traversed the transpacific world in a life’s work that bridged Tales from the South Pacific and The Ugly American. In his career, Lansdale embodied the “ugly American” — a misunderstood moniker that refers not to an American tourist behaving badly but to a diplomat willing to roll up his sleeves and get down at the village level for a drink, a meal, a walk, and a conversation to learn about local customs, values, and needs. It is one of two sides of Lansdale that Boot’s portrait reveals. In that form, Lansdale was a maverick who possessed an innate curiosity about humanity in all its diversity.[64] Boot makes a compelling claim that racism did not appear to have tainted Lansdale’s view of Asia at a time when U.S. policymakers referred to Filipinos and Vietnamese as “little brown brothers.” It was a key example of the chasm between Lansdale and the risk-averse policy establishment, a rift made all the wider by Lansdale’s unwillingness to accept received wisdom about nation-building. The tragedy that emerges from Boot’s telling of the Vietnam War story resulted from Washington’s impatience with what Lansdale understood to be the slow processes of cultivating political stability, fostering economic development, and establishing a national identity. As unconventional as Lansdale was in his career, he was an everyman in his personal life, and this is where Boot’s book contributes something new. Other scholars, notably Edward Miller, Mark Moyar, and Lewis Sorley, have written about the possibilities for Vietnam had Americans made different choices regarding Diem and the war.[65] While Boot’s focus on Lansdale is unique, the broader theme of “what might have been” is established in the historiography. What we know much less about is the impact of U.S. foreign relations on the lives and marriages of deployed personnel, their families, and local populations from the 1940s onward as part of U.S. military and diplomatic expansion. (In the afterword, Boot speculates that Lansdale might have had a Vietnamese mistress, in addition to his long-time Filipina paramour.) In Boot’s narrative, Lansdale’s love life was not the sideshow but the main event. It shaped him, his work, and, by extension, U.S. intervention in Asia. From the collections of personal letters Boot accessed, he pieces together a picture of an international post-World War II generation in which foreign relations shaped and were influenced by the women in the lives of American men overseas. Helen Lansdale represents the diplomatic and military wives whose husbands were stationed at U.S. embassies and military bases all over the world. Pat Kelly, a Manila newspaper staffer who volunteered to be Lansdale’s guide through rural Luzon, symbolizes the local women who caught the attention of American men abroad. Kelly, whose given name was Patrocinio Yapcinco, was from Tarlac Province, a Huk stronghold in central Luzon. Her husband, James Kelly, an Irish-Filipino orphan, died of tuberculosis in 1944, and Pat got a job to support herself and her baby daughter, Patricia. Pat eventually went to work for the United States, and she was assigned to work as Lansdale’s guide and interpreter. Sometimes the intersections of the personal and the political determined the course of international relations. Had Pat and Ed not met, Ramon Magsaysay might not have ascended to the presidency of the Philippines, providing the United States with its model for South Vietnam and sealing the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem. Lansdale might not have requested to return to the Philippines. Perhaps without realizing it, Boot validates the “cultural turn” in diplomatic and military history. Gender and sex influence the behavior of diplomats, military officers, and intelligence agents in ways that end up charting or shifting the courses of foreign relations and war. Boot is very clear about the importance of Lansdale’s wives (he married Kelly after Helen died in the 1970s), noting their roles in “some of his most consequential decisions, such as his return to the Philippines for a second, history-altering tour in 1950.”[66] He claims to be the first writer to have read Lansdale’s letters from both wives, which “provide the most intimate and complete account that will ever be available of Lansdale’s thinking — and they reveal the hitherto unrevealed importance of his love affair with Pat to the narrative of his life.”[67] Boot’s portrayal of the women in Lansdale’s life is provocative because, according to a recent piece he wrote for Foreign Policy, 2017 was the year Boot “got woke” to his white male privilege.[68] Unfortunately, neither Boot’s new consciousness nor the weight he places on Lansdale’s relationships with his wives inspired him to flesh out the Lansdale love triangle. His depiction of Helen Lansdale is one-dimensional, and his discussions of Pat Kelly are, at times, tied to old tropes about the exotic Orient and its alluring women. In Boot’s version of Lansdale’s romantic drama, Pat Kelly was beguiling while Helen Lansdale was prematurely gray. Pat teased and flirted while Helen was quiet. Pat was exciting while Helen was boring. It is as though Boot is trying to excuse Lansdale’s dalliances by making Helen the problem, implying that someone so dull couldn’t possibly satisfy an adventurous man of the world like Lansdale, and, let’s face it, men must be satisfied. That is their privilege. All of this may have been true, but Boot’s flat sketch of Helen leaves out the broader contexts that help explain her behaviors and motives. She was a complex human being just as her husband was. Social and cultural expectations likely limited her options and influenced her personal decisions as much as Lansdale did. Mr. and Mrs. Lansdale weren’t making love on a beach in California because he was overseas, and she was back home playing both mother and father to two sons. Boot remarks that Helen Lansdale refused to ask for a divorce when she learned of her husband’s affair, but a truly “woke” character study of the first Mrs. Lansdale would include a discussion of the limited financial and legal options she would have faced as a divorcee, not to mention the emotional and psychological effects on her and her sons. There was more at stake than Lansdale’s belief in his ability to win hearts and minds in Asia, his desire for adventure, or his longing for Pat Kelly. Lansdale himself understood this, which is why he didn’t simply quit his American family when Helen wouldn’t seek a divorce. Meanwhile, Kelly is important to the story not because she was a bewitching Filipina, but because she helped Lansdale break into rural Philippine society where he learned the most about the Huk insurgency. Kelly was a high school classmate of Luis Taruc, the Huks’ military leader, in Tarlac City in central Luzon, and she was able to get Lansdale remarkably close to the rebels. To his credit, Boot writes Kelly with much more empathy and depth than what he offers Helen. He acknowledges Kelly’s strategic importance, asserting that “it was her role as an invaluable intermediary and interpreter, not only of language but also of customs and mindsets, that would account for so much of his success with the Filipino people.”[69] Kelly played a vital role in one of America’s most successful nation-building efforts and had a long history of working for the United States, including years with the U.S. War Damage Commission and the U.S. Information Agency at the U.S. embassy in Manila. As Boot explains, Kelly was fairly unconventional in Philippine society as a working woman who became the head of her family after her husband and her father both died in the 1940s. Boot brings Kelly to life and illustrates her importance to the mission primarily through Lansdale’s letters and the author’s interviews with those who knew Kelly. From a methodology perspective, Boot’s book is a good example of how personal papers and oral histories can offer important details on military missions, policymaking, and other “official” business. Despite Kelly’s important role in U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the Philippines, it would not be surprising if her voice is absent from the archival record. Her race and her gender would have ensured that her American male colleagues would not have written her recommendations into an official report, and if they did, they likely would not have credited her. It is not clear whether Boot looked for Kelly in the records of the War Damage Commission or the U.S. Information Agency where she had worked, but were Kelly still alive, it would be fascinating to talk with her and learn her opinions of U.S.-Philippine relations, her country’s history and future, and her married lover. That Boot made the effort to craft a fairly vibrant portrait of Pat Kelly leaves readers wondering why he did not do Helen the same courtesy even though Lansdale’s relationship with her is also important to his life story. Having spent most of her adult life as a housewife, Helen likely would not appear in archival documents, but published sources on American women in the Cold War era would have provided some context for understanding the women of Helen’s generation. This type of background information might have helped Boot speculate about why Helen behaved and responded to her husband in the ways that she did. While Boot develops Kelly as an agent of her own history, he comes close to orientalism when describing the “mysterious East” as he sets the scene for the moment Lansdale and Kelly met. He writes, “As long as Western men have been journeying to the Orient (a term that once encompassed all of Asia and North Africa), they have, inevitably, fallen in love with the women they found there.”[70] Does Boot believe that, or is he referring to what men of a different era thought? He continues by describing the “Age of Discovery” as “an age of sexual discovery, with all kinds of tropes and innuendos that are now considered racist.”[71] But it’s not just that standards for polite conversation have changed. Europeans’ “erotic fascination” with the Far East was part of a broader imperial culture that used race, gender, and sexuality to justify Europe’s subjugation of its African and Asian colonies and establish power dynamics between Europeans and people of color. Boot does not discuss this context except to mention Edward Said’s orientalism, the theory that 19th-century Europeans crafted an exotic, romanticized image of the Middle East that rationalized Europe’s exploitation of colonized subjects. Boot concedes that “[t]here is an element of truth in the charge” but then counters with: “… the exploitation was not entirely one-sided—many poor Asian women saw relationships with Westerners as an opportunity for economic betterment”.[72] Poor Asian women exploited Western men? In colonialism? An author who claims to understand his white male privilege and “the reality of discrimination, harassment, even violence that people of color and women continue to experience” wrote this?[73] By accusing impoverished Asian women of manipulating Western men for a chance at a more financially secure future, Boot demonstrates a surprising obliviousness to the power dynamics that would have prevented such reverse exploitation. Boot lets quotes such as the Times’ Richard Bernstein’s comment about “an Eastern erotic culture that had always been more frank and less morally fastidious about sexual needs than the Western Christian erotic culture” hang without analysis.[74] Failing to delve into meaning and context, Boot misses an opportunity to challenge an outdated Western image of Asia by describing the prudish nature of Diem-era Vietnamese society. It’s important context for the time period in which Lansdale was stationed in Vietnam. Concerned citizens worried about the corrupting effects of American men and Western culture on Vietnamese women and traditional values. As J. William Fulbright noted, the Americans, not the Vietnamese, were responsible for turning Saigon into a brothel.[75] Boot’s link between Sir Richard Burton’s orientalism and Lansdale’s Southeast Asia is Puccini’s Madame Butterfly. The 1904 opera tells a tragic love story of an American naval officer and a Japanese teenaged girl who bears his son and then commits suicide when her lover returns to Japan with his American wife. Speculating that “[n]o doubt there were many such heartbreaks — and even some suicides — that resulted from liaisons between Western men and Asian women,” Boot then brings readers to the love story of Edward Lansdale and Pat Kelly.[76] Boot’s description of Helen Lansdale as “an old-fashioned, self-conscious ‘lady’ who had gone to a finishing school and behaved according to the prim standards of the early twentieth-century provincial American upper class” sets her up as the inhibited wife who drove her husband into the arms of a “livelier” Asian woman.[77] What does it all mean for our understanding of Lansdale and U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia? Was Lansdale a Western explorer who “inevitably” fell in love with an Asian woman? Does Boot believe Lansdale was the Cold War-era descendant of a 400-year-old lineage of white men drawn to the “alluring Orient?” If so, can we extrapolate that the orientalist framework that Europeans used to justify imperialism also informed U.S. intervention in Asia in the twentieth century?[78] Does Boot believe that the United States acts in the world just like its imperial European forefathers? Where does Pat Kelly fit into this framework? Does Boot see her independence and political acumen as an anomaly, or as a real-life example that complicates the romanticized image of Asian women? Absent a discussion of the colonial context in which Europeans developed the idea of the exotic Orient and the ways in which similar racial constructs have shaped U.S. foreign relations, it is unclear why Boot introduced Lansdale’s relationship with Kelly in this framework. Lansdale is actually an interesting character through which to explore these issues. Boot describes his long fascination with Asia, from his wearing of a sarong while in college to his interest in Filipino folk music, none of which indicates racism or anything else insidious. Lansdale’s willingness to meet Filipinos and Vietnamese on their terms and to go into villages to assess the attitudes of local people suggests a genuine desire to assist in these nations’ political development. Based on the evidence Boot offers, Lansdale did not appear to see himself as a man on a civilizing mission to uplift the darker races. Boot could have used Lansdale and Kelly to challenge the mysterious Asia construct rather than presenting it as the natural explanation for their relationship. Lansdale, the ugly American, believed that native people had important things to tell him about their country’s future. Kelly was an employee of the U.S. government, not a dragon lady or a sexually exotic object. In his letters, Lansdale wrote that he was drawn to Kelly’s mind as much as her body, and if that was true, then he deserves more credit than Boot gives him when he places him in the same category as earlier European colonizers. Boot’s tendency to provide lengthy quotes — usually from love letters between Lansdale and Kelly — without analysis or broader context is a flaw that runs throughout the book. Perhaps Boot believes discussions of the cultural constructs that influenced Lansdale’s relationships with his women belong in dense academic tomes and might bore a popular audience. But analysis need not be laden with tedious jargon, and the American public gets the complicated issues regarding gender, sex, women, and the patriarchy. The #metoo movement has proven that. Analysis can also prevent readers from mistaking the writer for being uninformed or, worse, an apologist for the orientalism of Victorian imperialists. This should be especially important to an author who has announced that his consciousness is raised, and that he now understands that the oppressive forces of racism and sexism are real. Sometime in the mid-1950s, Helen Lansdale stood beside her husband as he received a medal from Vice President Richard Nixon. While Edward Lansdale lived an adventure-filled career in the Pacific world, taking a mistress as he attempted to save the free world, his wife remained stateside doing the heavy and largely unnoticed work of maintaining a façade of normalcy even as it threatened to collapse. In her role on the home front, Mrs. Lansdale was not unlike all the other military and diplomatic wives who spent the Cold War years as single parents, filling their days with children’s activities, trips to the grocery store, and luncheons, but wondering in the lonely hours where their husbands were, who they were with, and why ordinary family life wasn’t enough for them. We know the story of Edward Lansdale the CIA agent, and what might have been in Vietnam, but Max Boot lets us in on a more universal tale. Edward and Helen Lansdale got married. They tried to play husband and wife and parents like they thought they were supposed to. The exigencies of U.S. national security gave Mr. Lansdale an honorable escape from the monotony of family life, while respectability required Mrs. Lansdale to quietly stand by her man. According to the conventions of the time, it would not have been appropriate for her to travel through a Southeast Asian jungle by jeep. But Americans did not hold Filipinas to the same standards. It was perfectly fine for them to drive into a war zone if they were from the same town as the leader of the local insurgency and spoke both English and Tagalog. And so Pat Kelly became part of Ed Lansdale’s fantasy, but even if his first wife had agreed to a divorce, it would have been difficult for Lansdale to make her part of his life back home. Boot points out that when Pat and Ed first met in the late 1940s, the United States was not kind to Asians, as anti-Asian immigration laws and Japanese internment illustrated. Americans likely would not have seen Pat Kelly, employee of the U.S. War Damage Commission and crucial operative in the counterinsurgency mission in the Philippines. They would have only seen her race. Heather Marie Stur, Ph.D., is an associate professor of history at the University of Southern Mississippi and a fellow in USM’s Dale Center for the Study of War & Society. 

5. Everything but Politics: America’s Counterinsurgency Blindspot

By Jon Askonas Max Boot has left no stone unturned in his extensive biography of Edward Lansdale, debonair ad man-turned-counterinsurgent. Boot’s tome contains, among other things, informed speculation on Lansdale’s sex life, psychoanalysis of Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsburg’s piano-playing, asides on Graham Greene’s novels, and short biographies of almost every character in the extensive cast of would-be American counterinsurgents, Filipino and Vietnamese politicos, and various world historical figures. This makes what was left out of The Road Not Taken all the more revealing. Boot’s mission is to make the case for “Lansdalism,” a variant of counter-insurgency characterized by winning “hearts and minds” through civic action (honest elections, government reforms, political persuasion) to legitimize governments and put pressure on insurgents.[79] According to Boot, Lansdale’s approach would have been far less costly than the massive armed military intervention in Vietnam, and might have actually worked. Boot believes Lansdalism provides a template and inspiration for future U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. But to support this argument, Boot selectively emphasizes details from Lansdale’s life that result in an oversimplified telling of the story: In Vietnam, Lansdale is foiled by bureaucratic insouciance, corrupt Vietnamese leaders, stubborn American politicians, and soldiers dedicated to “conventional warfare.” Boot’s oversimplification highlights this otherwise excellent biography’s most notable flaw. In making his case, Boot fails to contend with the ultimate sources of both Lansdale’s successes in the Philippines and his failures in Vietnam — the political desires of insurgents and of the people in the nations where Lansdale worked. Never is the possibility considered that people simply might not be buying what Lansdale — and Boot — are selling. Because Boot is a powerful storyteller, this failure isn’t immediately obvious. In both the Philippines and Vietnam, we are introduced to the players on both sides of the conflicts, and their relationships with each other are given dramatic life. But Boot’s political analysis never gets past this superficial layer. Why, exactly, are the Huks of the Philippines up in arms? Boot gives us little insight, except for a few slogans and a single oblique reference to a land-owning elite.[80] We learn nothing of the centuries of exploitation under the Spanish, nor that the postwar regime Constabulary destroyed more peasant villages than the Japanese did in their attempt to suppress the government.[81] Besides an innate charisma and popular touch, we never learn why Filipino politician Ramon Magsaysay might have had broad political appeal. This is not to suggest that the programs Lansdale embarked upon with Magsaysay (reforming the Army, improving elections, and resettling former insurgents with land, among others) were not valuable. However, throughout the book, one gets the sense that native populations, whether in the Philippines and Vietnam or in Iraq and Afghanistan, are primarily acted upon. If the wise Lansdalian counterinsurgent follows the right recipe, the native population cannot help but come around to the American position. There is no sense that they could legitimately choose otherwise. This political blindspot is particularly egregious in Boot’s treatment of Vietnam. He had time enough in his book for a short examination of Allen Dulles’ womanizing and spent pages on Hubert Humphrey’s relationship with LBJ. But he left no room for an analysis of Vietnam’s colonial history, nor for a discussion of why the South Vietnamese regime could be so easily associated with the imperialists, what the average rural resident might want, or why Ho Chi Minh remained such a popular figure. Not a jot is spent exploring the relative effectiveness of Southern and Northern propaganda or comparing relations between rural and urban residents or the rich and the poor. Choices that were in fact highly political and intentional are subsumed under the categories of excess violence due to notions of “conventional war,” “corruption” among military and civilian officials, and interpersonal feuds among both American and South Vietnamese leaders. Boot (following the work of Mark Moyar) identifies the 1963 overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem as a critical inflection point in the course of the war,[82] but says little about the political tensions his regime was causing, focusing instead on the dissatisfaction of the generals and the impatience of the American diplomatic and press corps.[83] He adopts Lansdale’s conviction that in Vietnam, “what was missing was a high-level American official who could influence allies to take difficult but necessary steps such as fighting corruption without risking a blowup or backlash.”[84] Boot thinks the same is true for both Iraq and Afghanistan. But client leaders are usually acutely aware of their interests, needs, and political pressures. They do not need a “stiff talking to” from some Yankee, but rather a reconfiguration of the incentives they face, which may be quite deep-seated.[85] Lansdale’s laser-sharp focus on the importance of building South Vietnamese state legitimacy was unique and laudable, but American leaders from JFK to Richard Nixon understood more or less the same thing. The problem for all of these American decision-makers (including Lansdale) was figuring out how to support the South Vietnamese without corrupting or distorting the regime, all the while attempting to keep both the Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese infiltrators at bay. Boot’s tendency to oversimplify is present throughout the book, especially regarding the complicated story of the American war effort in Vietnam. Boot tells us that Lansdale was avant garde in reading Mao in the 1950s. He wasn’t. Due to America’s involvements in Asia, military leaders were already reading and discussing the writings of Mao and Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap.[86] Boot argues that the conventionally minded soldiers (symbolized by Robert McNamara and Gen. William Westmoreland) ignored the human and political element. Yet the bibliography indicates Boot never consulted the actual records of MACV (the American military command in Vietnam) or its predecessor, which tell a much different story. Boot relies on Lewis Sorley’s narrative of the war (blaming Westmoreland for America’s heavy-handed strategy and praising Gen. Creighton Abrams for his belated attempt to turn things around), and ignores Gregory Daddis’ authoritative and detailed historical work rebutting most of Sorley’s claims.[87] If these flaws don’t ultimately undermine the book, it’s in part because Boot is a faithful interpreter of Lansdale himself. It would be hard to claim that Boot is projecting his ideas about counterinsurgency onto Lansdale. If anything, Boot is usually (though not always) circumspect about Lansdale’s zanier ideas, self-serving misconceptions, and occasional fables. In Boot’s book, one can find evidence to support both Lansdale the genius and Lansdale the crank. Though he wants us to see Lansdale through the eyes of his admirers, as an honest, savvy, warm counterinsurgency guru, Boot is honest in admitting that criticisms about Lansdale have merit as well. Thus, Boot conveys Daniel Ellsburg’s loving assessment of Lansdale as a “very shrewd, smart guy”, but also tells us that most of Lansdale’s bureaucratic rivals viewed him as “nutty, lightweight, stupid.”[88] The book contains ample evidence supporting both the case for Lansdale’s shrewdness and for his nuttiness. Lansdale’s naïveté about the political roots of insurgencies is emblematic of his place riding the line between idealism and delusion. To his dying day, he affirmed the universal appeal of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.[89] If only, he thought, Vietnam’s leaders were good enough, honest enough, and liberty-loving enough, Vietnam’s people would be sure to follow. It’s hard to reconcile Lansdale’s enthusiastic tinkering in other peoples’ governments with those ideals. Boot concludes the book by arguing that, in lieu of extensive intervention or aid, America could parachute “skilled political operatives” like Lansdale into dusty countries the world over to “subtly influence the course of an important, if obscure, conflict.” One cannot help but admire Boot’s wistful romance and self-delusion, reminiscent of Lansdalian plots to destabilize Castro with fireworks or win the Vietnam War with an accommodating soothsayer. Without a generous dose of realism and humility about the ultimate political forces driving an insurgency, Lansdalism risks turning into a kind of fantasy about plucky Americans manipulating local leaders with a wink and winsome smile (all for their own good, of course). Rather than his approach to counterinsurgency, Lansdale’s true enduring legacy may be his guileless optimism wedded to an unfalsifiable belief in the universal appeal of American political ideals. It is to Boot’s great credit that he has included enough unvarnished historical material that different interpretations of Lansdale’s life are available within the book itself. Outside of the sections on U.S. military operations in Vietnam, the biography gives a credibly balanced and detailed overview of the man’s complex life and times — not an easy feat. Boot is right that we have a lot to learn from Lansdale. Guided as he was by intuition, there is no doubt that Lansdale in practice was superior to Lansdale in theory. And no one can argue that in America’s counterinsurgencies we have spent too much time listening to “the natives,” lavished too many resources attempting to force actual reform, or hewed too closely to our traditional democratic and constitutional principles. It’s similarly hard to argue with Lansdale’s and Boot’s belief that the civic action approach to counterinsurgency is far less costly than any of the strategies the United States employed in Vietnam and Iraq. Despite the book’s shortcomings, in giving this extraordinary and inspirational American figure his due, Boot has done us all a service. Jon Askonas is a predoctoral fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin and a DPhil Candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford. His research focuses on the relationship between organizational adaptation and post-war “forgetting,” using case studies from U.S. Army efforts in Vietnam and Iraq.   Flickr: Rocklin Lyons [post_title] => Book Review Roundtable: Lost Opportunities in Vietnam [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => book-review-roundtable-lost-opportunities-in-vietnam [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2018-04-11 17:56:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2018-04-11 21:56:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://tnsr.org/?post_type=roundtable&p=544 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => roundtable [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw [lead] => [pubinfo] => [issue] => [quotes] => [style] => roundtable [type] => Book [style_label] => Roundtable [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => ) [authors] => Array ( [0] => 164 [1] => 161 [2] => 162 [3] => 163 [4] => 165 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] => [1] For an overview of such arguments, see Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2009). [2] An old but fascinating account of these charges is Jeffrey P. Kimball, “The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War,” Armed Forces and Society 14, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 433-458. [3] Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). [4] Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1982). [5] Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1999). [6] Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). [7] Especially Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002). [8] Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright, 2018). Max Boot, interview by David H. Petraeus, New York Historical Society, New York, Jan. 9, 2018, https://www.c-span.org/video/?438632-1/max-boot-discusses-the-road-taken. [9] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 311. [10] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 234. [11] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 209. [12] W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960). [13] Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 86. Similarly, Jessica M. Chapman argues that a closer reading of Vietnamese sources “suggests that politico-religious leaders acted more rationally than Lansdale presumed.” In Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, The United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 77. [14] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 281. [15] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 367. [16] Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 76. [17] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 475. [18] COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, “Concept of Operations—Force Requirements and Deployments, SVN,” June 13, 1965, in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam [Senator Gravel ed., 5 vols.] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-1972), IV: 606. [19] The best one-volume account of allied pacification plans remains Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). [20] Max Boot, “The Case for American Empire,” The Weekly Standard, Oct. 15, 2001, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-american-empire/article/1626. [21] Edward T. Linenthal, “Anatomy of a Controversy,” in History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, eds. Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 62. [22] Spc. Noelle Wiehe, “1st SFAB combat advisor teams train for upcoming Afghanistan deployment,” U.S. Army, Jan. 16, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/199082/1st_sfab_combat_advisor_teams_train_for_upcoming_afghanistan_deployment. [23] Stephen Biddle et al., “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 89-142; Walter C. Ladwig, III, “Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: U.S. Involvement in El Salvador’s Civil War, 1979-92,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 99-146. [24] Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Benjamin Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991). [25] William E. Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). [26] Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2018); Max Boot, “Win The War on Terror with Lansdale’s Cold- War Era ‘Friendly Persuasion,’” USA Today, Jan. 9, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/01/09/avoid-vietnam-fiascos-win-terror-war-learn-lansdale-friendly-persuasion-max-boot-column/1013646001/. [27] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 122-124, 138. [28] Charles T.R. Bohannan, “Antiguerrila Operations,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 341, no. 1 (May 1962), 21. [29] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 211. [30] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 602. [31] Walter C. Ladwig, III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). [32] Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 164. [33] “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), Sept. 6, 1950,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Doc. 837, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d837. [34] Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 107. [35] David Wurfel, “Foreign Aid and Social Reform in Political Development: A Philippine Case Study,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 2 (June 1959): 466. [36] Walter C. Ladwig III, “When Police are the Problem: The Philippine Constabulary and the Hukbalahap Rebellion,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, ed. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 24-25. [37] Myron M. Cowen, Letter to Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, Feb. 18, 1952, Box 6, Myron M. Cowen Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/MagPressure.pdf [38] Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 326. [39] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 113; Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 84. [40] Oral History Interview with John F. Melby, Truman Library & Museum, Nov. 21, 1986, 239, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/melby3.htm - 239. [41] The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI, Part 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p2/d3. [42] Chargé in the Philippines to the Secretary of State. [43] Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos, 152. [44] Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 133. [45] Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos, 155. [46] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 162-163. [47] For mention of the repeated attempts to replicate the Philippines template in Vietnam, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), 126; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 240; Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1965 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 98. [48] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 110-112. [49] Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos, 183. [50] Biddle et al., “Small Footprint, Small Payoff,” 98-101; Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 22-51. [51] Carmen M. Alston, “Adverse Selection,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/adverse-selection. [52] Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 28. [53] Daniel L. Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 79-115. [54] Bryce Denno, “Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: Vietnam War, 1962–1972,” July 19, 1963, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/DennoAA.pdf. [55] Denno, “Debriefing Reports.” [56]  For studies of U.S.-Vietnamese relations, particularly in the context of security force assistance, see Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983); Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 67-107. [57] Bernard Trainor and Michael Gordon, The End Game: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama (London: Atlantic Books, 2015), 290-292. [58] Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Patraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 36. [59] George W. Bush, Decision Points, (New York: Random House, 2010), 362. [60] Bush, Decision Points. [61] Peter Beinart, “The Surge Fallacy,” The Atlantic, Sept. 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-surge-fallacy/399344/. [62] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 599. [63] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 602. [64] Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2018), 15. [65] Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). [66] Boot, The Road Not Taken, XVLII. [67] Boot, The Road Not Taken. [68] Max Boot, “2017 Was the Year I Learned About My White Privilege,” Foreign Policy, Dec. 27, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/27/2017-was-the-year-i-learned-about-my-white-privilege/. [69] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 73. [70] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 67. [71] Boot, The Road Not Taken. [72] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 68. [73] Boot, “White Privilege.” [74] Boot, “White Privilege,” 67. [75] Heather Stur, Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 58. [76] Boot, The Road Not Taken, 69. [77] Boot, The Road Not Taken. [78] Key works that explore orientalism in a U.S. context include: Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2008); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). [79]  Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright, 2018), 601-602. [80] Boot, Road Not Taken, 76. [81] Andrew Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 58. [82] Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xiv-xv. [83] Boot, Road Not Taken, 405. [84] Boot, Road Not Taken, 602. [85] Walter Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017). [86] Jon Askonas, “A Vicious Entanglement, Part IV: If Only the North Vietnamese Had Read Galula,” Oct. 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/a-vicious-entanglement-part-iv-if-only-the-north-vietnamese-had-read-galula/. [87] Daddis has written a trilogy of books dismantling the notion that a simple focus on “the conventional war” or on the use of force is to blame for America’s loss in Vietnam: No Sure Victory (2011), Westmoreland’s War (2015), and Withdrawal (2017), all Oxford University Press. [88] Boot, Road Not Taken, 470. [89] Boot, Road Not Taken, 529. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => Contents [contents] => 1. Introduction, by Mark Atwood Lawrence 2. Vietnam and the White Man's Burden, by Gregory A. Daddis 3. Friendly Persuasion Is not Enough: The Limits of the Lansdale Approach, by Walter C. Ladwig III 4. The Woman Question in Max Boot's Tale of Edward Lansdale, by Heather Marie Stur 5. 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